Joseph Eilefson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0189

Joseph Eilefson,
Appellant,

vs.

Park Nicollet Health Services,
Respondent.

Filed August 8, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-14435

Joseph Ronald Eilefson, Hopkins, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

David M. Wilk, Larson King, L.L.P., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s summary- judgment dismissal of appellant -
employee’s claim of employment discrimination and reprisal under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA), Mi nn. Stat. §§ 363A.01- .50 (2020 & Supp. 2021), appellant argues
that he established a prima facie case of religious discrimination and retaliation and that
respondent-employer’s proffered reason for his termination is pretextual. We affirm.
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FACTS
These facts are construed in the light most favorable to appellant Joseph Eilefson as
the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d
758, 761 ( Minn. 1993). In 2007, Eilefson began working as a respiratory therapist at
Methodist Hospital, which is operated by respondent Park Nicollet Health Services.
Because of the delicate relationship between religion and health care, Park Nicollet
maintains a staff of chaplains, chaplain students, and palliative -care physicians to provide
spiritual care. These individuals ha ve specialized training and clinical experience to
provide care for each patient’s and family’s spiritual needs. Because of the risks associated
with improper spiritual care, only trained employees can provide spiritual care at Methodist
Hospital. Eilefson did not have spiritual-care training, so it was outside of his work duties.
Complaints about Eilefson
Eilefson is a Christian and would often share his religion with coworkers and
patients. Five patients raised concerns about Eilefson’s religious conversations and prayers
during his employment with Park Nicollet. Each complaint led to reprimands from one of
Eilefson’s two supervisors.
The first incident occurred in 2013 when a patient complained to Eilefs on’s first
supervisor that Eilefson asked if she was a Christian. In response, the first supervisor told
Eilefson to be “careful” when talking to patients about religion. Eilefson remembers this
conversation with his first supervisor . The second inciden t occurred in May 2014 after
Eilefson asked another patient if she was a Christian and began preaching to her. The first
supervisor told Eilefson to stop talking with his patients about religion. In June 2014, a
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third patient complained, and the first supervisor told Eilefson to refrain from talking about
religion unless a patient brings it up.
The fourth complaint occurred in May 2016. Eilefson began an unwanted
conversation about religion with a patient, who complained to her physician. The physician
contacted the director of spiritual care, who agreed with the physician that Eilefson acted
outside the scope of his employment. Eilefson’s second supervisor told him to refrain from
discussing religious topics or praying with patients unless expressly i nvited. At the time,
the second supervisor did not know of the three other complaints against Eilefson.
The final complaint, and the one immediately preceding Eilefson’s termination,
occurred in May 2018. Eilefson was caring for a patient who was also receiving palliative
care from trained employees. One night, he asked the patient’s husband if he was a
Christian and if he would like to pray. The husband agreed. Eilefson then knelt by the
patient’s bed and prayed that God would “add many more good yea rs to [the patient’s]
life.” Eilefson then told the husband a story about a friend with a terminal-cancer diagnosis
who was allegedly healed by prayer. After hearing Eilefson’s story about his friend, the
patient’s husband believed that prayer could save his wife and concluded that the doctors
were wrong.
The patient later died.
Park Nicollet Terminates Eilefson
The physician primarily responsible for the patient’s care reported Eilefson’s
conduct to Eilefson’s second supervisor, while the social worker and palliative-care doctor
informed their supervisor. The palliative-care doctor’s supervisor filed a formal complaint.
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At a meeting with his second supervisor, Eilefson admitted to the conduct. After contacting
Human Resources (HR), the second supervisor informed Eilefson that he would meet with
HR.
During the HR meeting, Eilefson again admitted to the conduct and became
defensive when the HR representative questioned his behavior. Following the meeting, the
second supervisor reviewed Eilefson’s file and saw the three other complaints. The first
supervisor’s notes, which were contemporaneous with each of the first three complaints,
contradicted Eilefson’s memory of each complaint. Based on these contradictions, the
second supervisor concluded that Ei lefson misled him regarding the previous complaints
against him and recommended that Eilefson’s employment be terminated. An HR
representative agreed. By that time, Eilefson emailed the HealthPartners CEO 1 claiming
that his supervisors falsified documents.
Park Nicollet supervisors independently reviewed the termination recommendation.
The supervisors agreed that termination of Eilefson’s employment was appropriate. Park
Nicollet terminated Eilefson’s employment on June 7, 2018.
Eilefson’s Charge of Discrimination
On April 1, 2019, Eilefson filed a Charge of Discrimination with the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 2 The charge alleges that Park Nicollet

1 Park Nicollet is a subsidiary of HealthPartners.
2 It is not clear from the record whether Eilefson cross-filed the charge with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights or, if so, what action the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights took on the charge.
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terminated him because of his religion. The charge did not allege reprisal by Park Nicollet.
The EEOC reviewed and dismissed Eilefson’s charge.
Eilefson then filed the present claim in district court , which included an allegation
of reprisal against his former employer. After the close of discovery, Park Nicollet moved
for summary judgment. At the hearing on Park Nicollet’s summary- judgment motion,
Eilefson submitted what he characterized as a professional reference from his second
supervisor dated January 15, 2020. The reference was allegedly sent to Emerald Health
Services to help Eilefson secure a new job. The district court excluded the reference as
inadmissible hearsay.
In its order granting summary judgment in favor of Park Nicollet, the district court
determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Park Nicollet
discriminated against Eilefson when terminating his employment. The district court also
determined that Eilefson’s reprisal claim was time-barred. This appeal follows.
DECISION
We discern three issues in Eilefson’s pro se brief. First, Eilefson contests the district
court’s exclusion of the professional reference as inadmissible hearsay. Second, Eilefson
argues that he presented a prima facie case of discrimination. Third, Eilefson argues that
the district court improperly dismissed his reprisal claim as time barred. We address each
issue in turn.

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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the professional
reference.

Eilefson argues that, had the district court considered the professional reference that
his second supervisor allegedly sent to Emerald Health Services in January 2020, then it
would have determined that the second supervisor committed perjury and fraud and that
Eilefson was therefore terminated based on religious discrimination. We are not
convinced.
We review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Doe 136 v. Liebsch,
872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). Eilefson does not explain how the district court
abused its discretion by exc luding the purported professional reference as inadmissible
hearsay. Therefore, Eilefson fails to meet his burden of proving error on appeal. See
Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464- 65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error is never
presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and]
the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”). Similarly, Eilefson
failed to brief this issue adequately and no “prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971); see also Ganguli v. Univ . of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App.
1994) (stating we decline to address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or citation).
II. Eilefson failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination.
Eilefson next argues that he presented a sufficient prima facie case of religious
discrimination. We disagree.
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We review de novo a district court’s summary-judgment decision. See Riverview
Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). “In doing
so, we determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are
genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Id. Summary judgment
is appropriate if “the [moving party] shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P.
56.01. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom judgment was granted. See Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 761. Park Nicollet as the moving
party has the burden to show that summary judgment is appropriate. Valspar Refinish, Inc.
v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 2009). General assertions and speculation
by the nonmoving party are not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial .
See Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995) .
Eilefson contends that Park Nicollet terminated his employment because he is a
Christian. Under the MHRA, an employer may not discriminate against or discharge an
employee because of religion. Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. In construing the MHRA,
we apply both Minnesota caselaw and “law developed in federal cases arising under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101
(Minn. 1999).
Under the MHRA, discriminatory intent may be shown using circumstantial
evidence under the three -part burden- shifting test in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Hoover v. Norwest Priv. Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534,
542 (Minn. 2001). This test first “requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
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discrimination.” Friend v. Gopher Co., 771 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. App. 2009). “Although
the prima facie case varies depending on the type of employment decision that is
challenged, its purpose is to disprove the most obvious legitimate bases for the employment
decision, thereby allowing the inference that the decision was motivated by
discrimination.” Id.
We conclude that Eilefson failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination and
that summary judgment is appropriate. 3 A plaintiff presents a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge by asserting that they: (1) are a member of a protected class ;
(2) were qualified for the position from which they were discharged ; (3) were discharged;
and (4) were replaced by a non -member of the protected class. Id. at 38. The parties only
dispute the fourth prong.
Neither party contends that P ark Nicollet replaced Eilefson with a non -Christian,
but that is not fatal to Eilefson’s claim. Federal caselaw allows for a plaintiff to meet the
requirements of the fourth prong if “ circumstances exist that give rise to an inference of
discrimination.” See Henry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 964 N.W.2d 667, 677 (Minn. App.
2021) (citing Rahlf v. Mo–Tech Corp., 642 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying same
test to analyze age -discrimination claim); Wierman v. Casey ’s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984,

3 Because Eilefson failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination, we need not
consider the other two parts of the McDonnell Douglas test. If Eilefson presented a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden would have then shifted to Park Nicollet to show
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Eilefson’s termination. Fletcher, 589 N.W.2d at
102. If Park Nicollet had met this burden, then the burden would have shifted back t o
Eilefson to show that Park Nicollet’s reasons for the decision were a pretext for
discrimination. Id.
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993 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying same test to analyze pregnancy -discrimination claim);
Wheeler v. Aventis Pharm. , 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2004) (using same test to analyze
race-discrimination claim)), rev. granted (Minn. Oct. 19, 2021); see also Fletcher, 589
N.W.2d at 101 (allowing our use of federal caselaw when reviewing discrimination claims
brought under MHRA).
Even under this relaxed standard, Eilefson fails to make a prima facie case of
discrimination. Other than generally asserting that “he felt he was being discriminated
against and persecuted because of his religious beliefs,” Eilefson does not present
circumstances showing a discriminatory environment specific to Park Nicollet. Eilefson
admitted that he could discuss his religio n with his co- workers and the hospital even
included a copy of Eilefson’s book on the Old Testament in a breakroom. Further, the
decision-making process used that led to Eilefson’s termination did not center on Eilefson
praying with the patient’s husband, but that he stepped outside the scope of his employment
as a respiratory therapist. Thus, Eilefson did not meet his burden of demonstrating a prima
facie case of discrimination.
III. Eilefson forfeited his reprisal claim.
Finally, Eilefson argues that he established a prima facie case of reprisal. Eilefson’s
claim fails. Generally, the MHRA prevents an employer from “intentionally engag[ing] in
any reprisal against any person because” that person “opposed a practice forbidden under
[the MHRA].” Minn. Sta t. § 363A.15. Park Nicollet notes, and we agree, that Eilefson
failed to contest its motion for summary judgment on his reprisal claim. “ Summary
judgment is proper when the nonmoving party fails to oppose the motion by presenting
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specific facts which cre ate a genuine issue of fact. ” Michaelson v. Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. App. 1991), aff’d mem., 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992).
Similarly, arguments not raised to the district court are forfeited on appeal. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Park Nicollet moved for summary judgment on
Eilefson’s reprisal claim, and Eilefson presented no arguments against that motion, either
written or oral. A ccordingly, Eilefson forfeits any arguments on his reprisal claim on
appeal.
Affirmed.