State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0190

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Travis Lee Baas,
Appellant.

Filed December 12, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-20-597

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anneliese L. McCahery, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Thomas K. Hagen, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s admission of evidence obtained from a
traffic stop, arguing that the police officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to
initiate the stop. We affirm.
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FACTS
At around 1:40 a.m. on November 28, 2019, a Blue Earth County deputy was on
routine patrol in downtown Mankato. He had patrolled this area regularly in the past seven
years and became familiar with the surroundings. The road was icy and slushy after a
recent snow, with snow on the sides of the street. Even though there weren’t many people
on the street, the deputy expected an influx when the bars closed at 2:00 a.m.
The deputy was travelling on or near Front Street when, from a block away, he saw
appellant Travis Lee Baas’s vehicle accelerate rapidly after stopping at a stop sign. Based
on his experience and observation, the deputy believed that appellant was speeding. The
deputy turned onto Front Street in the direction that appellant was headed while appellant
travelled parallel to him on Second Street. Based on the time in which it took for appellant
to reach the intersections ahead of them, the deputy believed that appellant was travelling
faster than normal traffic in this area and too fast for the road conditions. While catching
up to appellant’s vehicle, the deputy travelled at a speed up to 54 miles per hour. This area
has a speed limit of 30 miles per hour.
Once caught up to appellant, the deputy initiated a traffic stop. Appellant provided
his driver’s license and told the deputy that he had recently left work and had consumed a
few alcoholic beverages. During his interaction with appellant, the deputy noticed a
moderate odor of alcohol from appellant’s person and saw that appellant had watery and
bloodshot eyes. The deputy suspected that appellant was intoxicated and expanded the
traffic stop into a DWI investigation. Appellant performed field sobriety tests and took a
preliminary breath test that showed an alcohol concentration of 0.148. The deputy arrested
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appellant and transported him to the Blue Earth County Justice Center. A subsequent urine
test indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.114.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with two counts of fourth-degree
DWI, Minn. Stat. § 169A.27, subd. (2) (2018). At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, appellant
moved to dismiss the criminal complaint, arguing that reasonable, articulable suspicion did
not support the traffic stop. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the traffic stop
and denied the motion to dismiss the complaint. F ollowing a court trial, the district court
convicted appellant of fourth-degree DWI—operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of alcohol. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the deputy failed to provide objective, particularized facts to
support his belief that appellant drove above a reasonable speed so as to have authorized a
traffic stop. We disagree.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect persons against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A
police officer may conduct a “brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer
has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965
N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard is
“not high.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). It “requires more than a
mere hunch but is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d
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at 752. We review a district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. State
v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
Courts examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a trained
police officer to determine whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists for the stop of
an automobile. State v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019). “When an officer
observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.”
Id.; see State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004).
Failure to drive with due care and driving above posted speed limits are both
violations of traffic laws. Minn. Stat. § 169.14 subds. 1, 2 (2018). Subdivision 1 of the
statute provides that “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions.” Minn. Stat. § 169.14 subd.1. In other
words, an individual may violate subdivision 1 without exceeding any posted or statutory
speed limit. See id. Recently, we interpreted section 169.14 in a nonprecedential opinion
in State v. Konjaric, No. A18-0724 2019, WL 1320600, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 25, 2019),
and concluded that the standard for subdivision 1 is that of a reasonable and prudent person,
“given the driving conditions and hazards.” Although Konjari is not precedential, we find
its reasoning persuasive and adopt it here. Whereas subdivision 1 focuses on the
reasonableness of the speed, subdivision 2 makes driving above speed limits prima facie
evidence that the speed is unreasonable. Id.; see also Hatley v. Klingsheim, 53 N.W.2d
123, 127 (Minn. 1952) (holding that driving at a speed of 60 miles per hour may be
negligent if special weather or hazards exists, despite it being within the statutory speed
limit).
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Appellant claims it was impossible for the deputy to estimate accurately the speed
at which appellant was driving, because the streets were dark, there were houses
obstructing the view, and the deputy initially only observed appellant’s vehicle from a
block away. Appellant further notes that the deputy did not use markers, radar, or the
pacing method to estimate appellant’s speed. Lastly, appellant questions the reliability of
the speed estimation because the deputy testified that he believed it should take about a
minute to drive the one-half mile to where he stopped appellant, yet his squad video showed
that it took him about one minute and twenty seconds.
Appellant conflates the burden of proof required for a traffic stop with the burden
required for a speeding conviction. The reasonable-suspicion standard required for a traffic
stop is “not high” and “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of
evidence.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted).
A traffic stop meets the standard when an “officer observes unusual conduct that leads the
officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may
be afoot.” Id. (quotation omitted). In contrast, to sustain a conviction for speeding, the
evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ali, 679 N.W.2d 359, 364
(Minn. App. 2004).
Appellant relies heavily on State v. Frandsen , 391 N.W.2d 59 (Minn. App. 1986),
and Ali, 679 N.W.2d. Neither case controls here. Unlike appellant, the defendants in both
of those cases were stopped and charged for driving above the speed limit. Frandsen, 391
N.W.2d; Ali, 679 N.W.2d. Both cases dealt with the sufficiency of evidence for speeding
convictions, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Frandsen, 391 N.W.2d at
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62; Ali, 679 N.W.2d at 364. The issue here, however, is whether the deputy had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to support a traffic stop. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752.
At trial, the deputy testified that he had training in enforcing DWI laws and in
estimating the speed of the vehicles, with a margin of error of two to three miles per hour.
The record shows that the deputy witnessed appellant accelerate rapidly after a stop sign.
The road was icy and slushy, with snow on the side. While the streets were not busy at the
time, the nearby bars were closing soon, and there would be an influx of possibly impaired
people. The deputy tried to catch up with appellant by first travelling parallel to the vehicle
before entering the same street. The deputy observed that appellant drove faster than
normal traffic in the area, and the pursuit lasted approximately 80 seconds. When
attempting to reach appellant’s vehicle, the deputy accelerated up to 54 miles per hour in
an area that has a speed limit of 30 miles per hour.
Based on the road conditions, the time of day, and the deputy’s first-hand
observations, we conclude that the deputy had reasonable, articulable suspicion that
appellant violated Minnesota Statute § 169.14, subdivision 1, for failing to drive with due
care, and subdivision 2 for driving above the posted speed limit.
Affirmed.