State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0213

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shana Renee Petersen,
Appellant.

Filed February 6, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-20-800

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Lindsey Lindstrom, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of two counts of fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance. Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying her motion
to suppress evidence seized when police executed a search warrant for her residence as
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well as evidence seized when police subsequently conducted a warrantless search of her
person. Because the information in the search -warrant application established probable
cause to search appellant’s residence and the subsequent search of appellant’s person met
an exception to the warrant requirement, we conclude that the district court properly denied
the motion to suppress. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In March 2019, the Crow Wing County Sheriff’s Office began an investigation into
allegations that individuals were involved in selling methamphetamine at the Riverton
residence of appellant Shana Renee Petersen. A narcotics investigator with the Crow Wing
County Sheriff’s Office applied for a warrant to search Petersen’s residence for controlled
substances, drug paraphernalia, and other related items.
The search-warrant application was supported by the following information, as
attested to by the narcotics investigator. On March 4, an individual was arrested in Aitkin
County with approximately 13 grams of suspected methamphetamine. The individual
provided information to the arresting officer indicating that he purchased the
methamphetamine in the city of Riverton. The next day, the narcotics investigator went to
the Aitkin County jail to speak with the individual, who agreed to cooperate with the
investigation (cooperating defendant).
The cooperating defendant told the investigator that he had purchased
methamphetamine from M.S. at a house in Riverton and gave the exact address. The
address was that of Petersen’s residence. The cooperating defendant also told the
investigator that M.S. was living or staying at the residence. The cooperating defendant
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indicated that he had purchased methamphetamine from M.S. at the same residence
approximately two months earlier. The cooperating defendant also stated that, when he
was at the residence most recently to buy drugs, he observed a van in the driveway and a
woman in the home. The cooperating defendant indicated that he believed that M.S. drove
a van. The cooperating defendant also stated that during the most recent purchase, he
observed that M.S. had additional methamphetamine in a plastic bag. He described the
quantity of the remaining methamphetamine to the investigator, which the investigator
estimated to be one to two ounces.
After meeting with the cooperating defendant, the investigator drove by Petersen’s
residence on several occasions for observation. On one occasion, he observed several
vehicles at the address including a vehicle registered to Petersen as well as a van registered
to another individual. Several days later, he again observed a vehicle registered to Petersen.
He also saw a young child playing in front of the house. On a third occasion, he observed
a trash bin located on the side of the road near the residence that appeared ready for
collection. The investigator and two other officers collected three bags of trash, which they
later searched. Their search revealed: a small plastic bag containing about 0.13 grams of
marijuana; another plastic bag containing suspected marijuana and methamphetamine
residue; items belonging to small children; and a large number of quart-sized and smaller
plastic bags, two of which tested positive for methamphetamine residue. The search of the
trash also revealed “significant indicia of occupancy showing Petersen to be residing at
that residence.”
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In addition to the above information, the search-warrant application noted that the
focus of the investigation was on three individuals who were residing at or visiting the
residence— Petersen, her adult daughter, and M.S. The application indicated that all three
individuals had previous felony-level, drug-related arrests.
On March 18, 2019, a judge approved the application and issued a search warrant.
The next day, the investigator and other officers executed a search of the residence.
Petersen was at work when the search took place, but her adult daughter was at the
residence. Peters en’s daughter pointed the officers to Petersen’s bedroom. Officers
searched the bedroom and found mail belonging to Petersen along with methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia. Methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were also found in the
kitchen and other areas of the home.
Officers then drove to Petersen’s work. One officer went inside to find Petersen
and asked if she would step outside to speak with him about the investigation. Petersen
agreed and they walked toward the officer’s unmarked vehicle. Before entering the
vehicle, the officer said that he would like to search Petersen for weapons. He made the
request for safety reasons. Petersen responded, “go ahead” and then pulled her arms away
from her body. When conducting the pat down, the officer felt what he believed to be a
methamphetamine pipe. The officer asked Petersen if she had a methamphetamine pipe
and she responded that she did. The officer removed the pipe and a bag containing
approximately 0.7 grams of methamphetamine from Petersen’s pocket. Petersen was not
arrested at that time.
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In February 2020, the state charged Petersen with two counts of fifth-degree drug
possession. Petersen brought a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from her
residence, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause, that the warrant
failed to specify the areas to be searched, and that her bedroom was outside the scope of
the search warrant. Petersen also moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of the
search of her person, arguing that the search was not lawful.
The district court held a hearing on Petersen’s motion. The investigator who
submitted the search-warrant application testified about his investigation leading up to the
filing of the application and the search of the residence after the warrant was issued. He
also testified about the subsequent search of Petersen’s person.
Following the hearing, the district court denied Petersen’s motion to suppress. The
district court determined that the information in the search warrant application provided
probable cause to issue the warrant and that the scope of the search warrant was reasonable.
The district court also concluded that the search of Petersen’s person was justified because
Petersen provided consent to search her person and, in any event, the discovery of drug
evidence at her residence provided probable cause to arrest Petersen.
After the district court denied the motion, Petersen proceeded pursuant to Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, whereby Petersen stipulated to the state’s evidence and waived her
right to a jury trial in order to obtain review of the district court’s dispositive pretrial ruling
on her motion to suppress. The district court found Petersen guilty of both counts of
fifth-degree drug possession. The district court sentenced Petersen to 13 months, stayed
for five years. This appeal follows.
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DECISION
Petersen challenges the denial of her motion to suppress evidence. She first argues
that the district court erred by concluding that probable cause supported issuing the warrant
to search her residence. Petersen next argues that the district court erred by concluding
that the warrantless search of her person was justified as a consensual search or search
incident to arrest. We address each argument in turn.
I. The warrant to search Petersen’s residence was supported by probable cause.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures and require that warrants be issued only for probable cause. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Before searching a residence, police usually must
obtain a valid warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.” State v. Yarbrough,
841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014). Evidence obtained during a search of a residence
without a valid warrant generally is not admissible. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 36
(Minn. 2016).
A valid warrant is one supported by probable cause. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at
622. “Probable cause exists if the judge issuing a warrant determines that ‘there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’” Id. (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Whether probable cause exists is “a practical,
common-sense decision” based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.
To establish probable cause to search a residence, the warrant application must
demonstrate a nexus between the residence to be searched and the crime being investigated.
State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747- 48 (Minn. 1998). But direct observation of a crime
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at the place to be searched is not required. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622. “A nexus may
be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
When a party challenges the issuing court’s determination of probable cause, this
court’s review is limited to the information in the warrant application. Souto,
578 N.W.2d at 747. This court “afford [s] the district court’s determination great
deference.” State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001). Rather than
considering the issue de novo, we consider only “whether the issuing judge had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. Because the issuing
judge’s determination should be based on the totality of the circumstances, we must be
careful not to review each component of the application in isolation.
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732- 33 (1984). The resolution of doubtful or
marginal cases “should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to
warrants.” Id. at 734 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).
Here, the district court considered the information in the application when it
determined whether to issue the search warrant, including the information provided by the
cooperating defendant that he had recently purchased methamphetamine at the residence
along with the officers’ discovery of controlled substances in trash bags collected from a
trash bin adjacent to the property. The district court determined that probable cause existed
to issue a search warrant on the grounds that the possession of controlled substances
constitutes a crime, and there was a fair probability that evidence of a drug crime would be
found at the residence. The search warrant permitted the officers to seize evidence of
controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and related items.
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Petersen argues that the warrant was not supported by probable cause because the
search warrant application did not set forth a “sufficient nexus” between the alleged
criminal activity and her residence. She contends that the warrant application focused on
M.S. selling drugs to the coop erating defendant and that the warrant application failed to
show that M.S. resided in or stayed at Petersen’s residence. As a result, she argues that the
information in the warrant application failed to establish probable cause to support issuance
of a search warrant for her residence. We are not persuaded.
To establish probable cause, the warrant application needed to allege sufficient
information to establish a nexus between the alleged crime and the particular place to be
searched for drugs and related items. Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 747-48. The determination of
whether a nexus exists is made by the issuing judge based on the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the warrant application, not based on any specific
circumstance—such as whether M.S. was living at the residence. Id. at 747 (stating that
“[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” (emphasis added)
(quotation omitted)). And our review of the warrant application reveals that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that
the facts stated in the warrant application established the probable cause necessary for the
issuance of the search warrant.
First, the cooperating defendant who spoke with the officer applying for the warrant
stated that he purchased methamphetamine from M.S. at Petersen’s residence on two
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separate occasions—once shortly before the warrant application was filed and another time
approximately two months earlier. When the cooperating defendant messaged M.S. about
purchasing methamphetamine for the second time, M.S. told the cooperating defendant that
he had approximately seven or eight “8 balls”—a term used to describe an eighth of an
ounce of a controlled substance. While purchasing methamphetamine at Petersen’s
residence, the cooperating defendant observed additional methamphetamine in a plastic
bag. This direct information about drug sales occurring at Petersen’s residence as well as
the information that M.S. had additional methamphetamine at the residence at the time of
the most recent sale supports the district court’s determination that a sufficient nexus
existed between the alleged crime and the place to be searched. See State v. Cavegn ,
356 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1984) (stating that a clearer nexus can be established when
there is direct information that a sale occurred at a specific residence).
Second, officers searched three trash bags found in a bin on the street adjacent to
Petersen’s residence and discovered evidence of drugs and drug-related items in the trash
bags along with items showing that Petersen resided at the residence. The officers found
“a large number of controlled substance related items.” Specifically, one officer found “a
large number of plastic bags” that were quart-sized or smaller and two of the plastic bags
tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. The officers also found a small bag
containing 0.13 grams of marijuana.
Finally, the application stated that Petersen, her adult daughter, and M.S. all had a
history of controlled-substance arrests, which is a factor the issuing magistrate may
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consider when determining probable cause. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 205
(Minn. 2005).
To support her argument that the warrant application was insufficient to establish
probable cause, Petersen also points to the lack of certain details in the application. For
example, she notes that the application indicates that the cooperating defendant observed a
woman at the residence when purchasing methamphetamine in March, but the application
did not provide a description of the woman. But, as noted above, the issuing judge’s
determination of probable cause when issuing a warrant must be based on the totality of
the circumstances. Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 747. And, based on the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the magistrate was justified in determining that the facts
stated in the warrant application established probable cause to support issuing the warrant
to search the residence for drugs and drug- related items. Therefore, the district court did
not err by denying the motion to suppress evidence seized when officers searched
Petersen’s home pursuant to the warrant.
II. The district court did not clearly err by finding that Petersen consented to a
search of her person.

Petersen next challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress the
evidence found on her person. She argues that the warrantless search of her person was
unlawful because the search did not meet any exception to the warrant requirement.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable subject to a few
established exceptions. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015). Any
evidence obtained during a warrantless search is inadmissible unless an exception to the
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warrant requirement applies. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). It is
“well-settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both
a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”
State v. Hanley, 363 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Minn. 1985). For the consent exception to the
warrant requirement to apply, “the state must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that consent was given freely and voluntarily.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846. We review the
district court’s finding of voluntary consent under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.
“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. at 846-47.
Here, the district court found that Petersen consented to the search of her person
when the investigator “asked [her] if he could search her person, before conducting a
pat-down,” and she responded “go ahead” and lifted her arms. In its order, the district court
specifically noted that Petersen did not argue to the district court that the consent was
involuntary. For that reason, the district court declined to address the issue of
involuntariness.
1
On appeal, Petersen contends that the record reflects that the investigator did not
“ask” to search her person but instead stated that he would like to check her pockets for
weapons. On this basis, she argues that the district court erred by finding that the officer

1 The district court also concluded that, even if Petersen had not consented, the search was
justified as a search incident to arrest. We do not address Petersen’s challenge to this
determination because, as discussed below, we agree with the district court’s conclusion
that the consent exception applies.
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“asked” to search her person and by concluding that the search was justified as a consensual
search.
Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in finding that Petersen consented to the search of her person. The officer who
conducted the pat down testified that he went to Petersen’s workplace in plain clothes. The
officer identified himself and then asked Petersen if she would step outside to speak with
him. Petersen agreed and they walked outside toward a police vehicle. Before entering
the vehicle, the officer decided that he wanted to check Petersen’s pockets for weapons to
ensure “officer safety.” The officer testified that he “asked” Petersen if she would allow
him to do so. He further testified that he asked by saying to Petersen, in a friendly manner,
“I would like to check your pockets to make sure that you don’t have any weapons.” She
responded, “go ahead” in a “light way.” She then pulled her arms away from her body.
The officer proceeded to pat the outside of her clothes to “ensure that there were no large
bulges or anything.” While patting her pockets, he felt what he believed to be a
methamphetamine pipe. He testified that he asked her, “[d]o you got a meth pipe?” and
she responded, “yep.” He then seized the item.
While the officer’s testimony suggests that the officer did not specifically phrase his
request to search Petersen as a question, the circumstances surrounding the search do not
raise concerns of coercion or intimidation or otherwise suggest that consent was not given
voluntarily. See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 103 (Minn. 1999) (concluding that
voluntary consent was given based, in part, on the fact that appellant responded to the
request to search “promptly” and “unequivocally”); State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877,
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880-81 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search
of his wallet based , in part, on the officer’s official and persistent questioning). Instead,
the totality of the circumstances reveal that Petersen freely consented to a search of her
person. The district court did not clearly err when it found that Petersen consented to the
search.
In sum, because the district court had a substantial basis for concluding that the
warrant application was supported by probable cause and the record supports its finding
that Petersen consented to the search of her person, the district court did not err by denying
Petersen’s motion to suppress the evidence found in her home and on her person.
Affirmed.