State of Minnesota,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-0192

Hennepin County Moore, III, J.

State of Minnesota,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: August 30, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
Stafon Edward Thompson,

Respondent.
________________________

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant
County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Rachel Moran, University of Saint Thomas Legal Services Clinic, Ka Bao Jennrich, Ashley
Fischer, Kimberly Meyer, Certified Student Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
respondent.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S

We need not decide whether the district court erred in concluding that petitioner was
entitled to postconviction relief in the form of a substantive sentencing hearing because the
unique circumstances of this case would warrant the exercise of this court’s inherent
supervisory powers to direct that the district court hold a substantive sentencing hearing in
accordance with State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451–52 (Minn. 1999).
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Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
MOORE, III, Justice.
Appellant State of Minnesota argues that the Hennepin County District Court
abused its discretion when it granted respondent Stafon Edward Thompson postconviction
relief by ordering a substantive sentencing hearing. Thompson’s postconviction petition
requested a substantive sentencing hearing to consider whether Thompson’s modified
sentences of life in prison with the possibility of release should be served consecutively or
concurrently. Irrespective of the district court’s authority to order this relief, the unique
circumstances of this case would warrant the exercise of this court’s inherent supervisory
powers to direct that the district court hold a substantive sentencing hearing in accordance
with State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451–52 (Minn. 1999). Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2009, a jury found Stafon Edward Thompson guilty of two counts of first-degree
murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022) for the premeditated killings of
Katricia Daniels and her 10-year -old son Robert Shepard. 1 Thompson was 17 years old
when he committed the offenses. At that time, Minnesota’s sentencing statutes mandated
that Thompson receive two sentences of life in prison without the possibility of release.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2(1) (2008). However, the district court had discretion in

1 The underlying facts of Thompson’s offenses are discussed in greater detail in State
v. Thompson (Thompson I), 788 N.W.2d 485, 488–91 (Minn. 2010).
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whether to impose the two mandatory sentences consecutively or concurrently. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines II.F.2.b (2008).
The district court proceeded to sentencing immediately after the jury returned its
verdicts, without ordering a presentence investigation report. Five family members
provided victim impact statements to the court. Thompson’s counsel made no argument
on the issue of whether Thompson’s sentences should be imposed consecutively or
concurrently. The district court sentenced Thompson to two consecutive sentences of life
in prison without the possibility of release. We affirmed Thompson’s convictions and
sentences on direct appeal. State v. Thompson (Thompson I), 788 N.W.2d 485, 496 (Minn.
2010).
Thompson’s co-defendant, Brian Flowers, was also convicted of two counts of
premeditated murder under aiding and abetting theories of liability for the deaths of Daniels
and Shepard. Flowers was 16 years old when he committed the offenses. Like Thompson,
the district court sentenced Flowers to two consecutive sentences of life in prison without
the possibility of release. We affirmed Flowers’s convictions and sentences on direct
appeal. State v. Flowers (Flowers I), 788 N.W.2d 120, 134 (Minn. 2010).
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court announced in Miller v. Alabama that the
mandatory imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release
for a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). The following year, both Thompson and Flowers
filed federal habeas corpus petitions challenging their mandatory sentences of life in prison
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without the possibility of release under the new constitutional rule of law announced in
Miller. From here, the co-defendants’ cases took different paths.
In 2014, a federal district court judge granted Flowers’s habeas petition, finding that
Miller applied retroactively. Flowers v. Roy, No. CIV. 13-1508, 2014 WL 1757898, at *5–
9 (D. Minn. May 1, 2014). The federal district court remanded Flowers’s case to the state
district court for resentencing without any limitations on the scope of the resentencing
hearing. The state district court resentenced Flowers to two concurrent sentences of life in
prison with the possibility of release after 30 years. 2 In doing so, the district court
determined that Miller and our decision in Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 281–82
(Minn. 2016), limited its discretion to impose the sentences consecutively. We reversed
and remanded the case to the district court “to exercise its discretion to determine whether
consecutive or concurrent sentences are appropriate.” Flowers v. State (Flowers II), 907
N.W.2d 901, 907–08 (Minn. 2018). Flowers’s resentencing is currently proceeding in state
district court.
The same year that Flowers’s habeas petition was granted, a different federal district
court judge denied Thompson’s habeas petition based on its conclusion that Miller did not
apply retroactively. Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-CV-1524, 2014 WL 1234498, at *2 (D.
Minn. Mar. 25, 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 577 U.S. 1188 (2016). While Thompson’s appeal was working its way through

2 The imposition of sentences of life in prison with the possibility of release after 30
years was consistent with Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 281–82 (Minn. 2016)
(adopting a remedy of “as-applied severance and revival”).
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the federal court system, the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Montgomery v. Louisiana
that its holding in Miller is a new substantive rule of constitutional law that must be applied
retroactively. 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016). In light of Montgomery, the federal district court
vacated the “without possibility of release” provision of Thompson’s sentence and
remanded to the state district court for resentencing. Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-CV-1524,
2016 WL 7231599, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2016). The state district court resentenced
Thompson to two consecutive sentences of life in prison with the possibility of release after
30 years. The state district court did not hold a hearing on the issue of whether Thompson’s
sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently because it determined that the
remand from federal court was limited to the “without possibility of release” provisions of
the sentences.
On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s conclusions regarding the limited remand
from federal court. State v. Thompson (Thompson II), 942 N.W.2d 350, 354–55 (Minn.
2020). Specifically, we determined that because “the remand order was limited to the
singular issue of the possibility of release . . . the district court’s limited revision of the
sentences from [life in prison without the possibility of release] to life with the possibility
of release after 30 years—without reconsidering the issue of whether the sentences should
be consecutive—was not an abuse of discretion.” Id. We specifically noted that “[t]he
substantive issue of whether Thompson’s consecutive sentences ar e commensurate with
his culpability and criminality under the standard articulated in State v. Warren, 592
6
N.W.2d 440, 451–52 (Minn. 1999), is not properly before us.”3 Id. at 355 n.5. But we also
noted that “[n]othing in our decision today forecloses Thompson from seeking otherwise
available relief under the Minnesota postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01.” Id.
In February 2021, Thompson filed a postconviction petition. His petition requested
a substantive sentencing hearing to consider whether, pursuant to the test articulated in
Warren, 592 N.W.2d at 451–52, his modified sentences of life in prison with the possibility
of release after 30 years should be served concurrently rather than consecutively.
Thompson argued that the failure to hold such a hearing violated his constitutional rights
to equal protection and procedural due process. In its answer, the State wrote:
The fact that [Thompson] is the only convicted juvenile multiple murderer
who has never been able to offer arguments about his consecutive sentences
clearly implicates his rights to Equal Protection and Due Process. The legal
mechanism to protect these rights is a postconviction petition pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 590. If petitioner complies with the requirements under § 590
he is entitled to a review of his sentence.

(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
In an order filed on December 14, 2021, the district court granted Thompson’s
postconviction petition. The court determined that the 2-year time bar in Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4 (2022), did not start to run until March 26, 2019 —the date Thompson’s

3 In State v. Warren, we held that “[w]hen reviewing a defendant's challenge to the
imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple convictions of first degree murder
involving more than one victim, we consider whether consecutive sentences are
‘commensurate with culpability and not an exaggeration of defendant's criminality.’” 592
N.W.2d at 451 (quoting Bangert v. State, 282 N.W.2d 540, 547 (Minn. 1979)). In doing
so, “[w]e are also guided by past sentences imposed on other offenders.” Id. While
sentencing in such cases “is within the discretion of the trial court absent an abuse of
discretion[,]” the “exacting” abuse of discretion standard “is not a limitless grant of power
to the trial court.” Id.
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corrected sentences of life with the possibility of release after 30 years were imposed. The
district court reasoned that the time bar began on this date because Thompson’s
postconviction petition focused on his sentences, not his convictions. The district court
therefore concluded that Thompson’s postconviction petition was timely.
As for the procedural bar articulated in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741
(Minn. 1976), the district court determined that the facts of Thompson’s case satisfied the
two exceptions for claims that should have been known, but were not raised, in an earlier
proceeding.4 More specifically, the court determined that Thompson’s postconviction
petition raised a claim that presented a novel legal issue that was unavailable at the time of
his direct appeal because the consecutive sentences “only carried legal significance” after
Thompson’s sentences were changed to life with the possibility of release after 30 years in
accordance with the rule announced in Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206. The district court
also concluded that “it is not in the interest of justice or judicial efficiency to expect a
defendant to raise every issue in their initial appeal that may only take on legal significance
down the road.”
In addition to concluding that Thompson properly pled his case under section 590.01
by filing a timely postconviction petition, which raised claims that were not procedurally

4 When a claim was not previously raised, there are two exceptions to the Knaffla bar:
“(1) a novel legal issue is presented that was unavailable at the time of the direct appeal;
or (2) the interest of justice requires review.” Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665,
673 (Minn. 2020). In the context of Knaffla, “the interests-of-justice exception applies
only when the claim has substantive merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and
inexcusably fail to raise the [claim]” in previous appeals. Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d
295, 304 (Minn. 2021) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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barred under Knaffla, the district court also considered Thompson’s equal protection and
procedural due process claims. The district court noted that the State, in its answer, “nearly
concede[d]” the violations of Thompson’s constitutional rights by acknowledging that
Thompson would be entitled to a hearing if he had properly pled his case under section
590.01.5
In discussing the equal protection claim, the court observed, “No rational basis was
provided [by the State] for why Mr. Thompson should be treated differently, other than the
State’s argument [that] Mr. Thompson is not [substantively] entitled to the concurrent
sentences he would seek at the contested sentencing hearing.” The court also concluded
that past cases involving juvenile offenders who were sentenced to consecutive sentences
of life in prison supported Thompson’s procedural due process claim. The court reasoned
that these cases—especially Flowers’s case—established “a procedural due process
interest [that] Mr. Thompson will be afforded the same individualized consideration before
consecutive . . . sentences [of life with the possibility of release after 30 years] are
imposed.” It also observed, “This expectation is strengthened by the State’s request for the
same hearing for [Flowers], its historical willingness to have the contested hearing Mr.
Thompson seeks, and the many near-concessions made in the briefing to this court.”
(Footnote omitted.)

5 The district court acknowledged the State’s argument that Thompson should not be
granted a sentencing hearing because, under the State’s view of our precedent, Thompson
would not be entitled to concurrent sentences. But the district court concluded that
Thompson “raised constitutional grounds sufficient to meet the requirements of § 590.01.”
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Based on the analysis outlined above, the district court ordered a substantive
sentencing hearing at which it would consider, pursuant to the test articulated in Warren,
whether Thompson’s modified sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently.
The State now appeals the district court’s postconviction order.
ANALYSIS
“We review postconviction decisions for an abuse of discretion.” Peltier v. State,
946 N.W.2 d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). The party seeking relief
from the district court’s decision must show the district court abused its discretion. See
State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 688 (Minn. 2001) (explaining that Vick, the appellant,
“bears the burden of showing that the court abused [its] discretion”); State v. Doppler, 590
N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999) (same).
On appeal, the State argues the district court abused its discretion by granting
Thompson’s postconviction petition.6 According to the State, Thompson’s postconviction

6 The State also argues the district court ordered a de facto Miller hearing, which
focuses on consideration of the juvenile’s age at the time of the crime. See Miller, 567
U.S. at 465; Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195; Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct.
1307, 1311 (2021); State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 882 n.3 (Minn. 2021). We disagree.
The district court was clear in its conclusions of law that the hearing Thompson is entitled
to is “a resentencing hearing consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision[] in
Warren.” A Warren hearing is for the purpose of “determining whether to impose
permissive consecutive sentences,” and for which “a sentencing court considers whether,
when compared to past sentences imposed on other offenders for similar crimes,
consecutive sentences are commensurate with the defendant’s culpability and criminality.”
Flowers II, 907 N.W.2d at 907. Any overlap of the factors considered at Warren and Miller

10
petition is untimely because “Thompson’s conviction was final 90 days after this Court
issued Thompson I in 2010, and he did not raise this claim within two years.” (Emphasis
added.) The State also contends that the claims raised in Thompson’s postconviction
petition are procedurally barred and do not satisfy the Knaffla exceptions. The State asserts
that the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing is not a “novel legal issue” and that the
interests-of-justice exception is not satisfied in this case because “Thompson deliberately
and inexcusably failed to raise the issue in his last appeal.” The State also argues that the
district court incorrectly determined that denying Thompson a substantive sentencing
hearing would violate his rights to equal protection and procedural due process.
We need not decide whether the district court erred in concluding that Thompson
was entitled to postconviction relief in the form of a substantive sentencing hearing. Even
if the district court erred, the unique circumstances of this case would warrant the exercise
of this court’s inherent supervisory powers to direct that the district court hold a substantive
sentencing hearing in accordance with Warr en, 592 N.W.2d at 451–52. “Justice is a
process, not simply a result.” State v. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 1992). This
process requires the entire “criminal justice system, including judges, prosecutors and
defense lawyers” to be “responsible for the fair administration of justice.” State v. Windish,
590 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn. 1999).

hearings does not mean that a Warren hearing is—or that it will necessarily become—a de
facto Miller hearing. See id. (distinguishing Miller and Warren hearings).

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It is true that “the precise contours of our supervisory power are not easily
delineated.” Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 341 (Minn. 2013) (Pa ul H. Anderson,
J., dissenting), overruled by Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 2016), and
abrogated by Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). However, we also recognize
that “the thread that binds our court’s interests-of-justice jurisprudence is . . . quite simple:
our court must, at times, act as a backstop—the court of last resort—to protect ‘the human,
political, and property rights guaranteed by the constitution.’” Id. (quoting In re Petition
for Integration of the Bar of Minn., 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943)). Our supervisory powers
also may be used to serve the principle of constitutional avoidance. In the past, there have
been circumstances where we have chosen not to determine whether a constitutional right
exists, but have instead grounded relief in the exercise of our supervisory power to ensure
the fair administration of justice. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
Thompson’s case is exceptional in light of the significant constitutional
developments in juvenile sentencing that have occurred since Thompson was originally
sentenced in 2009. Three years after Thompson’s sentences were imposed, the Supreme
Court announced in Miller a new rule of constitutional law that prohibited mandatory life
sentences without the possibility of release for juveniles. 567 U.S. at 479. Four years later,
the Court held that the Miller rule must be applied retroactively to juveniles whose
sentences were already final. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206. In short, it became clear that
Thompson’s original sentences were unconstitutional 7 years after they were imposed as a
result of two landmark Supreme Court cases. Moreover, the specific circumstances of
Thompson’s sentencing are extraordinarily rare. The parties identify relatively few
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juvenile offenders in Minnesota who received mandatory sentences of life in prison without
the possibility of release before the Miller rule was announced by the Supreme Court.
Moreover, they identify only two juvenile offenders who received multiple mandatory
sentences of life in prison without the possibility of release: Thompson and his co-
defendant, Flowers.
When Thompson was resentenced on the limited remand from the federal courts, he
challenged the state district court’s conclusion that it could not reconsider the issue of
consecutive sentencing. We affirmed the district court on appeal, concluding that the
remand order allowed the district court to revise Thompson’s sentences from life in prison
without the possibility of release to life with the possibility of release after 30 years without
reconsideration of whether the sentences should be consecutive. Thompson II, 942 N.W.2d
at 354–55. However, in the same opinion, we signaled to Thompson that “[n]othing in our
decision today forecloses Thompson from seeking otherwise available relief under the
Minnesota postconviction statute.” Id. at 355 n.5. Thompson subsequently filed a
postconviction petition, which requested a substantive sentencing hearing as to whether his
sentences should be served concurrently.
In light of the unique circumstances of this case, including our statement in
Thompson II, it would be manifestly unfair for the district court not to hold a substantive
sentencing hearing in accordance with Warren, 592 N.W.2d at 451–52. We emphasize,
however, that Thompson’s sentencing hearing should be limited to the issue of whether
concurrent or consecutive sentences are appropriate. While the district court may consider
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all facts relevant to the Warren considerations, this hearing is not an occasion to relitigate
Thompson’s guilt of the crimes of which he was convicted in 2009.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.