In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. M. K. and S. A. G., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0198

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. M. K. and S. A. G., Parents.

Filed July 25, 2022
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Waseca County District Court
File No. 81-JV-21-840

Connor B. Burton, Messick Law, P.L.L .C., Woodbury, Minnesota (for appellant-mother
A.M.K.)

Rachel V. Cornelius, Waseca County Attorney, Waseca, Minnesota (for respondent
Minnesota Prairie County Alliance)

Michael K. Mountain, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent-father S.A.G.)

Renae Streich, West Concord, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The district court terminated A.M.K.’s parental rights to a five-year-old child. We
conclude that the district court did not err by concluding that the petitioner proved statutory

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interests. Therefore, we
affirm.
FACTS
A.M.K. gave birth to a child in June 2017. Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota Prairie
County Alliance (MPCA), which provides social services on behalf of Waseca County,
received reports that A.M.K. was homeless, had been diagnosed with a mental illness, and
was struggling to care for both herself and her infant child. The MPCA learned that A.M.K.
was experiencing undue stress in basic tasks such as grocery shopping, clothing the child,
and changing diapers, and the MPCA was concerned about A.M.K.’s ability to
appropriately care for and feed the child.
In January 2018, a public-health nurse reported that the child had two bruises on her
head. The MPCA petitioned the district court to adjudicate the child as in need of
protection or services (CHIPS), and the district court ordered that the child be removed
from A.M.K.’s custody. The district court allowed a trial home visit in December 2018.
Custody of the child was returned to A.M.K. in March 2019, and the CHIPS case was
closed in June 2019.
In June 2020, the MPCA received a report that it was becoming “increasingly
difficult for [A.M.K.] to manage mental health symptoms” and that there was “a concer n
for the overall well-being of [A.M.K.] and her child.” A.M.K. was referred for voluntary
assistance and services, and a social worker was assigned to the matter. During the next
year, A.M.K. repeatedly was hospitalized for panic attacks and other mental-health issues,
and the child repeatedly was placed with a respite caregiver. After one such hospitalization
3
in December 2020, A.M.K. indicated to a social worker that she had been suicidal. The
child again was placed in respite care , and A.M.K. was admitted for in-patient mental-
health treatment in Owatonna. A.M.K. was involuntarily discharged from that treatment
program in late January 2021 and later was admitted to an intensive residential treatment
program in Minneapolis. A.M.K. was released from the Minneapolis program in early
June 2021, but her dysregulated behavior continued, and the child again was returned to
respite care. The MPCA filed a second CHIPS petition in July 2021 after a bruise was
discovered on the child’s cheek. The district court ordered that the child be removed from
A.M.K.’s custody and placed in foster care.
In November 2021, the MPCA petitioned the district court to terminate A.M.K.’s
parental rights. The MPCA alleged that, since the second CHIPS petition was filed in July,
there had been a lack of progress on A.M.K.’s parenting and mental-health goals. The
petition alleged three statutory grounds for termination.
A two-day trial was held in January 2022. The child’s father, who never was
married to A.M.K., voluntarily consented to the termination of his parental rights. The
MPCA and A.M.K. stipulated to the admission of a diagnostic assessment of the child, the
CHIPS petitions, and two parental-capacity evaluations of A.M.K. The MPCA presented
the testimony of four witnesses: two social workers, the child’s foster parent, and A.M.K.’s
parental-capacity evaluator.
The parental-capacity evaluator testified that A.M.K. had been diagnosed with
generalized anxiety disorder and borderline personality disorder and had a history of
depression, panic disorder, and persistent depressive disorder. She testified that A.M.K.
4
had “difficulty managing her emotions,” a “chronic self-defeating attitude,” and “chronic
indications of suicidal ideation,” which had remained fairly consistent from 2018 to 2021.
She also testified that A.M.K. had “a very low frustration tolerance level” and had scored
“very high” on three domestic-violence inventory scales. She recommended that A.M.K.’s
parental rights be terminated because “the inconsistency in [A.M.K.’s] parenting and the
instability for [the child] would place her at high risk for mental health and emotional health
and behavioral issues.”
Both social workers expressed concerns about A.M.K.’s ability to parent the child.
The first social worker testified that A.M.K. had not made progress in treatment and was
“aggressive” and “not willing to work [the] program.” She testified that A.M.K.’s
instability had adversely affected the child in that the child’s behavior “mirrored” A.M.K.’s
behavior. The second social worker testified that the child’s mental-health issues are
“pretty severe” and opined that the child would require “almost 24/7 care.” She testified
that A.M.K. “undoubtedly loves her child but cannot work past her mental health and her
emotional health to meet the needs of” the child.
The child’s foster parent testified that the child has “special needs ,” had been
diagnosed with ADHD, and “was more like a two -year-old than a four-year -old.” She
testified that “structure and routine” were very important for the child as she “gets
dysregulated pretty easy.” She testified that the child was dysregulated after being with
A.M.K. and that alternating between respite care and A.M.K.’s care “really took a toll on”
the child.
5
A.M.K. testified on her own behalf. She testified that the child-protection
proceedings had been stressful and had negatively affected her mental health but that she
was “doing [her] best” and was “prepared to give [the child her] everything” if she were
able to maintain her parental rights.
Finally, the guardian ad litem testified that A.M.K. “is just not capable of
maintaining her own mental health enough to meet [the child]’s needs,” that the child
“needs a parent who can be with her 100 percent of the time,” that A.M.K. “is available
about half the time,” and that A.M.K. has “struggled with her emotional needs when she is
physically present as well.” The guardian ad litem testified that termination of parental
rights would be in the best interests of the child because A.M.K. cannot appropriately
provide for the child’s needs given her own mental-health needs.
In January 2022, the district court filed an order in which it granted the MPCA’s
petition and terminated A.M.K.’s parental rights to the child. A.M.K. appeals.
DECISION
A.M.K. argues that the district court erred by granting the MPCA ’s petition and
terminating her parental rights.
This court reviews an order terminating parental rights “to determine whether the
district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “Parental rights are
terminated only for grave and weighty reasons,” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370,
375 (Minn. 1990), but this court gives “considerable deference to the district court’s
6
decision to terminate parental rights,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We apply a clear-error
standard of review to a district court’s findings of historical fact and an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review to a district court’s determinations concerning the existence of statutory
grounds for termination, the child’s best interests, and the ultimate decision to terminate
parental rights. In re Welfare of Child ren of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App.
2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648,
657 (Minn. App. 2018).
I. Statutory Grounds for Termination
A.M.K. first argues that the district court erred by concluding that the MPCA proved
two statutory grounds for termination.
Before discussing A.M.K.’s arguments, we note that the MPCA alleged three
statutory grounds for the termination of A.M.K.’s parental rights: (1) that she had
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with [her
parental] duties,” see Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2020); (2) that she was
“palpably unfit” to be a party to the parent-child relationship, see id., subd. 1(b)(4); and
(3) that “reasonable efforts . . . have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
placement,” see id., subd. 1(b)(5). The district court concluded that the MPCA proved all
three of the alleged grounds. On appeal, A.M.K. acknowledges all three statutory grounds
but challenges the district court’s findings and conclusions only with respect to the first
two; she does not argue that the district court erred by determining that the MPCA proved
the third alleged ground. A termination of parental rights may be affirmed if at least one
statutory ground has been established. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49,
7
55 (Minn. 2004). The lack of any argument for reversal with respect to the third statutory
ground is a sufficient basis for affirmance with respect to the statutory grounds for
termination. See id. Nonetheless, we will analyze A.M.K.’s arguments.
A. Refusal or Neglect to Comply with Parental Duties
A district court may terminate parental rights to a child if it finds that the parent has
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat . § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2). Parental duties include, among other things, “providing the child with
necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Id.
The district court found that A.M.K. had “failed to provide the necessary control for
the Child’s physical, mental, and emotional health and development.” The district court
also found that the child has “high needs” and requires greater-than-normal emotional
support and stability. The district court further found that A.M.K. had “failed to maintain
stability in her own mental health” and had “consistently demonstrated that she cannot
parent the Child when [she] is having a mental health crisis.” The district court noted that
A.M.K.’s repeated and frequent use of respite care and daycare services indicated that
A.M.K. “could not manage the care for the child.”
The record supports the district court’s findings, both as to the child’s needs and
A.M.K.’s inability to provide the care necessary to meet those needs. The evidence shows
that the child was diagnosed with ADHD and disinhibited social engagement disorder and
exhibited symptoms of other mental-heal th disorders. The child’s diagnostic assessment
8
states that she “needs to have caregivers that are supportive, safe, and nurturing” who could
“be available to meet her needs” and were “willing to learn and develop positive parenting
strategies that will support her emotional and behavioral growth” as well as “a predictable
environment to know what to expect from her caregivers.” One of the social worker s
characterized the child’s mental-health issues as “pretty severe” and opined that the child
would require “almost 24/7 care” from “someone that has the ability to provide quite a bit
of supervision.” This opinion was shared by the foster parent, who testified that the child
benefitted greatly from “structure and routine.”
Several witnesses voiced concerns about A.M.K.’s inability to manage her mental
health and meet the child’s emotional and mental-health needs at the same time. The other
social worker testified that A.M.K. had made little to no progress in improving her
parenting skills, improving her own mental health, or ensuring that the child met routine
childhood-development goals because she was fully preoccupied with “managing day to
day crises.” The parenting-capacity evaluator testified that A.M.K. has a “very li mited
ability to manage her emotions,” which led to an inability to focus on parenting and day-
to-day functioning. Furthermore, the record reflects that the child was first placed in respite
care in December 2020, when A.M.K. was hospitalized, and that A.M.K. spent much of
the next several months in mental- health treatment, during which time she was almost
completely unable to fulfill her parental duties.
Thus, the district court did not err by concluding that A.M.K. “substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
[her] by the parent and child relationship.” See id.
9
B. Palpable Unfitness
A district court may terminate parental rights to a child if “a parent is palpably unfit
to be a party to the parent and child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child
relationship.” Id., subd. 1(b)(4). To justify a finding of palpable unfitness, a parent’s
conduct must be “of a duration or nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably
foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional
needs of the child.” Id.
The district court found that A.M.K. is palpably unfit because she “has not made
any significant improvements in stabilizing her mental health since the 2018 CHIPS case”
and her “continual unstable mental health over the past four years has shown that [she] has
been unable to safely care for the child on a full-time basis.” The district court also found
that A.M.K. and the child “do not share a healthy bond with each other” and that A.M.K.’s
unstable mental health was likely to continue “for the reasonably foreseeable future.”
The record supports th e district court’s findings. The record reflects that A.M.K.
repeatedly has struggled with her mental health for the entirety of the child’s life. Although
custody was returned to A.M.K. after the 2018 CHIPS proceeding, her mental-health issues
resurfaced just over one year later, leading to a series of mental-health crises that required
the child repeatedly to be placed in respite care and then foster care for a substantial period
of time. The guardian ad litem noted at trial that the child had been out of A.M.K.’s home
for more than 700 days as a direct result of A.M.K.’s mental-health issues. Numerous
witnesses testified about A.M.K.’s unstable mental health, her inability to care for the
10
child’s needs on a consistent basis, her lack of a healthy bond with the child, and the child’s
concerning behaviors and under-development. The experts opined that the child’s
misbehavior and under-development was attributable to A.M.K.’s inability to consistently
parent the child due to her unstable mental health.
In addition, the record supports the district court’s finding that these issues would
continue “for the reasonably foreseeable future.” See id. A.M.K. began receiving services
shortly after the child’s birth in 2017 and continued to receive them until March 2019.
Services resumed in June 2020 and continued until trial in early 2022. The parenting-
capacity evaluator testified that, despite receiving substantial services over an extended
period of time, A.M.K.’s mental health was “pretty much the same” in 2021 as in 2018.
The social workers testified that the services provided to A.M.K. “have not seemed to help
her gain any skills in order to be a parent” and that she “lacked the progress” needed to
permit reunification.
Thus, the district court did not err by concluding that A.M.K. is “palpably unfit to
be a party to the parent and child relationship.” See id.
II. Best Interests
A.M.K. also argues that the district court erred by finding that the termination of her
parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
In terminating parental rights, “the best interests of the child must be the paramount
consideration.” Id., subd. 7 (2020). If a district court has determined that at least one
statutory ground for termination exists, the court “shall make a specific finding that
termination is in the best interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); see
11
also In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Minn. App. 2020). The district
court must analyze three factors: (1) “the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child
relationship,” (2) “the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship,” and
(3)“any competing interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); see also
J.R.R., 94 3 N.W.2d at 667. “Because the best-interests analysis involves credibility
determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a
record, we give considerable deference to the district court’s findings.” In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). Accordingly,
we apply an abuse- of-discretion standard of review to the district court’s best-interests
determination. A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 657.
The district court concluded that termination is in the best interests of the child. The
district court addressed the first factor by noting its agreement with the witnesses who
testified that “it was in the child’s best interests to terminate [A.M.K.’s] parental rights to
make the Child available for adoption so the Child would have consistency and
permanency in her life.” The district court addressed the second factor by noting A.M.K.’s
testimony that she wants custody of the child. The district court addressed the third factor
by stating that A.M.K. “has demonstrated she cannot provide for the Child’s emotional and
developmental needs” and that “the Child will require a caretaker that can provide stability
for the Child and a caretaker that is committed to continuing the services for the Child.”
Given the evidence presented at trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its
consideration of the best-interests factors.
12
Thus, the district court did not err by concluding that termination of A.M.K.’s
parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
In sum, the district court did not err by granting the MPCA ’s petition and
terminating A.M.K.’s parental rights.
Affirmed.