Stephen Dontrail Thornton, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0185

Stephen Dontrail Thornton, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 24, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-18-18662, 27-CR-19-5348

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnes ota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court ’s denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas, appellant makes four arguments: (1) his pleas were involuntarily because they
were induced by the legally impossible threat of a life sentence ; (2) his pleas were
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unintelligent because he did not know the full implications of the mandatory conditional
release period that applied; (3) the imposition of the lifetime conditional release term
violated the plea agr eements; and (4) appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel .
We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Stephen Dontrail
Thornton with two counts of first -degree criminal sexual conduct in district court file 27-
CR-18-18662 involving a child victim. The state later amended these charges to include
four separate counts of first -degree criminal sexual conduct . In March 2019, the state
charged Thornton with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in district court
file 27 -CR-19-5348 involving a different child victim, Thornton’s biological son.
Thornton, who was represented in both cases by Andrew Gordon and Josh Esmay, met
with his attorneys multiple times before his scheduled trial in May 2018. Counsel prepared
a plea petition , reviewed it with Thornton, and discussed the consequences of a plea,
including conditional release. On the date of the scheduled plea hearing in May 2019,
Thornton informed the court that he wished to proceed to trial.
At the trial for the first case ( court file 27-CR-18-18662), the state presented the
testimony of numerous witnesses, including the child victim. When the state rested its
case, Thornton informed the court that he w ished to plead guilty in both pending cases,
pursuant to a plea agreement negotiated with the state . The negotiations reflected a global
resolution of both pending cases as well as two, uncharged , age -based criminal sexual
conduct offenses involving two other victims. Thornton agreed to plead guilty to one count
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of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in each court file in exchange for two 144-month
prison sentences, to be served consecutively. The plea petition1 indicated this agreement
as well as the state’s promise not to proceed with the two uncharged, age -based offenses
in exchange for Thornton’s two pleas .2 The petition also listed Thornton’s rights, stated
that Thornton had sufficient time to discuss his c ase with counsel, and noted that his
counsel had discussed with him the possible consequences of pleading guilty. The petition
also explained that a lifetime period of conditional release applied, and that Thornton faced
additional jail time if he violate d the terms of the conditional release. It stated : “For . . .
most sex offenses, a mandatory period of conditional release will follow any executed
prison sentence that is imposed. Violating the terms of this conditional release may
increase the time I s erve in prison. In this case, the period of conditional release is
LIFETIME years.”3
During the ensuing plea colloquy, t he district court confirmed that Thornton had
sufficient time to discuss all the provisions of the plea petition with his attorneys. Thornton
stated that he discussed the petition and the consequences of his decision with his attorneys
and wished to plead guilty. The district court specifically asked Thornton, “And by signing
that petition, you’re telling me that you went through every single item in that petition, line
by line, and your lawyer read it to you and explained anything you didn’ t understand?” to
which Thornton replied, “Yeah.” The district court also confirmed that if Thornton pleaded

1 The parties executed one plea petition and filed this petition in both court files.
2 The state believed that Thornton fathered children with each victim, who were both under
the age of 16 at the time of conception.
3 The word “lifetime” in all caps is written in the blank provided on the petition form.
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guilty to one count of first -degree cr iminal sexual conduct from each pending case , the
state would dismiss the remaining counts and would not charge the other two age-based
criminal sexual conduct offenses. Neither the district court nor the attorneys asked specific
questions regarding the l ifetime period of conditional release. The district court received
the guilty plea and Thornton provided his sworn testimony, admitting to the factual basis
for each guilty plea.
At the ensuing sentencing hearing, Thornton moved to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Thornton argued that his pleas were neither intelligent nor voluntary. The district court
denied Thornton’s motion, finding he waived his trial rights intelligently and voluntarily.
The district court sentenced Thornton to 144 months on each of the court files, to be served
consecutively. The district court also imposed the contemplated lifetime period of
conditional release. Following sentencing, Thornton appealed , and t his court determined
in an order opinion that Thornton was entitled to a new plea withdrawal hearing with new
counsel. State v. Thornton, No. A19- 1341, (Minn. App. Aug. 26, 2020) (order op.), rev.
denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2020) .
On remand, the district court heard testimony from Gordon and Thornton. Gordon
testified that a t the time of the plea hearing, the parties had negotiated for a global
resolution, and Gordon believed that absent a plea agreement, the state would pursue an
actual life sentence in court file 27-CR-19-5348. According to the record from the
evidentiary hearing, d uring the plea negotiations, the prosecutor emailed Thornton’s
attorneys and stated the following: “It occurs to me that your client will be eligible in [court
file 27-CR-19-5348] for sentencing pursuant to Minn. S tat. § 609.3455, subd. 4(a)(2)(i) or
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(ii) [(2016)]. That’s a pretty significant risk to take . . . .” Gordon shared that information
with Thornton. In addition, Gord on testified that the two uncharged incidents of criminal
sexual conduct were also part of the negotiations with the state. Gordon testified that he
believed that absent a plea agreement to the two pending court files, the state w ould seek a
life sentence once it charged the two additional offenses. Gordon also testified that he had
personal knowledge that the district court judge had durationally departed upward in
similar cases and believed that the state would pursue aggravated sentences on the pending
charges, just as it had in court file 27-CR-18-18662. Gordon testified that he s pecifically
discussed the uncharged offenses and the potential consequences with Thornton, which
included the possibility of very lengthy sentences , in excess of the 288 months
contemplated in the plea petition. The record reflects that at some point, Gordon concluded
that Thornton was not subject to life imprisonment under section 609.3455, subdivision
4(a)(2), but the district court determined that Thornton had not established when this
occurred. Gordon also testified that he “absolutely” discussed cond itional release “being
a fact of a conviction,” with Thornton. Gordon testified that Thornton’ s primary focus in
plea negotiations was not on conditional release but on the potential length of his prison
sentence.
In January 2022, the district court issue d its order denying Thornton’ s motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas. The district court found Gordon’s testimony credible and found
that Thornton’s testimony was “self-serving and at points, unreasonable and , therefore, not
credible.” The district court also discussed various potential sentences that included a life
sentence under Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455, subdivision 4(a)(2) ; a life sentence
6
under subdivision 4(a)(3) (2016); and prison terms of more than 1000 months even without
application of subdivision 4(a)(2) or 4(a)(3) . In addition, while Thornton testified that the
plea petition was altered, the district court disbelieved that testimony, stating that this
assertion “is too much and seriously undercuts the credibility of any of [Thornton’s]
testimony.” The district court also disbelieved Thornton’s testimony regarding the
importance of conditional release to Thornton’s decision: “While [Thornton] testified that
he would not have accepted the plea offer if he knew he was subject to mandatory lifetime
conditional release, this Court does not find him credible.”
The district court determined that Thornton’s guilty pleas were accurate, voluntary ,
and intelligent. The district court concluded that Thornton could have faced a life sentence
given the uncharged offenses and that Thornton received adequate notice of the lifetime
conditional release requirement. Finally, t he district court determined that Thornton
received effect ive assistance of counsel. Thornton appeals.
DECISION
Thornton argues that the pleas were involuntary, unintelligent, and the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel. He also argues that the imposition of the lifetime period
of conditional release violated the plea agreement. We first note the general standards of
review that apply and then address each argument in turn.4

4 Thornton filed a pro se supplemental brief, reiterating arguments from the principal brief.
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A defendant must be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea if “withdrawal is necessary
to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.5 A manifest injustice
occurs when a plea is not constitutionally valid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be
constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. The
validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. “The defendant
bears the burden of establishing the facts that support his claim that the guilty plea is
invalid.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). We defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations and review factual findings for clear error. See State v.
Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994) (reviewing questions of fact regarding validity
of a plea for clear error); State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (noting
that appellate courts do not make credibility determinations), aff’d on other grounds sub
nom. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) .

5 Neither Thornton’s principal brief nor his pro se supplemental brief make any argument
under the “fair and just” standard . See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd . 2 (requiring that
district courts balance the prejudice to the state against the stated reasons for withdrawal
under the “fair and just” standard ); see also, e.g., State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97
(Minn. 2010) (noting that appellate courts review denials of motions to withdraw under the
fair and just standard for an abuse of discretion). W e note that the district court expressly
considered the prejudice that with drawal would cause to the state. Because Thornton does
not raise a challenge under this subdivision, we need not review the district court ’s
conclusions that “the state would suffer significant prejudice if [the district court] allowed
[Thornton] to withd raw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial” or that withdrawal “ would
create an immense hardship on the State, the child victim, and the witnesses.”
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I. Voluntariness of Thornton’s Guilty Pleas
Thornton argues that his guilty pleas were induced by the prosecutor’s legally
impossible threat of a life sentence . Because Thornton did not establish that the threat of
a life sentence overbore his will, we conclude that Thornton entered his pleas voluntarily.
“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to
improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. “[T]he government may not
produce a plea through actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994)
(quotation omitted) . Nor can the state induce a guilty plea b ased on the promise of an
illegal sentence. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
Thornton argues that the prosecutor ’s threat of a life sentence was a legal
impossibility that overbore his will. We disagree for two reasons. First, as a legal matter,
a life sentence was not an impossibility. In its opposition to Thornton’s motion to withdraw
and on appeal, the state argues that Thornton could have received a life sentence under
subdivision 4(a)(3), although the prosecutor ’s email initially referenced section 609.3455,
subdivision 4(a)(2), during plea negotiations. The state had filed notice of its intent to seek
an aggravated sentence in c ourt file 27-CR-18-18662.6 Had the state been successful, and
had the state also obtained convictions in court file 27-CR-19-5348 and the two uncharged
offenses, subdivision 4(a)(3) would permit a life sentence.

6 The parties dispute whether this notice was timely. Because the district court could have
determined that the state made a timely notice or that the untimely filing did not prejudice
Thornton, a life sentence under subdivision 4(a)(3) and an effective life sentence apart from
subdivision 4 remain legal possibilities.
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Second, as a factual matter, the district court determined that Gordon did not merely
relay the state’s intent to seek a life sentence, but instead met for two hours with Thornton
and discussed various potential resolutions. Gordon “had significant concerns ” after the
state’s case-in-chief that Thornton “was going to go to prison for a long time.” According
to the complaint, Thornton faced four separate counts representing four separate incidents
in court file 27-CR-18-18662, and each could have been sentenced consecutive to the
others. In addition, the state had filed its notice that it intended to seek an aggravated
sentence in that court file. Gordon also knew that this judge had departed upward in similar
cases and believed that was also a possibility in this case. Given the other pending case
and the two uncharged cases, Gordon reasonably believed Thornton faced what was
effectively a life sentence. As the district court noted, plea negotiations require criminal
defendants to weigh speculative risk and various potential sentences other than life applied
for the charges Thornton faced , including prison terms totaling over 1000 months. Th e
uncontested facts show that the threat of a life sentence did not coerce Thornton’s decision.
He did not decide to plead guilty only because of the threat of a life sentence based on
subdivision 4(a)(2) . Instead, the facts in this case show that Thornton relied on his
attorneys’ advice and his own assessment of risk regarding a range of possible sentences .
In sum, because the prosecutor’s threat of a life sentence was a legal possibility, and
because Thornton did not establish facts sufficient to show the state’s threat of a lifetime
sentence under this section overbore his will , Thornton’s pleas were not coerced by an
improper threat . We affirm the district court’s denia l of Thornton’s request to withdraw
the guilty pleas on voluntariness grounds.
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II. Intelligence of Thornton’s Guilty Pleas
Thornton argues that he did not intelligently enter the pleas because he did not
understand that he would be subject to conditional release for the rest of his life. Because
the lifetime period of conditional release was included in the plea petition and because
Thornton disc ussed conditional release with his attorney, we conclude that Thornton
entered intelligent pleas.
“To be intelligent, a guilty plea must represent a knowing and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action available.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “Whether a plea is intelligent depends on what the
defendant knew at the time he entered the plea . . . .” Id. More specifically, a plea is
intelligent when the defendant understands the charges, the rights being waived, and, most
importantly here, the consequences of entering the plea. Id.; see also, e.g., Brown v. State,
449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989) (concludi ng that a plea was intelligent because the
defendant adequately understood all three aspects of his plea, even though “the
interrogation of defendant was not a model interrogation”).
In this case, at the time of the guilty plea, Thornton signed a plea petition. The
petition states that Thornton had sufficient time to discuss his case with counsel, that his
counsel had discussed with him the possible consequences of pleading guilty, and that
Thornton had a right to a jury trial. The petition stated, “For . . . most sex offenses, a
mandatory period of conditional release will follow any executed prison sentence that is
imposed. Violating the terms of this conditional release may increase the t ime I serve in
prison. In this case, the period of conditional release is LIFETIME years.” Further,
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Thornton agreed during the plea colloquy that he “ went through every single item in that
petition, line by line ” and his lawyer “ read it . . . and explained anything [he] didn’t
understand.” Thornton’s attorney also testified that he “absolutely” discussed conditional
release “being a fact of a conviction,” with Thornton. Given this record, Thornton has not
established that he did not enter intelligent pl eas.
III. Imposition of Conditional Release Term
Thornton also argues that the imposition of a conditional release term violate d the
plea agreement. We are not persuaded for two reasons.
First, we are aware of no authority that requires a defendant to specifically agree to
the applicability of a mandatory period of conditional release. Such periods of conditional
release mandated by statute “cannot be waived.” Kubrom v. State, 863 N.W.2d 88, 92 n.3
(Minn. App. 2015). We decline to adopt a new requirement that defendants subject to
periods of conditional release must do more than acknowledge the applicability of the
mandatory statutory provisions requiring imposition of periods of conditi onal release.
Second, Thornton argues that the imposition of the lifetime period of conditional
release violated the plea agreement based on a series of cases, but those authorities do not
apply here. The cases Thornton refers to all relate to the imposition of a conditional release
term as a n after -the-fact modification to a previous sentence , and they all involve plea
petitions and initial sentencing hearings that failed to include or otherwise mention a
mandatory period of conditional release. See State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 523- 25
(Minn. 2003) (allowing for withdrawal of plea when the district court amended the initial
sentencing order to impose a period of conditional release that was not included in the plea
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petition or mentioned at the initia l sentencing hearing); State v. Jumping Eagle , 620
N.W.2d 42, 43, 45 (Minn. 2000) ( allowing for withdrawal of plea when the district court
amended the initial sentencing order to impose a conditional release that was not included
in the plea petition and was not imposed at the initial sentencing hearing); Brown, 606
N.W.2d at 672-73, 75 (Minn. 2000) (affirming modification of sentence that imposed a
period of conditional release that was not included in the plea petition and was not imposed
at the initial sentencing hearing because the additional period of conditional release did not
extend Brown’s sentence beyond the period of time contemplated in the plea petition); see
also State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 880- 82 (Minn. 1998) (holding that m andatory
periods of conditional release cannot be waived, but allowing Garcia the option to
withdraw his plea because the period of conditional release was imposed at a subsequent
hearing and not included in the plea petition or imposed at the initial sent encing hearing).
By contrast, i n this case, the plea petition specifically included the lifetime period
of conditional release . Thornton discussed the period of conditional release with his
attorney prior to pleading guilty, and the district court imposed the period of conditional
release at the initial sentencing hearing. Indeed, the supreme court has affirmed the denial
of a request to withdraw a plea when the plea petition and ensuing colloquy made no
mention of the applicable period of conditional release, but the period of conditional release
was noted in the presentence investigation report and the district court imposed the period
of conditional release at the initial sentencing hearing. State v. Rhodes , 675 N.W.2d 323,
325, 326-327 (Minn. 2004) (distinguishing Wukawitz and Jumping Eagle because “the
conditional release term was not mentioned at the sentencing hearing or included in the
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initial sentence” and specifically quoting the portion of Wukawitz that limited the holding
“to those situations where the original sentence did not include conditional release”
(quotation omitted) ). Pursuant to Rhodes, because the plea petition here cont emplated a
lifetime period of conditional release and because the district court imposed the period of
conditional release in the original sentence, the imposition of this period of conditional
release did not violate the plea agreement.
IV. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Finally, Thornton argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
Gordon did not adequately explain the implications of a lifetime period of conditional
release. We conclude that Thornton has not demonstrated the necessa ry prejudice to
support a claim of ineffective assistance.
A two -part standard applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A court may address the two prongs
“in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”
Schleicher v. State , 718 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Minn. 2006). First, the individual alleging
ineffective assistance must show that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.”7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, the individual must
establish to a reasonable probability that “but for the alleged errors of his counsel, he would

7 To the extent that portions of Thornton’s briefs can be construed as arguing that Gordon
provided ineffective assistance of counsel in relaying the state’s plea offers, we disagree.
Thornton has not established that Gordon’s conduct in that regard fell below an objective
standard of reasonablen ess. Gordon duly relayed the state’s position—including the
comments regarding a life sentence —and provided advice based on his experience
regarding the risk of a life sentence and of other lengthy sentences of imprisonment.
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not have pleaded guilty.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 718. In considering this second prong,
the appellate court reviews findings of fact for clear error, see Danh, 516 N.W.2d at 544,
and defers to the district court’s credibility determinations without reweighing conflicting
testimony, see Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843. “Courts should not upset a plea solely
because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for
his attorney’s deficiencies.” Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) .
Thornton asserts that but for his attorney’ s ineffective advice regarding the period
of conditional release, he would not have pleaded guilty. The district court, however,
determined that Thornton was not credible when he testified that he would not have pleaded
guilty: “While [Thornton] testified t hat he would not have accepted the plea offer if he
knew that he was subject to mandatory lifetime conditional release, this Court does not find
him credible.” The district court also noted that Thornton only decided to plead guilty after
the state presented its case, and after Thornton “engaged in prejudicial behavior in front of
the jury.” In the district court’s estimation, Thornton faced a difficult choice: “cut a deal
or face a likely straight conviction” on the pending charges. We must defer to the se
credibility determinations and unchallenged factual findings on appeal. Accordingly,
Thornton has not established the second Strickland prong.
Affirmed.