In re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0097

In re the Matter of:

Kelsey Anne Canaday, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Haley Jo Canaday,
Appellant,

and

Edward Lee Hogan,
Respondent.

Filed October 3, 2022
Reversed
Kirk, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-18-22

Kelsey Anne Canaday, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Kathleen M. Miller, KMH Custom Family Law, PLLC, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Edward Lee Hogan, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant Haley Jo Canaday (H.J.C.), respondent Kelsey Anne Canaday (K.A.C.) ,
and respondent Edward Lee Hogan (E.L.H.) are the legal parents of six-year-old S.D.C-H.
S.D.C-H. is the biological daughter of K.A.C. and E.L.H., but K.A.C. was married to H.J.C.
when S.D.C-H. was born and all three have been adjudicated the parents of S.D.C- H.
H.J.C. and E.L.H. share joint legal custody of S.D.C-H. H.J.C. has sole physical custody
of S.D.C-H. and provides her primary residence, subject to limited supervised parenting
time on Sundays for E.L.H. and K.A.C. H.J.C. sought to move herself and S.D.C-H. to
California, but the district court denied her motion to relocate. Arguing that the record
does not support the district court’s findings regarding S.D.C-H.’s best interests, and that
the district court misapplied relevant caselaw, H.J.C. appeals. Because the district court’s
findings on three factors were contrary to logic and the facts in the record, we reverse.
FACTS
Before H.J.C. and K.A.C. married, H.J.C. had two sons with an ex-husband. H.J.C.
is Caucasian and her ex-husband is Black. The boys are 17 and 11 years old and reside
full-time with H.J.C. Also, during the time preceding H.J.C. and K.A.C.’s marriage,
K.A.C. worked with E.L.H. and they had an “occasionally sexually physical” relationship
that lasted into her marriage, through 2015. Simultaneously, E.L.H. was in a “romantic
relationship” with a woman he later married and with whom he shares a child.
In 2013, H.J.C. and K.A.C. married, and K.A.C. moved into H.J.C.’s Minneapolis
home. K.A.C. was laid off from her job in 2014. K.A.C., who is Black, was adopted and
3
had a difficult time being raised by White parents, and following her layoff went to visit
her birth mother. In the aftermath of the trip, K.A.C. struggled with substantial mental-
health and chemical-use issues. Her long-standing drug and alcohol use intensified. In
2015, H.J.C. called 911 after she and K.A.C. got into an argument. K.A.C. was ultimately
arrested and pleaded guilty to domestic assault.
The police report from the 2015 incident provided H.J.C.’s account of the events.
The police report indicates that K.A.C. threw a glass through a window and blocked the
bedroom door—preventing H.J.C. from leaving—and slapped and pushed H.J.C.’s face
multiple times until she ultimately allowed H.J.C. to leave. H.J.C. also reported that
K.A.C. “threaten[ed] her about once a week,” that K.A.C. had used alcohol and marijuana
the previous night, and that K.A.C. consumed alcohol on the morning of the incident.
K.A.C. pleaded guilty, but later stated that the argument was mutual, that she never blocked
H.J.C. from leaving, and that the arrest was racially motivated and biased.
Following the 2015 incident, H.J.C. obtained an order for protection (OFP) against
K.A.C. for herself and her sons and K.A.C. moved out of H.J.C.’s home. Despite the OFP,
the women mutually agreed to attempt to repair their relationship. H.J.C. dropped the OFP
and K.A.C. moved back in with her. During this time, K.A.C. and E.L.H. conceived S.D.C-
H.
1 K.A.C. told H.J.C. about her pregnancy, but it is unclear whether H.J.C. knew of
E.L.H. E.L.H. did not know about K.A.C.’s pregnancy.

1 A DNA test confirmed that E.L.H. is S.D.C-H.’s biological father with 99.98 percent
probability.
4
S.D.C-H. was born in March 2016. S he tested positive for THC at her birth,
resulting in child -protective services becoming involved with her care. K.A.C. asserted
that marijuana use during pregnancy alleviated her nausea, but admitted that she stopped
nursing S.D.C-H. after ten days in order to consume more alcohol and drugs. In July 2016,
H.J.C. took her sons to a movie following an argument with K.A.C. In an attempt to get
H.J.C. to return home, K.A.C. sent H.J.C. text messages during the movie that included a
photograph of S.D.C-H. and text that read “I will kill her.”
Upon reading the message, H.J.C. immediately returned home. When she arrived,
K.A.C. was “extremely intoxicated.” H.J.C. reported—and K.A.C. does not refute —that
K.A.C. shook, kicked, and attempted to choke her during this incident. When law
enforcement arrived and arrested K.A.C., she gave S.D.C-H. to H.J.C. K.A.C. was later
charged with and found guilty of domestic assault.
Three days after the incident, H.J.C. petitioned for another OFP against K.A.C. on
behalf of herself and her sons. The district court issued an OFP, which preclude d K.A.C.
from contacting H.J.C. outside of a mobile application that facilitates communication
regarding the care of children shared by separated parents and other caregivers. After the
2016 incident, H.J.C. and K.A.C. made a parenting-time arrangement regarding S.D.C-
H.’s care. K.A.C. originally received parenting time, which was to take place at her
adoptive parents’ home and under their supervision, from Thursday through S unday each
week. Over the years, this parenting time was reduced to Friday nights, then to just four
hours of parenting time on Sunday s. Multiple OFP violations, including harassing
comments by K.A.C. toward H.J.C. and K.A.C.’s refusal to register to use the mobile
5
application and her eventual misuse of the application, resulted in two, two-year-long OFP
renewals in 2018 and 2020.
E.L.H., who is Black, only learned of S.D.C-H.’s existence in late summer 2016 and
did not meet her until late August 2016. A s such he was not included in the original
parenting-time arrangement. Throughout 2016 and 2017, he completed a total of 11 two-
to-three-hour parenting-time sessions. H.J.C. contends that he missed and failed to
reschedule many other sessions. E.L.H. married his now-wife, who he was dating when
S.D.C-H. was conceived, soon after he learned of S.D.C-H.’s existence. His wife gave
birth to a child approximately nine months after S.D.C-H. was born. E.L.H.’s wife
obtained an ex parte OFP against him following allegations of physical abuse that was later
resolved in his favor and dismissed. E.L.H. has six hours of parenting time with S.D.C-H.
every Sunday. Apart from the ten total hours of parenting time shared by K.A.C. and
E.L.H. each week , H.J.C. is effectively S.D.C-H.’s sole parent; S.D.C-H. spends every
overnight with H.J.C., who also home schools her. Accordingly, H.J.C. shoulders nearly
all the burden associated with parenting a young child.
In March 2017, K.A.C. filed a summons and petition for legal separation from
H.J.C., and H.J.C. filed an answer and counterpetition for dissolution with child one month
later. In September 2017, E.L.H. filed a custody and parenting-time petition against
K.A.C., seeking an order awarding him joint custody over S.D.C- H., shared between
himself and K.A.C. H.J.C. intervened in that proceeding. In December 2017, a guardian
ad litem (GAL) was appointed for S.D.C-H. Approximately one month later, K.A.C.
initiated a parentage proceeding against H.J.C. and sought to obtain a determination of non-
6
existence of parentage. Around this time, the GAL issued her report recommending that
H.J.C. have sole legal and sole physical custody of S.D.C-H., that K.A.C. have supervised
parenting time “at least twice weekly,” and that E.L.H. receive supervised parenting time
to “serve as a reintroduction format for [S.D.C-H.] to connect with her father.” The report
also contained various concerns regarding K.A.C.’s engagement with S.D.C-H., as well as
her chemical health, excessive and inadequate communication with H.J.C. about S.D.C-
H.’s welfare and daily activities, and her failure to follow court orders and enter therapy.
The report also noted:
[K.A.C.] has consistently made concerning statements
to me, her former therapist, staff at Relationships, LLC, and
her probation officer. These comments include, but are not
limited to: threats to conduct welfare checks on [S.D.C-H.],
threats of harm, threats to go to jail, stating she will not follow
court orders, and threatening not to return [S.D.C-H.] to
[H.J.C.]’s care. Such comments and threats directly relate to
[S.D.C-H.] and have threatened her safety and well-being. It
leaves the professionals having to guess which comment is
valid and which is not. Most concerning has been when she
has threatened to go get [S.D.C-H.], leave with [S.D.C-H.], or
cause harm to herself and [ S.D.C-H.] The most recent
occurrence took place on 1/3/2018 in which [ K.A.C.] sent me
a text message saying, “I’m going to [H.J.C.]’s and getting my
child.” Additionally, I was informed that on 12/30/2017, when
[K.A.C.] was picking up belongings at [ H.J.C.]’s home,
[K.A.C.] went to the daycare provider’s home knocking on the
door looking for [S.D.C -H.]. [S .D.C-H.] was placed upstairs
and was playing with another child and [K.A.C.] was not
allowed inside. This occurred while a sheriff’s deputy was
nearby at [H.J.C.]’s home. The daycare provider lives across
the street. [ K.A.C.] did not follow the court order in this
instance as has been a continual pattern.
It is difficult to determine when K.A.C. is making valid
threats or making idle comments.

7
In May 2018, H.J.C., K.A.C., and E.L.H. entered into a binding mediation
agreement resolving issues related to parentage, legal custody, and parenting time. The
district court subsequently issued a judgment and decree consistent with the terms of the
mediation agreement that adjudicated H.J.C, K.A.C., and E.L.H. the parents of S.D.C-H.,
awarded H.J.C. and E.L.H. joint legal custody, awarded H.J.C. sole physical custody , and
awarded K.A.C. and E.L.H. parenting time in accordance with the graduated parenting-
time schedule established in the mediation agreement. H.J.C. and K.A.C. divorced in July
2018. K.A.C. is now with a different partner and has since given birth to a second child.
Neither K.A.C. nor E.L.H. have had their parenting time increased with S.D.C-H. since
H.J.C. was granted sole physical custody.
In October 2021, H.J.C. filed a motion under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 (2020),
seeking an order permitting her and S.D.C-H. to relocate to San Diego, California so she
could pursue a career opportunity. Relying on S.D.C.-H. flying between California and
Minnesota throughout the year as her school schedule allows, the parenting-time schedule
H.J.C. proposed with her motion gives the Minnesota- based parents approximately 35
percent more collective parenting time with S.D.C-H. per year than the current arrangement
provides.
Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The district court assessed
the eight statutory best-interest factors and determined that four factors were neutral, two
favored relocation, and two disfavored relocation. After balancing the factors, the district
court denied the motion. H.J.C. appeals.

8
DECISION
H.J.C. argues that the district court erred in determining that her proposed relocation
to California was not in S.D.C-H.’s best interest. District courts are afforded broad
discretion regarding parenting-time issues. Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn.
1995). “Appellate review of custody modification and removal cases is limited to
considering whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748
N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion
by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262
(Minn. 2022)).
H.J.C. argues that the district court’s findings are not supported by the record. A
district court’s findings of fact are not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn.
R. Civ. P. 52.01 ; see Goldman at 284 (applying rule 52.01 in a family-law appeal). The
clear error standard of review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to
support the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn.
2021). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted).
In addressing H.J.C.’s motion to relocate, the district court first determined that the
purpose of the move was not to interfere wi th K.A.C. and E.L.H.’s parenting time. See
9
Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(a). The district court then considered the eight statutory
best-interest factors:
(1) the nature, quality, extent of involvement, and
duration of the child’s relationship with the person proposing
to relocate and with the nonrelocating person, siblings, and
other significant persons in the child’s life;

(2) the age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and
the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s
physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into
consideration special needs of the child;

(3) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between
the nonrelocating person and the child through suitable
parenting time arrangements, considering the logistics and
financial circumstances of the parties;

(4) the child’s preference, taking into consideration the
age and maturity of the child;

(5) whether there is an established pattern of conduct of
the person seeking the relocation either to promote or thwart
the relationship of the child and the nonrelocating person;

(6) whether the relocation of the child will enhance the
general quality of the life for both the custodial parent seeking
the relocation and the child including, but not limited to,
financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity;

(7) the reasons of each person for seeking or opposing
the relocation; and

(8) the effect on the safety and welfare of the child, or
of the parent requesting to move the child’s residence, of
domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(b); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(c) (providing
that all best-interest factors must be considered).
10
Before assessing each factor, the district court noted the burdens of proof established
by statute. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(c):
The burden of proof is upon the parent requesting to move the
residence of the child to another state, except that if the court
finds that the person requesting permission to move has been a
victim of domestic abuse by the other parent, the burden of
proof is upon the parent opposing the move.

Accordingly, H.J.C. had the burden of demonstrating that moving S.D.C.-H. away from
E.L.H. was in S.D.C.-H.’s best interests. Id. But because K.A.C. had committed domestic
abuse against H.J.C., the burden was on K.A.C. to prove that moving S.D.C.-H. was not in
S.D.C.-H.’s best interests. Id.
The district court determined that factors (1) and (2) weighed against relocation,
factors (3) and (5) favored relocation, and factors (4), (6), (7), and (8) were neutral. H.J.C.
specifically contends that the district court erred with respect to its determinations on
factors (1), (2), and (8). We address each of these factors in turn.
I. The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of S.D.C- H.’s
relationships with each of her parents, siblings, and other significant persons in
her life does not weigh against relocation.

With respect to the first factor, the district court stated:

[S.D.C-H.] spends the vast majority of her time with [H.J.C.],
including every overnight. [K.A.C.] has her for four hours
every Sunday; [E.L.H.] has six hours the same day. This is the
schedule she has known for most of her life. However, [S.D.C-
H.] also has other significant persons whose relationships with
her would be affected by a move. She has a half-sister who
lives primarily with [K.A.C.], and a half-brother who lives with
[E.L.H.]. [K.A.C.]’s partner also has a six-year-old with whom
[S.D.C-H.] is close. She is close to [E.L.H.]’s wife. And
[S.D.C-H.] has extended family in the Twin Cities through
11
both [K.A.C.] and [E.L.H.]. This factor weighs against
relocation.

The district court directly contradicted this finding with respect to the amount of parenting
time permitted for each parent when it addressed the third best-interest factor concerning
the preservation of the relationship between the child and the nonrelocating parent(s) and
found that “[H.J.C.] has proposed a parenting -time schedule through frequent visits from
San Diego to Minnesota that would actually give [K.A.C.] and [E.L.H.] significantly more
time with [ S.D.C-H.] than they have now, including overnights.” Based on the
determination that the proposed schedule provided a suitable parenting-time arrangement
and did not raise any logistical or financial concerns, the district court found that the third
factor weighed in favor of relocation.
Furthermore, H.J.C.’s proposed schedule indicates that she is willing to do
everything in her power to give K.A.C. and E.L.H. meaningful presence in S.D.C-H.’s life,
including allowing her to spend time with them on holidays, granting E.L.H. “unlimited
electronic access” to her and establishing a standing weekly video call between her and
K.A.C. Both biological parents would also be permitted to visit S.D.C-H. in California
with the appropriate notice provided to H.J.C., per the proposal. As the district court noted,
the GAL indicated that H.J.C. has “consistently followed court orders and has maintained
communication” with the other parents. All three parents need to adhere to the proposed
schedule which will be a legally enforceable document.
K.A.C. did not proffer evidence to sustain her burden of showing that S.D.C-H. had
any meaningful relationships with extended family members. Because the nature, quality,
12
extent of involvement, and duration of S.D.C -H’s relationships with each of her parents
shows that H.J.C. has done the lion’s share of the parenting work and has formed an
essential primary bond with her, the district court’s decision with respect to this factor is
clearly erroneous. See Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 810.
II. S.D.C-H.’s age, developmental stage, needs, and the likely impact the relocation
will have on her physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into
consideration special needs, do not weigh against relocation.

Regarding the second factor, the district court found:

[S.D.C-H.] is five years old and has no special needs. She has
been home-schooled to date. Developmentally, a move to
California should not be difficult for her. However, [S.D.C-
H.] is darker skinned, and [E.L.H.] and his family will play an
important role in her life as she gets older and has to deal with
the reality of being a biracial
2 child in this society. This factor
weighs against relocation.

H.J.C. argues that she is “able and willing to raise [S.D.C-H.] in a racially sensitive
and supportive environment,” and that she has demonstrated this capacity by raising two
biracial sons, by surrounding S.D.C-H. with Black and Latino friends, and by maintaining
a diverse friend group herself. Nothing in the record indicates that H.J.C. is incapable of
relaying and engaging with the reality that S.D.C-H. is a Black girl in this society. To the
contrary, H.J.C. contends that a move to San Diego would allow S.D.C-H. to “live in a
more diverse community, both around [the] home and at [year-round] school” while still
providing for “frequent trips back to Minnesota” and facilitating electronic

2 The record indicates that S.D.C.-H., as the biological daughter of two Black parents, is
not biracial, but we acknowledge the realities the district court intended to portray.
13
communications that would allow her to converse with her biological parents regularly
regarding race and her corresponding personal realities.
Related to the emotional-development needs addressed within this factor, H.J.C.
argues that S.D.C-H. would be better supported with the proposed move, given that she
would not be “subjected to . . . high-conflict parenting-time exchanges between [H.J.C.]
and [K.A.C.]” each week, particularly when K.A.C. only has four hours of parenting time
per week and H.J.C. cares for her nearly all of the remainder of the time, including
homeschooling her. The district court’s decision to weigh this factor against relocation on
the sole basis that S.D.C-H. will have “to deal with the reality” of b eing a Black child in
the United States, despite acknowledging the fact that a move to California would not be
developmentally difficult for her, is clearly erroneous and does not weigh against
relocation.
III. The effect of domestic abuse on the safety and welfare of the S.D.C-H. and H.J.C.
is not neutral and weighs in favor of granting relocation.

As to this final factor, the district court determined:
While there has been domestic abuse between [H.J.C.] and
[K.A.C.] in the past, it does not seem to be an issue now that
an [OFP] is in place. The court is not aware of any allegations
that [S.D.C-H.] has been the victim of domestic abuse. Thus,
this factor is neutral.

While it does not appear that S.D.C-H. has been the victim of domestic abuse
herself, K.A.C. has violated OFPs from 2016 through 2021, and S.D.C-H. has occasionally
witnessed these violations. The violations have most often taken the form of written threats
via text or other electronic messaging platforms, including the mobile application intended
14
for communications regarding S.D.C-H . We also note that the incident in July 2016 that
led to H.J.C. seeking and being granted a second OFP was caused by K.A.C. sending H.J.C.
a text message with a photograph of S.D.C-H. along with the text “I will kill her.”
Although K.A.C. asserted that she has been attending therapy every week, and
E.L.H. explained that the three parents have steadily improved their cooperation over the
years, H.J.C. called law enforcement out of concern for her and S.D.C-H.’s safety as
recently as August 2021. H.J.C.’s concerns regarding domestic abuse—and her past
domestic-violence experiences with K.A.C., to which K.A.C. has pleaded guilty—should
not simply be dismissed. Accordingly, the record does not support the district court’s
finding and the effect of domestic abuse on the safety and welfare of S.D.C-H. and H.J.C.
weighs in favor of granting H.J.C.’s relocation motion.
Because the district court’s findings with respect to factors (1), (2), and (8) are
unsupported by the record, we reverse on this basis and need not address H.J.C.’s argument
that the district court erroneously relied on inapposite caselaw in its analysis.
Reversed.