State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0246

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kareem Jamar Waites,
Appellant.

Filed January 30, 2023
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-19-9700

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Ole Tvedten, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for first-degree controlled-substance crime,
arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained
from two tracking-device orders. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant Kareem Jamar Waites was convicted of first-degree controlled-substance
crime. The investigation leading to his conviction began in November 2018 when law
enforcement with the Central Minnesota Violent Offender Task Force (CMVOTF)
received a crime-stoppers tip that Waites was selling controlled substances out of his car
and apartment and kept controlled substances in his vehicles. Over the following four
months, officers also received information from a “concerned citizen” and an informant
that Waites sold the substances with his significant other, J.E.H., and that Waites and J.E.H.
used Waites’s 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe in the sales.
In July 2019, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of J.E.H. in the Tahoe and
found 2.5 grams of heroin in the car. The investigating officer applied for a tracking-device
order for the Tahoe pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 626A.36-.38 (2018), which the district court
granted. The following month, law enforcement saw Waites driving a 2018 Dodge
Challenger and learned that it was newly registered to Waites. Law enforcement then
applied for and received a tracking-device order for the Challenger.
Based on the information obtained from the tracking devices, law enforcement
determined that Waites and J.E.H. lived at a residence on Cooper Avenue in St. Cloud. On
three occasions in August, September, and October 2019, law enforcement searched the
trash collected from the Cooper Avenue residence. The trash contained items that tested
positive for cocaine. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant for the residence, which
CMVOTF officers executed in late October 2019. The officers collected evidence from
the home that included suspected heroin and over $7,000 in cash.
3
J.E.H. was at the residence during the search and informed officers that she had been
selling the substances for Waites for about ten months and that Waites brought the
substances to the house. In October 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged Waites
with three counts of first-degree controlled-substance crime.1
Waites filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the two
tracking-device orders (the orders), arguing that the orders lacked probable cause. Waites
further argued that, because law enforcement located Waites’s residence through the
orders, the evidence obtained from the search of his residence must also be suppressed.
The district court denied the motion.
The state amended its complaint before trial, charging Waites with a fourth count of
first-degree controlled -substance crime based on additional testing that revealed the
quantity of heroin obtained from Waites’s residence was approximately 65 grams. Waites
and the state later agreed to move forward with a stipulated -evidence trial under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, that allowed Waites to preserve for appeal his challenge to the
tracking-order and search-warrant evidence. The parties agreed that the pretrial issue of
suppression of the evidence was dispositive, that three of the counts would be dismissed,
and that the stipulated -evidence trial would proceed only on the charge of first-degree
possession of 25 or more grams of heroin.

1 Specifically, the charges were (1) first-degree aggravated controlled-substance crimes
with two aggravating factors; (2) first- degree possession of 25 or more grams of heroin;
and (3) first-degree possession of 10 grams or more of heroin.
4
The district court found Waites guilty of the single count of first-degree controlled-
substance crime based on the stipulated evidence and imposed a 128-month sentence.
DECISION
In his appeal, Waites argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence for two reasons. First, he argues that the tracking orders lacked probable
cause because the factual background to support the order s references evidence of
controlled-substance crimes, but the district court’s probable-cause determinations refer to
the crime of arson, not controlled-substance crime. For his second argument, Waites
contends that, even if the probable-cause determinations had referenced a controlled-
substance crime instead of arson, the factual allegations were not sufficient to establish
probable cause.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect the “right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures” and provide that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
When law enforcement installs a tracking device on a vehicle and monitors its
location, as here, a search occurs within the meaning of the Constitution. State v. Liebl,
886 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. App. 2016) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012)). Thus, monitoring of a vehicle via a tracking device is
only constitutional if (1) the authorizing tracking order is “legally equivalent to a search
warrant” and supported by probable cause or (2) “a specific exception to the warrant
5
requirement applies.” Id. (applying this standard to a vehicle-monitoring search pursuant
to a tracking-device order).
“A warrant is supported by probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted).
Probable cause also requires that there be “a direct connection . . . between the alleged
crime and the particular place to be searched.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn.
1998).
Appellate review “is limited to the information presented in the affidavit supporting
the warrant.” Holland, 865 N.W.2d at 673. Appellate courts review de novo a district
court’s legal conclusions on a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Id. But “great
deference” must nevertheless be accorded the issuing judge’s determination at the time of
the warrant’s issue. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001).
Having set out the constitutional requirements governing tracking orders and the
standard of review, we turn to Waites’s argument that the orders are constitutionally infirm
because they are not supported by probable cause.
A. The orders can be construed as containing probable-cause findings for
controlled-substance crime, despite their mistaken references to arson.

Waites first challenges the validity of the orders because the orders and their
supporting affidavits include probable-cause statements related to arson instead of the
crime which the officers were in fact investigating—controlled-substance crime.
6
The two applications for the orders contain multiple attestations related to the
commission of a controlled-substance crime, such as “[a]ffiant certifies that the Central
MN Violent Offender Task Force is conducting a criminal investigation of [Waites] for the
following criminal offenses: controlled substance crimes,” and “[y]our affiant believes that
the tracking device will aid in the locating of Waites’ co-conspirators as well as additional
residences which Waites may be using to facilitate his controlled substance distribution.”
The second paragraph of each affidavit includes the phrase “controlled substance crime”
four times. The affidavits also cite tips regarding Waites’s alleged controlled-substance
sales from his cars, his former controlled-substance-related conviction, and police finding
heroin in a car registered to Waites.
In the third paragraph of both affidavits, however, the officer states that “[t]he facts
establish[] probable cause to believe arson has been committed or that a particular person
has committed arson.”2 The resulting orders from each affidavit similarly references arson:
The Court further finds there is probable cause to believe that
arson has been committed and that a particular person has
committed arson and that the installation and use of a tracking
device will result in the discovery of evidence which tends to
show arson has been committed or tends to show that a
particular person has committed arson.

Because the probable-cause determinations are for arson but the factual allegations
relate only to controlled-substance crimes, Waites asserts that the orders are invalid. He

2 The affidavits and resulting tracking-device orders for the Chevrolet Tahoe and Dodge
Challenger are nearly identical—the affidavit for the Challenger repeats the same facts as
the Tahoe affidavit and then adds that Waites had been observed driving the Challenger
and that it was newly registered to Waites. We thus analyze them together.
7
maintains that the orders lack the required “direct connection . . . between the alleged crime
and the particular place to be searched.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 747. The state contends
that these references to arson are technical errors which do not affect the orders’
constitutional validity. We agree with the state.
First, despite referencing arson in the sections quoted above, the applications and
orders sufficiently connect the tracking of the vehicles to controlled-substance crime. The
affidavits make no other mention of arson or facts related to arson. Similarly, the orders
list Waites’s vehicle information and state that the tracking devices will be used to
investigate controlled-substance crime. They do not mention arson except in the probable-
cause sentences. Given these facts, we are persuaded that the reference s to arson should
be treated as typographical errors committed by law enforcement in the preparation of the
tracking-order applications that were not caught by the issuing judges. As such, we
conclude that the orders establish the requisite direct connection between Waites’s vehicles
and the alleged controlled-substance crime, despite the erroneous reference to arson.
See id.
Second, analogous caselaw regarding warrant particularity requirements and
misrepresentations in warrant affidavits holds that mistakes in warrants and applications
do not necessarily render warrants constitutionally invalid.
3 For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held in State v. Gonzales that a warrant containing an incorrect address was

3 While Waites does not argue that the orders at issue are insufficiently particular, caselaw
on this issue is instructive because it demonstrates the willingness of reviewing courts to
overlook clerical-type errors in an analogous context.
8
valid where the “address stated in [the] warrant was reasonable for the location intended
and the error did not create a reasonable probability that an innocent party’s residence
would be mistakenly searched.” 314 N.W.2d 825, 826 (Minn. 1982); see also State v.
Kessler, 470 N.W.2d 536, 537 (Minn. App. 1991) (“A search warrant with an incorrect
house number does not lack sufficient particularity when the defendant suffers no
prejudice, the house intended to be searched was searched, and the executing officer went
directly to the house shown to him by an informant and observed by him from the air.”).
The supreme court has also found warrants constitutionally valid where law
enforcement’s misstatements in affidavits were not deliberately or recklessly made and
were not material to the determination of probable cause. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d
211, 224 (Minn. 2010) (holding that “[a]lthough the warrant application here misstates the
location where the taxicab dropped the man and woman off, [nothing] in the record before
us suggest[s] that the misstatement was deliberately or recklessly made or that the precise
location of their drop off was material to establishing probable cause”); State v. Andersen,
784 N.W.2d 320, 328- 29 (Minn. 2010) (stating, in a case where law enforcement made
incorrect statements about the weapons owned by defendant, that “[w]hile greater care in
assembling the application would have been preferable, we do not believe that any of the
alleged misrepresentations or omissions were material to the probable cause determination.
We conclude that the application established probable cause to justify issuance of the
search warrant.”). These cases provide additional support for our conclusion.
9
Having determined that the orders can be construed as containing probable-cause
findings for controlled-substance crime, we proceed to address whether the order s were
supported by probable cause.
B. The tracking-device applications establish probable cause relating to
controlled-substance crime.

Waites next argues that “[e]ven if the issuing court made a probable- cause finding
relating to controlled substance crimes, the tracking-device applications do not support
such a finding.” In its order denying Waites’s motion to suppress, the district court
determined that the applications for the orders established probable cause for controlled-
substance crime, citing six details included in the supporting affidavits 4: (1) “the affiant
had received a [crime stoppers] tip that [Waites] was selling controlled substances out of
his apartment and vehicle”; (2) “a concerned citizen had reported that [Waites] had hired a
third party to drive his vehicle and transport[] 100 grams of fentanyl” and “police
subsequently arrested the third party [in Indiana] and recovered the fentanyl”; (3) “the
police had executed an ion scan on [Waites’s] 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe which tested positive
for the presence of cocaine”; (4) “a confidential informant told police that [Waites] is
involved in the distribution of controlled substances including heroin”; (5) “the police had
stopped [Waites’s] girlfriend [J.E.H.] in the 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe with 2.5 grams of
heroin” and the “girlfriend stated that [Waites] used his vehicle to make weekly trips to the
Twin Cities to pick up heroin”; and (6) Waites has a prior conviction for “the sale and
possession of controlled substances.”

4 As noted above, these facts are repeated in both affidavits.
10
Waites argues this information is insufficient to establish probable cause because it
is stale: the orders were issued in July and August 2019, but the crime-stoppers and
concerned-citizen tips came in late 2018 and the ion scan was in December 2018. He also
asserts that the information from the confidential informant (CI) cannot overcome that
staleness because “[t]he applications in this case provide no information establishing the
informant’s reliability or basis of knowledge.” Waites further points to the fact that law
enforcement had originally obtained a tracking-device order for the Tahoe in March 2019,
but officers removed the device before it expired because they did not obtain useful
information. And, finally, Waites points out that the officers never saw Waites driving the
Tahoe.
Waites’s arguments are not convincing. First, in terms of timing, the application
must be comprised “of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to
justify a finding of probable cause at that time.” Souto , 578 N.W.2d at 750 (quotation
omitted). However, “[a]ppellate courts have refused to set arbitrary time limits in obtaining
a warrant or to substitute a rigid formula for the judge ’s informed decision. Instead, the
question must be determined by the circumstances of each case.” State v. Jannetta, 355
N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. App. 1984) (citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 14, 1985).
And “[w]hen an activity is of an ongoing, protracted nature, the passage of time is less
significant.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750.
Here, while law enforcement received several of the tips up to nine months prior to
the issuance of the first tracking- device order, they also obtained information in the
intervening months that suggested Waites’s and J.E.H.’s criminal activity was ongoing.
11
Most significantly, officers pulled over J.E.H. in the Tahoe in July 2019—within a week
before the first tracking-device order was issued—and found heroin in the vehicle.
Moreover, law enforcement received information from the CI within four months of the
order being issued—more recently than the original tips.
Second, in relation to the CI, the affidavits contain sufficient information to support
the CI’s reliability. According to the affidavits, the CI informed an investigator that Waites
and J.E.H. were involved in selling controlled substances, including heroin. The CI also
said that when they met with J.E.H., J.E.H. was driving the Tahoe which law enforcement
knew was registered to Waites, and the CI saw controlled substances in the car. Four
months later, officers pulled over the Tahoe, J.E.H. was driving, there was heroin inside,
and J.E.H. told the officers that Waites uses the Tahoe to pick up heroin. This traffic stop
corroborated the CI’s information. See State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 840-41 (Minn.
App. 2008) (stating that a confidential informant’s “veracity can be proven by showing that
details of the tip have been sufficiently corroborated so that it is clear the informant is
telling the truth on this occasion” and that “the corroboration of even minor details” can
bolster a CI’s reliability (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304
(Minn. App. 2004) (stating that one of the six factors that indicates CI reliability is when
the police can corroborate the CI’s information).
In addition, as the district court noted, the affidavits listed a prior controlled-
substance conviction for Waites, as well as J.E.H., with whom Waites was alleged to be
selling controlled substances and in a romantic relationship. These controlled-substance -
related convictions both corroborate the CI and support the probable-cause determination.
12
Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 844 (“[T]he state correctly asserts that the previous convictions
. . . provide additional support for the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and
corroborate the information provided by the CI.”).
Finally, we are not persuaded by Waites’s contention that the validity of the orders
is subject to question because the officers removed an earlier tracking device from the
Tahoe which was issued in March 2019 and because officers never saw Waites driving that
vehicle. It is irrelevant that the earlier tracking device was removed—Waites was the
registered owner of the Tahoe and heroin was found in the vehicle the week before the first
tracking-device order was issued. And it is not surprising that the police did not see Waites
in the Tahoe. Waites had apparently switched to driving the Dodge Challenger, which
police observed Waites driving within the month following the first tracking-device order
and which officers discovered was newly registered to Waites.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err by
denying Waites’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the tracking orders
because the applications supporting the orders provide a substantial basis for the issuing
judge’s conclusion that tracking the vehicles would result in the discovery of evidence of
controlled-substance crime.
Affirmed.