Troy K. Scheffler, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0205

Troy K. Scheffler,
Appellant,

vs.

Brian Richard Helget, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed December 12, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CV-21-84

Peter J. Nickitas, Peter J. Nickitas Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Janine Kimble, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal, appellant challenges the district court’s rule 12.02(e) dismissal of his
civil claims arising from respondent-state-trooper’s response to a “road rage” traffic
incident that involved appellant pointing a handgun at the other driver . Because qualified
and official immunity shield respondent state trooper from liability, we affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant Troy K. Scheffler sued respondent- state-trooper Brian Richard Helget ,
alleging violations of his Second and Fourth Amendment rights, and raising state-law
claims. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). We derive the following facts from
Scheffler’s amended complaint and its attached materials.
On February 11, 2018, Scheffler was driving his vehicle east on Highway 10 in
Sherburne County with his service dog when he was rear-ended by another vehicle. Both
drivers stopped their vehicles on the shoulder. The other driver approached Scheffler’s
vehicle and pounded on the window . Scheffler then pointed a handgun he lawfully
possessed at the other driver and told him to “[b]ack away immediately,” which the other
driver did. Both drivers called law enforcement.
While Trooper Helget was on the way to the scene, the dispatcher informed him that
Scheffler had a handgun and intended to “leave it on his lap until [the trooper] g[o]t there
and then he’ll put it in the glove box.”
When Trooper Helget arrived, he parked behind the other driver’s vehicle and
walked past it toward Scheffler’s vehicle with his gun drawn . He confirmed that
Scheffler’s gun was in the glove box and instructed Scheffler to roll the window up, exit
the vehicle with his hands raised, and back slowly to the rear of the car. Trooper Helget
handcuffed Scheffler and informed him that he was “not under arrest, [he was] being
detained . . . until we [do] a further investigation and figure out what’s going on.”
3
Trooper Helget placed Scheffler in his patrol car and heard Scheffler’s account of
what happened. He then talked with the other driver and heard his account of the incident.
Trooper Helget decided he would seize Scheffler’s gun as potential evidence and prepare
a report for the county attorney to make a charging decision.
Trooper Helget returned to his patrol car and, when Scheffler complained about the
handcuffs being “kind of tight,” removed the handcuffs and returned Scheffler to the back
seat. He finished his investigation by obtaining Scheffler’s insurance and contact
information and gave Scheffler a case number to track his handgun. With Scheffler’s help,
Trooper Helget retrieved the gun from Scheffler’s vehicle. Scheffler then left.
Eleven days later, Scheffler retrieved his gun from the state patrol office in St. Cloud
in a prearranged meeting.
In February 2020, Scheffler sued Trooper Helget, alleging violations of his Second
and Fourth Amendment rights and state-law claims.
Trooper Helget moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and to stay discovery. Attached to this motion, Trooper Helget
submitted patrol-car video of the stop and a transcript of the dispatch call. Scheffler filed
an amended complaint “attach[ing] and incorporate[ing]” the patrol-car video and the
dispatch call Trooper Helget had previously filed with his motion to dismiss and adding an
additional common-law claim.1

1 Scheffler also added a claim against the Minnesota Department of Public Safety pursuant
to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Scheffler raises this issue in his appeal
but presents no argument in support of his claim of error, so we consider the issue waived.
See Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982). Moreover, the district court
4
The district court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss Scheffler’s amended
complaint. Scheffler appeals.
DECISION
We “review de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for
relief . . . [,] accept[ing] the facts alleged in the complaint as true and constru[ing] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851
N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Engstrom v. Whitebirch, Inc.,
931 N.W.2d 786, 790 (Minn. 2019). We “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint,
accepting those facts as true.” Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013)
(quotation omitted). If, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56,” including by giving the parties “reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. However, “a court
may consider documents referenced in a complaint without converting the motion to
dismiss to one for summary judgment.” N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro. Council, 684
N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2004). The materials must be referenced in the complaint itself.
See id. at 491 (concluding it was error to consider affidavits “not referenced in or a part of
the pleading that was the subject of the motion to dismiss”).

concluded that this claim fails because Scheffler does not allege that he was actually
“excluded from participation in or . . . denied the benefits of” any “services, programs, or
activities of a public entity,” which is required to state a claim pursuant to Title II of the
ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
5
Because Scheffler’s amended complaint referenced the attached patrol-car video
and dispatch-call audio, the district court properly considered these materials in its rule
12.02(e) dismissal, and we apply the rule 12.02(e) standard.
I. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity is a defense available to public officials sued for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil
liability if ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d
475, 483 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). Questions of qualified immunity “should be resolved at the earliest possible stage
to shield officers from disruptive effects of broad -ranging discovery and effects of
litigation.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn. 1988) (citing Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987)). To give effect to this goal, plaintiffs must
provide more than conclusory allegations they hope to find factual support for during
discovery, and “should supply in their complaints or other supporting materials greater
factual specificity and particularity than is usually required.” Id. at 676 (quotation
omitted). We review de novo whether qualified immunity applies. Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at
481.
For alleged constitutional violations, determining if qualified immunity applies
requires determining “ whether the facts alleged are adequate to show a constitutional
violation,” and deciding “whether the law regarding the right allegedly violated ‘was
clearly established.’” Id. at 483 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
6
However, strict application of both steps is not mandatory if one resolves the issue.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). “Whether the law regarding the right was
clearly established is a legal question for the court.” Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 483-84.
Scheffler argues that his Second and Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
temporary seizure of his gun and his confinement in the patrol car while Trooper Helget
investigated.
The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.”
U.S. Const. amend. II. “Lawful seizure and retention of firearms, however, does not violate
the Second Amendment . . . [and] even the unlawful retention of specific firearms does not
violate the Second Amendment, because the seizure of one firearm does not prohibit the
owner from retaining or acquiring other firearms.” Rodgers v. Knight, 781 F.3d 932, 941-
42 (8th Cir. 2015). Thus, the temporary seizure of Scheffler’s gun did not violate a clearly
established Second Amendment right.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[I]n the ordinary case,” seizure of property pursuant to a valid
search “is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 -42 (1983) (quoting
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). The Supreme Court “frequently has
remarked [that] probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires
that the facts available to the officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that certain items may be . . . useful as evidence of a crime.” Id. at 742 (quotation
7
and citation omitted). The officer’s belief does not need to be “more likely true than false.”
Id.
When Trooper Helget temporarily seized Scheffler’s gun, he had been informed that
there had been a “road rage” incident and that Scheffler had pointed a loaded hand gun at
the other driver. On these facts, “a [person] of reasonable caution” could believe that
Scheffler intended to cause the other driver fear of immediate bodily harm, which would
be a crime for which the gun would be useful evidence. Id. (quotation omitted); see also
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.222 (criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon), .02, subds. 6
(defining “dangerous weapon” as “any firearm, whether loaded or unload ed”), 10(1)
(defining “assault” as “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily
harm or death”) (2016). Thus, seizure of Scheffler’s gun as potential evidence was
reasonable and, therefore, not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Scheffler also argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by Trooper
Helget “extending the detention beyond the time needed to complete the traffic-ticketing
process” without “reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity may be afoot.”
Confinement in a patrol car may be reasonable if it relates to the lawful basis for a
stop, furthers investigation of a lawfully discovered offense, or protects officer safety.
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 369- 70 (Minn. 2004). Minnesota applies the
principles and framework set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to determine
whether seizure during a traffic stop is reasonable. State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38
(Minn. 2021). Terry provides a two-prong analysis which first asks, “whether the traffic
stop was justified at it s inception,” then whether the “scope and methods of a search or
8
seizure” invalidated the stop by making it “intolerable in its intensity or scope.” Id .
(quotations omitted).
Trooper Helget detained Scheffler in his patrol car because he believed it was
necessary to separate the two individuals whose recent conflict involved Scheffler pointing
his handgun at the other person, and the handgun remained in Scheffler’s car. Trooper
Helget reasonably detained Scheffler in the patrol car while he investigated the potentially
deadly traffic incident, ensuring his own safety and the safety of the other driver. See State
v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Minn. 1990) (“The officers had the choice of leaving the
men in the stopped car, but that would have been foolish because the officers were
investigating the possible involvement of the men in a burglary and the men might have
had one or more weapons in the car.”).
Furthermore, Scheffler’s detention lasted only approximately 37 minutes, and
during the entire time Trooper Helget was questioning the parties involved, collecting
insurance and contact information, and preparing a report. When Scheffler complained
that the handcuffs were uncomfortable, Trooper Helget removed them. He also warned
Scheffler to “watch [his] foot” when he closed the patrol-car door, sympathized with him
about the back seat being cramped because of equipment the trooper carried, and offered
to open a window if Scheffler was too hot. Nothing about the temporary detention indicates
an intolerable scope, duration, or intensity. See id. at 119 (noting that the reasonableness
of the time someone is detained is fact- specific and that a 61-minute detention was
reasonable). The facts do not show that the detention of Scheffler violated the Fourth
Amendment, and the district court properly applied qualified immunity.
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II. Official Immunity
“[T]he doctrine of common law official immunity provides that ‘ a public official
charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not
personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious
wrong.’” Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn.
2004) (quoting Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677). In this context, “[m]alice means nothing
more than the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse, or,
otherwise stated, the willful violation of a known right.” Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100,
107 (Minn. 1991) (quotation omitted). “[W]hether official immunity applies turns on:
(1) the conduct at issue; (2) whether the conduct is discretionary or ministerial and, if
ministerial, whether any ministerial duties were violated; and (3) if discretionary, whether
the conduct was willful or malicious.” Vassallo ex rel. Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456,
462 (Minn. 2014). “[T]he conduct of police officers in responding to a dispatch or making
an arrest involves precisely the type of discretionary decisions, often split-second and on
meager information, that [the supreme court] intended to protect from judicial
second-guessing through the doctrine of official immunity.” Kelly v. City of Minneapolis,
598 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Minn. 1999). We review de novo whether official immunity applies.
Anoka Hennepin, 678 N.W.2d at 655.
Scheffler argues that the district court erred by dismissing his state-law claims
because it misapplied the malice standard and “cherry-picked” facts.
“In order to find malice, the court must find that ‘the wrongful act so unreasonably
put at risk the safety and welfare of others that as a matter of law it could not be excused
10
or justified.’” Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 465 (quoting Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582
N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 1998)). As previously discussed, Scheffler’s confinement in the
patrol car and the seizure of his gun were reasonable. And nothing in Scheffler’s complaint
or the incorporated materials suggest that Trooper Helget’s actions “put at risk the safety
and welfare of others.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Contrary to Scheffler’s argument that the district court erroneously based its
lack-of-malice conclusion on the fact that “Trooper Helget was respectful, polite, [and]
thoughtful,” the district court cited the correct law and thoroughly explained why Trooper
Helget’s actions were reasonable. Our de novo review of the complaint and incorporated
materials confirms the district court’s analysis and conclusion. See Anoka Hennepin, 678
N.W.2d at 655.
Scheffler also argues that the district court “‘cherry-picked’ [facts] for its narrative,”
citing a Seventh Circuit case reversing a federal rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Federated
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2020). But the district
court order shows only appropriate selection of the relevant facts and, moreover, Federated
interpreted the federal civil-procedure rules, not the Minnesota rules. 2
Affirmed.

2 Scheffler also argues that his complaint was erroneously dismissed because the district
court had approved his application to proceed in forma pauperis. This argument is
unpersuasive because it conflates the separate standards applied to an application to
proceed in forma pauperis and a rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss.