Deshon Israel Bonnell,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-0084

St. Louis County Thissen, J.

Deshon Israel Bonnell,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: December 28, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota; and

Tyler J. Kenefick, Assistant St. Louis County Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota, for
respondent.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
The defendant is entitled , under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd . 1, to withdraw his
guilty plea to correct a manifest injustice because the guilty-plea record did not show that
the defendant killed the victim while the defendant was committing the predicate crime of
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aggravated robbery and , accordingly, the factual basis of defendant’s guilty plea to felony
murder was inaccurate.
Reversed.
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
On January 6, 2019, Joshua Lavalley was fatally shot in the head two times near the
Mesabi Trail in St. Louis County. The State charged appellant Deshon Bonnell with one
count of second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1)
(2022), under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability ; one count of kidnapping
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3) (2022), and one count of aggravated robbery
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2022). Bonnell was later indicted on charges
of premeditated first-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022), and
first-degree intentional felony murder while committing a kidnapping in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2022). The mandatory penalty for a conviction of either
premeditated murder or intentional felony murder while committing a kidnapping is life in
prison without the possibility of release. Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2 ( 2022).
On September 25, 2019, Bonnell pleaded guilty to one count of first -degree felony
murder during the commission of an aggravated robbery in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.185(a)(3). The penalty for a conviction of first -degree felony murder while
committing aggravated robbery is life in prison with the possibility of release after 30 years.
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3), 244.05 (2022) . On October 25, 2019, the district court
sentenced Bonnell to life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 30 years.
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Bonnell subsequently filed a petition to withdraw his guilty plea under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 1. The district court denied the pe tition. Bonnell’s appeal of that decision
is before us now.
We reverse. Rule 15.05, subdivision 1, provides that “the court must allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of
the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” We conclude that
Bonnell has demonstrated that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice
because the plea record does not show that Bonnell admitted to adequate facts to find him
guilty of murder while committing an aggravated robbery.
FACTS
Bonnell, Lavalley, and two others were together on January 6, 2019, in Hibbing,
Minnesota. At some point, Lavalley was robbed. The parties dispute whether Bonnell
participated in the robbery. Sometime later, Bonnell , Lavalley, and one other unnamed
person ended up along the Mesabi Trail where, Bonnell admitted, he shot Lavalley two
times in the head, killing him.
After an investigation, the State charged Bonnell with second -degree intentional
murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. A grand jury subsequently indicted Bonnell
on charges of first -degree premeditate d murder and first-degree felony murder while
committing a kidnapping.
Bonnell and the State reached a plea agreement under which Bonnell would plead
guilty to one count of first -degree felony murder during the commission of an aggravated
robbery, a crime that carries a minimum life sentence with the p ossibility of release after
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30 years. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3), 244.05. In exchange for Bonnell’s plea, the State
dismissed all remaining charges , including the more serious charges. The plea agreement
allowed Bonnell to avoid a possible conviction for an offense carrying a mandatory penalty
of life without the possibility of release. See Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2.
The district court held a hearing where Bonnell testified to the facts set forth above.
The district court accepted h is plea. In conformity with the agreement, the district court
sentenced Bonnell to a life sentence with the possibility of release after 30 years.
Bonnell filed a timely postconviction petition. He alleged that the plea colloquy did
not establish an a dequate factual basis for felony murder during the commission of an
aggravated robbery. The postconviction court denied Bonnell’s petition, determining that
plea withdrawal was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Bonnell now appeals.
ANALYSIS
The question before us is whether Bonnell must be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea because of a manifest injustice. The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law we
review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05, subdivision 1, provides: “At any time
the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof
to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. ”
A manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is not valid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “To
be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State
v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 2021).
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The manifest injustice claimed here is that the guilty plea was inaccurate. “To be
accurate, a plea must be established on a proper factual basis.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
A proper factual basis requires evidence that the defendant’s conduct meets all elements of
the offense to which he is pleading guilty. State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 349–50
(Minn. 2003); see also State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2017) (holding that
a guilty plea was inadequate when the defendant’s plea indicated that he did not “know”
about the predatory registration requirement, thus negating the “knowingly” element of the
crime). The district court judge must ensure there are “sufficient facts on the record to
support a conclusion tha t defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires
to plead guilty.” Kelsey v. State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974); see Nelson v. State,
880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (stating that the district court judge “must make certain
that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime” to which he is pleading guilty
can be reasonably inferred ). We do not require that a defendant expressly admit each
essential element of the crime; all that is required is that the defendant admit facts that are
adequate to allow the district court to reasonably infer an essential element of the crime
from the record. See Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861. Guilty pleas lacking a suf ficient factual
basis must be set aside. State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988).
To properly assess whether Bonnell’s guilty plea to felony murder is accurate, we
must first understand what the State must show to prove felony murder. A person commit s
first-degree felony murder if he intentionally causes the death of another person “while
committing or attempting to commit” one of several enumerated felony crimes, including
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aggravated robbery. Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3). 1 The critical question in this case, then,
is whether there is adequate evidence that the killing occurred “while” Bonnell was
committing aggravated robbery. See Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 1986)
(holding that killing was felony murder because there was “no real question that defendant
killed [the victim] while committing the crime of aggravated robbery”).
The clearest cases of felony murder are those when the killing occurs during the
commission of the predicate felony. See id. at 271–72, 274 (holding that felony murder
applied when the defendant was robbing a liquor store and killed the victim during the
course of the robbery) ; State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471, 478 (Minn. 1998) (upholding
felony murder conviction when defendant entered a store with the intent to commit robbery
and then committed murders during that robbery). But we have also recognized that “[t]he
felony murder rule encompasses a kil ling by one trying to escape or conceal a felony as
long as there was no break in the chain of events between the felony and the killing.” State
v. Russell, 503 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Minn. 1993) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To capture this concept , we have stated that a killing occurs while a defendant

1 Bonnell made three primary arguments in his postconviction petition. First, he
asserted that the plea hearing record did not establish his intent to kill Lavalley. Second,
he argued that the record at the plea hearing did not establish that he was guilty of the
predicate crime of aggravated robbery. Third, he asserted that, even if he was guilty of
aggravated robbery, he did not kill Lavalley “while committing . . . aggravated robbery.”
See Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a) (3). The postconviction court rejected each of those
arguments. On appeal, Bonnell did not challenge the postconviction court’s decision that
the plea colloquy record was adequate to show an intent to ki ll. He did challenge the
postconviction court’s decision that the record was adequate to show that he committed
aggravated robbery. Based on our resolution of the case, however, we do not need to reach
the question of whether Bonnell’s plea colloquy was adequate to establish that Bonnell
committed aggravated robbery.
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is committing a predicate felony if the predicate felony and the killing are part of “one
continuous transaction.” Kochevar v. State , 281 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Minn. 1979)
(upholding a conviction for felony murder based on a predicate offense of aggravated
assault when the defendant admitted he fired one shot to scare the victim and “ [w]ithin
seconds” a struggle ensued, and the fatal shot was fired ).
We have analyzed whether a predicate felony and a killing are part of “one
continuous transaction” by considering whether the “ ‘fatal wound’ was inflicted during
the ‘chain of events ’ so that the requisite time, distance, and causal relationship between
the felony and killing are established.” Russell, 503 N.W.2d at 113 (quoting 2 Wayne R.
LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 7.5(f), at 223 n.88 (1986) ).
The three factors—“time, distance, and causal relationship” —are lenses through which to
analyze the dispositive question of whether the killing occurred “while” the defendant was
committing the predicate felony. In some cases, each of the factors will shed light on that
question; in others, some factors may be useful while others are not. Further, we have held
that even if t he predicate felony and the killing occurred at the same time and place, if the
killing did not share a causal relationship with the predicate felony, no felony murder
occurred. State v. Darris, 648 N.W.2d 232, 239 (Minn. 2002); see also State v. Webster,
894 N.W.2d 782, 785–86 (Minn. 2017) (noting that this court only needed to analyze
“causal relationship” because “the requisite time and distance between the attempted
aggravated robbery and the killing” were not at issue).
The plea colloquy rec ord here does not provide an adequate factual basis to show
that Bonnell “cause[d] the death” of Lavalley “while committing . . . aggravated robbery.”
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Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3). 2 In the simplest terms, it stretches the ordinary meaning of
the statutory language to conclude that the murder of Lavalley on the Mesabi Trail
happened “while” Bonnell was committing aggravated robbery in Hibbing. While,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2604 (2002) ( defining “while” as “during
the time that ”); New Oxford American Dictionary 1969 (3d ed. 2010) (defining “while” as
“during the time that; at the same time as”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 2033 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “while” as “as long as; during the time
that”). The predicate felony of aggravated robbery was complete when Lavalley’s cash
was taken . See State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn. 2020) (“A robbery is
complete the moment all of the elements have been satisfied . . . .”). There is no
evidence—nor even a suggestion—that Lavalley was killed during an escape from the
aggravated robbery, or to cover up the aggravated robbery, or, indeed, for any reason
related to the aggravated robbery. See Russell, 503 N.W.2d at 113 (noting that “the fatal
wound was inflicted during the course of the robbery even though [the victim] may not
have died until later ”); see also State v. Murphy , 380 N.W.2d 766, 771–72 (Minn. 1986)
(stating that felony murder applied when the defendant killed the victim immediately
following the rape—the predicate felony —to conceal his crime); see generally Darris,

2 On appeal, the State relies (with one exception) on the statements made by Bonnell
in his plea colloquy—and not on sources outside Bonnell’s plea hearing testimony—to
support its argument. The one exception is the parties’ reference to the approximately
4-mile distance between the location of the aggravated robbery someplace in Hibbing and
the location of the killing along the Mesabi Trai l near the “Kerr” location, which the plea
colloquy does not describe. As discussed below, even if we consider that the distance
between the predicate robbery and the killing was approximately 4 miles, it would not
make a difference in our resolution of this case.
9
648 N.W.2d at 238 ( explaining that the “historical purpose” behind felony murder is “to
punish an unintentional killing that results from a felony more severely than other
unintentional killings in order to deter killings that might occur during the commission of
a felony”).
Causal relationship is the central factor in the analysis in assessing whether a killing
occurred while the defendant was committing the predicate felony. See Darris,
648 N.W.2d at 239–40 (holding that the state failed to prove felony murder when it did not
establish a causal relationship between the predicate felony and the killing even though the
predicate robbery felony and the killing occurred at the same time and place) . As the
LaFave treatise states, “[T]he homicide must have some causal connection with the felony
in order to qualify for felony murder; more than a mere coincidence of time and place is
necessary.” Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 465 (2nd ed. 2003) (hereinafter
“LaFave”); see Russell, 503 N.W.2d at 113 (holding that “the robbery [predicate crime]
and the gagging, strangulation, and positioning of [the victim] . . . were parts of a single,
continuous transaction or chain of events because the activities occurred . . . as part of the
act of robbing [the victim]”) (emphasis added) ).
“[W]hether there is a sufficient causal connection between the felony and the
homicide depends on whether the defendant’s felony dictated his conduct which led to the
homicide.” LaFave, at 466. In this case, nothing in the record suggest s that Bonnell’s
decision to kill Lavalley (at a different time and in a different place) had any connection to
the aggravated robbery. The absence of any evidence from which to draw an inference
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establishing a causal connection supports the conclusion that the plea colloquy record was
inadequate to show that Bonnell killed Lavalley while he committed aggravated robbery. 3
Moreover, in this case, the spatial connection between the aggravated robbery and
the killing does not tell us much to convince us that the killing occurred while Bonnell was
committing aggravated robbery. The record show s that the aggravated robbery occurred
in the city of Hibbing and Lavalley was shot on the Mesabi Trail . We do not know the
actual distance between the location of the aggravated robbery and the location of the
killing, however, because the record does not disclose where in Hibbing the aggravated
robbery occurred and where along the Mesabi Trail the killing occ urred. If anything, the
fact that two events happened in two distinct places suggests that the killing did not occur
while Bonnell was committing aggravated robbery. That analysis is true on these facts

3 In a few cases, we have hinted that a shared motivation for the predicate felony and
the killing is relevant to the analysis of whether the killing occurred while the defendant
was committing the predicate felony. State v. Heden , 719 N.W.2d 689, 697–98 (Minn.
2006) (affirming a conviction for felony murder where the defendant tried to quiet a baby
with a bottle, a pacifier and “digital penetration” (criminal sexual conduct) before losing
his temper and shaking her to death); State v. McBride, 666 N.W.2d 351, 365–66 (Minn.
2003) (holding that the state proved felony murder because the beating that caused death
and the acts of criminal sexual conduct occurred as part of the defendant’s broader plan to
torture the victim). It is not clear from our opinions whether the shared motiva tion is an
independent factor or merely an indication that the killing took place at a time and place
sufficiently proximate to the predicate felony.
In this case, in contrast, there is absolutely no evidence in the plea colloquy record
about the motivation for the aggravated robbery or the killing. The State urges us to
conclude that a shared motivation connected the aggravated robbery and the killing based
on the fact that the aggravated robbery and the killing involved the same victim, the same
weapon, and some of the same people. We conclude that to do so would be impermissible
speculation. Notably, in both Heden and McBride, the killing and the predicate felony also
occurred in the same place and at the same time; facts that (as we discuss m ore below) are
not evident from the plea colloquy record in this case.
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even if we assume that the distance between the two events was relatively short —a matter
of a few miles. Notably, we have never affirmed a felony murder conviction when
aggravated robbery is the predicate offense and the aggravated robbery and the killing
occurred in distinct locations. See Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 273; Russell, 503 N.W.2d at
113; Peou, 579 N.W.2d at 478; State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 793 (Minn. 1999); Darris,
648 N.W.2d at 239; State v. Fox , 868 N.W.2d 206, 223–24 (Minn. 2015); Webster ,
894 N.W.2d at 784; State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 188 (Minn. 2022). 4
The State’s argument on the spatial connection between the two events focuses not
on location or distance, but rather on the evidence in the record that the two locations are
connected because Bonnell and his accomplices transported Lavalley from Hibbing to the
Mesabi Trail. However, because the underlying crime is aggravated robbery—a crime that
was complete when the property was taken from Lavalley in Hibbing—the mere fact that
Lavalley and Bonnell travelled together from Hibbing to the Mesabi Trail does not provide
compelling insight into whether the killing occurred while Lavalley was being robbed.
Similarly, the evidence in the plea colloquy testimony about the temporal relation
between the predicate felony and the killing does not shed much light on whether the killing
occurred while Bonnell was committing the aggravated robbery. At best, there is a

4 On this point, we emphasize that the offense of aggravated robbery is complete
when the defendant takes the victim’s property (having done so using or threatening the
use of force). See Townsend, 941 N.W.2d at 112. Cases involving a predicate offense, like
kidnapping, where transport of the victim may be part of the predicate offense, may present
different considerations. In addition, no evidence suggests that Bonnell killed Lavalley in
the course of an escape or to cover up his aggravated robbery, see Murphy, 380 N.W.2d at
771–72, or to prevent the victim-witness from testifying.
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sequential element in Bonnell’s plea hearing testimony: Bonnell stated that he was present
when others took cash from Lavalley and that he later caused Lavalley’s death while on
the Mesabi Trail.5 But there is no evidence about either the time the aggravated robber y
took place or the time that Bonnell caused Lavalley’s death. In the absence of such facts,
the district court had nothing from which to draw a reasonable inference that the killing
occurred while Bonnell was committing the aggravated robbery.
It is true that we do not require precision on the time of the predicate felony and the
killing. State v. McBride, 666 N.W.2d 351, 366 (Minn. 2003). In McBride , for example,
McBride was convicted of felony murder after a trial for killing his victim while
committing criminal sexual conduct. Id. McBride argued on appeal that the s tate failed to
establish that the killing occurred while McBride was committing criminal sexual conduct
because the evidence “d[id] not prove precisely when the criminal sexual conduct occurred
or when the fatal blows wer e inflicted.” Id. We rejected that argument because McBride
testified about the specific and limited period of time that he was with the victim (9:30 p.m.
to 2:30 a.m.) and other evidence showed that the criminal sexual conduct injuries occurred
within a certain period before the victim’s death. Id. In contrast, as noted above, the plea

5 The only testimony that Bonnell gave in the guilty plea colloquy about the temporal
connection between the robbery and killing is:

Q. After this money was taken from the person of [ Lavalley], did you cause
the death of [Lavalley]?
A. Yes, ma’am.

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colloquy record here includes no information about the time of the aggravated robbery or
the killing.6
In short, the temporal evidence provides little help in determining whether Bonnell
killed Lavalley while he was committing aggravated robbery. And, as noted, even if the
evidence in the plea colloquy record weakly shows that the aggravated robbery and the
killing occurred in the same time period, that in and of itself is not dispositive of the
question of whether the killing occurred while Bonnell committed aggravated robbery. See
Darris, 648 N.W.2d at 239 (holding that even if the predicate felony and the killing
occurred at the same time and place, no felony murder occurred because the killing did no t
share a causal relationship with the predicate felony).
In conclusion, the evidence in the plea colloquy record is in adequate to show that
Bonnell “cause[d] the death” of Lavalley “while committing . . . aggravated robbery.” See
Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3). The record simply does not contain sufficient facts to support
a conclusion that Bonnell’s conduct falls within the charge to which he plead ed guilty.
Accordingly, Bonnell’s plea is inaccurate, and he must be allowed to withdraw his plea to
avoid a manifest injustice under Rule 15.05, subd. 1. 7

6 In addition, it was central to our decision in McBride that the evidence at trial
showed that the defendant “tortured [the victim] to death” and that the predicate criminal
sexual misconduct felony was part of that torture and occurred in the same location.
McBride, 666 N.W.2d at 366. In contrast, the evidence from the plea colloquy in this case
showed that the aggravated robbery occurred and ended in Hibbing while the killing
occurred on the Mesabi Trail.

7 The State argues that no manifest injustice exists because the plea colloquy showed
that Bonnell admitted facts proving first-degree premeditated murder, a crime at least as
serious as first-degree felony murder. However, the State forfeited this issue by not raising
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the postconviction court. We
remand the case to the district court for trial on the charges pending when Bonnell pleaded
guilty (premeditated first -degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1);
first-degree intentional felony murder while committing a kidnapping in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.185(a)(3); second -degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability; kidnapping
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3 ); and aggravated robbery in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1), subject to amendment of those charges as allowed by law.
Reversed.

it in the district court. See State v. Brown, 932 N.W.2d 283, 296 n. 14 (Minn. 2019).
Accordingly, we decline to consider the issue of whether adequate evidence in the plea
colloquy record demonstrates that Bonnell committed premeditated murder.