State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0114

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Suvwe Peter Ighovojah,
Appellant.

Filed January 9, 2023
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-8222

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellat e Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge .
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentence for aiding and abetting second-degree intentional
murder, arguing that the district court sentenced appellant based on an inaccurate criminal-
history score. We affirm for two reasons. First, the parties and district court discovered
the criminal-history score error before sentencing and the district court sentenced appellant
using an accurate score . Second, appellant’s sentence is within the presumptive range of
the sentencing guidelines as contemplated by the plea agreement .
FACTS
Law enforcement identified appellant Suvwe Peter Ighovojah as the driver of a
vehicle spotted around the time of a fatal, gang-related shooting in September 2017. The
victim was shot multiple times in front of an apartment complex in Roseville, Minnesota.
In October 2019, a grand jury indicted Ighovojah for his role in the victim’s death on four
aiding-and-abetting charges: (1) first-degree murder for the benefit of a gang; (2) first-
degree premeditated murder; (3) second-degree intentional murder committed for the
benefit of a gang; and (4) second-degree intentional murder.
Ighovojah reached a plea agreement with respondent State of Minnesota and the
district court held a plea hearing. I n exchange for Ighovojah pleading guilty to aiding and
abetting second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1)
(2016), the state agreed to dismiss the remaining c harges against him . The written plea
petition also stated that “ [t]he parties agree to the guidelines sentence in this matter, 406
months, with credit for any time served since the offense date.” Ighovojah’s attorney
3
summarized for the district court that it was his belief that the parties agreed Ighovojah
“would receive a guideline sentence, which, barring some surprise, the parties agree that
he has five criminal-history points. The guideline sentence for that is 406 months.” The
state agreed with this summary.
During his plea colloquy, Ighovojah admitted that he drove his white Chevy Impala
with his friend, P.W., as a passenger to the victim’s Roseville apartment complex in
September 2017 to kill the victim. When they arrived , P.W. stepped out of Ighovojah’s
car, shot the victim multiple times, and returned to the car before Ighovojah drove them
both away from the scene. Ighovojah testified that he aided and abetted in second -degree
intentional m urder. The district court accepted his plea, adjudicated him guilty of the
offense, and ordered a presentence investigation (PSI). The PSI calculated Ighovojah’s
criminal-history score to be four points, not five points.
In October 2021, the district court held a sentencing hearing. The district court
noted the discrepancy in the calculation of Ighovojah’s criminal-history score between the
PSI and the score the parties relied on at the plea hearing .1 The district court remarked,
The parties contemplat ed a criminal-history score of five, and
I’m not recalling whether they knew it was going to come in as
a four and that was part of the agreement to sentence it as if it
were five, or if the four is a surprise because it’s a different
number than we talked about at the time of the plea.

1 For second -degree intentional murder, the sentencing guidelines specify that the
presumptive sentence for a criminal-history score of four points is 386 months with a range
of 329 to 463 months. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (2017). For a criminal-history score
of five points, the presumptive sentence is 406 months with a range of 346 to 480 months.
Id.
4
The state responded, “Your honor, I don’t believe the criminal-history score has any effect
on this plea. The parties negotiated a set number, which is well within the guideline
sentence.” Ighovojah’s attorney agreed and noted, “[the state] is correct that we made a
specific agreement for the days under five [ criminal-history points]. Even with this, while
the presumptive duration is 386 [months], the range is from 329 to 463 [months], so we’re
still . . . really close to the middle of that range.” Ighovojah’s attorney concluded that
(1) his client and the state agreed as to the basis of the plea petition; and (2) he explained
to Ighovojah that “the plea we’ve reached is for 406 months.” The district court sentenced
Ighovojah to 406 months in prison as contemplated by the plea agreement.
This appeal follows.
DECISION

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ighovojah based on
his correct criminal-history score to a duration within the corresponding presumptive
range of the sentencing guidelines and specifically contemplated by his plea
agreement.

We afford the district court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and will
reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d
303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion when it mak es a decision
based on an erroneous view of the law or when its decision is against logic and facts in the
record. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). We will generally not review
a district court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion when the sentence imposed is within
the presumptive guidelines range. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010),
rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).
5
Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, t he presumptive sentence for an
offense is determined based on the offender’s criminal-history score and the severity level
of the charged offense . Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (2017). For offenses involving a
presumptive commitment to prison, the guidelines prescribe a corresponding presumptive
range of sentence lengths. Id. The district court must “use accurate criminal-history scores
in order to set mandatory presumptive sentences that comply with the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines.” State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 142 (Minn. 2007). Any
“sentence based on an incorrect criminal -history score is an illegal sentence” that is
correctable at any time. Id. at 147.
Ighovojah argues the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to
406 months in prison because 406 months is the presumptive sentence corresponding to a
criminal-history score of five . Relying on State v. Provost , Ighovojah asserts that the
parties conti nued to use a score of five as the “anchor” for their sentencing
recommendations and the district court “must resentence” him based on his accurate score
of four. 901 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. App. 2017). We disagree.
First, the record does not support Ighovojah’s contention that the district court
sentenced him using an inaccurate score. The parties believed Ighovojah’s criminal-history
score was five at the time of the plea hearing . But at the beginning of the sentencing
hearing, the district court alerted the parties to Ighovojah’s score calculation in the PSI and
asked whether they “knew it was going to come in as a four” or if his accurate score was
“a surprise.” The state acknowledged the corrected score and argued that it had no impact
on the plea agreement because the parties negotiated for a specific sentence of 406 months.
6
Ighovojah’s attorney also acknowledged the corrected score and observed that under a
criminal-history score of four, a 406- month sentence was “still . . . really close to the
middle” of the presumptive range of 329 to 463 months . Thus, it is clear from the record
that at the time of sentencing, the district court and parties understood that Ighovojah’s
criminal-history score was four .
Second, Ighovojah’s reliance on Provost is misplaced. In Provost, the district court
sentenced a defendant to 48 months in prison based on a criminal -history score of six. Id.
at 201. Later, one of defendant’s convictions was reve rsed, leading to a reduction of one
and one-half points to his criminal-history score , and he moved the district court to correct
his sentence. Id. The district court denied defendant’s motion, reasoning his sentence was
“still authorized.” Id. The 48-month sentence, originally within the guidelines under his
incorrect criminal history score, also fell within the presumptive guidelines range under his
corrected criminal -history score. Id. This court held that “because the sentencing
guidelines serve as the anchor for a district court’s discretion at sentencing,” a sentence
based on an incorrect criminal -history score is an unauthorized sentence “even if the
sentence would still be within the presumptive sentencing guidelines range when calculated
with the correct criminal -history score.” Id. at 202 (adopting conclusion of the United
States Supreme Court in Molina-Martinez v. United States , 578 U.S. 189, 198- 99 (2016)).
Unlike Provost, the parties and the district court realized the mistake in calculating
Ighovojah’s criminal-history score before he was sentenced. We addressed a similar issue
in an unpublished opinion in Hodges v. State and concluded that Provost did not apply
when a defendant is sentenced based on a correct criminal -history score . A19-2003, 2020
7
WL 4932790, at *2- 3 (Minn. App. Aug. 24, 2020) (Hodges II), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
17, 2020). Although not precedential, we find the reasoning to be persuasive on closely
analogous facts.
In Hodges II, a defendant pleaded g uilty to an offense and the parties agreed to a
presumed sentencing range for a person with a criminal -history score of five, which was
260 to 306 months. Id. at *1. At sentencing, the district court noted that the defendant ’s
PSI clarified he had a criminal-history score of four, which corresponded to a sentencing
range of 199 to 281 months under the guidelines. Id. The state recommended that the
district court sentence the defendant to 281 months in prison — a “top-of-the-box” sentence
for the cor rected criminal -history score and within the range anticipated by the plea
agreement. Id. The district court sentenced defendant to 281 months. Id.
The d istrict court denied the defendant’s subsequent petition for postconviction
relief, finding his sentence complied with the plea agreement he originally reached with
the state. See Hodges v. State, A13- 2207, 2014 WL 3558335, at *4 (Minn. App. July 21,
2014) ( Hodges I ), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014) (affirming the denial of
postconviction relief and holding the mutual mistake about defendant’s criminal -history
score did not render his plea unintelligent). The defendant later moved to correct his
sentence, arguing his sentence was illegal because it was calculated based on an incorrect
criminal-history score. Hodges II, 2020 WL 4932790, at *2. This court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s illegal -sentence claim
because the defendant was sentenced based on his correct criminal -history score of four .
Id. at *3.
8
Here too, the parties reached a plea agreement under the shared belief that
Ighovojah’s criminal-history score was five. Before sentencing, t he parties and the district
court learned that Ighovojah’s correct criminal-history score was four points. Like Hodges
II, the district court’s sentence of 406 months adhered to the parties’ plea agreement. It
also fell within the permissible discretionary sentencing range for his crime under his
accurate criminal-history score. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when sentencing Ighovojah because the sentence is not an “ illegal sentenc e” ultimately
“based on an incorrect criminal-history score.” Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d at 147.
Ighovojah further argues that, under the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a
“middle-of-the-box” guidelines sentence tied to his accurate criminal -history score rather
than a specific sentence of 406 months. We agree that there is some ambiguity as to the
exact terms of the agreem ent. The plea petition state s that the parties agreed “to the
guidelines sentence in this matter, 406 months .” At the plea hearing, the state endorsed
Ighovojah’s attorney’s summary of the agreement where he “ would receive a guideline
sentence . . . [and] the parties agree that he has five criminal-history points .” The parties’
understanding of the agreement’s terms appeared to differ slightly at the sentencing
hearing. The state argued that the parties agreed on a “set number” and the corrected
criminal-history score had no effect on the plea because the duration fell within the
permissible guidelines range corresponding to his accurate score. Ighovojah’s attorney’s
assertion that “[the state] is correct that we made a specific agreement for the days u nder
five [criminal-history points] ,” suggests that the agreement was tied to his criminal-history
9
score. Yet, Ighovojah’s attorney also stated that he explained to Ighovojah “the plea we’ve
reached is for 406 months,” which suggests the agreement was for a specific sentence.
Despite this ambiguity , we are not persuaded that Ighovojah’s sentence is
unauthorized. “[A]ny sentence within the presumptive range for [a] convicted o ffense
constitutes a presumptive sentence.” Delk , 781 at 428; see also State v. Jackson , 749
N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Minn. 2008) (“All three numbers in any given cell [of the sentencing
guidelines grid] constitute an acceptable sentence .”). Even if the plea agreement were for
a “guidelines sentence” rather than a specific sentence, 406 months is a presumptive
guidelines sentence. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A.
To the extent that Ighovojah is making a mutual-mistake argument, he does not seek
to withdraw his plea. Ighovojah only asks this court to reverse the district court’s illegal
sentence and remand with instructions to sentence Ighovojah according to his correct
criminal-history. As the district court sentenced Ighovojah based on his correct criminal -
history score, consistent with the sentencing guidelines and his plea agreement, we cannot
grant his requested remedy. We discern no abuse of discretion .
Affirmed.