Tyler Douglas Flantz, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0206

Tyler Douglas Flantz, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 28, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-18-5482

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the di strict court ’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, arguing that the district court should have vacated one of his convictions for
possession of child pornography pursuant to the provisions of Minnesota Statutes sections
2
609.04 and 609.035 (2016). We conclude that because the two convictions at issue involve
separate victims, neither section applies, and we affirm the district court’s decision.
FACTS
On August 17, 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tyler
Douglas Flantz with five counts of possession of pornographic work involving minors in
violation of Minnesota Statutes, section 617.247, subdivision 4(a) (2016). Flantz pleaded
guilty to counts two through five in exchange for the dismissal of count one. Each count
corresponded to a different pornographic image, and Flantz admitted during the plea
colloquy that the images depicted different children. Specifically, Flantz admitted that the
female child depicted in image D (corresponding to count four) was a different victim than
the female child depicted in image E (corresponding to count five ). The district court
accepted Flantz’s pleas and sentenced him to four concurrent prison terms.
Flantz filed a direct appeal , challenging the district court’s calculation of his
criminal history score and the order in which the district court imposed the four concurrent
sentences. State v. Flantz, No. A20-0667, 2021 WL 957325, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 15,
2021), rev. denied (June 15, 2021). We affirmed, concluding that the district court imposed
sentences for each of the four convictions in the proper chronological order because both
counts four and five were continuing offenses occurring throughout the entire range of
stated dates. Id. at *4. We also determined that the district court included the correct
custody status points when it calculated the applicable criminal history score for each
conviction. Id. Flantz then petitioned for postconviction relief, challenging the validity of
3
his conviction and sentence for count five. The district court denied Flantz ’s petition for
postconviction relief, and Flantz appeals.
DECISION
Flantz argues that the district court should have vacated his conviction for count five
based on the prohibitions in Minnesota Statutes sections 609.04 and 609.035.1 We disagree
and conclude that neither statutory prohibition applies because Flantz admitted tha t the
images corresponding to count s four and five depicted two different children .2
Section 609.04 prohibits a district court from convicting a defendant “twice for the
same offense against the same victim on the basis of the same act.” State v. Goodridge ,
352 N.W.2d 384, 389 (Minn. 1984) . Section 609.035 prohibits a district court from
sentencing a defendant for more than one offense committed during a single behavioral
incident. State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Minn. 2011) . The general prohibition in
section 609.035 does not apply to crimes involving multiple victims. State v. Skipintheday,
717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006) (permitting multiple sentences when the crimes involve
multiple victims and the sentences do not unfairly exaggera te the criminality of the

1 Flantz also argues that his conviction for count five violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses
of the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions. We have previously observed that the statutory
protections “broaden the protection afforded by . . . constitutional provisions against double
jeopardy” and “encompasses [an] appellant’s constitutional double jeopardy protections.”
State v. Bakken, 871 N.W.2d 418, 423 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted) , aff’d, 883
N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2016) . Thus, we limit our discussion to the statutory provisions and
need not address Flantz’s constitutional argument.
2 As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether Flantz has forfeited his arguments , and
they disagree regarding whether his petition is barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d
737, 741 (Minn. 1976). We need not address Knaffla, forfeiture, or whether any
distinctions between sections 609.04 and 609.035 impact the applicability of Knaffla in
light of our decision affirming the denial of Flantz’s postconvicti on petition on its merits.
4
defendant ’s conduct);3 see also State v. Edwards , 774 N.W.2d 596, 606 (Minn. 2009)
(“[W]here multiple victims are harmed by a defendant’s conduct during a single behavioral
incident, that defendant is more culpable than if he had harmed only one victim.”); State
ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 161 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1968) (“[M]ultiple crimes against
multiple victims [may] permit the imposition of more than one sentence.”).
While the rule regarding multiple victims is more frequently discussed when
addressing section 609.035, the rule also applies to section 609.04. State v. Mitjans, 408
N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that the Blockburger rule4 does not apply “if
the greater offense is against one victim and the included offense is committed against a
different victim,” and explaining that the “exception is set out in both section 609.04 and
section 609.035”); s ee also, e.g. State v. Hodges , 386 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn. 1986)
(observing that for both sections 609.04 and 609.035, “the multiple-victim exception
clearly permits three assault convictions if a burglar assaults three different people after
entering a house”). In addition, the rule applies to charges involving pornographic images

3 Even when an exception applies, a district court abuses its sentencing discretion if it
imposes sentences that unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s behavior. See
State v. Longo, 909 N.W.2d 599, 612 (Minn. App. 2018) (concluding that although an
exception to section 609.035 applied, the sentence imposed unfairly exaggerated the
criminality of appellant’s behavior). Flantz, however, makes no such argument, and we
therefore conclude that the sentences imposed did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality
of Flantz’s conduct. See State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397- 98 (Minn. 1998) (rejecting
the argument that imposition of multiple sentences , by itself, constitute s unfair
exaggeration).
4 In Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) , the U nited States Supreme
court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits convictions for a greater and a lesser-
included offense. Section 609.04 codified the holding in Blockburger. Mitjans, 408
N.W.2d at 834-35.
5
depicting separate child victims. 5 State v. Rhoades , 690 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. App.
2004). We review de novo the question of whether multiple sentences and convictions are
permitted in a particular case due to the presence of involves multiple victims.
Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006); see also Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d
590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (stating that appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review to
legal issues when reviewing the denial of a petition for postconviction relief).
In this case, the state charged Flantz with possession of one specific image in count
four and a different specific image in count five. The charges describe each of the two
victims involved , and Flantz admitted that the each of those images depicted different
children. This fact remains undisputed on appeal. 6 Pursuant to the holding in Rhoades,
we conclude that the existence of multiple victims permitted the district court to enter two
separate convi ctions and impose two separate sentences for counts four and five .
Accordingly, the district court properly denied Flantz ’s postconviction petition .
Affirmed.

5 Flantz does not argue that the children depicted in the images are not victims. We observe
that this court previously described the harm s of possessing child pornography and
acknowledged the express purpose of the statute criminalizing this possession: to protect
“minors who are victimized by involvement in the pornographic work.” Rhoades, 690
N.W.2d at 139 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 1 (2002) ).
6 To the extent that portions of Flantz’s brief c an be construed as arguing that this court’s
decision on direct appeal concluded that the same conduct underlies counts four and five ,
we disagree. This would mischaracterize our previous decision, which concerned the date
ranges of counts four and five. See Flantz, 2021 WL 957325, at *4. We held that both
counts four and five were continuing offenses, occurring during the same date range, but
we did not conclude that the con duct at issue constituted a single incident. Id.