State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0214

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lakaiki Latrice Williams,
Appellant.

Filed December 12, 2022
Reversed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-11066

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Emily M. Asp, Sharon Markowitz, Special Assistant Public Defenders, Stinson LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Lakaiki Latrice Williams appeals from her conviction for first-degree sale
of a controlled substance following a stipulated-evidence court trial. Williams and
respondent State of Minnesota agree that a single dispositive issue has been preserved for
our review: whether the district court erred in determining that probable cause supported
a search warrant that police obtained during their investigation of Williams. We conclude
that the district court erred and, based on the parties’ stipulation that this issue is
dispositive, we reverse.
FACTS
The sole issue in this case is whether one of multiple search warrants that police
obtained while investigating Williams for narcotics sales was supported by probable cause.
That warrant, which a district court judge signed on April 20, 2020, required Alliance
Housing Incorporated to give police a “list of current tenants” residing at a specific
apartment building in Minneapolis and a “list of current unit numbers associated with each
tenant.”
The warrant application states that the apartment building is “a 61-unit sober,
supportive, permanent, singles housing program location,” and that police were
investigating one suspected resident in particular, Williams, for “the possession, and
distribution of controlled substances to wit, Heroin.” According to the application, police
“received information within the recent past, from a Cooperating Defendant [CD] who
provided information on a female [Williams] who is selling large quantities of Heroin out
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of a sober house in Northeast Minneapolis.” The application states that the CD “indicated
the sober house had a black fence around the front of the property.” Additionally, it states
that the CD told police that Williams “drives a vehicle with Texas License plates.”
The warrant application states that the affiant, a narcotics investigator, was aware
that the sober house had “a black fence located on the front of the property.” Moreover,
the affiant queried Williams’s driver’s license and confirmed that, “as of 9/17/2019,”
Williams listed her address as the sober house in question. The search warrant application
states that the affiant drove to the sober house “and located a silver Volkswagen Jetta
parked next to the building.” It further states, “ inside the vehicle your affiant observed a
female matching the description of [Williams].”1
After obtaining and executing the requested warrant, police confirmed that Williams
resided in an apartment at the sober house but learned that she lived in a different unit than
the one listed on her driver’s license. Police then performed a dog-sniff outside of
Williams’s apartment door. Based on the dog’s alert for the presence of controlled
substances, police obtained a second search warrant—not at issue here—to search
Williams’s apartment. In the apartment, police found fentanyl and indicia of drug sales.
Police then obtained two additional search warrants—also not at issue here—for
Williams’s cars, where more narcotics were found. In total, the police recovered 630.89
grams of fentanyl. Williams was arrested and charged with first-degree possession and
first-degree sale of a controlled substance.

1 The search warrant application did not include any information about the car ’s license
plates.
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Williams filed a motion to suppress all the evidence found by the police, challenging
the initial search warrant as unsupported by probable cause, and the subsequent search
warrants as tainted by the illegality of the initial search warrant. The state responded that
probable cause supported the initial warrant and the subsequent warrants were not the
product of the initial warrant. Concluding that probable cause supported the initial warrant,
the district court denied Williams’s suppression motion. Williams filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the district court also denied.
Subsequently, Williams waived her jury trial rights and agreed to submit the issue
of her guilt to the district court to preserve a dispositive issue for appeal pursuant to
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. Williams and the state agreed
that the district court’s pretrial ruling on the legality of the initial search warrant was
dispositive of the entire case. Based on stipulated evidence, the district court convicted
Williams of first-degree sale of 50 or more grams of fentanyl in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 1(4) (2018). The district court sentenced Williams
to 90 months in prison.
DECISION
The parties have limited the scope of our review in this appeal. They agree that the
only question before us is whether the district court erred in determining that the search
warrant directing Alliance Housing Incorporated to give police a list of tenants and unit
numbers was supported by probable cause.
Because the parties have limited our review to this issue, we also note that several
issues are not before us on appeal. We do not consider the threshold question of whether
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Williams had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the list of tenants and unit numbers.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012); State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149,
156 (Minn. 2020) (stating that the threshold issue in a challenge to the constitutionality of
a search is whether the individual challenging the search had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place or item searched). We do not consider whether a warrant is required
to obtain such a list or whether the probable-cause standard applies under these
circumstances. And, because the parties stipulated that our decision on the probable-cause
issue presented here is dispositive, we do not consider whether the subsequent searches in
this case were tainted by the initial warrant.
To answer the single question before us— whether the district court erred in
concluding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause—we first identify our
standard of review. “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence,
[appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law,
whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing — the evidence.” State
v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). In other words, our review is de novo. Id. In
a challenge to the validity of a search warrant, however, an appellate court also gives “great
deference” to the determination of the signing judge that there was probable cause for the
search. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001). The precise question
before the reviewing court is “whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. When considering this question, the
reviewing court should not analyze the individual components of the search -warrant
application in a hyper- technical fashion but should consider whether the totality of the
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allegations established probable cause. State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985).
Our review is limited to the “four corners of the document”; we do not consider information
outside of the search-warrant application in determining whether there was probable cause.
State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 539-40 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 22,
2006). “[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by
the preference to be accorded warrants.” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 (quotation omitted).
Having identified our standard of review, we next turn to the law governing
searches. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no
Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Our state constitution likewise requires probable cause for a search
warrant. Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The probable-cause requirement is intended to
safeguard citizens from rash and unfounded invasions of privacy and from unsubstantiated
criminal charges. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
In considering whether to grant a search-warrant application, a judge must “make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit . . . , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see also Wiley, 366
N.W.2d at 268 (applying this precept from Gates). The issuing judge should examine the
totality of the circumstances to determine if there is probable cause to believe it is more
likely than not that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched . Gates, 462
U.S. at 238; see generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.2(e) (6th ed. 2022).
“Elements bearing on this probability include information linking the crime to the place to
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be searched and the freshness of the information.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747
(Minn. 1998).
Here, an informant alleged that Williams was selling drugs from the apartment
building. When police request a search based on an informant’s tip, the informant’s
reliability and basis for knowledge must be examined as part of the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 303-04 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting State
v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999)), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2004).
Reliability and basis for knowledge must be viewed as “closely intertwined issues” and not
two “independent requirements to be rigidly exacted.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. And the
pieces of information in the affidavit must not be reviewed in isolation from each other.
Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268.
In Ross, we identified six factors for assessing the reliability of confidential, but not
anonymous, informants:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police can corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

676 N.W.2d at 304.
Even wh en an informant is “undeniably credible,” the warrant application also must
show that the informant had a basis for the knowledge passed on to police. State v. Cook,
610 N.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). A basis
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for knowledge can be established through an informant’s first-hand, personal knowledge,
“such as when a [confidential reliable informant (CRI)] states that he purchased drugs from
a suspect or saw a suspect selling drugs to another,” or through “self-verifying details that
allow an inference that the information was gained in a reliable way and is not merely based
on a suspect’s general reputation or on a casual rumor.” Id. at 668.
Applying this law, we now address the information in the search warrant application
at issue here. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo and giving deference to the
judge who signed the search warrant, we consider whether the application establishes a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in Williams’s apartment.
The search warrant application does not directly address th e veracity of the
informant beyond noting that this individual was a CD—a person presumably facing
criminal prosecution and consequently cooperating with the police. Informants who give
information to earn “favor with the police” are considered less reliable than citizen
informants who voluntarily approach law enforcement. State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 71-
72 (Minn. App. 1998) (quoting State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 1990)).
We also note that the search warrant application does not contain other facts from which
we can infer the informant’s reliability, such as the informant’s history of providing reliable
information or a controlled buy.
Police corroboration of the CD’s tip is the only Ross reliability factor present here.
Police do not need to corroborate every detail of an informant’s tip for the tip to be credible.
Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269. “Even corroboration of minor details lends credence to an
informant’s tip and is relevant to the probable-cause determination.” State v. Holiday, 749
9
N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008). But corroboration is not sufficient to lend reliability
to an informant’s tip if the only facts corroborated by police are “easily obtained.” State v.
Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. App. 1991).
Here, the search warrant application states that the affiant was already “aware” of
two details provided by the informant—that the apartment building was a sober house and
there was a black fence in front of the building. The affiant then corroborated one more
detail provided by the CD—that Williams resided in the apartment building. The affiant
viewed Williams’s driver’s license, which confirmed that she listed her address as a unit in
the building. And the affiant drove by the property on one occasion and observed a woman
matching Williams’s description in a car parked outside.
The easily obtained facts here—that the apartment building was sober housing, there
was a black fence in front of the building, and Williams lived there —do not show that the
informant was a reliable source. Indeed, these details are similar to the information that
police corroborated in Albrecht, where we concluded that an anonymous informant’s tip
was not reliable. 465 N.W.2d at 109. There, the informant told police that Albrecht was
dealing and supplying marijuana. Id. at 108. The informant claimed to have observed
marijuana in Albrecht’s home multiple times, described the inside of Albrecht’s home, and
identified the car that would be in the driveway when Albrecht was home. Id. Police
confirmed that the informant had correctly identified the location of Albrecht’s home and
the type of car that Albrecht drove. Id. But observing that Albrecht’s home address and
details about his car were easily obtained facts, we concluded that corroboration of those
facts was not sufficient to establish the informant’s reliability. Id. at 109; cf. Holiday, 749
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N.W.2d at 841 -42 (holding that a CRI ’s knowledge of a defendant’s gang-affiliation,
nickname, and specific apartment location within a building were not easily obtained facts
and showed a personal familiarity with the defendant). Similarly, here, the affiant’s
corroboration of easily obtained information did not show that the CD was particularly
reliable.
The state argues that Williams’s case is distinguishable from Albrecht because th e
search warrant here was just the “first step” in the investigation, whereas the search warrant
in Albrecht was for a search of a home. 465 N.W.2d at 108. But the state conceded at oral
argument that, given the unique procedural posture of this case, our review is limited to
whether the search warrant application satisfies the traditional probable-cause standard.
Thus, because we do not consider Williams’s expectation of privacy in the information
sought, whether a warrant was even required under the circumstances here, or whether
some other legal standard should apply in these situations, the purpose of the warrant is not
a factor in our analysis. Thus, we reject the state’s attempt to distinguish Albrecht on this
ground.
But even if we conclude, as did the district court, that the police corroboration here,
unlike Albrecht, established the CD’s reliability, the search warrant application cannot
overcome a more significant problem. It contains no information about the CD’s basis for
knowledge. The application does not state how or why the CD knew that Williams was
selling drugs out of her apartment. It does not reveal whether the CD had purchased drugs
from Williams, had seen her selling drugs, had heard her discussing drug possession or
sales, or had observed drugs in her apartment. There is simply no information from which
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we can infer that the CD had a basis for knowing the facts alleged. See Cook, 610 N.W.2d
at 668 (affirming the district court’s finding of no probable cause for a warrantless arrest
because a “[r]ecitation of facts establishing a CRI’s reliability by his proven ‘track
record’ . . . does not by itself establish probable cause” and “[t]he information obtained
from the CRI must still show a basis of knowledge” (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 3.3(b), at 121 (3d ed. 1996))); see, e.g., Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269 (holding
that a warrant was supported by probable cause when an informant personally observed
stolen guns and narcotics at the defendant’s residence); Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 840
(holding that a confidential informant’s personal observations of a defendant with drugs in
his residence within the last 48 hours was a sufficient basis for knowledge); State v. Wiegel,
No. A18-2125, 2019 WL 7286956, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 30, 2019) (affirming denial of
a motion to suppress evidence, in part, because confidential informant “provided the basis
for his knowledge—he was on his way to purchase methamphetamine from” the
defendant), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2020); State v. Freeman, No. A14-1759, 2015 WL
732524, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Feb. 23, 2015) (distinguishing Cook, 610 N.W.2d at 668, and
reversing the district court’s finding of no probable cause because the informant “recently
and personally observed [the defendant] at the home with firearms dealing narcotics”).2
Given this considerable shortcoming in the search warrant application, the totality
of the circumstances alleged did not establish that it was more likely than not there would
be drugs in Williams’s apartment. Even deferring to the signing judge as we are required

2 Nonprecedential cases are not binding authority but may be cited as persuasive authority.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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to do, there was not a substantial basis to conclude that the search warrant application
satisfied the probable-cause standard. By concluding otherwise, and denying Williams’s
motion to suppress the evidence, the district court erred. Because the parties stipulated that
this issue is dispositive, we must reverse.
Reversed.