State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0241

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bobby Dawkins, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed February 27, 2023
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-225

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Benjamin
J. Butler, Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his robbery conviction, arguing that (1) a second warrant
lacked probable cause; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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a mistrial after improper, prejudicial testimony had impacted the jury; and (3) a new trial
should be granted because the prosecutor elicited hearsay evidence about appellant’s
admission of guilt. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 9:10 p.m. on December 27, 2020, a man walked up to the cash
register at a Holiday gas station. He showed the cashier a silver gun, set the gun on the
counter, and put his left pointer finger over his mouth. The cashier understood this to mean
that he wanted her to remain quiet and give him money. She gave him the cash in the
safety box, totaling approximately $250. The man put the money in his pocket and left.
The cashier’s coworker sounded the alarm and called the police. Bloomington
police officers arrived at approximately 9:12 p.m. The cashier described the suspect as a
Black male about 5’6” tall. A surveillance video showed that the suspect wore a black
coat, black pants, black hoodie with a hat underneath, black shoes with white bottoms,
black mask, and black gloves. Officers discovered footprints from a single individual in
the fresh snow along where a surveillance video showed the suspect fleeing. An officer
took a picture of one of the footprints showing a clear design that appeared to belong to a
Reebok shoe. Officers and a K-9 dog tracked the footprints to the north door of a three -
story apartment building nearby (the building), where the footprints ended. At
approximately 9:22 p.m., two police officers guarded the north and south doors of the
building. Neither officer saw anyone entering or leaving the building after they arrived.
When officer B came to the building, there were already multiple officers on site.
A woman walking near the building stopped to ask officer B what was going on. Officer
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B identified her as C.B., who stated that she lived alone in an apartment in the building and
that nobody was in her apartment. Officer B obtained her phone number and let her go
back inside.
Officers devised a plan to contact the occupants of each apartment. Dispatch
informed officer B that C.B.’s apartment was associated with a man named Bobby Collins
who potentially matched the suspect’s description. Dispatch then called C.B. and asked
her to come out to talk to the police. This time, C.B. told the officers that “her cousin” was
inside her apartment. She requested to go in first to notify him and then allowed the officers
to come in. The cousin provided an identification card bearing the name “Zuriel Gray.”
When officer R returned to the police department and ran a search under that name, he
realized that the person on the identification card was not the man they met. Based on prior
contacts, the police identified the man in C.B.’s apartment, who is not her cousin, as
appellant Bobby Dawkins, Jr.1
Later, when reviewing officer R’s body-worn-camera video, officer G noticed a pile
of clothes and shoes in the bedroom of C.B.’s apartment that resembled those worn by the
suspect in the robbery. During the investigation, an agent from the Bureau of Alcoh ol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF agent) contacted the Bloomington police with
information that the building owner had reached out to him, claiming that appellant was
staying in C.B.’s apartment again recently and that he thought appellant may be the robber.
On December 29, 2020, the manager of the Holiday station told the police that a customer

1 An officer testified that Bobby Collins is an alias used by appellant.
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stopped in and said that the robber lives on the top floor in the building where C.B.’s
apartment is located.
On December 30, 2020, the police obtained and executed a search warrant for the
apartment and found a silver gun in the couch. During the search, the officers became
aware that the apartment had an assigned storage locker in the same building. They
obtained a second warrant for the storage locker, which they executed on the same day. In
that storage locker, the police found a plastic bag containing multiple items of dark
clothing, including pants, a long-sleeved shirt, a hooded sweater, and other dark-colored
shirts and underwear. The bag also contained a pair of Reebok shoes with a pattern the
same as or similar to the tread marks outside the Holiday.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with first- degree aggravated
robbery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2020), and gross-misdemeanor
giving a false name to a peace officer in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 2 (2020).
During the trial, C.B. and officer G referenced appellant’s history of domestic abuse
and other crimes involving violence and firearms. Appellant moved for a mistrial based
on the alleged negative cumulative effect of these inadmissible statements. Having given
cautionary instructions both during the trial and in its closing jury instructions, the district
court denied appellant’s motion. In addition, officer G testified that C.B. told him that
appellant had admitted to committing the robbery. The district court sustained appellant’s
objection on hearsay grounds.
The jury found appellant guilty of robbery and giving a false name to a peace officer.
Following the guilty verdict, appellant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial, arguing that
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the jury verdict resulted from prejudicial hearsay testimony about appellant’s admission of
guilt. The district court denied the motion and sentenced appellant to 68 months in prison
for his robbery conviction. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant makes three arguments on appeal: (1) the second warrant for the storage
locker lacked probable cause; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion for a mistrial after improper, prejudicial testimony had affected the jury; and (3) a
new trial should be granted because he was prejudiced by officer G’s hearsay testimony
about him admitting to the robbery to C.B. We address each issue in turn.
I. Probable cause supported the second search warrant.
Appellant argues that the second search warrant lacked probable cause because its
supporting affidavit failed to establish a direct connection between the storage locker and
the robbery. We disagree.
“When examining whether a search was supported by probable cause, the ultimate
question is whether there is ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.’” State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Minn. 2005)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). We will uphold a search warrant
when specific facts contained in the affidavit establish a direct connection between the
alleged crime and the place to be searched. Id. at 205 (Minn. 2005). Factors for
determining probable cause include (1) the type of crime; (2) the nature of the items sought;
(3) the extent of the suspect’s opportunity for concealment; (4) information as to where the
suspect would keep the items; (5) facts connecting the place to the crime; and (6) the
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freshness of the information. See State v. Pierce, 358 N.W.2d 672, 673 (Minn. 1984);
Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 206. Although a district court’s determination of whether probable
cause existed to support a warrant is reviewed de novo, appellate courts give great
deference to the issuing magistrate’s determination of probable cause at the time of the
warrant’s issue. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 803-04 (Minn. 2001).
Here, the affidavit states that the surveillance video from Holiday showed that the
suspect was a Black male in all-black clothing who used a silver handgun. The police
discovered clear footprints in the snow leading to the building. Because the police arrived
at the building approximately 12 minutes after the robbery and guarded both its south and
north doors, there was a fair possibility that the suspect concealed evidence in the building.
Importantly, the affidavit detailed the list of items obtained from the search of the
apartment that appeared to be connected to the robbery, including three cellular devices,
one tablet used for exterior CCTV, a silver- tone revolver-styled handgun, a government
identification card and other personal items bearing appellant’s name, an empty shell
casing, a wallet with personal identification cards, and a black coat with fur trim believed
to have been worn during the robbery. When the police learned that the apartment had an
assigned storage locker in the same building, they sought a second, updated warrant for the
storage locker instead of trying to rely on the first warrant for the apartment. Based on the
proximity of the apartment, the storage locker, and where the robbery occurred, the
magistrate judge properly determined that the facts in the affidavit established probable
cause that more evidence would be found in the storage locker.
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However, the basis upon which a judge finds probable cause in a drug-crime case is
different from that in a robbery case. See Pierce, 358 N.W.2d at 673 (stating that type of
crime is factor to be considered in determining probable cause). Appellant first cites
Carter, in which our supreme court held that the warrant for a self -storage unit lacked
probable cause. 697 N.W.2d at 212. Carter is distinguishable for two additional reasons.
First, unlike the stand-alone self-storage facility in Carter, the storage locker here is in the
same building as the searched apartment. Id. at 214. Second, whereas the Carter court
reasoned that the officers’ observation of suspicious behavior around the storage facility
four weeks before the warrant application was too stale to establish probable cause for the
search, id. at 206, the search of the apartment and its assigned locker in the present case
took place only three days after the robbery. The freshness of the information here supports
the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause.
Appellant also cites State v. Kahn, in which we held that a defendant’s possession
of one ounce of cocaine upon his arrest did not provide probable cause to search his
residence approximately 80 miles away. 555 N.W.2d 15 (Minn. App. 1996). In the present
case, however, the storage locker was only several hundred feet away from the Holiday gas
station where the robbery occurred, and the suspect’s footprints led directly to the building
where the storage locker is located.
Finally, appellant appears to argue that the probable cause supporting the search of
the apartment should not extend to the assessment of probable cause to search the storage
locker. However, our review must be guided by the totality of the circumstances rather
than reviewing each component of the affidavit in isolation. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466
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U.S. 727, 732-33 (1984). Applying that standard, and with the great deference we give to
the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause, we conclude that probable cause supported
the affidavit for the search of the storage locker.2
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
for a mistrial.

Appellant argues that the “cumulative effect” of C.B. and officer G’s prejudicial
testimony about appellant’s history of domestic abuse painted him in “a bad light” that
could not be cured. We are not convinced.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016). A district court may grant
a mistrial only if a person can establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
trial would have been different had the incidents resulting in the motion not occurred. Id.
On appeal, the reviewing court may consider (1) whether the introduction of the improper
evidence was an isolated incident; (2) the strength of the state’s case; and (3) whether the
district court gave the jury a cautionary instruction. See State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804
(Minn. 2013); State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016). The district court is
“in the best position to determine whether an error is sufficiently prejudicial to require a
mistrial or whether another remedy is appropriate. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at 819.

2 The state raises a “standing” argument on appeal, arguing that an occasional guest such
as appellant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in C.B.’s storage locker and cannot
vicariously assert the Fourth Amendment rights of the homeowner. Because we already
concluded that there was probable cause for the second search warrant, we need not address
the standing argument.
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During the trial, C.B. volunteered information about her relationship with appellant
being “up and down” and that they had a history of arguments and domestic abuse. The
district court sua sponte gave cautionary instructions both during trial and as part of the
closing jury instructions, emphasizing that the jury may not convict the defendant based on
any prior conduct other than the charged offense.
Subsequently, officer G testified that he identified appellant because Bobby Collins
was “an alias name, or previously arrested name on his fingerprints,” and that after
comparing the booking photos of Bobby Collins and the body- worn-camera video in the
apartment, it was “very clearly the same person.” Appellant raised no objection. The
officer further explained that they reviewed the occupants’ criminal histories involving
violence and gun charges before executing the warrants for the apartment and the storage
locker. Appellant objected, and the district court sustained the objection. At the end of
officer G’s testimony, the district court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony about
the prior arrest and criminal histories of the occupants in the apartment.
First, the record shows that the improper testimony came from two witnesses on
three occasions, but each was brief. Second, physical evidence and testimony from
witnesses established a strong case against appellant. Holiday’s surveillance video
captured a suspect matching appellant’s description, and the footprints outside Holiday led
to the building where police found appellant. A search of the apartment and its assigned
locker revealed incriminating evidence including a silver gun, dark-colored clothing, and
a pair of Reebok shoes with the same tread pattern as the footprints found outside Holiday.
Appellant and C.B. attempted to conceal appellant’s identity during the investigation, and
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C.B.’s inconsistent testimony at trial also supported an inference of guilt. To the extent
that appellant argues that the state did not have a strong case because it relied on
circumstantial evidence, our caselaw is clear that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is entitled to
the same weight as any other evidence.” State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 583 (Minn. 2009).
Third, the district court gave multiple cautionary instructions, both right after the improper
testimony and in its final jury instructions, which we presume that the jury followed. See
Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 262 (“When a court instructs a jury to disregard an improper
question, [appellate courts] presume the jurors followed the instruction.”). Appellant fails
to show that the outcome of trial would have been different had the improper testimony not
occurred. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion for a mistrial.
III. The hearsay testimony does not warrant a new trial.
Appellant contends that officer G’s testimony about appellant’s admission to the
robbery entitles him to a new trial because it is both prosecutorial misconduct and
inadmissible hearsay. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04; Minn. R. Evid. 802. We are not persuaded.
“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings on hearsay for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941, N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). An appell ant
claiming error bears the burden to show “both the error and the prejudice resulting from
the error.” Id. (quotation omitted).
At trial, there were two occasions in which the witnesses testified about appellant’s
admission. When C.B. first denied telling the police that appellant made the admissions,
the prosecutor properly impeached her with her prior inconsistent statement. Minn. R.
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Evid. 613 (b). Appellant does not challenge this impeachment. Subsequently, the
prosecutor asked officer G “did anyone during the investigation tell you that the defendant
made any admissions?” Appellant objected to the question, but the district court overruled.
Officer G answered, “Yes.” No hearsay had occurred so far. Minn. R. Evid. 801. The
prosecutor next asked “what did [C.B.] say?” Officer G responded that “[C.B.] stated that
[appellant] committed the robbery.” Appellant did not object until the prosecutor further
asked “[w]hat did she tell you [appellant] said about the robbery.” The district court then
paused the questioning and sustained the objection on hearsay grounds. 3
As an initial matter, we note that appellant never raised the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct with the district court. “Ordinarily, [a party’s] failure to object to an error at
trial forfeits appellate review.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn. 2006). We
nevertheless may review the claim , in our discretion, under the modified plain-error
standard. Id. at 302. However, appellant’s brief only mentions prosecutorial misconduct
in passing and presents no substantive argument or analysis. Appellant has therefore
forfeited this issue and we will not consider it. See State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 806-
07 (Minn. 2016) (party mentioning alleged error in passing and providing no substantial
argument or analysis forfeits issue and appellate courts need not consider it). 4

3 Because appellant objected before officer G answered the question, no hearsay testimony
occurred. Appellant does not appear to challenge the district court’s ruling sustaining his
objection at trial.
4 Had appellant properly briefed the issue of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct on
appeal, and assuming appellant carried his initial burden of showing plain error, it did not
affect appellant’s substantial rights given that the statement was brief, the state presented
a strong case, and the state did not mention the statement in closing argument.
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Turning to appellant’s hearsay argument, the only hearsay testimony from officer G
was that “[C.B.] stated that [appellant] committed the robbery.” At trial, appellant did not
object to the prosecutor’s question, did not make a motion to strike or seek a curative
instruction. Nor did the district court make a ruling for our review. Appellant therefore
has forfeited the issue on appeal unless plain error occurred when the district court failed
to act sua sponte in response to the objectionable testimony. State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d,
498, 505 (Minn. 2006). Under the plain-error standard, an appellant must show (1) an error
(2) that is plain and (3) affects their substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736,
740 (Minn. 1998). If the court finds that any prong is not satisfied, it need not address the
others. State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). An
error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if “there is a reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Here, substantial evidence at
trial supports appellant’s guilty verdict, including the clothing items matching those worn
by the suspect, the pair of Reebok shoes with the same tread pattern as the footprints found
outside Holiday, and the silver gun found in C.B.’s apartment. Appellant thus fails to
satisfy the third prong.
We therefore conclude that neither the alleged prosecutorial misconduct nor officer
G’s hearsay testimony warrants a new trial.
Affirmed.