State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0151

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Corrie Raeann Thompson,
Appellant.

Filed December 5, 2022
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-15978

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lisa Lopez, Acting Fourth District Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Following her conviction for third- degree assault, appellant argues that the
prosecutor committed misconduct warranting a new trial by making certain statements
during closing argument. Because we discern no prosecutorial misconduct, prejudice to
appellant affecting her substantial rights, or impairment of the fairness and integrity of the
proceedings, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 20, 2020, following an assault of A.R., respondent State of Minnesota
charged appellant Corrie Raeann Thompson and a co-defendant, K’Lob Stewart, with one
count of first- degree assault causing great bodily harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1
(2018), and one count of third-degree assault causing substantial bodily harm, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.223, subd. 1 (2018). Thompson and Stewart were tried jointly before a jury, and the
jury’s verdict against Thompson was based on the following evidence presented at trial.
Thompson worked at the Circle of Life Center. The victim, A.R., has cerebral palsy
and received services at the center. A.R. began dating Stewart in high school, but she was
no longer in a relationship with Stewart at the time of the reported assault. A.R. and Stewart
share a daughter, J.S., who was two years old at the time of this event. Stewart physically
abused A.R. during their relationship. As of the date of the assault, Stewart was in a
romantic relationship with Thompson, and A.R. had not seen Stewart for several months.
On July 5, 2020, Stewart called A.R. about a Facebook post that contained offensive
statements, including statements about Thompson’s father and brother. A.R. denied
3
knowledge of the post and she said it originated from a fake account. A.R. testified that
during the phone call, Stewart was “talking to [her] crazy, yelling at [her], and screaming
at [her].” A.R. said she also recognized Thompson’s voice on the phone call. A.R. called
police twice to report her fear that Stewart might hurt her and asked if police could
apprehend Stewart before “something bad happens.” An officer told A.R. that police could
not take any action under the circumstances.
On July 6, 2020, Stewart appeared outside A.R.’s apartment, threw rocks at her
window, cried, and said he wanted to see J.S. A.R. woke J.S. and let Stewart into her
apartment. Stewart entered the apartment with Thompson and Stewart’s two brothers.
A.R. was surprised that Stewart was not alone.
A.R. testified that Thompson went to the bathroom, and when she came out, Stewart
said to Thompson, “Go ahead. Get her.” A.R. said Thompson grabbed her hair, threw her
to the floor, and punched and kicked her head and face. Stewart kicked A.R. in the face.
A.R. grabbed Stewart’s leg and said, “Tell her to stop.” Stewart “lightly” pushed
Thompson off A.R. Stewart dragged A.R. along the floor, into the hallway, and punched
A.R.’s arms and side.
The state introduced evidence of two 911 calls following the incident. A.R. testified
that she did not recall placing an emergency call. The transcript of one call is a report from
a caller that her boyfriend and his girlfriend “beat me up really bad.” The transcript also
indicates that the caller was occasionally not responsive, and she said she was bleeding and
trying to stay focused.
4
Police arrived at the scene. Body-camera footage shows J.S. in a squad car saying,
“daddy hurt mommy” and J.S. making another statement, either “Daddy stopped it,” or
“Daddy stepped in it.” Officers observed numerous injuries on A.R.’s face and blood on
her face and shirt. A.R. reported to one officer that Stewart had said he wanted to see his
daughter, A.R. asked Stewart and his party to leave, and a fight broke out. Testimony from
medical professionals confirmed that A.R. had numerous injuries to her face, head, and
shoulder. A surgeon realigned A.R.’s nose and repaired a fracture in her jaw. A laceration
on top of A.R.’s scalp was consistent with the possibility that her hair had been pulled.
Thompson testified in her defense. She stated she accompanied Stewart to the
apartment and that initially everybody was “talking and, like, happy,” but that A.R. became
upset when she saw Thompson and asked Stewart, “Why did you bring her? I don’t want
her here.” Thompson said A.R. “got really, really upset and angry” and yelled at
Thompson, told her to leave, and made offensive statements about Thompson’s father and
brother.
Thompson testified that A.R. first punched Thompson in the eye and nose and that
Thompson pushed A.R. away. Thompson stated that A.R. came at her again, and in
response, Thompson punched A.R. “maybe twice,” pulled A.R. to the ground, and kicked
her twice. Thompson claimed that A.R.’s assault resulted in bruising and the jury received
photos depicting a bruise around Thompson’s left eye and blood in the eye. Thompson
said A.R. was not bloody or bruised when they left the apartment.
1

1 Thompson also testified she was still in a relationship with Stewart at the time of trial
but was not communicating with him. The state introduced evidence that between March
5
K.G. also testified at trial. K.G. did not know Stewart or Thompson, but she was
familiar with A.R. from their interactions in the neighborhood. K.G. testified that she ran
into A.R. and saw that A.R.’s face was bruised. K.G. asked A.R. what happened, and K.G.
testified that A.R. said she was in an “incident” but was “laughing about it” because she
had “pinned it on somebody else that really didn’t do it.” K.G. testified that A.R. also
mentioned pinning it on her “baby dad” and saying “I can do whatever I want.” K.G.
testified she then made efforts to find Stewart’s attorney and report what A.R. had said
because A.R.’s actions did not “sit right” with her. K.G. denied that Stewart’s or
Thompson’s families had urged her to make these claims. On cross-examination, K.G.
stated that A.R. identified Stewart and Thompson by name, and that K.G. remembered their
names a year later when she contacted defense counsel. A.R. denied talking with K.G.
about the incident and testified that she never told anyone that someone other than Stewart
and Thompson were responsible for her injuries.
During closing argument, the prosecutor made several statements about the state’s
burden of proof, witness credibility, and A.R. The jury found Thompson not guilty of first-
degree assault, and guilty of third-degree assault.
Thompson appeals.

9 and July 27, 2021, Stewart made over 1,400 jail calls to a number belonging to
Thompson, which Thompson denied. The state also introduced recordings of the calls
between Thompson and Stewart, and the court informed the jury that the parties had
stipulated that the voices on the recordings were of Thompson and Stewart.
6
DECISION
Thompson raises one issue on appeal: that the prosecutor’s statements and theme
during closing argument amount to misconduct warranting a new trial. Thompson
specifically argues that the prosecutor misstated, diluted, and shifted the state’s burden of
proof, made improper statements about the credibility of witnesses, and stoked sympathy
for the accuser.
We review this alleged prosecutorial misconduct under a modified plain-error test
because Thompson did not object during closing argument. See State v. Carridine, 812
N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012) (citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)).
Under the modified plain-error test, Thompson must show that the misconduct was error
and that the error was plain. Id. An error is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a
standard of conduct.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. When reviewing a closing argument
for plain error, we look “to the closing argument as a whole, rather than to selected phrases
and remarks.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
If Thompson establishes the existence of plain error, the “burden then shifts to the [s]tate
to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.” Carridine,
812 N.W.2d at 146. Plain error affects substantial rights “if the error was prejudicial and
affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998).
Error is “prejudicial” if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that it had a significant effect on
the verdict. Id. (quotation omitted). Even where misconduct occurs, we will reverse only
when “the defendant was denied a fair trial.” State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Minn.
1995). If all prongs of the modified plain -error test are satisfied, we assess “whether the
7
error should be addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.”
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.
Burden of Proof
Thompson argues that the totality of the prosecutor’s closing argument misled the
jury and shifted the state’s burden of proof because the prosecutor urged the jury not to
weigh all of the evidence but instead to reach a verdict based on A.R.’s testimony alone.
Thompson specifically argues that the prosecutor improperly advised the jury that it should
“disregard” testimony of certain witnesses if it did not find such testimony credible, that if
the jury credited A.R.’s testimony then it had “everything that you need” to convict
Thompson, that the law allows the jury to decide the case based on the testimony of a single
witness, and that the jury should acquit Thompson if it believed that A.R. made the “whole
story up.” The state argues that the prosecutor “essentially” argued to the jury “that A.R.’s
testimony was critical to the State proving Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
We discern no error in the prosecutor’s closing argument.
First, Thompson did not identify any statement by the prosecutor about the burden
of proof that is contrary to case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct. See State v. Caine,
746 N.W.2d 339, 360 (Minn. 2008) (“It is the job of a jury to determine the credibility of
the witnesses.”); State v. Bliss, 457 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1990) (“It is well established
that a conviction can rest upon the testimony of a single credible witness.”).
Second, we disagree with Thompson’s claim that the prosecutor’s arguments
suggesting the jury must choose whether to believe A.R. or Thompson was plainly
erroneous as “just a variation” on improper “were they lying” questions. The prosecutor
8
did not make an argument akin to “were they lying” questions. The jury was confronted
with the necessary choice of determining the credibility of competing, inconsistent
testimony. It is not error for a prosecutor to argue to the jury that it must make a credibility
determination from contrasting testimony. Caine, 746 N.W.2d at 359 (holding that
prosecutor’s statements in closing argument including “what we’ve got is a credibility
determination,” “it really has come down to who are you going to believe,” “I want you to
contrast [the defendant’s] testimony with [the witness’s],” and “we’re back to [the
witness’s] credibility versus the defendant’s” were not analogous to “were they lying”
questions when “a great deal of evidence” pointed to the defendant’s guilt and “[t]he only
contrary evidence was [defendant’s] testimony” (quotations omitted)); see also State v.
Meyers, No. A12-0781, 2013 WL 599284, at *5 (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2013) (concluding
that the prosecutor did not make statements analogous to “were they lying” questions
misstating the burden of proof when he argued that “these cases . . . come down to
credibility” and that the case came “down to two people’s statements” (quotation omitted));
State v. Dudley, No. A07-1843, 2009 WL 112845, at *8- 9 (Minn. App. Jan. 20, 2009)
(concluding that the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that the jury needed
to decide who was credible between the alleged victim and defendant was not the same as
“were they lying” questions and was not improper), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009).
2
The prosecutor therefore did not commit misconduct by inviting the jury to evaluate the
credibility of competing testimony from the witnesses.

2 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority and are being cited as persuasive
authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
9
Third, the prosecutor did not misstate the burden of proof. We disagree with
Thompson’s argument that the prosecutor’s statements were similar to those in State v.
Strommen, where the supreme court concluded that a prosecutor misstated the state’s
burden of proof by telling the jury to “weigh the story in each hand and decide which one
is most reasonable, which one makes the most sense.” 648 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn. 2002)
(quotation omitted). The prosecutor here did not ask the jury to “weigh” competing stories
and instead argued that “the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt with
evidence in court at trial” that the defendants committed the crime, that the “elements of
the offense are what the state has to prove,” and that the jury may consider direct and
circumstantial evidence and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. We discern no error
in these statements.
Thompson also cites In re Welfare of D.D.R. for the proposition that the prosecutor
misstated the burden by inviting the jury to acquit if the jury determined that A.R. “made
up” her testimony. 713 N.W.2d 891, 903- 04 (Minn. App. 2006). But in D.D.R., we
determined that the prosecutor’s statements that the jury would have to find that “all the
evidence is wrong” in order to find the defendant not guilty and the comment that the
“[a]ppellant [is] no longer presumed innocent” amounted to misconduct because it “goes
against the fundamental tenets of the judicial system that an individual is innocent until
proven guilty.” Id. (quotations omitted). The prosecutor in this case did not make a similar
misstatement of the law. We ther efore conclude that the prosecutor did not misstate the
burden of proof.

10
Sympathy for the Accuser

Thompson argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stoking sympathy
for the accuser during closing argument with the following statements:
[Y]ou have to decide whether you believe her or not. So
consider some of those factors about [A.R.]. Who is she?
She’s a single mom. She’s disabled. She told you she’s part
of Minneapolis’s Native community. Right now, she’s getting
a lot of support from her church.

. . . .

. . . And [J.S. is] a witness who [Thompson’s attorney]
did not reference. . . . This little girl, days before her third
birthday, was there.

Thompson argues these comments “had nothing to do with what happened in [A.R.’s]
apartment on the night in question, and were expressed solely to engender sympathy and
outrage.”
A “prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the
defendant.” Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 363. But “[p]rosecutors are permitted to make
reasonable inferences from evidence on the record, to analyze or explain the evidence, and
to make legitimate arguments to the jury based on the evidence.” State v. Rucker, 752
N.W.2d 538, 552 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008). We look at the
“closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be
taken out of context or given undue prominence.” State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607
(Minn. 1993).
We disagree with Thompson’s characterization that these two isolated statements
were without a proper purpose and designed solely to stoke the sympathies of the jury. The
11
statement about A.R. had a proper purpose. In examining the totality of the argument, the
prosecutor accurately recounted the jury instructions related to witness credibility, made
the referenced statements about A.R.’s background in the context of asking the jury to
consider A.R.’s credibility, and followed the statements by setting forth A.R.’s consistent
accounts of the offense. We do not consider the entirety of this argument as an improper
attempt to interject sympathy or prejudice. The prosecutor mentioned A.R.’s disability
because that fact related to a potential aggravating factor. The statement about J.S. also
had a proper purpose. The prosecutor made the statement about J.S. in rebuttal after
Thompson’s attorney argued to the jury that it “only heard from three people” about the
accusations and omitted that the jury received evidence that J.S. was also present during
the altercation and reported to police that “daddy hurt mom my.” Because the prosecutor
had a legitimate purpose for making these limited, isolated statements during closing
argument and did not improperly stoke the sympathies of the jury given the totality of the
closing argument, we discern no plain error.
Substantial Rights
Even assuming that the prosecutor committed plain error during closing argument,
we only reverse a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct if such plain error “affects
the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 654 (Minn. 2011). For
claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a modified substantial- rights test where the
state has the burden to demonstrate the misconduct did not affect substantial rights. Id. To
determine whether a plain error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, w e consider
“(1) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; (2) the pervasiveness of the
12
improper conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity (or made efforts) to
rebut the prosecutor’s improper suggestions.” Id. at 655. We address each of these factors
in turn.
First, there was significant evidence against Thompson. Thompson admitted to
punching A.R. at least twice, pulling A.R. to the ground, and kicking A.R. twice after she
was on the ground. The testimony from medical professionals and photographs show the
severity of A.R.’s injuries, and A.R.’s injuries were consistent with her description of the
assault. A.R.’s testimony was also consistent with her statement to the police and the
emergency calls . While Thompson disputed the severity of A.R.’s injuries, the state
introduced evidence to impeach Thompson’s credibility, including evidence showing that
Stewart had contacted Thompson o ver 1,400 times while he was incarcerated despite
Thompson’s denial that she was contacting Stewart and her statement she was not
communicating with Stewart. Thus, the evidence supporting Thompson’s guilt of third-
degree assault against A.R. was strong and the evidence of self-defense was not. See State
v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 832- 35 (Minn. 2012) (concluding the evidence against
defendant was strong for purposes of substantial-rights analysis when the state relied on
circumstantial evidence to support the verdict).
Second, as discussed above, the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument were
not pervasive. Thompson does not argue that the challenged statements about A.R.’s
background permeated the entirety of the closing argument, and the record reflects that
Thompson complains of only isolated statements in the prosecutor’s argument.
13
Third, Thompson rebutted the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements.
Thompson’s counsel argued to the jury that it should make a “neutral assessment of the
evidence” and that it “cannot let . . . sympathy for [A.R.]” or the question of who it
“believe[s] more” to “substitute for evidence.”3 See State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 718
(Minn. 2010) (concluding the third factor of substantial- rights analysis weighed against
defendant when his counsel addressed prosecutor’s alleged misstatements during closing
argument).
Accordingly, we conclude that any alleged misconduct did not have a significant
effect on the verdict and therefore did not affect Thompson’s substantial rights. See State
v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 692-93 (Minn. 2008) (holding alleged prosecutorial misconduct
during closing argument did not affect defendant’s substantial rights when there was strong
evidence of defendant’s guilt and defendant’s credibility was undermined, the alleged
misconduct were not significant parts of the state’s closing argument, defendant had the
opportunity to correct the prosecutor’s comments, and the jury was correctly instructed on
the burden of proof, presumption of innocence, witness credibility, and the difference
between evidence and the arguments of counsel).

3 We observe that Thompson’s attorney also made similar statements to those of the
prosecutor to which she now objects. For example, Thompson’s attorney stated that the
testimony from the witnesses “gives you basically two general possibilities as to what went
down here” and that it was “either the prosecution’s theory, more or less in some fashion
along the lines of what [A.R.] says, or what you had was a short interaction and a short
scuffle between my client and [A.R.].”
14
Fairness and Integrity of the Proceedings
Finally, even assuming that the prosecutor committed plain error affecting
Thompson’s substantial rights, we conclude that a new trial would not be necessary to
ensure the fairness and the integrity of the proceedings. The district court instructed the
jury to apply the correct burden of proof, to consider all of the evidence, to consider and
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and not to allow sympathy or prejudice to influence
its decision. The district court instructed the jury that it may only consider evidence
admitted at trial, that the arguments of counsel are not evidence, and to follow the law as
instructed by the court. The district court instructed the jury to disregard anything the
attorneys say in closing argument that may contradict the instructions delivered by the
district court and to follow the district court’s instructions. “We assume that the jury
followed the court’s instructions and properly considered the evidence.” State v. Vang,
774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009); see also State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 550
(Minn. 2010) (“We presume that juries follow instructions given by the court.”) . These
instructions were sufficient to cure any potential prejudice from the prosecutor’s
statements. See State v. Bell, 199 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. 1972) (concluding trial court’s
jury instructions prevented prejudice to defendant from prosecutor’s indiscretion); see also
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298-99 (recognizing jury instructions can cure the effect of
improper prosecutorial argument).
Thompson does not contest that the district court properly instructed the jury and
offers no basis to conclude that the jury did not follow the district court’s instructions in
15
reaching its verdict. We therefore conclude that a new trial is not necessary to ensure the
fairness and integrity of the proceedings.
Affirmed.