Andrew Crisman, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0123

Andrew Crisman, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Hillman Township, Minnesota,
Appellant.

Filed August 22, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Kanabec County District Court
File No. 33-CV-20-4

Sarah R. Jewell, River Valley Law, P.A., Waite Park, Minnesota (for respondents)

Robert A. Alsop, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Steve M. Fenske, Minnesota Association of Townships, St. Michael, Minnesota; and

Jason J. Kuboushek, Susan M. Tindal, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
amicus curiae Minnesota Association of T ownships)

Considered and decided by Bratvold , Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPI NION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant -township challenges the district court’s amended judgment for
respondents -landowners requiring appellant to maintain the northern portion of a town
road. Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11 (2020) , gives township electors the authority to let the
town board determine maintenance for an “abandoned” road, defined as a road for which
no maintenance “has been conducted for 25 years or more.” Because the district court
found that the northern portion of this town road had not been maintained for more than 25
years, and the electors denied respondents’ petition to maintain the northern portion of this
road, we conclude the district court erred . Thus, we reverse and remand to the district court
to enter judgment for appellant.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s factual findings following a bench
trial and includes record evidence when relevant to the issues on appeal.
Appellant Hillman Township (the township) established Hornet Street in 1904 by
town order; the road measures two rods wide and runs north one-half mile from County
Road 3. Respondents Andrew and Renee Crisman use Hornet Street to access their cabin,
which they bought in 2013. Hornet Street is a dead-end gravel road that also serves two
properties neighbor ing the Crisman property. The neighboring properties are within the
first quarter -mile of Hornet Street (southern portion) , and the Crisman cabin is within the
second quarter -mile of Hornet Street (northern portion) .
3
In 2017, the Crismans moved to reside year-round at their property on Hornet Street.
They noticed that snow plowing and other maintenance “was not being done as far ” down
Hornet Street as they believed. The t ownship only maintained the southern portion of
Hornet Street. The Crismans used a tractor to plow snow from Hornet Street so they could
access their property.
At the 2017 annual township meeting, the Crismans petitioned under Minn. Stat.
§ 365.10, subd. 11 , for maintenance to be performed on the northern portion of Hornet
Street. A board member introduced t he petition , according to Renee Crisman, as requiring
a “new road that would need to be built through a wetland.” After some discussion about
costs and that the township had not maintained the northern portion of Hornet Street “for
more than 25 years,” the electors voted to deny the petition.
After the meeting, board members informally told the Crismans that they could
improve Hornet Street themselves. Andrew Crisman later testified that he underst ood if the
Crismans “made these improvements ,” then the northern portion of Hornet Street “would
receive maintenance.”
In 2019, the Crismans improved the northern portion of Hornet Street by adding
gravel, grading, and creating a turnaround for easier access by the school bus . After these
improvements were made, one of the Crismans’ neighbors added large fence posts between
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his and the Crisman property. The neighbor also placed a four-foot post in the gravel road,
which hampered the school bus from accessing the Crisman property .1
In November 2019, the Crismans wrote to the town board, contending that enclosed
affidavits showed the town had maintained the northern portion of Hornet Street within the
last 25 years. At a subsequent meeting, the town board discussed the evidence presented
by the Crismans and then designated the northern portion of Hornet S treet as a
minimum-maintenance road , which allowed the township to maintain Hornet Street “at a
level required to serve the occasional or intermittent traffic.” Minn. Stat. § 160.095, subd. 4
(2020) .
On January 3, 2020, the Crismans sued the township, “seeking declaratory judgment
to clarify the rights of the Parties with respect to Hornet Street.” Specifically, the complaint
sought an order stating that Hornet Street is not a minimum -maintenance road and that the
township is required to maintain the northern portion of Hornet Street, including “clearing
right of way obstructions .”
The district court held a bench trial in February 2021. The district court issued
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order (June order), denying relief and finding the
Crismans failed to establish that the township had maintained the northern portion of
Hornet Street within the last 25 years. The district court reasoned that the township lacked
the authority to expend funds on Hornet Street “without the maintenance first being

1 The neighbor testified that the fence posts were to mark his property line and disagreed
that he placed one post in the gravel road. But the district court found this part of the
neighbor’s testimony to be “not accurate.”
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approved by the electors at the annual town meeting ,” citing Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd.
11.2 The district court also noted that neither party addressed “whether or not Hillman
Township’s regular and routine maintenance of half [of Hornet Street] obligates it to
maintain the whole road when requested by the resident s who live there, and the Court does
not address that issue.”
The Crismans moved to amend one factual finding and asked the district court to
consider “whether maintaining all but the last quarter mile of Hornet Street obligates [the
township] to also maintain that last quarter mile.” The township opposed the motion to
amend.
Following a hearing, the district court issued additional findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and order (November order), amending its earlier decision and granting relief to the
Crismans. The additional factual f indings mainly related to the procedural history
following the trial.
3 The district court did not amend any factual findings from the June
order that related to the maintenance of Hornet Street. The district court determined that
the township has a duty t o maintain “all of Hornet Street. ” The district court also stated

2 The Crismans also sought to estop the township from denying a duty to maintain Hornet
Street based on the board- member comments following the 2017 annual township meeting.
The district court, however, rejected the Crismans’ estoppel claim because “the comments
made by a town supervisor in a casual sense after a town board meeting do not rise to the
level of wrongful conduct on behalf of the Township.”

3 The Crismans moved to amend one finding from the June order, arguing that the district
court erred by finding the fence post was removed from Hornet Street. The township agreed
that the post had not been removed but argued the fact was irrelevant because it had no
duty to maintain Hornet Street. The November o rder amended the challenged finding and
directed the township to remove the post based on its duty to maintain all of Hornet Street.
6
that “it is unreasonable and absurd” to allow the t ownship to maint ain only the southern
portion of Hornet Street, “leaving the Crismans stranded while what exists of Hornet Street
erodes aw ay.” The township asked to file a reconsideration motion, but the district court
denied the request.
The district court directed entry of judgment for the Crismans, as stated in the
November order, and vacat ed the judgment for the township, as stated in the June order. 4
The township appeals.
DECISION
Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11 (the abandonment statute) , states that township
electors “may let the town board, by resolution, determine whether to open or maintain
town roads or town cartways under the jurisdiction of the town board upon which no
maintenance or construction has been conducted for 25 years or more.” The district court
entered an amended judgment for the Crismans after concluding that a township is required
to maintain all of a town road if the township maintains a portion of the same road. The
township contends this conclusion lacks legal authority and contradicts the abandonment
statute and existing caselaw. The Crismans contend the district court’s amended judgment
is support ed by the abandonment statute. We are therefore asked to interpret the
abandonment statute.

4 After the appeal was filed and before oral argument, the Crismans moved to dismiss the
appeal as moot, arguing that township electors voted by resolution to “end the litigation ”
and “maintain Hornet Street, ” and there is, therefore, no case or controversy. This court
denied the motion after determining the Crismans failed to meet their burden of showing
the resolution rendered the appeal moot. Crisman v. Hillman Twp , No. A22 -0123 (Minn.
App. May 17, 2022) (order).
7
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the legislature.” Harkins v. Grant Park Ass’n , 972 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. 2022)
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020) ). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that
appellate courts review de novo. In re Dakota County, 866 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 2015).
When interpreting a statute, the first step is to determine whether the statute’s language is
ambiguous . Id. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, this court applies the statute’s
plain meaning. Id.
Here, the district court determined, and the parties agree, the abandonment statute
is unambiguous. We also determine this statute is unambiguous . Thus, our review first
considers whether the plain meaning of the statute requir es the township to maintain a ll of
a town road if the township maintains a portion of that road.
A town board can maintain a town road “upon which no maintenance or
construction has been conducted for 25 years or more” if township electors “let” the town
board do so. Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11. Thus, subdivision 11 does not require
maintenance of any road . Instead, it narrowly addresses when a town board may maintain
an abandoned road, which it defines a s one that has not been maintained or constructed
“for 25 years or more.” Id.
In the June order, the district court interpreted the abandonment statute to mean the
town board lacked authority to expend “funds on the maintenance of the northern [portion]
of Hornet Street without the maintenance first being approved by the electors at the annual
town meeting .” In the November o rder, the district court determined that “nowhere in
Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11, does it state that an electorate may vote to disc ontinue
8
maintenance of only a portion of a road.” Because the abandonment statute does not
address abandonment of a portion of a road, the district court reasoned the township could
not “deny maintenance of the latter portion of Hornet Street while maintai ning the first
portion.” The district court’s reasoning turned, in part, on language in Minn. Stat.
§ 160.095, subd.1 (2020) , the minimum-maintenance- road provision.
The township argues the district court erred because the plain language of the
abandonment statute “precluded [the township] from performing any maintenance on the
northern [portion] of Hornet Street as a matter of law” absent elector approval. The
Crismans contend we should affirm the district court’s decision because “the Minnesota
legislatur e, when enacting [the abandonment statute], chose not to allow an electorate the
ability to abandon certain segments of roads.”
We conclude that the district court erred for three reasons. First, its decision
conflicts with binding precedent . Second, our interpretation of the abandonment statute is
not guided by an unrelated statute . Third, application of the statute’s plain meaning does
not yield an absurd result. We address each reason in turn.
First, the district court did not follow or distinguish binding precedent. The district
court stated that “there is little precedent interpreting Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11
regarding whether only a portion of a road may be abandoned under the 25-year rule.” But
there is precedent . And we are bound by the decisions of the supreme court , State v. Curtis ,
921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018), and by the precedential opinions of our own court ,
Jackson ex rel. Sorenson v. Options Residential, Inc. , 896 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. App.
2017).
9
In Hagen v. Windemere Township, this court interpreted and applied the
abandonment statute to a portion of a road. 935 N.W.2d 895, 900- 01 (Minn. App. 2019),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug . 6, 2019). We considered the landowner’s appeal of a district
court’s decision to deny a writ of mandamus to compel a township to maintain and repair
a portion of road containing a bridge. Id. at 897. It was undisputed that although part of the
road was repaired in the last 25 years, “the final 2,280 f eet of road, including the bridge,
was not repaired” in the preceding 25 years. Id. The landowner asked the township to repair
the bridge , and town electors decided “not to spend money on the bridge.” Id. at 898.
We determined that the abandonment statute was unambiguous , and given that the
road and bridge had not been maintained for more than 25 years , and the electors voted to
prohibit the township from spending funds on the road or bridge, we affirmed the district
court’s decision. Id. at 900. In short, we held that “in the absence of elector approval, the
township lacks the authority to maintain the road, ” and therefore the township “has no duty
to maintain the road.” Id.
We discern no principled basis not to follow Hagen in this case . Like the township
in Hagen, the township here lacked the authority to maintain the northern portion of Hornet
Street because the district court found this portion of Hornet Street had been abandoned ,
and town electors had voted against spending funds on maintenance.
The Crismans argue that Hagen is distinguishable. The Crismans emphasize that in
Hagen, the parties agreed the bridge portion of the road had not been maintained, whereas
the Crismans disputed whether the township maintained the northern portion of Hornet
Street. We are not persuaded. The Crismans ignore that the district court resolved the
10
dispute d fact issue in the June order following the bench trial. 5 The district court found the
Crismans “failed to prove that Hillman Township maintained the northerly quarter mile of
Hornet Street in the last 25 years.” 6 In the same order, the district court found that the
township “has historically and does regularly maintain the first quarter mile of Hornet
Street.” Thus, the northern portion of Hornet Str eet was abandoned, just like the bridge
portion of the town road in Hagen.
The Crismans also argue we should decline to follow Hagen because the Crisman
home is accessed by the northern portion of Hornet Street , unlike the nonresidential
property accessed by the bridge portion of the town road in Hagen. The presence of the
Crisman home at the end of Hornet Street is obviously significant to these parties. But the
presence of a residence is not an exception to the abandonment statute , and we will not add
language to a statute to create an exception. See State v. Hensel , 901 N.W.2d 166, 178
(Minn. 2017 ) (“[I]t is impermissible to add words or phrases to an unambiguous statute .”
(quotation omitted) ). Our analysis of the abandonment statute turns on the unambiguous

5 The Crismans argue that because the district court vacated the judgment entered after the
June order, the factual findings in the June order are also vacated. We disagree. The
Crismans moved to “amend finding number 14” and to rule on “the purely legal issue of
whether maintaining all but the last quarter mile of Hornet Street obligates Defendant to
also maintain that last quarter mile,” and the district court granted that relief. T he
November order and the later order for judgment on the November order rely on the factual
findings in the June order. There is no indication that the district court vacated the June
order’s factual findings .

6 We do not consider the Crismans’ argument that the record shows the township
maintained the northern portion of Hornet Street. The Crismans did not file a notice of
related appeal (NORA) challenging the district court’s adverse determination. By failing
to file a NORA, a respondent forfeits appellate review of issues decided adversely to it.
Arndt v. Am. Fam. Ins. Co., 394 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 1986).
11
language in the abandonment statute in light of our precedent in Hagen. Thus, we conclude
that the township lacks authority to mainta in an abandoned road unless allowed by the
township electors. See Minn. Stat. § 365.20, subd. 11; Hagen, 935 N.W.2d at 900.
Second, the district court erred by interpreting the abandonment statute based on
language in an unrelated statute. The district court concluded that the abandonment statute
does not recognize abandonment of a portion of a road. In doing so, the district court relied
on Minn. Stat. § 160.095, subd. 1, which provides a road authority may designate a
“minimum-maintenance road” by resolution if it determines that the “road or road
segment” is used “only occasionally or intermittently for passenger and commercial
travel.” The district court note d that the abandonment statute does not refer to road
segments and conclude d this is “an intentional omission.”
We disagree. We acknowledge that the omission of limiting language in one part of
a statute may not be ignored when that limiting language is used in another part of the same
statute. Gen. Mills, Inc. v . Comm’r of Revenue , 931 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Minn. 2019) . But
section 160.095 is a separate statute from the abandonment statute and is unrelated. As the
township argues, the abandonment statute “was enacted in 1981 while minimum
maintenance road provisions of Minn. Stat. § 160.095 were enacted four years later in
1985.” The two statutes also serve separate purposes. The abandonment statute is part of a
section that defines the powers of electors 7 and specifically provides that electors, by

7 Section 365.10 addresses the powers of electors, who are township residents. Section
365.10 includes 18 subdivisions, most of which define explicit elector powers —from
deciding the location of animal shelters to voting on money to repair and build roads.

12
resolution, “may let the town board” determine whether to maintain town roads that have
been abandoned. Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11. In contrast , section 160.095 allows a road
authority, here the township, to designate by resolution that a road or road segment is a
minimum-maintenance road. Minn. Stat. § 160.095, subd 1. W e conclude that section
160.095 does not guide our interpretation of “road” in the abandonment statute.
Third, the district court erred when it reason ed that allowing a township to abandon
a portion of a road would lead to an absurd result. Generally, we consider whether an
interpretation of a statute leads to an absurd result only when the language is ambiguous.
Greene v. Minn. Bureau of Medi ation Servs. , 948 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. 2020). Because
the district court determined the abandonment statute is unambiguous, it should have
applied the plain meaning of the abandonment statute. See id. (applying the plain meaning
after determining the sta tutory language was unambiguous).
Even if we were to consider the “result” of applying the unambiguous language of
the abandonment statute, we would not find it absurd. When the Crismans petitioned for
maintenance of the northern portion of Hornet Street , they relied on the abandonment
statute , and the electors rejected their petition. Thus, the parties followed the process
outlined in the abandonment statute, which does not dictate a result. 8

8 We recognize that electors may have sound fiscal reasons for denying maintenance of an
abandoned portion of a town road. As argued in an amicus brief submitted by the Minnesota
Association of Townships (MAT), Hagen reflects the practical policy that “[t] ownship
roads make up nearly forty percent of the road mileage in Minnesota, but carry only about
two percent of the state’s traffic. Hundreds of townships have sections of roads which have
been unused for decades.” MAT argues that maintenance on these unused roads “would
require townships to expend tremendous funds on maintenance without public purpose.”
13
Moreover, t he district court erred in its analysis by emphasizing the township had
left “the Crismans stranded” and clearly erred by finding Hornet Street “is the only means
of access to the [Crisman] home.” While the record establishes that Hornet Street is the
only means of accessing the Crisman home from County Road 3, the record does not
include evidence about access to the Crisman property generally . See Rasmussen v. Two
Harbors Fish Co. , 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013) (stating a finding of fact is clearly
erroneous unless there is “r easonable evidence in the record to support the court’s
findings”). Access to the Crisman property—apart from Hornet Street —was not raised in
the Crismans’ complaint, nor was it an issue during the trial. To be clear, the Crismans did
not petition for a ca rtway as a landlocked property under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2
(2020) . As the township argues , “[t]he Crismans’ alternative access to their property was
not relevant to the district court’s review of the issues in this case.”
In closing, we note our sympathy to the Crismans’ argument that the township is
displaying gamesmanship by favoring established residents over new residents . We are
disturbed by the district court’s finding that “three times when [the Crismans] plowed
[Hornet Street] open after the y made improvements, someone called County law
enforcement who told them they could not maintain a public road.” We understand, as did
the district court, that “the Crismans, as homeowners and taxpayers, are frustrated that their
efforts to be treated like their neighbors when it comes to the maintenance of the road
leading to their home have been rebuffed by the [t]ownship.”
But appellate review of the legal issue raised by the township requires that we
conclude the township lacks authority to maintain an abandoned road absent elector
14
approval , as provided in the abandonment statute and explained in Hagen. Further, the
abandonment statute provides that a township has abandoned a road that has not been
maintained for 25 years. Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11. Because the district court found
that the Crismans failed to prove the township maintained the northern portion of Hornet
Street in the last 25 years, and the district court found that the electors voted against the
Crismans’ petition to maintain the northern portion of Hornet Street, the district court erred
by requiring the township to maintain the northern portion of Hornet Street.9
Reversed and remanded.

9 The township also challenges the district court’s amended order directing the township to
remove the post from Hornet Street , contending the post was not placed within the
right-of-way. Because we conclude the township has no duty to maintain Hornet Street, we
need not decide whether the district court clearly erred by determining the fencepost was
within the right- of-way.