State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0132

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kevin Lee Anthony,
Defendant,

Midwest Bonding, LLC,
Appellant.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-12810

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Tara Ferguson Lopez, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

James McGeeney, Doda McGeeney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the denial of the appellant’s motion to reinstate a forfeited bond that it
posted on behalf of a criminal defendant because the district court properly considered the
applicable law and acted within its discretion.
FACTS
In June 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged defendant Kevin Lee Anthony
with four felonies relating to the promotion of prostitution and criminal sexual conduct. 1
Responding to an online advertisement to exchange money for sex, police found Anthony
with an adult woman, identified as the complainant, and arrested them both. The district
court ordered that Anthony could be released from custody before his trial if he posted a
$100,000 bail bond and agreed to comply with certain conditions, such as not contacting
the complainant and being monitored by a GPS device.
In August 2020, appellant Midwest Bonding, LLC, (Midwest) posted a $100,000
bail bond on Anthony’s behalf. Anthony signed a form acknowledging that he was
required to appear for court in September when he was released the following day. But
Anthony failed to appear in September and remained at large for over a year. The district
court originally ordered the bond forfeited in December 2020. But Midwest requested an

1 The state charged Anthony with two counts of promoting prostitution of an individual in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(2) (2018), one count of receiving profit derived
from prostitution in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(3) (2018), and one count
of third-degree criminal sexual conduct involving force or coercion in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2018).
3
extension because it had hired a fugitive-recovery agency to assist with locating Anthony.2
The court extended the forfeiture date until February 2021.
Nine days before the extended forfeiture date, Midwest petitioned the district court
to either reinstate the bail bond or extend the due date once more. Midwest averred that
while it had not yet located Anthony, its agents were tracking down “six different people
of interest connected to” him. The state opposed this petition, in part because the
complainant had passed away while Anthony was absent.
In October 2021, police arrested Anthony in Florida and transported him back to
Minnesota. The district court denied Midwest’s petition to reinstate the bail bond,
reasoning that the purpose of bail had not been accomplished and that the state was
prejudiced by Anthony’s abscondment.
DECISION
Midwest argues that the district court should have reinstated the bail bond that it
posted on behalf of Anthony once he was back in custody. We review a district court’s
denial of a petition to reinstate a forfeited bail bond for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Askland, 784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion if its
decision is based on an error of law. State v. Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Minn. 2003).
With this standard in mind, we review the legal requirements for bail-bond forfeiture and
then consider the district court’s reasons for denying Midwest’s reinstatement petition.

2 In addition, Midwest electronically searched Minnesota jails and contacted members of
Anthony’s family.
4
When a person released from custody on a bail bond fails to conform to the
conditions of the bond, the amount of the bond is forfeited to the district court. Minn. Stat.
§ 629.58 (2020). But when a bond is forfeited, the district court “may forgive or reduce
the penalty” according to the equities of the situation. Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2020). To
determine whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a petition to reinstate
a forfeited bail bond, we consider four factors (the Shetsky factors):
(1) the purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and
the cause, purpose and length of a defendant’s absence; (2) the
good faith of the bond company as measured by the fault or
willfulness of the defendant; (3) the good-faith efforts of the
bond company to apprehend and produce the defendant; and
(4) any prejudice to the State in its administration of justice.
Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62 (citing In re Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn. 1953)). The
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the first three factors, but the state must show
prejudice. Id.
Here, the district court considered all four Shetksy factors. First, the court concluded
that the “purpose of bail was not substantially accomplished” based on Anthony’s long
absence from supervision. Midwest argues that the purpose of bail was accomplished
because the state ultimately convicted Anthony. But the purpose of bail is “to insure the
prompt and orderly administration of justice without unduly denying liberty to the
accused,” and the “use of bail to enable the accused to evade, delay, or cripple the prompt
and effective administration of justice is directly contrary to any legitimate purpose.”
Shetksy, 60 N.W.2d at 46. Anthony’s 13-month absence here was contrary to the purpose
of his bail bond.
5
Second, the district court determined that Anthony “willfully failed to appear and
was gone for 13 months,” and that there was “no demonstration the actions of
[Midwest] . . . contributed in any way to his apprehension.” Midwest argues that its
good-faith efforts to find Anthony outweigh his willful absence from Minnesota. But the
second factor is concerned with the willful d efault of the defendant , not the surety. Id.
And Midwest concedes both that Anthony had no excuse for failing to appear in court as
required and that it did not contribute to his capture. Anthony’s long absence weighs
against reinstatement.
Third, the district court reasoned that Midwest’s efforts to locate Anthony—
including electronically searching jails, hiring a professional fugitive-recovery agency, and
skip-tracing efforts—demonstrated Midwest’s good faith even though “these efforts were
unsuccessful.” Of the four Shetsky factors, the court concluded that only this one weighed
“in favor of reinstatement.” We agree.
Fourth, the district court concluded that the state was prejudiced by the delay
because the complainant passed away before Anthony could be tried. The state bore the
burden of demonstrating prejudice. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. When the state
demonstrates prejudice, this factor weighs heavily against reinstatement. Storkamp, 656
N.W.2d at 542. Midwest argues that the state failed to show prejudice because Anthony
was ultimately convicted. But although the district court convicted Anthony of two of the
four charged felonies, it acquitted him of the third, and the state dismissed the fourth before
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trial.3 The complainant who passed away was the key witness for all four offenses.
Midwest presents no caselaw supporting its argument that successfully obtaining
convictions on some counts prevents the state from demonstrating prejudice due to a
defendant’s unlawful absence. The state showed prejudice here.
In sum, three of the four Shetsky factors weigh against reinstatement of the bail
bond. Because the purpose of bail was not accomplished, Anthony willfully absconded for
13 months, and the state was prejudiced by the complainant’s death during that period, the
district court acted within its discretion by denying Midwest’s petition to reinstate its bond.
Affirmed.

3 The district court convicted Anthony of one count of promoting prostitution of an
individual and one count of receiving profits from prostitution, and it acquitted him of the
second count of promoting prostitution of an individual. The state dismissed the
third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge before trial.