In re the Marriage of: Ai Vang, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0100

In re the Marriage of:
Ai Vang, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Ka Thao,
Respondent.

Filed September 6, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-21-2799

Der Yang, Village Lawyer, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Sia Lo, Lo Law Office, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his marriage-dissolution
petition based upon a lack of evidence that the parties were legally married. Because
appellant failed to demonstrate that the parties’ marriage while residing in a refugee camp
2
was valid in the place it occurred, the district court correctly concluded that appellant did
not establish a legally valid marriage. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1993, at the Chiang Khan refugee camp in Thailand, appellant Ai Vang and
respondent Ka Thao participated in a “customary and religious wedding
ceremony . . . performed by the authorities in charge of the refugee camp in Thailand.”
The camp authorities did not issue a marriage certificate and the parties did not register the
marriage in Thailand.
The parties immigrated to the United States in 1996. And once in the U.S., the
parties identified themselves as married. For example, as a married couple, they filed joint
tax returns and bought and sold real estate.
In 2015, Vang “separated from [Thao] and moved to California.” The parties,
following mediation, signed an “Agreement for Cultural Divorce” in April 2017.
In April 2021, Vang filed and served upon Thao a petition for dissolution of
marriage. Thao, in her answer, requested that the petition be dismissed “because
Minnesota does not recognize cultural marriage.” Vang moved for declaratory judgment
that the marriage was valid, and in response Thao moved to dismiss the petition. The
district court dismissed the dissolution petition, concluding that “the parties’ marriage in
this case did not conform to the requirements of Thai law.” Vang appeals.

3
DECISION
When reviewing a district court’s determination of whether a valid marriage existed,
“this court must decide whether the [district] court correctly applied the law.” Ma v. Ma,
483 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. App. 1992).
“When the fact of marriage is required or offered to be proved before any court,
evidence of . . . general repute, or of cohabitation as married persons, or any other
circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact may be inferred, shall be
competent.” Minn. Stat. § 602.02 (2020). “When evidence of a marriage is shown, a strong
presumption of its legality arises. The burden of proof shifts to the objecting party to
overcome this presumption.” Ma, 483 N.W.2d at 735 (citing In re Lando’s Est., 127 N.W.
1125, 1128 (Minn. 1910)).
“The validity of a marriage normally is determined by the law of the place where
the marriage is contracted. If valid by that law, the marriage is valid everywhere unless it
violates a strong public policy of the domicile of the parties.” Id. (quoting Laikola v.
Engineered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653, 655- 56 (Minn. 1979)). This has long been “a
generally accepted principle of interstate and international law.” Lando’s Est., 127 N.W.
at 1126. When applying the law of a foreign country, the “foreign laws must be pleaded
and proved like any other fact.” Id.; see also Ramsey County. v. Yee Lee, 770 N.W.2d 572,
577-78 (Minn. App. 2009) (“Foreign law is a matter of fact which the courts of this country
cannot be presumed to be acquainted with or to take judicial notice of unless it is pleaded
and proved.” (quotation omitted)).
4
The district court, citing Ma, determined that “there is circumstantial evidence that
the parties were married” but, because “there was no evidence that the parties complied
with the specific marriage laws of Thailand,” the marriage was invalid.1 We conclude the
district court correctly followed the law set forth in Ma and the preceding cases it relied
upon.
Vang does not claim that the marriage was valid pursuant to Thai law. He argues
that, in this case, the place of marriage was the refugee camp, not Thailand. And, because
he presented evidence that the marriage was recognized as such in the refugee camp, the
burden shifted to Thao to rebut the marriage validity.2 We disagree.
We first note that the cases the parties have cited and those we have independently
reviewed do not define what is meant by the place of marriage. In Ma, for example, this
court concluded that a Chinese marriage certificate was competent evidence of a valid
marriage entered in China. 483 N.W.2d at 735. In Lando’s Est ., the supreme court
determined the validity of a marriage “by the law of Germany, where it was celebrated.”
127 N.W. at 1126. In In re Kinkead’s Est., 57 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Minn. 1953), the supreme

1 It is not clear whether the district court reached this conclusion because Vang failed to
present competent evidence of a legally presumed marriage, or because Thao rebutted the
presumption of marriage. The parties do not address this ambiguity and, because it does
not affect our analysis, neither do we.
2 Vang also argues that requiring his marriage to meet the requirement of Thai law results
in the unequal protection of his fundamental right to marry because it “denies [him] a fair
dissolution of marriage where one is warranted.” Vang does not assert that he was
prevented from legally marrying once he reached the U.S., and he has cited no authority
for the proposition that there exists a fundamental right to dissolution of a marriage which
is not legally valid. Moreover, Minnesota’s putative-spouse statute protects the rights of
individuals who believe incorrectly, but in good faith, that they are married. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.055 (2020).
5
court considered whether a marriage entered in Iowa was valid pursuant to Iowa law despite
the fact it would have been invalid in Minnesota. In Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 254, 254-55
(Minn. 1890), the supreme court considered whether a couple “married about the year
1848, in accordance with the usage and custom of the tribe with which they lived” had
formed a valid marriage. The court reasoned that “those persons who were recognized by
the Indian custom and law as married persons must be so treated by the courts” because
the federal government recognized the authority of tribes to govern domestic relations.
Earl, 44 N.W. at 255.
None of these cases explained the relationship between a geographic place and the
legal authority to create valid marriages (perhaps because they were not asked to do so).
In the present case, we also do not need to answer this question because Vang did not
present to the district court rules governing marriage in the refugee camp which would
allow it to conclude that the marriage was validly formed.
In support of his motion to declare their marriage legally valid, Vang submitted:
• a 2009 “Questions and Answers” document from U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services which states that marriages in Thai refugee camps which
were not registered as required by Thai law “could be valid for immigration
purposes,”

• a similar United Nations document which states that documents issued by the
Department of Homeland Security could be used “to establish your birthdate and
family relationships” in the absence of a Thai birth certificate or “identification
from your home country,”

• a United Nations “Bio-Data Sheet” showing the parties as married, and

• U.S. immigration documents showing the parties as married.

6
None of these documents describe requirements to form a valid marriage within the refugee
camp, so the district court could not determine whether the evidence indicated the existence
of a valid marriage. And perhaps more critically, no evidence was presented to the district
court, such as a marriage certificate, which could confirm the recognition of their marriage
in the refugee camp.
During oral argument, Vang requested, as alternative relief, that we remand to the
district court for him to present additional evidence that the refugee camp had rules
governing marriage validity and that his marriage satisfied those rules. We decline that
request because he does not explain how he was improperly deprived of the opportunity to
present this evidence to the district court in the proceedings generating this appeal.
Generally, the district court considers motions in marriage-dissolution cases on exhibits,
affidavits, and other documents submitted to the court unless a party requests that oral
testimony be taken. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)(1), (2). The parties submitted exhibits
and affidavits in support of their respective motions, and neither party requested oral
testimony or additional discovery. Vang had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence
to the district court, and we will not remand simply because he now claims he will be able
to present additional evidence of a valid marriage.
Vang failed to present to the district court evidence by which it might conclude that
the marriage was legally recognized in the place the marriage was celebrated such that it
would be valid in Minnesota. Therefore, the district court properly applied the law to these
facts by concluding that a valid marriage did not exist.
Affirmed.