In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Eric Matthew Flanders.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0261

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Eric Matthew Flanders.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel
File No. AP20-9139

James P. Conway, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A., Shakopee, Minnesota (for
appellant Flanders)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Monal B. Patel, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent Scott County)

Considered and de cided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his petition for provisional discharge from his
commitment as a sexually dangerous person. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Eric Matthew Flanders is cognitively disabled and has a history of sexual
misconduct that includes exposing himself to others. In 1992, at the age of 14, Flanders
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was charged with several counts of criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a seven-
year-old girl. The charges were ultimately dismissed.
In 2001, at the age of 23, Flanders repeatedly sexually abused a developmentally
disabled adult female, who was a resident at a group home where he resided. The abuse
included forced vaginal penetration. Flanders pleaded guilty to one count of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct and received a 21- month stayed sentence for that conduct .
Flanders continued to engage in aggressive and inappropriate conduct, including exposing
himself to a dental assistant and attacking a treatment staff member, and he was ultimately
dismissed from his treatment programs. In 2004, the district court revoked Flanders’s
stayed sentence and sent him to prison.
In October 2005, the district court indeterminately committed Flanders as a sexually
dangerous person. Flanders currently resides at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(MSOP) facility in St. Peter. He is in the first phase of a three-phase treatment program,
specifically, an alternative program designed for individuals with compromised executive
functioning.
In 2019, Flanders petitioned for a transfer, provisional discharge, or discharge. The
special review board (SRB) recommended denying Flanders’s petition. The SRB opined
that Flanders’s “current treatment setting is not the appropriate place for him” and that
“[h]e cannot successfully function in the MSOP treatment model, [because] he needs
individualized, one-on-one treatment.” But the SRB concluded that Flanders “simply d[id]
not meet the statutory criteria” for a custody reduction. Flanders sought rehearing and
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reconsideration, and the matter was scheduled for a hearing before the commitment appeal
panel (CAP). CAP appointed an independent examiner, who issued a report.
In September 2021, CAP held a hearing on Flanders’s request for a custody
reduction. CAP received numerous exhibits, including the independent examiner’s report,
and it heard testimony from MSOP’s reintegration director, Flanders’s legal guardian (his
mother), and the independent examiner. Flanders withdrew his requests for a transfer or
full discharge, leaving only his request for a provisional discharge.
The reintegration director testified that he oversees the supervision of MSOP
patients who are placed in the community on provisional-discharge status. He discussed
the standard provisional discharge conditions that would apply if Flanders were released.
He testified that patients do not receive a finalized discharge plan until after a provisional
discharge is granted. The reintegration director testified that he had experience placing
individuals with intellectual disabilities into the community and knew of several “licensed
adult foster care homes,” most with “a one staff to client ratio.”
The independent examiner testified that Flanders had the “functionality of a six-
year-old” and had not “progressed” or “improved in any appreciable way” after
approximately 16 years at MSOP. The examiner testified that Flanders was incapable of
operating in a group- treatment environment, that MSOP’s secure facility was not an
appropriate treatment setting because Flanders was “not intellectually, emotionally, or
behaviorally able to engage in treatment programming,” and that Flanders was better suited
to treatment in a controlled residential setting. The examiner believed that the monitoring
and security provided in a residential setting would be sufficient to protect the public. The
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examiner concluded that the case presented a difficult situation because Flanders did not
“look good from a treatment perspective” and did not “look safe from an actuarial
perspective,” but he was receiving no benefit from MSOP. The examiner believed that
Flanders would never be able to successfully engage in sex-offender treatment because of
his intellectual disability, even in a residential setting.
At the close of the hearing, the commissioner of human services (commissioner)
moved to dismiss Flanders’s petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b). CAP determined
that Flanders was not entitled to a provisional discharge and granted the commissioner’s
motion. CAP concluded that Flanders failed to present “competent evidence” showing that
he is no longer in need of treatment and supervision in his current setting and that he failed
to show that his provisional discharge plan would provide sufficient protection to the public
and enable him to successfully adjust to the community. CAP acknowledged that Flanders
also sought relief on constitutional grounds. It determined that Flanders’s continued
commitment was not unconstitutional because he remained “an untreated sex offender with
unmet treatment needs.”
Flanders appeals.
DECISION
Flanders challenges CAP’s denial and dismissal of his petition for provisional
discharge. An individual committed as a sexually dangerous person may petition for a
provisional discharge from commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subds. 1(b), 2 (2020). If
the SRB recommends denying the petition, the committed person may seek reconsideration
from CAP. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1 (2020); Larson v. Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531, 534
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(Minn. App. 2014). In a first-phase hearing before CAP, the petitioner bears the burden of
“presenting a prima facie case with competent evidence” to show that he is entitled to a
provisional discharge. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d) (2020); Larson, 847 N.W.2d at
535. If the petitioner satisfies that burden, CAP then holds a second-phase hearing at which
the party opposing the petition must prove that a provisional discharge should be denied.
See Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d).
After the first-phase hearing, the party opposing the petition may move to dismiss
the petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) on the grounds that the petitioner failed to
make a prima facie case. Larson, 847 N.W.2d at 535. When considering such a motion,
CAP may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations and must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Id. When CAP dismisses a civil-
commitment petition for provisional discharge under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b), this court
applies a de novo standard of review. Id. at 532-33.
I.
A person civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person “shall not be
provisionally discharged unless [he] is capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open
society.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(a) (2020). CAP must consider two factors in
determining whether to grant a provisional discharge:
(1) whether the committed person’s course of treatment
and present mental status indicate there is no longer a need for
treatment and supervision in the committed person’s current
treatment setting; and
(2) whether the conditions of the provisional discharge
plan will provide a reasonable degree of protection to the
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public and will enable the committed person to adjust
successfully to the community.

Id., subd. 1(b) (2020).
As to the first factor, Flanders failed to present evidence showing that he no longer
needs treatment and supervision in his current setting. The examiner testified that Flanders
did not “look good from a treatment perspective,” did not “look safe from an actuarial
perspective,” and had not meaningfully progressed in treatment. The examiner’s report
noted Flanders’s failure to attend treatment activities, disengagement from treatment
programming, emotional dysregulation, and “poor insight and judgment regarding the
circumstances of his commitment and current status at the MSOP.” The examiner assessed
that Flanders was at the “precontemplation stage,” or “the stage of least progress toward
change,” which is a stage defined by “little to no insight, little to no willingness to change,
rigid and unchanging beliefs, and lack of awareness that there is any problem with
behaviors or actions.” The examiner opined that the “ safety of the community,” and
Flanders’s own safety, would be at risk if he were “unsupervised, unsupported, and residing
in an environment without security protocols.”
The evidence concerning Flanders’s course of treatment and present mental status
indicates that he continues to need treatment and supervision in his current setting and is
not capable of transitioning to open society. We acknowledge that the examiner concluded
that Flanders’s current setting is not appropriate because he is not benefitting from
treatment. But this conclusion concerns the adequacy of Flanders’s treatment and strays
from the relevant inquiry under the first factor. Moreover, the examiner testified that
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Flanders had recently received a roommate, was “tolerating it and working with the
roommate,” had recently engaged in a few sessions of one-on -one therapy, and was
showing “some improvement.”
“To satisfy the burden of production, the petitioner must come forward with
sufficient, competent evidence that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief.”
Larson, 847 N.W.2d at 535 (quotation omitted). Flanders failed to present evidence that
his course of treatment and present mental status indicate that he no longer needs treatment
and supervision in his current setting.
As to the second factor, Flanders presented the SRB with a standard provisional
discharge plan that set forth 37 broad conditions, such as complying with any MSOP rules
or supervision policy, submitting to GPS monitoring, residing at an approved residence,
and refraining from contacting “minors, known victims, or vulnerable adults unless
approved in advance.” Those broad conditions are likely sufficient to show that a
provisional discharge would provide “a reasonable degree of protection to the public.”
Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(b)(2). But Flanders did not present evidence showing that
a provisional discharge will enable him “to adjust successfully to the community.” Id.
Indeed, we fail to see how he could do so given that he did not present sufficient evidence
showing that he no longer needs treatment and supervision in his current treatment setting.
In sum, although we are sympathetic to Flanders’s situation, we conclude that he
failed to make a prima facie case for provisional discharge.

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II.
Flanders next argues that he presented a prima facie case for provisional discharge
“under constitutional standards.” He asserts that he “no longer has a mental illness which
is the basis for his detention” and that continued detention “is not rationally related to why
he was originally committed.”
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 7. The Due Process Clause confers rights on persons who are civilly committed because
civil commitment “constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). “A state may deprive a person who is mentally ill and dangerous
of his or her liberty by confinement to a mental institution without violating due process
until such time as that person is no longer mentally ill or is no longer a danger to himself.”
Lidberg v. Steffen, 514 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1994). “[T]here is . . . no constitutional
basis for confining [mentally ill persons] involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and
can live safely in freedom.” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
“Due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Lidberg , 514
N.W.2d at 783 (quotation omitted). “The reasonable-relationship requirement is satisfied
if a committed person ‘is confined for only so long as he or she continues both to need
further inpatient treatment and supervision for his . . . disorder and to pose a danger to the
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public.’” In re Civil Commitment of Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d 220, 226-27 (Minn. App. 2020)
(alteration in original) (quoting Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)).
We note that the cases cited by Flanders in support of his constitutional argument
primarily concern mentally ill and dangerous patients seeking discharge or release from
commitment, and not sexually dangerous persons seeking provisional discharge. See, e.g.,
Addington, 441 U.S. at 421 (involving challenge to commitment as mentally ill and
dangerous); Lidberg, 514 N.W.2d at 780 (involving mentally ill and dangerous patient’s
request for discharge); Call, 535 N.W.2d at 314 (involving challenge to discharge of patient
committed as psychopathic personality); Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d at 222 (involving mentally
ill and dangerous patient’s request for discharge). Even if the reasoning espoused in those
cases applies to a sexually dangerous person’s request for provisional discharge, Flanders
has failed to present a prima facie case for relief.
A sexually dangerous person is defined as one who has “engaged in a course of
harmful sexual conduct,” “manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction,” and “as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” Minn.
Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a) (2020).1 Flanders seems to suggest that his past sexual
misconduct and present danger to society result only from his intellectual disability. He
asserts that he “no longer has a mental illness that compels him or causes him to be of the

1 We note that Flanders was committed as a sexually dangerous person under Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.02, subd. 18c (2004), which is essentially identical in language to section 253D.02,
subdivision 16.
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class of persons committed to MSOP due to sexual disorders or compulsions.” For the
reasons that follows, we are not persuaded.
The independent examiner’s report notes that Flanders suffers from exhibitionistic
disorder, a paraphilic disorder, antisocial personality disorder, posttraumatic stress
disorder, as well as other disorders. Flanders argues that the independent examiner’s “only
diagnoses” were that he “is intellectually disabled and suffered from PTSD.” Flanders
recognizes that the examiner’s report “lists a variety of other diagnoses,” but
Flanders argues that the examiner “ did not corroborate those by his testimony or in the
body of his report as being presently existent.” Although the examiner was not questioned
about Flanders’s present diagnoses, t he examiner’s report listed the above diagnoses.
Moreover, F landers’s individual treatment plan listed several diagnoses, including
exhibitionistic disorder and other specified paraphilic disorder. This record does not
support a conclusion that Flanders is no longer a sexually dangerous person.
The record also does not support a conclusion that the nature and duration of
Flanders’s commitment no longer bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of his
commitment. Again, Flanders did not present evidence showing that he no longer needs
treatment and supervision in his current sex-offender treatment setting.
In sum, Flanders failed to present a prima facie case for provisional discharge on
due-process grounds.
III.
Lastly, we address the adequacy of Flanders’s treatment. Much of the evidence
presented to CAP concerned the adequacy of Flanders’s treatment at MSOP. For example,
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the examiner testified that Flanders is incapable of operating successfully in a group-
treatment environment and that his current setting is inappropriate “for the simplest reason
that he’s unable to engage in the treatment modalities that are offered.” The SRB reached
a similar conclusion.
“A committed individual has a statutory and constitutional right to treatment.” In
re Civil Commitment of Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 24, 2011). But a custody-reduction petition is not the proper method of
attacking the adequacy of treatment. Minnesota’s commitment act “does not provide any
procedures for a patient indeterminately committed . . . to raise nontransfer, nondischarge
claims.” In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635, 642 (Minn. 2012); see
also In re Civil Commitment of Saengchanh, No. A18-1811, 2019 WL 1233562, at *4
(Minn. App. Mar. 18, 2019) (stating that Minnesota’s commitment and treatment act does
not “authorize a discharge or transfer as a means of obtaining alternative treatment when
the statutory standards for a discharge or transfer are not otherwise satisfied”).
CAP observed that it “has limited jurisdiction and can only grant relief based upon
specific criteria” and that it “cannot direct or evaluate the effectiveness of treatment.”
However, CAP “strongly encourage[d] MSOP to re-evaluate [Flanders’s] needs and make
all necessary accommodations for him.” We do the same. We also observe that although
the underlying process is not an avenue to obtain relief based on inadequate treatment,
there are other ways for a patient to challenge the adequacy of treatment. See In re Civil
Commitment of Moen , 837 N.W.2d 40, 47 -48 (Minn. App. 2013) (discussing the
availability of a habeas corpus or federal civil rights claim to challenge inadequate
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treatment), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013); In re Civil Commitment of Travis, 767
N.W.2d 52, 58-59 (Minn. App. 2009) (discussing available legal avenues).
Affirmed.