State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0080

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brock Alan Lawrence,
Appellant.

Filed December 5, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Larson, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-20-3991

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael A. Welch, Forest Lake City Prosecutor, Hebert and Welch, P.A., Forest Lake,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
SYLLABU S
A guilty plea is not constitutionally valid if the defendant does not personally sign
his or her petition to plead guilty, entered pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.03, subd. 2, and
the record does not otherwise demonstrate the defendant entered a voluntary and intelligent
guilty plea.
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OPINION
LARSON, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction for third-degree driving while impaired, a
gross misdemeanor, appellant Brock Alan Lawrence challenges the constitutional validity
of his guilty plea entered pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.03, subd. 2. Lawrence contends
the record fails to establish a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea because Lawrence did
not sign the plea petition and the record otherwise fails to demonstrate the constitutional
validity of his guilty plea. Because the record includes a plea petition that Lawrence’s
defense counsel signed and does not otherwise show Lawrence entered his guilty plea
voluntarily and intelligently, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On October 20, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Lawrence with two
counts of gross-misdemeanor third-degree driving while impaired pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5), .26 (2020). At a pretrial hearing held via video conferenc e,
defense counsel informed the district court that the matter had “been resolved.” Defense
counsel proposed that Lawrence would use the alternative method for pleading guilty found
in rule 15.03, subdivision 2, which allows a defendant to avoid appearing personally at a
hearing by pleading guilty using a signed plea petition filed with the district court. Defense
counsel suggested to the court that defense counsel would “circulate a [plea] petition” to
Lawrence and the state, obtain Lawrence’s permission t o sign the plea petition on
Lawrence’s behalf, and file the plea petition with the district court.
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The district court questioned Lawrence on the record. The district court asked , and
Lawrence confirmed, that Lawrence had consulted with his lawyer. The d istrict court then
confirmed that Lawrence understood that (1) the parties were discussing an agreement to
enter a guilty plea; (2) the agreement needed to be in writing; (3) Lawrence needed to
review any plea agreement he received; and (4) his defense cou nsel “could sign [the
petition reflecting the agreement] for you and send it to the [c]ourt.” The district court
explained that if Lawrence followed this procedure , the district court would then convict
and sentence Lawrence without a hearing. The district court specifically asked Lawrence
if “that process [was] okay”; Lawrence answered in the affirmative.
Defense counsel filed a written plea petition signed “O.B.O. B .A.L.[,]” signifying
“on behalf of” Lawrence, with the district court several days later. The plea petition
included the terms of a plea agreement and indicated that Lawrence pleaded guilty to Minn.
Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5). On November 2, 2021, the district court accepted the plea
petition and signed a warrant of commitment, convicting Lawrence of one gross -
misdemeanor count of third -degree driving while under the influence pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1).1
Lawrence appeals.

1 Lawrence argues the warrant of commitment does not reflect the agreed -upon terms in
the plea agreement. The warrant of commitment refers to a conviction under Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (“the person is under the influence of alcohol”). In contrast, the plea
agreement refers to a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (“the person’s alcohol
concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of driving,
operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more”). We need not
reach this issue because we reverse and remand to allow Lawrence to withdraw his guilty
plea.
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ISSUE
Was appellant’s guilty plea constitutionally valid where he did not sign his petition
to plead guilty as set forth in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.03, subd . 2, and the record does not
otherwise demonstrate appellant entered his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently?
ANALYSIS
Lawrence challenges the constitutional validity of his guilty plea, arguing it was
neither voluntary nor intelligent. 2 Lawrence asserts that the district court used an
inadequate process that failed to establish that Lawrence entered a voluntary and intelligent
guilty plea.
An appellant may challenge a guilty plea ’s validity in the first instance on direct
appeal. Brown v. State , 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989) . We review whether a
defendant entered a valid guilty plea de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). If a defendant entered an invalid guilty plea, we reverse and remand for the district
court to allow a defendant to withdraw their guilty plea. State v. Davenport , 948 N.W.2d
176, 181 (Minn. App. 2020).
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two procedures for a defendant
to plead guilty when charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor. The first
procedure requires a defend ant to personally appear at a hearing to undergo questioning
from the court or counsel. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.02, subds. 1, 2. Alternatively, a defendant
can avoid appearing at a hearing if a defendant or defense counsel

2 The state did not file a brief in this appeal. We, therefore, consider Lawrence’s arguments
on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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file[s] with the court a plea peti tion to plead guilty. The
petition must be signed by the defendant indicating that the
defendant is pleading guilty to the specified misdemeanor or
gross misdemeanor offense with the understanding and
knowledge required of defendants personally entering a guilty
plea under Rule 15.02.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.03, subd. 2 (emphasis added).
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31
(1970)); State v. Lyle , 409 N.W.2d 549, 552- 53 (Minn. App. 1987) (applying the
constitutional standard to a plea petition) . An accurate guilty plea is “established on a
proper factual basis.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Voluntariness refers to “what the parties
reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement” and whether the def end ant
pleaded guilty due to “improper pressure or coercion.” Id. at 96. Intelligence “ensures that
a defendant underst [ood] the charges against him, the rights he [waived] , and the
consequences of his plea.” Id.
To establish a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea, the district court need not create
a perfect record. State v. Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1983) (holding
that “[w]hat is important is not the order or the wording of the questions, but whether the
record . . . establish[es] that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily given”). If the
“record reveals careful interrogation by the trial court and the defendant had full
opportunity to consult with his counsel before entering his plea, the court may safely
presume that the defendant was adequately informed of his rights.” Hernandez v.
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State, 408 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing State v. Propotnik , 216 N.W.2d
637, 638 (Minn. 1974)).
But “[a] guilty plea must appea r on the record to have been voluntarily and
intelligently made. ” State v. Casarez , 203 N.W.2d 406, 408 ( Minn. 1973) (emphasis
added) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). For misdemeanor or gross -
misdemeanor guilty pleas, the record can include “a verbatim record of the proceedings,”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.09, and/or a plea petition “signed by the defendant and filed with the
court as part of the record ,” State v. Nordstrom , 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. 1983)
(emphasis added) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.09). Where the record is “so incomplete
that there is no way of determining if defendant properly waived all of his [or her] rights,”
a defendant must be allowed to withdraw their guilty plea. Casarez, 203 N.W.2d at 408;
see also Nordstrom , 331 N.W.2d at 905 (“Otherwise adequate review by [an appellate
court] of prior convictions under constitutional attack is impossible ”).
Lawrence asserts that t he record does not show that his guilty plea was volunt ary
and intelligent. Lawrence notes that the district court neither made on-the-record inquiries
regarding Lawrence’s understanding of the agreement, his rights , and the consequences,
nor ensured that Lawrence received and consented to the plea agreement because defense
counsel, rather than Lawrence, signed the plea petition. See Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at
905. We agree.
Rule 15.03, subdivision 2, requires that, when using the alternative procedure for
pleading guilty to a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, the defendant “ must” sign the
plea petition. Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15a (2020) (“must” is mandatory); see also In re
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M.O., 838 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. App. 2013) (“Courts may apply principles of statutory
interpretation when interpreting rules of court.”). A defendant’s signature on a plea petition
is important because the signature itself constitutes prima facie evidence that a defendant
voluntarily and intelligently waived their constitutional rights. See State v. Clark , 361
N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. App. 1985) (“ We hold that the signed [rule 15.03, subdivision 2]
petition is a prima facie showing of a valid waiver of counsel .” (emphasis added)) . And
filing a plea petition with the defendant’s si gnature “is not a burdensome requirement.”
Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at 905.
Here, without Lawrence’s signature, there is no prima facie evidence that Lawrence
voluntarily and intelligently entered his guilty plea . And the record is otherwise “so
incomplete” that we have “no way of determining” the validity of Lawrence’s guilty plea.
See Casarez, 203 N.W.2d at 408. Specifically, nothing in the record shows that
(1) Lawrence was advised of and forfeited his constitutional rights or (2) that La wrence
understood and agreed to the terms set forth in the plea agreement.
The statements made on the record at the pretrial hearing do not establish a voluntary
and intelligent plea. At the pretrial hearing, defense counsel announced he would circulate
a plea petition for Lawrence to review. But the pretrial hearing transcript neither indicates
that a final agreement had been reached nor contains any terms of the proposed plea
agreement, tentative or otherwise. The pretrial hearing transcript shows the district court
asked Lawrence whether he had consulted with defense counsel prior to the pretrial
hearing, but the district court did not ask whether Lawrence had discussed any specific
terms of a proposed plea agreement. And the district court’s statements during the pretrial
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hearing indicate its view that a final agreement had not been reached. More importantly,
the record does not include any events that followed the pretrial hearing to establish that,
at the time Lawrence’s defense counsel signed and filed the plea petition, Lawrence
voluntarily and intelligently entered a guilty plea.
Without further indicia that Lawrence received and reviewed the plea agreement,
understood the terms of the plea agreement, and, thereafter, agreed to have his defen se
counsel sign the petition reflecting those terms on his behalf, the record fails to show
Lawrence entered his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently. We reverse and remand to
the district court to allow Lawrence to withdraw his guilty plea to third -degree driving
while impaired.
DECISION
Because Lawrence did not sign his plea petition as required under rule 15.03,
subdivision 2, and the record does not otherwise show that his plea was voluntary and
intelligent, we reverse and remand to allow Lawrence to withdraw his guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded.