Alejandro Cruz-Guzman, as guardian and next friend of his minor children, et al., Appellants,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0118

Alejandro Cruz-Guzman, as guardian
and next friend of his minor children, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

State of Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents,

Higher Ground Academy, et al., intervenors,
Respondents.

Filed September 26, 2022
Certified question answered in the negative
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-19117

Daniel R. Shulman, Shulman & Buske, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Richard C. Landon, Lathrop GPM, L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kevin Finnerty, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents State of Minnesota, et al.)

Jack Y. Perry, Brayanna J. Bergstrom, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

John Cairns, John Cairns Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Nekima Levy Armstrong, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for intervenor-respondents Higher
Ground Academy, et al.)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.

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SYLLABUS
An imbalance in the racial composition of schools within a school district or school
system is not a per se violation of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution,
unless the imbalance is caused by intentional, de jure segregation of the type described in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Parents of public-school children seek to establish a violation of the Education
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution , which provides that the legislature has a duty “to
establish a general and uniform system of public schools” and to “make such provisions by
taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools
throughout the state.” Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1. This interlocutory appeal is focused on
a certified question. We answer the certified question by stating that the existence of a
racial imbalance in the student body of a school, as compared to other schools in the same
school district or school system, is not a per se violation of the Education Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution, unless the racial imbalance is caused by intentional, de jure
segregation.
FACTS
This class action was commenced in 2015 by parents of children who are enrolled
as students, or may in the future be enrolled as students, in a public school in Minneapolis
or St. Paul. The parents sued the State of Minnesota, the senate, the house of
representatives, the department of education, and the commissioner of education (to whom
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we refer collectively as the state for purposes of this opinion). In addition, three charter
schools located in Minneapolis or St. Paul, and three parents of students in those charter
schools, were permitted to intervene as defendants.
The parents’ lawsuit is summarized in the second paragraph of their amended
complaint as follows:
The Minneapolis and Saint Paul Public Schools have
been in the past and currently are segregated on the basis of
both race and socioeconomic status, such that plaintiffs and
other school-age children attend schools the enrollment of
which is disproportionately comprised of students of color and
students living in poverty, as compared with a number of
neighboring and surrounding schools and districts. The
plaintiffs are therefore confined to schools that are separate and
segregated in terms of both racial and socioeconomic
composition. As a matter of both law and fact, such schools
are not equal to neighboring and surrounding whiter and more
affluent suburban schools. Because such schools are separate
and unequal, the education the students receive is per se
inadequate within the meaning of the Education Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution. Such discrimination also violates
§ 363A.13 subd. 1 of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.

This appeal is concerned only with the parents’ claims arising under the Education Clause
of the Minnesota Constitution and, more specifically, only with the parents’ theory that a
racial imbalance among schools is a per se violation of the Education Clause.
The parties’ various allegations, claims, and defenses are described in detail in a
prior opinion in this case in which the supreme court concluded that the parents’ claims are
justiciable. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5-7, 7-12 (Minn. 2018). After the
supreme court remanded for further proceedings, the district court granted the parents’
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motion for class certification. The parties thereafter engaged in alternative dispute
resolution for more than 18 months but were unsuccessful in voluntarily resolving the case.
In July 2021, the parents moved for partial summary judgment on their theory of a
per se violation of the Education Clause. In December 2021, the district court filed a 25-
page order in which it denied the parents’ motion. T he district court reasoned that, to
prevail on their claim under the Education Clause based on evidence of racial imbalance,
the parents must prove that the racial imbalance is caused by de jure segregation. The
district court’s analysis is based in part on the premise that a remedy for a violation of the
Education Clause would require the re-assignment of students based on race and the
premise that such a remedy is permitted by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution only as a remedy for intentional segregation.
The district court stated that the parents do not have evidence of de jure segregation. The
district court also noted the parents’ argument that “many state actions . . . contribute[d] to
the current racial imbalance.” The district court stated that “any challenged state action(s)
must directly cause the racially imbalanced school environment” and concluded that the
parents submitted no such evidence.
In the conclusion of its order, the district court certified the following question to
this court pursuant to rule 103.03(i) of the rules of civil appellate procedure: “Is the
Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution violated by a racially imbalanced school
system, regardless of the presence of de jure segregation or proof of a causal link between
the racial imbalance and the actions of the state?” The parents filed a notice of appeal. The
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parents also petitioned the supreme court for accelerated review , as did the intervenor-
respondents. The supreme court denied both petitions.
ISSUE
Is the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution violated by a racially
imbalanced school system, regardless of the presence of de jure segregation or proof of a
causal link between the racial imbalance and the actions of the state?
ANALYSIS
A.
We begin by identifying and confirming the legal authority for this interlocutory
appeal. The applicable rule provides: “An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals
. . . if the trial court certifies that the question presented is important and doubtful, . . . from
an order which denies a motion for summary judgment.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(i).
Although a certified-question appeal may be initiated by a district court and a party,
appellate courts retain authority to determine whether a certified question is both important
and doubtful. See, e.g., Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 696 N.W.2d 340, 344
(Minn. 2005); Jostens, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 878, 885-87 (Minn.
2000). A question is important if “(1) it will have statewide impact, (2) it is likely to be
reversed, (3) it will terminate lengthy proceedings, and (4) the harm inflicted on the parties
by a wrong ruling by the district court is substantial.” Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d at 344. A
question is doubtful “if there is no controlling precedent” and “there is substantial ground
for a difference of opinion.” Jostens, 612 N.W.2d at 884-85 (quotation omitted).
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In this case, none of the parties has discussed—let alone questioned—whether the
certified question is either important or doubtful. We believe that the certified question is
important because the ultimate resolution of this case could have a significant effect on
public schools in the two largest cities in the state as well as public schools elsewhere. See
Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d at 344. Also, the district court stated that if this court were to agree
with its reasoning, an appellate opinion might be determinative of the parents’ Education
Clause claim in light of the “profound difficulty in successfully proving intent.” On the
other hand, if this court were to disagree with the district court’s reasoning, the parents
might prevail on their Education Clause claim without the need to gather and introduce
additional evidence, thereby avoiding additional expense and delay. We believe that the
certified question is doubtful because, as a general matter, there is a lack of caselaw
interpreting the Education Clause. See Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 8. In addition, there
is “no controlling precedent” on the certified question itself. See J ostens, 612 N.W.2d at
884.
Thus, the certified question is important and doubtful.
B.
We next consider the parties’ requests that we rephrase the certified question. This
court has discretion to reformulate a question that is certified pursuant to rule 103.03(i).
See N.H. v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 950 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. App. 2020);
Ames & Fischer Co., II, LLP v. McDonald, 798 N.W.2d 557, 561 -62 (Minn. App. 2011),
rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011); Erdman v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 771 N.W.2d 58, 60-
7
61 (Minn. App. 2009), aff’d, 788 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 2010); Professional Fiduciary, Inc. v.
Silverman, 713 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2006).
The parents request that we reformulate the certified question by inserting the words
“or socioeconomically imbalanced” after the words “racially segregated” and before the
words “school system.” The parents note that they presented arguments to the district court
concerning both racial and socioeconomic imbalances. But the district court did not
consider whether a socioeconomic imbalance is a per se violation of the Education Clause.
This court “cannot answer a certified question which is not first decided and explained by
the trial court.” Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175 v. Columbia Heights Sch. Dist., ISD No. 13, 842
N.W.2d 38, 44 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we will not
reformulate the certified question in the manner requested by the parents.
The state requests that we reformulate the certified question by adding the following
clause at the end of the question: “even if there is no evidence that the imbalanced school
system denies students the opportunity to acquire an adequate education.” The state notes
that the parties presented arguments to the district court concerning the issue or issues
referenced in the proposed additional language. But the district court chose to frame a
certified question that is narrowly focused on the parents’ per se theory. We decline to
venture beyond the certified question into issues for which an answer was not requested by
the district court. Accordingly, we will not reformulate the certified question in the manner
requested by the state.
C.
The Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution provides as follows:
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The stability of a republican form of government
depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the
duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform
system of public schools. The legislature shall make such
provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough
and efficient system of public schools throughout the state.

Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1.
As the supreme court noted in its prior opinion in this case, the Education Clause
has been interpreted by the supreme court on only a few occasions. Cruz-Guzman, 916
N.W.2d at 8. In the earliest case arising under the clause, the supreme court “stated that
the object of the constitutional clause on education ‘is to ensure a regular method
throughout the state, whereby all may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit
them to discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the republic.’” Id. (quoting Board
of Educ. of Sauk Ctr. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 416 (1871)).
In another early case, the supreme court “held that the education system provided
by the Legislature did not violate the Education Clause when it ‘afford[ed] upon like terms
the means for obtaining a common-school education to all resident scholars of the requisite
age’ and ‘ha[d] a general and uniform application to the entire state, so that the same grade
or class of public schools [could] be enjoyed by all localities similarly situated.’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 6 (1878)).
More recently, in Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 ( Minn. 1993), in which a group
of 52 school districts and 10 parents claimed that the statewide education-finance system
violated the Education Clause, the supreme court
held that because the plaintiffs were “unable to establish that
the basic system [was] inadequate” and “the existing system
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continue[d] to meet the basic educational needs of all districts,”
there was no “constitutional violation of the state constitutional
provisions which require the state to establish a ‘general and
uniform system of public schools’ which will secure a
‘thorough and efficient system of public schools.’”

Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 8 (alterations in original) (quoting Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at
312).
In part I of the supreme court’s prior opinion in this case, the court analyzed whether
the parents’ claims based on the Education Clause are justiciable. Id. at 7-10. The court
emphasized that the constitution “assigns to the Legislature responsibility for establishing
a public school system.” Id. at 8. The court explained that the Education Clause
“constitutes ‘a mandate to the Legislature,’ ‘not a grant of power,’” id. at 9 (quoting
Associated Schs. of Indep. Dist. No. 63 v. School Dist. No. 83, 142 N.W. 325, 327 (Minn.
1913)), and “is the only section of the Minnesota Constitution that imposes an explicit
‘duty’ on the Legislature,” id. (quoting Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 313). The court stated that
the parents’ Education Clause claim requires the judiciary “to determine whether the
Legislature has violated its constitutional duty under the Education Clause” or, on the other
hand, “whether the Legislature has satisfied its constitutional obligation under the
Education Clause.” Id. at 9-10. T he court defined the ultimate issue as “whether the
Legislature has violated its constitutional duty to provide a general and uniform system of
public schools that is thorough and efficient, and ensure[s] a regular method throughout
the state, whereby all may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit them to
discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the republic.” Id. at 9 (alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted).
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In part II of its opinion, which concerned the justiciability of the parents’ equal-
protection and due-process claims, the court stated, “Claims based on racial segregation in
education are indisputably justiciable.” Id. at 10 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954)). Immediately following the citation to Brown is a footnote, which states,
in part, “It is self-evident that a segregated system of public schools is not ‘general,’
‘uniform,’ ‘thorough,’ or ‘efficient.’” Id. at 10 n.6 (quoting Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1).
The court added that “courts are well equipped to decide whether a school system is
segregated, and have made such determinations since Brown.” Id.1
The foregoing legal principles are the law of the case. “‘Issues determined in a first
appeal will not be relitigated in the trial court nor re-examined in a second appeal.’”
Interstate Power Co., Inc. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 617 N.W.2d 566, 582
(Minn. 2000) (quoting Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 414 N.W.2d 717, 720
(Minn. 1987)). The law-of-the-case doctrine “applies where an appellate court has ruled
on a legal issue and has remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

1In part II, the supreme court also stated that the right conferred by the Education
Clause is a fundamental right for purposes of an equal- protection or due-process analysis.
Id. at 11 (citing Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 313-18). The court stated, “The fundamental right
recognized in Skeen was not merely a right to anything that might be labeled as ‘education,’
but rather, a right to a general and uniform system of education that is thorough and
efficient, that is supported by sufficient and uniform funding, and that provides an adequate
education to all students in Minnesota.” Id. at 11. This discussion is supported by citations
to part II of Skeen, which concerned an equal-protection claim. See Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at
312-20.

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D.
Before answering the certified question, it is necessary to express our understanding
of the meaning of certain terms used in the certified question.
First, the certified question includes the term “racially imbalanced” as an adjective
describing “school system” and the term “racial imbalance” as a noun. The district court
expressly refrained from defining those terms. The district court chose those terms in lieu
of the parents’ terms “segregated” and “segregation.” The parents used th e terms
“segregated” and “segregation” to describe public schools in Minneapolis and St. Paul in
which the percentage of students of color exceeds the district-wide average by more than
15 or 20 percent or in which the percentage of students of color is less than 20 percent or
more than 60 percent of the student body at that school (notwithstanding district-wide
averages of 63 percent and 79 percent, respectively). The parents’ measurements compare
the racial composition of the student body of a particular school to the racial composition
of the student body of the entire district, without regard for the racial composition of the
community served by either a particular school or the entire district. The parents’ means
of identifying schools that they consider segregated (and, thus, the district court’s means
of identifying racially imbalanced schools) differs from the United States Supreme Court’s
use of the term “racial imbalance,” which reflects either “a comparison of the proportion
of majority to minority students in individual schools with the propo rtions of the races in
the district as a whole, ” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 474 (1992), or “the failure of a
school district’s individual schools to match or approximate the demographic makeup of
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the student population at large,” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 749 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Second, the certified question uses the term “de jure segregation.” The United
States Supreme Court has used that term to describe “segregation resulting from intentional
state action directed specifically to the . . . schools,” Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver ,
413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973), and, more specifically, the practice “of maintaining two sets
of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental
policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race,” Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1971). The Supreme Court has made clear that
Brown was “the first case invalidating a de jure system.” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 282 (1977) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 495). The term de jure segregation sometimes
is used in contrast with the term de facto segregation, which also appears in the district
court’s December 2021 order. The Supreme Court has used the term de facto segregation
to refer to the situation in which “racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no showing
that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state authorities.” Swann, 402 U.S.
at 17-18. The Supreme Court has explained that “the differentiating factor between de jure
segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.” Keyes,
413 U.S. at 208.
E.
The parents urge the court to answer the certified question in the affirmative. Their
argument is based on footnote 6 of the supreme court’s prior opinion in this case, which
stated, “It is self-evident that a segregated system of public schools is not ‘general,’
13
‘uniform,’ ‘thorough,’ or ‘efficient.’” Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 10 n.6 (quoting Minn.
Const. art. XIII, § 1). The parents urge this court to interpret footnote 6 expansively so that
the word “segregated” would encompass not only a school system with a racial imbalance
arising from intentional, de jure segregation of the type at issue in Brown, but also a school
system with a racial imbalance arising from de facto segregation of the type that is alleged
to exist presently in Minnesota. In response, the state argues that the Brown Court used
the word “segregated” to refer to laws that prohibited students of color from attending the
same schools as white students. The state further argues that the supreme court has not
recognized the parents’ per se theory and “would not have used a single line in a footnote
on justiciability to stake out the extraordinary position appellants claim.”
In answering the certified question, we are mindful of the many occasions on which
this court has refrained from expanding existing caselaw on the ground that “the task of
extending existing law falls to the supreme court . . . , but it does not fall to this
court.” Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 18, 1987); see also, e.g., SVAP III Riverdale Commons LLC v. Coon Rapids Gyms,
LLC, 967 N.W.2d 81, 86 (Minn. App. 2021); State v. Thomas, 890 N.W.2d 413, 420 (Minn.
App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2017); Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 815
N.W.2d 848, 851 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 841 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. 2014). This prudential
principle is especially appropriate in a case such as this one, given the supreme court’s
primary role in interpreting the state constitution. See Forslund v. State, 924 N.W.2d 25,
35 (Minn. App. 2019) (interpreting Education Clause); Otto v. Wright County, 899 N.W.2d
186, 196 n.9 (Minn. App. 2017) (interpreting article III of state constitution). Thus, in light
14
of the role of this court vis-a-vis the supreme court, as well as the fact that the parents’
argument is based on a prior supreme court opinion, we seek to determine only whether, in
footnote 6 of its prior opinion, the supreme court recognized as viable the per se theory
that the parents presented to the district court.
First, proof of a racial imbalance among schools within a school district or school
system due to intentional, de jure segregation of the type described in Brown is sufficient
to establish a violation of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. This is so
because the supreme court expressly said so in footnote 6 of its prior opinion in this case.
See Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 10 n.6. Accordingly, a racial imbalance due to
intentional, de jure segregation of the type described in Brown would be a per se violation
of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.
Second, p roof of a racial imbalance among schools within a school district or school
system due to intentional, de jure segregation of the type described in Brown is not
necessary to prove a violation of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. The
ultimate question under the Education Clause is “whether the Legislature has violated its
constitutional duty to provide a general and uniform system of public schools that is
‘thorough and efficient, and ensure[s] a regular method throughout the state, whereby all
may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit them to discharge intelligently their
duties as citizens of the republic.” See Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 9 (alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted). A plaintiff could prove that the legislature
violated its duty under the Education Clause without introducing any evidence of racial
imbalance.
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Third, proof of a racial imbalance among schools within a school district or school
system due to de facto segregation is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Education
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Again, the ultimate question under the Education
Clause is “whether the Legislature has violated its constitutional duty to provide a general
and uniform system of public schools that is thorough and efficient, and ensure[s] a regular
method throughout the state, whereby all may be enabled to acquire an education which
will fit them to discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the republic.” See id.
(alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). A racial imbalance due to de
facto segregation is beyond the scope of footnote 6 of the supreme court’s prior opinion in
this case, which cited Brown, see id. at 10 n.6, which was a case of de jure segregation, see
Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282. Accordingly, a racial imbalance among schools within a school
district or school system due to de facto segregation would not be a per se violation of the
Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. This is so even if state action
unintentionally contributed to a racial imbalance arising from de facto segregation. Such
a situation is significantly different from the de jure segregation that was present in Brown.
Fourth, p roof of a racial imbalance among schools within a school district or school
system due to de facto segregation is not necessary to establish a violation of the Education
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Again, the ultimate question under the Education
Clause is “whether the Legislature has violated its constitutional duty to provide a general
and uniform system of public schools that is thorough and efficient, and ensure[s] a regular
method throughout the state, whereby all may be enabled to acquire an education which
will fit them to discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the republic.” See Cruz-
16
Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 9 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). A
plaintiff could prove that the legislature violated its duty under the Education Clause
without introducing any evidence of racial imbalance.
DECISION
A racially imbalanced school system, by itself, is not a violation of the Education
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. A racially imbalanced school system caused by
intentional, de jure segregation of the type described in Brown would be a violation of the
Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. A racially imbalanced school system
caused by de facto segregation, by itself, is not a violation of the Education Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution, even if state action contributed to the racial imbalance.
Certified question answered in the negative.