A22-0111 Precedential Affirmed in part and reversed in part Processed

Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al.,

Minnesota Supreme Court · Filed May 24, 2023

Also decided on this docket: Minn. Ct. App., August 15, 2022

The holding in the court’s own words

Accordingly, we hold that Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. Accordingly, we hold that the rule does not conflict with the statute.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-0111

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al.,

A p p e l l a n t s ,
Filed: May 24, 2023
vs. Office of Appellate Courts

Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State,

R e s p o n d e n t .

Douglas P. Seaton, James V.F. Dickey, U pper Midwest Law Center, Golden Valley,
Minnesota; and

Gregory J. Joseph, Joseph Law Office PLLC, Waconia, Minnesota, for appellants.

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney Ge neral, Nathan J. Hartshorn, Allen Cook Barr, Assistant
Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

William Z. Pentelovitch, Joseph P. Cer onsky, Melissa Muro LaMere, Maslon LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Teresa Nelson, David P. McKinney, Ameri can Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and
American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota.

2
SYLLABUS
1. Because Minnesota Rule 8210.2450, subpart 3 (2021), authorizes any ballot
board member to review signatures in the event of an identification number mismatch and
Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3) (2022), requires that election judges conduct that
review, the rule conflicts with the statute. The rule is invalid to the extent that it conflicts
with the statute.
2. Because the other challenged parts of Minnesota Rule 8210.2450, subparts 2
and 3 (2021), are not inconsistent with Minn. Stat. § 203B.121 (2022), these parts of the
rule do not conflict with the statute.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
OPINION
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether an administrative rule governing the
acceptance of absentee ballots conflicts with a statute on that same topic. Appellants
brought this declaratory judgment action in the court of appeals, seeking a prospective
declaration that Minnesota Rule 8210.2450, subparts 2 and 3 (2021) (the rule), conflicts
with Minnesota Statutes section 203B.121 (2022) (the statute), and that the challenged rule
therefore is invalid. The court of appeals held that there was no conf lict. We agree with
appellants that subpart 3 of the challenged rule conflicts with subdiv ision 2(b)(3) of the
statute to the extent that the rule permits any ballot board member to compare signatures
when the statute requires that election judges do this comparison. As a result, we reverse
3
that part of the court of appeals decision. But we reject the other alleged conflicts
appellants raise and otherwise affirm the court of appeals.
FACTS
This case involves absentee voting in Minnesota, so we begin with an overview of
that process. Under Minnesota law, any el igible voter may request to vote by absentee
ballot. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.04, subd. 1(a) (2022 ). The voter can re quest an absentee
ballot by mail, email, fax, or in pers on, by filling out an application. Id. The voter is
required to sign the application. See id., subd. 1(b).1
Once the application has been approved, see Minn. Stat. § 203B.04, subd. 1(b), the
voter will typically receive thei r absentee ballot by mail. Mi nn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 1
(2022); but see Minn. Stat. § 203B.11, subd. 1 (2022) (providing for absentee ballots to be
delivered by election judges in limited circumstances). Along with the absentee ballot, the
voter receives a signature enve lope and a mailing envelope. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.07,
subd. 1 (“The county auditor or the municipa l clerk shall prepare, print, and transmit a
return envelope, a ballot envelope, and a copy of the directions for casting an absentee
ballot to each applicant whose application fo r absentee ballots is accepted pursuant to
section 203B.04.”); Minn. Stat. § 203B.08 (2022) (discussing mailing envelope). After
filling out the ballot, the voter puts the ballot into their completed signature envelope, then

1 A voter can also request a ballot thr ough a secure website maintained by the
Secretary of State. Minn. Stat. § 203B.04, subd. 1(a) (2022); Request an Absentee Ballot,
Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State St eve Simon, https://mnvotes.sos.state.mn.us/
ABRegistration/ABRegistrationStep1.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2023). The parties agreed
at oral argument that when a voter applies fo r an absentee ballot through the Secretary’s
website, the voter does not sign the application.
4
puts the signature envelope into the mailing e nvelope and mails the ballot to the county
auditor or municipal clerk. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.08. The voter can also return their
completed ballot in the completed signature envelope to the county clerk in person or
deposit it at a drop box. Id.
A voter must print their name, address, and identification number (either a
Minnesota driver’s license number, a Minnesota ID card number, or the last four digits of
their social security number) on the signature envelope. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.08,
subd. 1(a) (“An eligible voter who receives absentee ballots as provided in this chapter
shall mark them in the manner specified in the directions for casting the absentee ballots.”);
see, e.g. , Absentee Ballot Signature Envelope , https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/2319/
absentee-ballot-signature-envelope.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2023). The voter is also
required to sign an oath certifying that they “meet[] all of the requirements established by
law for voting by absentee ballot.” Mi nn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3 (2022); see also
Instructions: How to vo te by Absentee Ballot for Registered Voters ,
https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/2315/absentee-ballot-instructions-for-registered-
voters.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2023).
Ballot boards are responsible for deciding whether to accept or reject absentee
ballots. Minn. Stat. § 203B.1 21, subd. 2. Ballot boards “must consist of a sufficient
number of election judges” and “may include deputy county auditors or deputy city clerks.”
Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 1; see Minn. Voters All. v. County of Ramsey (Alliance I) ,
5
971 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Minn. 2022).2 In other words, there are members of ballot boards
who are election judges and there might be other members who are not election judges.
In 2010, the Legislature revised the pro cess for acceptance of absentee ballots
through the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 203B.121. See Act of Mar. 24, 2010, ch. 194, § 9,
2010 Minn. Laws 120, 124–25 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 203B.121).3 The
statute was passed following the contested 2008 senate race between Al Franken and Norm
Coleman. See generally House debate on H.F. 3111, 86th Minn. Leg., Mar. 8, 2010 (video
tape) (starting at 45:47) (available at https://w ww.lrl.mn.gov/media/file?
mtgid=1011529#ctl00_Main_video); Sen. debate on S.F. 2622, 86th Minn. Leg., Mar. 8,
2010 (video tape) (starting at 36:06) (a vailable at https://www.lrl.mn.gov/media/
file?mtgid=860890). Issues central to the litigation over that election involved how to tell
whether the voter’s signature was genuine, as the law then in effect required, and variations
in absentee ballot review procedures between local election sites. See, e.g., Sheehan v.

2 In Alliance I, the Alliance argued that counties “violated their statutory obligations
for appointing members to ab sentee ballot boards during th e 2020 general election.”
971 N.W.2d at 273. We rejected that argument and affirmed the dismissal of the Alliance’s
mandamus petitions.

3 Minnesota Statutes section 203B.121, the provision at issue here, has been amended
several times since, though none of the amendments are releva nt to our analysis in this
case. See Act of May 11, 2010, ch. 314, § 4, 2010 Minn. Laws 846, 849; Act of May 23,
2013, ch. 131, art. 1, §§ 6–8, 2013 Minn. Laws 2188, 2191–93; id. art. 2, §§ 17–18, 2013
Minn. Laws 2188, 2201-02; Act of May 22, 2015, ch. 70, art. 1, § 15, 2015 Minn. Laws
822, 829–30; Act of May 30, 20 19, ch. 10, art. 4, § 3, 2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess.
1995, 2044; Act of May 25, 2021 , ch. 31, art. 3, §§ 4–5, 20 21 Minn. Laws 812, 835–36;
Act of June 30, 2021, ch. 12, art. 4, § 6, 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2124, 2170; Act
of May 5, 2023, ch. 34, art. 1, § 17, 2023 Mi nn. Sess. Law Serv. ___, ___ (West) (to be
codified at Minn. Stat. § 203B.121).

6
Franken (In re Contest of General Election He ld on Nov. 4, 2008, for the Purpose of
Electing a U.S. Senator fr om the State of Minn.) , 767 N.W.2d 453, 468 & n.19 (Minn.
2009). In both the house and th e senate, the bill’s authors stat ed that the purpose of the
legislation was to ensure that fewer ballots were wrongly accepted or rejected, to move
away from signature matching to identification number matc hing, and to rely on more
objective criteria.4
As enacted, Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd . 2, explains how ballot boards are to
decide whether to accept or reject absentee ballots. The board reviews each signature
envelope and accepts or rejects it. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b). A signature envelope
is accepted “if a majority of the members of the ballot board examining the envelope are
satisfied that” six criteria are met. Id. But if a majority of the members of the ballot board
examining a signature envelope find that an absentee voter has failed to meet one of the six
criteria provided in paragraph (b), th e signature envelope is rejected. Id., subd. 2(c)(1).

4 See Hearing on H.F. 3111, H. Comm. on State and Loc. Gov’t Operations Reform,
Tech. and Elections, 86th Minn. Leg., Mar. 2, 2010 (video tape) (comments of author Rep.
Ryan Winkler occurring at 32:57–33:15 & 34: 03–34:09) (stating that “this bill takes a
number of steps to try to ensu re that many fewer absentee ballots are improperly rejected
and to ensure that absentee ballots and applications are treated equally across the state” and
that one of the changes was “moving from a si gnature match between the application and
the return ballot to a number match”); Hearing on H.F. 3111, H. Comm. on State and Loc.
Gov’t Operations Reform, Tech. and Elections, 86th Minn. Leg., Mar. 2, 2010 (video tape)
(comments of author Rep. Ma ry Kiffmeyer occurring at 39: 00–39:50) (stating that “[t]he
point” of the bill “is accuracy in accepting and rejecting” absentee ballots); Sen. debate on
S.F. 2622, 86th Minn. Leg., Ma rch 8, 2010 (video tape) (comments of senate sponsor
Senator Katie Sieben starting at 36:50) (expl aining that the bill would reduce the number
of rejected absentee ballots by using “more objective criteria for accepting or rejecting
absentee ballots” and that the bill “will repl ace the signature match with identification
number matches”).
7
The determination that the envelope fails to meet the six statutory criteria is the only reason
the board can “reject[] an absentee ballot.” Id.
Two of the six statutory criteria are relevant here. The first asks if “the voter signed
the certification on the envelope.” Id., subd. 2(b)(2). The second asks whether the voter’s
identification numbers (their driver’s license number, state identification number, or the
last four digits of their social security numb er) “are the same as a number on the voter’s
absentee ballot application or voter record.” Id., subd. 2(b)(3). In the event of an
identification number mismatch, “the election judges must compare the signature provided
by the applicant to determine whether the ballo ts were returned by the same person to
whom they were transmitted.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Secretary of State has promulgated a rule relating to the ballot board’s review
of absentee ballot signature envelopes. Minn. R. 8210.2450. Both subparts 2 and 3 of the
rule are at issue here. Subpart 2 addresses, in part, “w hether the signature envelope was
signed by the voter.” 5 Id., subp. 2. It directs that the “[ u]se of, or lack of, full names,

5 Subpart 2 of Minnesota Ru le 8210.2450 reads in full:

The voter’s name and address on the absentee ballot application must match
the voter’s name and address on the signa ture envelope. Use of, or lack of,
full names, nicknames, abbreviations, or initials on either document are not
a reason for rejection.

Ballot board members must determine whether the signature envelope was
signed by the voter. Use of, or lack of, full names, nicknames, abbreviations,
or initials within either signature are not a reason for rejection. A signature
is considered the voter’s ev en if a voter uses a signature mark on either or
both documents, or if a voter has anot her individual or different individuals
sign the voter’s name in their presence on either or both the application and

8
nicknames, abbreviations, or initials within either signature are not a reason for rejection.”
Id. (nickname provision). And voters may use a signature mark or have someone else sign
their name consistent with Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 14 (2022) (accommodation statute).6
Subpart 2 of the rule provides only one ground for rejecti ng an absentee ballot: “if the
name signed is clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the
signature envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2.

the signature envelope in accordance with Minnesota Statutes, section
645.44, subdivision 14. A ballot must be rejected under this subpart on the
basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the
name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope. This is the only
circumstance under which a ballot may be rejected on the basis of signature
under this subpart.

6 Under the accommodation statute, when “[ t]he signature of a person” is required by
law, the signature “(1) must be in the hand writing of the person, or (2) if the person is
unable to write,” the person ma y use a mark, have another pe rson sign for them, or use a
rubber stamp of their signature or mark. Minn. Stat. § 645.44, su bd. 14. Ballot board
members will know that the accommodation stat ute has been invoked because the voter
will have used a signature mark or stamp or because the pe rson signing for the voter will
have also signed. The instructions for an absentee ballot application and for the signature
envelope cite the accommodation statute and explain that a voter with a disability can sign
the application themselves, make their signature mark, ask another person to sign for them
in their presence (in which case the voter should “have the person sign their own name as
well”), or use a signature stamp. See 2023 Minnesota Absentee Ballot Application ,
https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/2444/english-regular-absentee-ballot-application.pdf
(last visited Apr. 26, 2023); How to Vote by Absentee Ba llot for Registered Voters ,
https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/2315/absentee-ballot-instructions-for-registered-
voters.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2023); see also How to Vote by Absentee Ballot ,
https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/2314/absentee-ballot-instructions-for-non-registered-
voters.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2023).

9
Subpart 3 of the rule is also at issue. Subpart 3 addresses the match of identification
numbers.7 Id., subp. 3. When the voter’s identification numbers do not match, “the ballot
board members must compare the signatures on the absentee ballot application and on the
signature envelope to determine whether the ba llots were returned by the same person to
whom they were transmitted.” Id. As in subpart 2, subpart 3 includes a nickname provision
that prohibits the rejection of ballots based on the voter’s use of a nickname. See id.
Appellants are the Minnesota Voters A lliance and several election judges from
Ramsey County (collectively, the Alliance). The Alliance filed a declaratory judgment
action in the court of appeals. See Minn. Stat. § 14.44 (2022). The Alliance argued that
the challenged rule subparts conflict with the statute by infringing on discretion the
Legislature gave to ballot board members. The court of appeals concluded that there were
no conflicts between the challenged rule and the statute because the statute did not give

7 Subpart 3 of Minnesota Rule 8210.2450 provides in full:

Ballot board members must determine whether the identification number
provided by the vo ter on the certificate is th e same as the identification
number provided by the voter on the absentee ballot application or the voter’s
record in the statewide voter registration system.

If the numbers do not ma tch or the voter did not provide identification
numbers on both docume nts, the ballot board me mbers must compare the
signatures on the absentee ballot applic ation and on the signature envelope
to determine whether the ballots were returned by the same person to whom
they were transmitted. Use of, or lack of, full names, nicknames,
abbreviations, or initials within either signature are not a reason for rejection.
A signature is considered the voter’s even if a voter uses a signature mark on
either or both documents, or if a vot er has another individual or different
individuals sign the voter's name in their presence on either or both the
application and the return envelope in accordance with Minnesota Statutes,
section 645.44, subdivision 14.
10
complete discretion for ballot board members and election judges to rely on any evidence
in determining whether to accept absentee ballots, and because it was possible to comply
with both the challenged rule and the statute. See Minn. Voters All. v. Off. of Minn. Sec’y
of State (Alliance II), A22-0111, 2022 WL 3348641, at *6 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2022).
We granted the Alliance’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
This is a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a rule under Minn. Stat.
§§ 14.44–.45 (2022). We can “declare [a] rule invalid” if: “[the rule] violates constitutional
provisions or exceeds the statutory authorit y of the agency or was adopted without
compliance with statutory rulemaking proce dures.” Minn. Stat. § 14.45. The Alliance
asserts that the challenged rule exceeds the statutory authority of the Secretary because it
conflicts with the statute. The Secretary does not dispute that if the rule conflicts with the
statute then the rule exceeds the agency’s statutory authority.8
A rule conflicts with a statute when the rule “violates the pl ain meaning of” the
statute, Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Dunham, 498 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. 1993), or when
the rule has “no counterpart in the statut e[] and [is] inconsis tent with [it],” Green v.
Whirlpool Corp. , 389 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn. 1 986). Because the conflict question

8 The parties made concessions at oral ar gument that narrow the scope of our review.
For its part, the Alliance agreed that other than its argument that the rule conflicts with the
statute, it is not otherwise arguing the Secr etary exceeded his rule making authority. See
Hirsch v. Bartley-Lindsay Co. , 537 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn. 1995) (“An agency has the
power to issue binding administrative rules only if, and to the extent , the legislature has
authorized it to do so.”). And the Secretary agreed that a rule that conflicts with the statute
exceeds the statutory authority. Based on these concessions, we do not address the specific
contours of the Secretary’s rule-making authority or the scope of Minn. Stat. § 14.45.
11
depends on our interpretation of the statute and the rule, the question is one of law that we
review de novo. Berglund v. Comm’r of Rev., 877 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Minn. 2016).
The Alliance argues that the ch allenged rule and the statute conflict. As a general
matter, the Alliance contends that subpart 2 of the challenged rule conflicts with
subdivision 2(b)(2) of the statute because the rule infringes on the ballot board’s discretion
to consider any evidence, including comparison of the voter’s signature on the application
with the voter’s signature on the signature envelope, when determining if the voter signed
the certification on the signature envelope. The Alliance challenges the portion of the rule
that states that the ballot board may reject the signature envelope only when “the name
signed is clearly a different name than the na me of the voter as pr inted on the signature
envelope.” The Alliance also alleges that the rule conflict s with the statute because the
rule provides in both subparts 2 and 3, that a signature envelope cannot be rejected if the
voter uses a nickname on either the signature on the envelope or the signature on the
application. Finally, the Alliance asserts that subpart 3 of the challenged rule conflicts with
subdivision 2(b)(3) of the stat ute because the statute require s that election judges do the
signature comparison but the rule permits ba llot board members, who may not always be
election judges, to do the comparison. We begin with this last argument.
I.
The Alliance contends that subpart 3 of the challenged rule conflicts with the statute.
The Alliance argues there is a conflict because the rule allows any ballot board member to
conduct a signature review in the event of an identifica tion number mismatch, when the
Legislature intended that election judges perform this review. We agree. The rule gives
12
the power to review signatures to members of the ballot board gene rally, but the statute
gives this responsibility only to election judg e members of the ballot board. That is a
conflict. See Billion v. Comm’r of Rev., 827 N.W.2d 773, 781 (Minn. 2013) (invalidating
rule to the extent that statute allowed certain taxpayers to carry over losses, but the rule
permitted all taxpayers to do so).
The court of appeals reached a contrary conclusion, because “a ballot board can
comply with both the statute and the rule by having ballot board members who are election
judges perform signature comparison.” Alliance II, 2022 WL 3348641, *5. The Secretary
urges us to reach the same conclusion. We decline to do so.
The court of appeals is correct that it is possible to comply with both the rule and
the statute because the ballot board members who compare the signatures could be election
judges. But the possible-to-com ply-with-both standard that the court of appeals applied
comes from conflict preemption cases concerning an alleged conflict between a statute and
a local ordinance or between federal and state law. See, e.g., Musta v. Mendota Heights
Dental Ctr. , 965 N.W.2d 312, 321 (M inn. 2021) (stating that one way for conflict
preemption to arise is “when it is impossible to comply with both state law and federal
law”). We have not applied conflic t preemption case law to an alleged conflict between
an administrative rule and a statute. Instead, when, as in this case , the rule changes the
plain terms of the statute, we have found that the rule and the statute conflict. See Dunham,
498 N.W.2d at 445 (recognizing that “[i]t is elemental that when an administrative rule
conflicts with the plain meaning of a statute, the statute controls,” and holding that rule that
13
provided limitations period of 90 days conflic ted with statute that provided for a 45-day
limitation period). We reach a similar conclusion here.
Under subpart 3 of the challenged rule , “ballot board members” may review
signatures in the event of an identification number mismatch, Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp.
3, but that is a task the statute gives to “election judges” spec ifically, Minn. Stat.
§ 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3). Th e term “ballot board” is br oader than “election judges”
because a ballot board may be comprised of el ection judges and county auditors or city
clerks. See Alliance I, 971 N.W.2d at 278 (“The plain language of the statute distinguishes
between election judges and deputy county auditors and permits both to serve on absentee
ballot boards.”). Because the rule changes the explicit terms of the statute by assigning the
task of signature review to someone other than election judges, the rule conflicts with the
statute to the extent that the rule authorizes non-election judge members of a ballot board
to review signatures. See Dunham, 498 N.W.2d at 445. Accordingly, we hold that Minn.
R. 8210.2450, subp. 3, is inva lid to the extent that the ru le conflicts with Minn. Stat.
§ 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3).
II.
We turn next to the Alliance’s argument that the rule conflic ts with the statute
because the rule limits the di scretion of the ballot board me mbers in reviewing signature
envelopes.
A.
The Alliance first argues that the rule vi olates the statute by limiting what ballot
board members can consider to evaluate whet her the name signed is “clearly a different
14
name” from the voter’s name in determining whether the board is “satisfied” that “the voter
signed the certification on the envelope.” Minn. R. 8210.2450, s ubp. 2; Minn. Stat.
§ 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2). The Alliance asserts that the word “satisfied” as it relates to
subdivision 2(b)(2) of the statute clearly gives broad discretion to ballot boards to compare
the signature on the absentee ballot application with the signature on the signature envelope
when determining whether “the voter signed the certification on the envelope.” By limiting
the ballot board’s ability to re ject an envelope to only when the name signed on the
envelope is “clearly a different” name than the name printed on the envelope, the Alliance
argues the rule conflicts with the statute.9
For his part, the Secretary contends that the rule and the statute do not conflict. We
agree, but on different grounds. As explained below, we disagree with the Secretary’s
interpretation of the statute, but conclude that as properly in terpreted, there is no conflict
between the statute and the rule.

9 The Alliance also argues that the rule conflic ts with the statute to the extent that the
rule “requires acceptance of ballots with signature marks or another person’s signature on
‘either’ document, even if they don’t matc h, which means that anyone can sign for any
voter for any reason . . . . ” The Alliance overreads the rule. The rule simply incorporates
the provisions of the accommodation statut e for those voters who need accommodation;
the rule does not make those provisions broadly applicable to all voters. Minn. R.
8210.2450, subp. 2 (noting that a signature is the voter’s “even if a voter uses a signature
mark . . . or if a voter has another individual or different individuals sign the voter’s name
in their presence . . . in accordance with [the accommodation statute]” (emphasis added));
id., subp. 3 (same). And the Alliance acknowledge s that it is “not arguing that a ballot-
board member cannot accept a ballot if a pers on uses a signature ma rk or signature-by-
proxy . . . .” In short, th e rule’s incorporation of the protections in the accommodation
statute does not create a conflict with the statute.
15
1.
The Secretary argues that there is no conflict because “the voter signed” criterion in
the statute means “only that there is a signatu re on the envelope.” In other words, the
Secretary argues that all that the statute re quires ballot board members to determine is
whether there is a signature on the envelope, a nd he contends subpart 2 of the rule is not
inconsistent with that statutory requirement. We disagree with the Secretary’s
interpretation of the statute.
Subdivision 2(b)(2) requires that the ballo t board is satisfied that the voter who
signed the envelope is the voter who applied for the absentee ballot. The language of Minn.
Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(2), plainly expresses a legislative intent that “the voter” who
“signed the certification on the envelope” is the person who requested and is entitled to
receive the absentee ballot. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022) (“The object of all
interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and e ffectuate the intention of the
legislature.”). “The” is a word of limitation, versus th e inclusive article “a.” State v.
Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. 2012) (citing Am. Bus. Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d
1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is a rule of law well established that the definite article ‘the’
particularizes the subject which it precedes.” )). Thus, the plain lang uage of the statute
makes clear that “the voter” means the person entitled to cast the vote.
Other uses of the phrase “the voter” in Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b), support
our interpretation. In subdivision 2(b)(1), the Legislature required that “the voter’s name
and address on the signature envelope” must be “the same as the information provided on
the absentee ballot application” for the ballot to be accepted. Id., subd. 2(b)(1). And under
16
subdivision (2)(b)(4), “the voter” must be “registered and eligible to vote.” Id.,
subd. 2(b)(4); see also id., subd. 2(b)(3) (listing as a criter ion that “the voter’s Minnesota
driver’s license, state identifica tion number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social
Security number are the same as a number on the voter’s ab sentee ballot application or
voter record”); id., subd. 2(b)(6) (listing as a criterion that “the voter has not already voted
at that election”). Accordingly, it is clear that “the voter” referenced in section 203B.121,
subd. 2(b)(2), is the person eligible to vote by absentee ballot and not some other person.
In urging us to conclude otherwise, the Secretary relies on the meaning of “the voter
signed” in the accommodation statute. The Secretary asserts that “the voter signed” cannot
include an identity requiremen t (i.e., it cannot mean that “the voter” is the person who
signed the envelope) because state and federal law require accommodations for voters with
disabilities. But the accommodation statute applies when “[t]he signature of a person” is
required by law. Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 14. And when a signature is required, a person
who cannot write may substitute for their signature a mark, their name written by someone
else, or a stamp or facsimile. Id. This substitute signature is the signature of the voter
under the accommodation statute. 10 Thus, the accommodation statute does not foreclose
an interpretation of “the voter” that includes an identity requirement. Instead, it merely
forecloses any interpretation of “the voter signed the certification on the envelope” that

10 For the same reason, the Secretary’s argument that the Allia nce’s interpretation
conflicts with federal laws about voting assistance is unavailing. The federal requirement
that a voter who requires assistance to vote must be given that assistance by a person of the
voter’s choice can be met by reading the accom modation statute as making the substitute
signature the signature of the voter. See 52 U.S.C. § 10508.
17
does not allow for a substitute signature on the signature envelope when the circumstances
at issue in the accommodation statute apply.
In short, the statute requires that the ba llot board be satisfied that the person who
applied to vote absentee (the voter) is th e person who signed the certification on the
envelope.
2.
The next question is whether the rule conf licts with the statut e due to the rule’s
limitations on what evidence the ballot board can use as a basis to reject a signature
envelope. The Alliance contends that the rule’s provision limiting rejection based on
signature comparison to when “the name signed is clearly a different name” than the voter’s
conflicts with the discretion afforded to ballot board members in the statute. We conclude
that it does not.
The Alliance asks us to ho ld that the Legislature in tended to give ballot board
members discretion to compare signatures on the application and the signature envelope
whenever they wish, because “satisfied” in subdivisi on 2(b) of the statute means
“persuaded by argument or evidence.” And the Alliance asserts that “[s]ignature matching
is likely the best possible place to look for a ballot-board member to” become satisfied that
the voter signed the certification on the envelope.
It is true, as the Alliance argues, that th e statute requires that the ballot board be
“satisfied” that the voter is the same person who submitted the absentee ballot application.
And the rule limits the reasons for rejection un der subpart 2 to when “the name signed is
clearly a different name than the name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope”—
18
foreclosing a comparison of the voter’s signatures. But nothing in the statute’s requirement
that the ballot board members be “satisfied” that “the voter signed the certification on the
envelope” plainly gives the ballot-board members discretion to consider any evidence. The
definition of “satisfied” that the Allianc e points to—“persuaded by argument or
evidence”—likewise says nothing about what evidence the ballot board might consider.
Accordingly, to conclude that there is a co nflict here, we would have to infer that the
Legislature did not intend there to be limits on the ballot board’s investigation, and that by
imposing limits the rule conflicts with the statute. But we have not concluded that
administrative rules and statutes conflict through inference or legislative silence. See
Alliance I, 971 N.W.2d at 277 (“We will not read in requirements to a statute where none
exist.”); see also Berglund , 877 N.W.2d at 784 (“Had the Legislature intended to require
the Commissioner’s signature for commissioner-f iled returns, it woul d have done so
explicitly just as it did for orders of assessment and property tax assessments.”).
The Alliance argues that “the Secret ary cannot create rules which are an
‘enlargement of express powers by implication,’ ” and that “administrative rules ‘must be
fairly drawn and fairly evident from the agency objectives and powers expressly given by
the legislature,’ ” quoting Hirsch v. Bartley-Lindsay Co. , 537 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn.
1995). But these principles guide the analysis of whether an agency has acted within the
scope of its rulemaking authority, which is not at issue here.11 See id. (noting that “agency

11 Whether the Secretary acted within the scope of his rulemaking authority under the
rules-enabling clause is not the issue before us here, based on th e Alliance’s concession
that we previously noted. See Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc. , 963 N.W.2d 164, 170

19
has the power to issue binding administrative rules only if, and to the extent, the legislature
has authorized it to do so,” and discussing enabling legislation).
We have found that a rule conflicts with a statute in two situations. First, we have
determined that a rule conflicts with a statute when the rule adds a requirement that is
different from the requirements expressed in the statute. See Berglund, 877 N.W.2d at 785
(“The lack of an explicit signature requirement for commissioner-filed returns in the statute
conflicts with the signature requirement in the Department of Revenue’s rule.”); Billion,
827 N.W.2d at 781 (determining that rule co nflicted with the statute because the statute
provided that only trusts and estates could carry over losses but rule permitted any taxpayer
to do so); Green, 389 N.W.2d at 506 (determining that rule conflicted with statute because
rule added requirements to default remedy that were not in the statute). Second, we have
determined that a rule conflicts with a statut e when the rule changed the explicit terms in
the statute. See Dunham, 498 N.W.2d at 445 (determining that rule conflicted with statute
because limitations period in the rule was 90 days but the limitation pe riod in the statute
was 45 days). Subpart 2’s restriction on signature comparison as a basis for rejection under
that subpart does neither.
The statute requires signature comparison only when identification numbers do not
match. See Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(3). Rule 8210.2450, subpart 3, keeps this
exact requirement, so there is no express co nflict because the rule does not change the

(Minn. 2016) (discussing the extent of dele gation in the rules enabling clause). The
question here is simply whether the rule, even assuming it was enacted within the scope of
the Secretary’s authority, nevertheless conflicts with the statute.
20
requirements of the statute. Because the signature-comparison restriction in Rule
8210.2450, subpart 2, govern s only signature comparison don e “under” subpart 2 of the
rule, it does not govern what happens in the event of an identifica tion number mismatch
under subpart 3. Minn. R. 8210.2450, subp. 2 (“A ballot must be rejected under this
subpart on the basis of the signature if the name signed is clearly a different name than the
name of the voter as printed on the signature envelope. This is the only circumstance under
which a ballot may be rejected on the basis of signature under this subpart .” (emphasis
added)). Thus, the signature comparison rest riction in subpart 2 of the rule is not
inconsistent with the statute’s requirement for signature comparison when the voter’s
identification numbers do not match. In other words, an envelope could be rejected under
subpart 3 of the rule even when it could not be rejected under subpart 2 of the rule. Reading
the rule as a whole, we conclude that there is not a conflict between the rule and the statute
with regard to signature comparison.
B.
Similar to its argument that the rule conflicts with the statute by improperly cabining
the ballot board’s discretion to compare signatures, the Alliance also argues that the rule’s
nickname provision leads to a conflict between the statut e and the rule. Under the
nickname provision, differenc es in names due to nicknames cannot be the basis for
rejection of an absentee ballot. See Minn. R. 8210.2450, subps. 2 & 3. The Alliance argues
that this provision conflicts with the statut e’s broad delegation to the ballot board to be
21
“satisfied” that the voter is the same , and for election judges to “determine” 12 that the
ballots were returned by the voter based on signature comparison. Minn. Stat. § 203B.121,
subds. 2(b)(2) & 2(b)(3). We disagree.
In the nickname provision in subparts 2 and 3, the rule provides that the ballot board
may not reject a signature envelope if the vote r used a nickname on either the application
or the signature envelope. The statute does not address the use of nicknames. The statute
requires that the ballot board members are satis fied that “the voter’s name . . . on the
signature envelope [is] the same as th e information provided on the absentee ballot
application.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 2(b)(1). The rule, by allowing the expression
of one’s name through use of a nickname, do es not add a requirement to the statute or
change any explicit term in the statute. Accordingly, we hold that the rule does not conflict
with the statute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part , and reverse in part the decision of the
court of appeals.

12 “Determine” means “to establish or ascer tain definitely, as after consideration,
investigation, or calculation.” Determine, The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 494 (5th ed. 2018). “Determine,” like “satisfied,” is silent about what
evidence should be used in making the determination.