State of Minnesota, Respondent,

1
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0272

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tanisha Amiea Dunn,
Appellant.

Filed August 29, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-8344

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles Clippert, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Larkin , Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
On direct appeal from her conviction of aiding and abetting attempted second -
degree murder of an unborn child, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying her motion for a larger downward durational departure. We affirm.
2
FACTS
In April 2021, appellant Tanisha Amiea Dunn’s codefendant asked her to go wit h
him while he ran errands. After they got into the codefendant’s car, the codefendant told
appellant that he actually wanted her to help him assault the victim, who was pregnant with
his child, in an attempt to terminate the pregnancy. Appellant went wi th the codefendant
and helped him assault the victim. Appellant used mace on the victim, hit the victim, and
held the victim down while the codefendant tased and kicked the victim’s stomach.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with (1) aiding and abetting
attempted second -degree murder of an unborn child ; (2) aiding and abetting attempted
aggravated first-degree robbery; and (3) aiding and abetting attempted first -degree murder
of an unborn child. In exchange for appellant’s guilty plea to the first charge, the state
agreed to dismiss the other charges and cap appellant’s sentence at 150 months in prison,
a downward durational de parture from the presumptive sentencing range. The agreement
allowed appellant to seek a larger departure at sentencing.
Appellant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting attempted second -degree murder of
an unborn child in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2662, subd. 1 (2020). Appellant then
moved for a downward durational departure , arguing that she should receive a sentence of
36 to 60 months in prison. In support of her motion, appellant submitted a mitigation report
detailing her traumatic past and ex plaining how her mental -health issues and history of
victimization related to her state of mind and culpability for her current offense. Hennepin
County Corrections submitted a presentence investigation (PSI) report, which calculated
the presumptive sente ncing range for appellant’s offense as 164 to 231 months in prison.
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The PSI report noted that appellant admitted to her involvement in the attack but stated that
she felt t hreatened by her codefendant . The PSI report also described appellant’s history
of trauma and her struggles with mental health and addiction. Ultimately, the PSI
recommended a presumptive sentence of 164 months.
At appellant’s sentencing hearing, the victim gave an impact statement and the
district court viewed surveillance video sho wing the attack. The district court considered
the parties’ arguments and explained that it had reviewed the PSI and mitigation report s.
It acknowledged that it struggled to find the appropriate sentence but ultimately sentenced
appellant to 150 months i n prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
for a larger downward durational departure because she (1) acted under duress and
(2) lacked substantial capacity for judgment when she committed the offense. We disagree.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D (2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2020).
The district court “must ” impose a sentence within the presumptive range unless it
identifies “substantial and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1. If such circumstances exist, the district court “may depart” from the
presumptive sentence. Id. A downward durational departure occurs when the district court
orders a sentence shorter than the presumptive range. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5.b
(2020). “Substantial and compelling circumstances for a durational departure are those
which demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than
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that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” State v. Rund, 896
N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). While d ispositional departures may
be based on offender -related factors, durational departures must be based on “the nature
of the offense, not the individual characteristics of the offender.” State v. Solberg, 882
N.W.2d 618, 625 (Minn. 2016).
“We review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive sentence for
an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 623. “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record. ”
State v. Hallmark , 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted) . Because the
district court “is in the best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct and weigh
sentencing options,” State v. Bendzula, 675 N.W.2d 920, 921 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation
omitted), we generally will not interfere with a sentencing decision so long as the record
shows that the district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented,” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011).
We first note that the presence of a mitigating factor does not obligate the district
court to impose a shorter sentence . Wells v. State , 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App.
2013). The district court therefore had no obligation to impose any downward durational
departure when sentencing appellant.
Regarding appellant’s asserted mitigating factors, the record shows that the district
court carefully considered those factors when sentencing appellant. The state explained
that its requested 150-month sentence repr esented a slight downward durational departure
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to account for the pressure that appellant’s codefendant exerted on her.1 The mitigation
report also relayed appellant’s fear of her codefendant and its effect on her decision to
participate in the attack . And t he district court stated at the hearing that the 150- month
sentence represented an appropriate reduction from the presumptive sentence , “taking into
the account” the factors described in the mitigation report.
Additionally, to the extent that appellant argues that her mental illness and history
of victimization made her susceptible to coercion and “impeded her ability to control her
actions” during the offense, the record shows that the district court considered those
arguments too. The mitigation report, which the district court commended as “ excellent,”
explained how appellant’s history of physical and domestic abuse and her resulting post-
traumatic-stress disorder made her particularly susceptible to duress. The district court
acknowledged appellant’s history of trauma and mental-health issues, and it agreed that
appellant was “not thinking clearly on the day of the assault.” But it also weighed those
mitigating factors against the seriousness of the offense and appellant’s active participation
in the assault on the victim . Because the record shows that the district court carefully
considered all the information and testimony presented when sentencing appellant to 150
months in prison, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied appellant’s request for a larger downward durational departure.
Affirmed.

1 The presumptive guidelines sentence for appellant’s offense ranged from 164 to 231
months. The district court’s 150- month sentence therefore represented a downward
durational departure of 14 months .