Kristen M. Egan, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0162

Kristen M. Egan,
Respondent,

vs.

Victor Wright,
Appellant.

Filed December 5, 2022
Reversed and remanded; motion denied
Slieter, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CV-21-1612

Patrick J. Boley, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

John Kaschins, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s inclusion of a firearm-prohibition and
firearm-surrender provision in the harassment restraining order (HRO) issued against him.
Appellant does not challenge the district court’s decision to issue the HRO. Because the
HRO statute does not authorize a firearm prohibition or firearm surrender as an available
remedy, we reverse that provision of the HRO and remand to the district court. The HRO
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issued against appellant, minus the firearm-prohibition and firearm -surrender provision,
remains in effect.
FACTS
Appellant Victor Wright and respondent Kristen Egan worked together at a grocery
store. Wright left that job in June 2021. During the weeks following his departure, Wright
messaged Egan, but Egan did not respond. Wright continued to contact Egan even without
responses from her. Wright also visited the grocery store.
In July 2021, Egan’s boyfriend contacted Wright and asked W right to stop
contacting Egan. However, Wright continued to contact Egan after the July request to stop
contact.
In September 2021, Egan successfully petitioned the district court for an ex parte
HRO against Wright pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2020). Wright timely requested a
hearing. The district court held a hearing in October 2021 and granted a two-year HRO
against Wright.
The district court explained that the HRO prohibits Wright from “having any contact
with Ms. Egan whatsoever.” The district court also stated the following:
THE COURT: Do not possess any firearms or ammunitions
while this order is in effect. Do you have a firearm?
WRIGHT: Yes.
THE COURT: You are to contact Burnsville Police, the police
department in your city, let them know of this order, and follow
their instructions regarding giving up that firearm. And you
are to show proof of that within two weeks from today’s date.
Do you understand that?
WRIGHT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about this order?
WRIGHT: So giving up the firearms, how long are they --
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THE COURT: While this order is in effect. So that’s for two
years. And what do you do with your firearms? How many
firearms do you have?
WRIGHT: I have two handguns and a rifle.
THE COURT: Okay. And how do you use those -- what do
you use those handguns for?
WRIGHT: Target shooting.
THE COURT: Okay.
WRIGHT: I’ve had – I’ve had handguns ever since 2012.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, at this point, you cannot have one
until 2023. Do you understand that?
WRIGHT: Yes.
The district court issued the HRO utilizing the form, “Order Granting HRO After
Hearing” and added, under the form’s “Other” category: “no possession of firearm and
follow the Burnsville Police Department protocol for getting rid of the weapons – two
handguns and a rifle.”
Wright subsequently moved the district court to remove the firearm-prohibition and
firearm-surrender provision (firearm-prohibition provision) from the HRO which Egan
opposed. The district court conducted a hearing and denied the motion. Wright appeals. 1
DECISION
Interpretation of the statute authorizing district courts to grant HROs is a question
of law that we review de novo. Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App.
2008). However, we review a district court’s decision to grant an HRO for abuse of
discretion. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against

1 Wright appealed from the December 8, 2021 order denying Wright’s motion, and we
construed the appeal as taken from the original October 14, 2021 order granting the HRO
pursuant to Huso v. Huso, 465 N.W.2d 719, 720-71 (Minn. App. 1991).
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logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
(quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)).
In this appeal, we focus on whether the district court misapplied the HRO statute,
and if it did, we reverse the district court’s determination as an abuse of discretion. See id.
at 510-11.
An HRO is a form of statutory relief that provides a harassment victim with the
ability to “seek a restraining order from the district court in the manner provided in this
section.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 2. An HRO proceeding is not a typical civil matter
and, instead, is considered a “special proceeding.” Fiduciary Found., LLC ex rel. Rothfusz
v. Brown, 834 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). A
special proceeding exists when “‘the law confers a right, and authorizes a special
application to a court to enforce it.’ ” Id. (quoting Schuster v. Schuster, 87 N.W. 1014,
1015 (Minn. 1901)).
The relevant portion of the HRO statute authorizes two remedies which the district
court may order:

(a) The court may issue a restraining order that provides
any or all of the following:
(1) orders the respondent to cease or avoid the
harassment of another person; or
(2) orders the respondent to have no contact with
another person.

Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(1)-( 2). The statute is silent as to the district court’s
authority to prohibit possession of firearms or require surrender of firearms as part of an
HRO.
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Wright argues that the statute’s silence regarding a firearm-prohibition provision
means the district court is without authority to issue such a provision and is, instead, limited
to the two remedies specified in the HRO statute. Egan argues that the district court’s
authority pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.748 is broad and allows for a range of remedies not
limited by the statute. We agree with Wright.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the legislature.” Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013) (quotations
omitted). When conducting statutory interpretation, the first step is to determine whether
a statute’s language is ambiguous. Id. “A statute is only ambiguous if its language is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 537. If the statute is
unambiguous, then a court should “enforce the language of the statute and not explore the
spirit or purpose of the law.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020).
We agree with the parties that Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(1)-(2), is
unambiguous. Section 609.748, subdivision 5(a)(1)-(2), is silent as to the district court’s
authority to prohibit possession of firearms as part of an HRO. And a statute’s silence
“does not render a statute ambiguous unless the silence renders the statute susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation.” Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn.
2012) (citing In re Welfare of R.S., 805 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Minn. 2011)). When considering
silence, the “task . . . is to ‘resolve whether the statutory construction issue . . . involves a
failure of expression or an ambiguity of expression.’” Id. (quoting Premier Bank v. Becker
Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010)). Courts cannot add to a statute “what the
legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.” Ullom v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
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No. 112, 515 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Minn. App. 1994) (quotation omitted). Therefore,
“‘[w]hen a question of statutory construction involves a failure of expression rather than
an ambiguity of expression, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction
and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.’” Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 590
(quoting Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001)).
The silence regarding firearm prohibition as an available remedy in the HRO statute
is the former, a failure of expression. See id. This is in contrast to an order for protection
(OFP), also a creature of statute, that expressly authorizes district courts to prohibit an
abusing party from “possessing firearms for the length the [OFP] is in effect.” Minn Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6(g) (2020). Therefore, the district court lacked authority to include the
firearm provisions in the HRO based upon the unambiguous language of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 5(a)(1)-(2), which does not authorize this remedy.
Our court has previously ruled that a district court is limited to the authority
explicitly identified in the HRO statute. In Roer v. Dunham, we held that a district court
did not have authority to extend an existing HRO beyond two years from the effective date
of the restraining order because, in part, the statute is silent about the court’s authority to
do so. 682 N.W.2d 179, 181-82 (Minn. App. 2004). Our court relied on the same reasoning
we apply here. Specifically, the “statutory rule of construction that this court cannot add
language that is not present in the statute or supply what the legislature purposely omits or
inadvertently overlooks.” Id. at 181 (citing Ullom, 515 N.W.2d at 617).
Egan argues that our court has previously affirmed HROs that contain a range of
remedies going beyond simple no-contact orders. Therefore, Egan claims, the district court
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did not here err by including its firearm- prohibition provision. To support this argument,
Egan directs us to Welsh v. Johnson, in which an HRO provision that prohibited the
harassing party from coming within two blocks of the petitioner’s residence was considered
“permissible” restriction. 508 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. App. 1993). We are not persuaded.
First, Welsh did not contradict the rule of statutory construction that we may not add
words to a statute which includes silence of expression. See 508 N.W.2d at 214- 16;
Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 590. Second, defining a geographic scope is a logical, and
arguably essential, component of an order for no contact— which is one of the two remedies
the legislature specifically authorized. A firearm prohibition is not an authorized remedy
in the HRO statute.2
The HRO statute does not authorize the district court to include a
firearm-prohibition provision in the HRO issued against Wright. Therefore, including such
a provision in the HRO was a misapplication of the law, and the district court abused its
discretion by including the firearm-prohibition provision. See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at
510-11. Though Egan makes arguably reasonable policy assertions about the discretionary
authority of a district court pursuant to the statutorily created HRO special proceeding, we
are “limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d
203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (citations omitted); cf. Leifur v. Leifur, 820 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn.

2 Egan also directs us to Baker v. Baker, to argue that the district court has broad powers
to order injunctive relief. 494 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. 1992). However, Baker did not
consider the HRO statute and instead construed the Domestic Abuse Act. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01 (1990). Further, Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 286-88, did not contradict the rule of
construction later articulated in Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 590, which prevents us from
adding language authorizing relief where the HRO statute is silent.
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App. 2012) (noting a party’s “meritorious policy arguments” supporting a proposed
reading of a statute but rejecting that proposed reading of the statute because “this court
may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”). Because we are an error-correcting
court, we are “without authority to change the law.” Lake George Park, L.L.C. v. IBM
Mid-Am. Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 576 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied
(Minn. June 17, 1998). Therefore, we reverse and remand to allow for the removal of the
firearm-prohibition provision in the HRO because the district court improperly applied the
law. See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 510-11. The HRO remains in effect, and we remand to
the district court to vacate the firearm-prohibition provision.3
Reversed and remanded; motion denied.

3 Wright filed a motion to strike Egan’s addendum filed on appeal and the portions of
Egan’s brief citing to the addendum because they are allegedly outside the appellate record.
Wright also moved to strike portions of Egan’s brief because they are not supported by the
record. We deny the motion to strike as unnecessary in light of our resolution of this
appeal.