Destiny Walker, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0199

Destiny Walker,
Relator,

vs.

St. Paul Public Library,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed November 14, 2022
Reversed
Jesson, Judge
Dissenting, Worke, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 44905197-5

Destiny M. Walker, Winona, Minnesota (pro se relator)

St. Paul Public Library, St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
2

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
On what she thought would be her last week before a planned leave of absence,
relator Destiny Walker was instead asked to sign a separation of employment by respondent
St. Paul Public Library (the library). She signed the document. After two hearings, an
unemployment law judge (ULJ) decided that because Walker quit, she was ineligible for
employment benefits. But because the record reflects Walker was never given the
opportunity to keep working, she could not have made the free-will choice to quit.
Accordingly, substantial evidence does not support the ULJ’s finding that Walker quit and
we reverse.
FACTS
Walker, a college student at St. Mary’s University in Winona, worked part-time for
the library between October 2017 and August 2020. Walker worked during the summer
months and took leave s of absence during the school years. Midway through summer
2020, Walker informed the library of a date to begin what she thought would be her
school-year leave of absence. But during her last week, Walker’s supervisor told her that
she would not be able to take a leave o f absence. Instead, the supervisor said Walker
needed to sign a separation of employment, which she did.
Walker then applied for unemployment benefits and initially received payments.
But in March 2021, Respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED) issued a determination of ineligibility, stating that Walker was not
eligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her job. Her appeal of that
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determination resulted in two hearings before a ULJ. In the first hearing, which the library
did not attend despite contesting the award of benefits, the ULJ decided that Walker was
discharged, so she could receive benefits. The library requested a second hearing.
At the second hearing, both Walker and the library participated. The library’s
representative explained that at the time of Walker’s separation, the library had a hiring
freeze due to COVID-19. As a result, they could not hold Walker’s position for her while
she attended school. Instead, the library needed to hire another employee to work the hours
Walker had been working. The library’s representative testified that Walker was highly
regarded by her supervisors, and she could have chosen to keep working at the library if
she wanted to. But the representative did not know if Walker was told of that choice.
Walker testified that she was not offered the opportunity to continue working before
signing the separation document.
1
After the second hearing, the ULJ ruled that Walker quit, so she was ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Walker requested reconsideration of this order, and the ULJ
affirmed the second order. Walker petitioned this court for certiorari review.
DECISION
This case asks us to decide whether the ULJ was correct in ruling that Walker quit
and was not discharged. If Walker quit, then she is not eligible for unemployment benefits,
but if she was discharged for reasons other than misconduct, she is eligible to receive them.
Compare Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2020), with id., subd. 5(a) (2020).

1 The separation-of-employment agreement is not in the record, but since neither party
contests its contents, it is not material to our decision.
4

“Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit is a question of fact.”
Midland Elec., Inc. v. Johnson, 372 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. App. 1985). This court will
not disturb factual findings if there is evidence in the record which reasonably supports
those findings. Id. “[W]e review findings of fact in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s
decision and will rely on findings that are substantially supported by the record.”
Fay v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev., 860 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation
omitted). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might find
adequate to support a conclusion. Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers Cmty. Action, Inc.,
917 N.W.2d 813, 816 n.4 (Minn. App. 2018) (citing Minneapolis Van & Warehouse
Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 180 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. 1970)).
An employee quits when “the decision to end the employment was, at the time the
employment ended, the employee’s.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a). A discharge, on
the other hand, occurs when “any words or actions by an employer would lead a reasonable
employee to believe that the employer will no longer allow the employee to work for
the employer in any capacity.” Id., subd. 5(a). An employee has voluntarily quit when
they exercise “a free-will choice to leave the employment.” Pose v. Securitas Sec. Servs.
USA, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn. App. 2016). Accordingly, we turn to whether
substantial evidence supports the finding that the decision to end Walker’s employment
was, at the time she departed, Walker’s choice.
Here, the ULJ determined that the decision was hers stating: “Continuing work was
available to her. The employer planned to fill her role if she went back to school. The date
the employment ended was selected by Walker.”
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But this reasoning behind the factual finding that Walker quit only holds true if, at
the time of her departure, Walker knew that continuing work was available to her. The
library’s representative testified that Walker could have continued her employment rather
than return to school. But no one testified Walker knew this. The testimony from the
library representative follows:
ULJ: Could [Walker] have chosen to not go back to
school and stay working at the library?

LIBRARY: Yes.

ULJ: Um, was that communicated to Ms. Walker?

LIBRARY: I don’t know.

After this testimony, the ULJ questioned Walker:

ULJ: Okay. Um, Ms. Walker, did you have the option
to continue working at the library and not return
to school?

WALKER: I was not told about that option.

If an employee does not know that they have a choice whether to keep working or to leave,
they cannot make the necessary free-will choice to leave employment. Minn.
Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a). And an employee cannot quit unless the words or actions of
the employer allow that employee to make a free-will choice to leave. That is what the law
requires.
This court articulated the free-will-choice requirement in Posey. 879 N.W.2d at
665. In Posey, an employee took time away from work because her family was evicted
and her children had chronic health problems. Id. at 663-64. After her employer gave her
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a notice of discharge, she was denied unemployment benefits because the ULJ determined
that she quit. Id. at 664. But this court reversed, holding that the record did not contain
substantial evidence to support the ULJ’s decision. Id. at 666. The evidence in Posey was
lacking because the employee was never told that taking time off amounted to quitting. Id.
at 667. Because there was no evidence that the employee made the decision to end her
employment before being given the notice of discharge, this court held that she did not
quit. Id.
These facts parallel Walker’s situation. Walker asked to take time off, as she had
done in years past, and was not told until the last moment that she could not take a leave
of absence. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the library told Walker that she could
choose to remain employed rather than take a leave of absence. Accordingly, substantial
evidence does not support that she decided to end her employment entirely of her own free
will. And because Walker was not given the choice whether to continue working for the
library in any capacity, she was discharged. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5(a) (stating that
a discharge occurs when the words or actions of an employer lead a reasonable employee
to believe that they will not be allowed to work for that employer in any capacity).
We are not persuaded otherwise by the fact Walker chose the date for her summer
work to end under the assumption that, once again, she would receive a leave of absence.
That choice, based on her status as a part-time employee, was made long before she learned
that a leave would not be possible. A choice of dates made before becoming aware of the
library’s limited options is not “a free-will choice” to end employment. See Posey,
879 N.W.2d at 665. Perhaps the library guessed Walker would prefer to end her
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employment (and return to school) rather than remain employed at the library. And perhaps
Walker would have done so. Nothing in the record addresses this question, and Walker
never stated that she would be returning to campus for in-person classes in the fall of 2020.2
And an assumption cannot supplant a free-will choice.
In sum, substantial evidence does not support the ULJ’s determination that Walker
chose to end her employment. Rather, Walker was discharged. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 5(a). She was qualified to receive unemployment benefits.
Reversed.

2 We further note that during a pandemic, which was ongoing in August 2020, it is hard to
predict future behavior based on past customs.

D-1

WORKE, Judge (dissenting)
As the majority recognizes, we must determine whether the ULJ correctly found
that Walker quit her employment, and as a result, would be ineligible for unemployment
benefits. Because I believe that the evidence supports the ULJ’s factual finding that Walker
quit her employment, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that Walker
was discharged.
The law guides us to review the ULJ’s determination whether an employee quit
employment as a question of fact. See Midland Elec., Inc. v. Johnson, 372 N.W.2d 810,
812 (Minn. App. 1985). We “review the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable
to the decision and should not disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the
record that reasonably tends to sustain them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place, Inc., 796 N.W.2d
312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). The evidence here reasonably tends to support
the ULJ’s factual finding that Walker quit her employment; that is, when she left her
employment at the library to return to school, it was her decision to end the employment.
See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2020).
The majority states that Walker worked at the library in St. Paul during the summer
months and took a “leave of absence” to attend college in Winona during the school year.
But the record shows no formal agreement, and there is no contract of employment
containing a provision for “leave of absence.” In fact, this arrangement was allowed at the
discretion of the employer. Thus, Walker would essentially quit at the end of each summer
to attend school and assume that she could return the following summer. Walker could
have continued working at the library each year she left to attend school. The library was

D-2

able to accommodate Walker’s desire to leave and return in the summer, until it was not.
At that point, the library was under a hiring freeze due to COVID-19. The record shows
that a “leave of absence” was no longer available, but the library still needed employees,
like Walker, to keep the library operational. At that point, Walker could choose to continue
working, which was available to her, or quit and attend school. She chose to quit.
The majority states that “during her last week, Walker’s supervisor told her that she
would not be able to take a leave of absence.” When this was communicated to Walker,
she had a choice to stay working at the library. But she decided to go back to school in
Winona. She signed a separation of employment, which stated that she was separating for
“personal reasons.” This document, and Walker’s decision to sign it, speaks for itself. It
shows that Walker could have stayed, she did not have to sign the document. It was her
choice to quit working at the library in St Paul to return to school in Winona.
The employer’s representative testified that Walker could have chosen to stay
working at the library. The majority points out that Walker did not make a free-will choice
to leave the employment because she testified that “[she] was not told” that she had this
option. But the record shows that Walker made the decision to leave the employment early
in the summer and communicated this to the employer. Thus, when the employer told
Walker that the leave of absence was not an option in 2020, it was aware that Walker had
already indicated when she planned to leave employment to return to school.
The majority likens this matter to Posey v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.,
stating that “Walker asked to take time off, as she had done in years past, and was not told
until the last moment that she could not take a leave of absence.” See 879 N.W.2d 662

D-3

(Minn. App. 2016). But the two situations are quite different. In Posey, the employee did
not ask for time off like Walker did here and had done in years past. See id. at 663-64. It
was not planned, the employee abruptly was forced to address a family crisis, facing
eviction and caring for her children. Id. And asking for “time off” to address recent
homelessness is not the same as planning a “leave of absence” to move and attend school
in a different part of the state. Finally, in Posey, the record did not demonstrate a notice of
resignation showing the employee’s intent to quit. Id. at 666. Here, we know that Walker
told her employer her last day of work and she signed a separation-of-employment
document. Based on our review of observing factual findings in the light most favorable
to the decision, this evidence reasonably tends to support the ULJ’s factual finding that
Walker quit her employment. Accordingly, I would affirm the ULJ’s decision.