George Cornelius Watkins, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0291

George Cornelius Watkins, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-6338

Amber S. Johnson, Johnson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County
Attorney, Annika Johnson (certified student attorney), Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying appellant’s second petition for postconviction
relief, appellant argues that a trial witness gave false testimony, requiring a new trial.
2
Because the district court did not abuse its disc retion in concluding that appellant failed to
establish that the witness gave false testimony, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 7, 2014, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant George
Cornelius Watkins with one count of felony assault, alleging that Watkins physically forced
B.T. into a vehicle . The complaint further alleges that once in the car, Watkins punched
B.T. repeatedly. After Watkins drove B.T. to her home and carried her into the residence,
Watkins assaulted her further, punching and choking her. According to the complaint,
Watkins confiscated B.T.’s phone and she was not able to contact the police or anyone for
help until after W atkins fell asleep. On June 12, 2014, the state amended the complaint ,
adding two counts of felony kidnapping. The case proceeded to trial .
At trial, B.T. testified that for several years, she had an “on and off” relationship
with Watkins and that he physically abused her during this time . B.T. testified that she
made plans to meet Watkins at a Minneapolis bar on March 6, 2014, but when he “started
to get aggressive and angry,” she decided to go to the bar with two friends instead. When
they arrived, B.T. saw Watkins , and she immediately wanted to leave. B.T. testified that
Watkins was waiting in a truck with three people she did not know and that Watkins “forced
[her] in the car with him .” She testified that he “pushed” her in to the vehicle and that ,
although she was terrified, she did not resist him because she “knew not to” and because
she feared how Watkins might react if she tried to resist . According to B.T.’s testimony,
after she entered the vehicle, Watkins punched her and took her phone from her. Watkins
then took off driving while continuing to punch her. Eventually, he pulled over and
3
continued punching her. B.T. testified that Watkins brought B.T. to her home and he
“continued to fight more” inside the residence. The next morning, B.T. found her
cellphone and called her cousin to ask her to call the police. Shortly after, the police arrived
at B.T.’s home and arrested Watkins.
The jury found Watkins guilty of one count of felony assault and one count of felony
kidnapping, but it acquitted him of the second count of felony kidnapping. The jury also
found that the kidnapping occurred in B.T.’s zone of privacy—a factor that was used to
support an upward sentencing departure. The district court s entenced Watkins to 39
months in prison for the assault conviction and 205 months in prison for the kidnapping
conviction. Watkins appealed, challenging the admission of relationship evidence and the
upward departure. State v. Watkins , No. A14- 1779, 2015 WL 6829697 *1 (Minn. App.
Nov. 9, 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 2016). We affirmed. Id. In 2018, Watkins filed
his first petition for postconviction relief, asserting numerous errors. The district court
denied the petition and we affirmed the dis trict court’s decision in an order opinion .
Watkins v. State, No. A19- 0152 (Minn. App. Sept. 9, 2019), rev. dismissed (Minn. Nov. 7,
2019).
In September 2020, Watkins filed his second postconviction petition, alleging that
he had newly discovered evidence that B.T. recanted her trial testimony. Attached to the
petition was an affidavit from a private investigator stating that the private investigator
interviewed B.T. in his office on August 13, 2019, where B.T. told the investigator that she
left the bar and got into Watkins’s vehicle “of her own free will.” B.T. also told the
investigator that she made up the story about being forced into the vehicle because she
4
wanted Watkins to get into more trouble. Afte r the interview, the investigator drafted the
affidavit summarizing the interview, showed the document to B.T. , and signed the
affidavit. B.T. did not write the statement or sign the investigator’s affidavit.
The district court presided over an evidentiar y hearing. The private investigator
testified at the hearing regarding the interview and his affidavit. The investigator explained
that he did not have B.T. write or sign a statement herself , but instead allowed B.T. to
review his draft affidavit. The p rivate investigator testified that B.T. did not appear to be
under duress during the interview but just seemed “tired of all this.” B.T. also testified
during the evidentiary hearing. She confirmed that she had met with the private
investigator. She stated that it had been Watkins’s idea to give the statement and that she
gave the statement to the investigator because she felt “forced, scared, [and] wanted to be
left alone.” B.T. proceeded to explain that her statement to the investigator was not the
truth and that she was lying to the investigator because she wanted Watkins to leave her
alone. Specifically, B.T. testified that she was not telling the truth when she told the
investigator that the trial testimony had been false. B.T. then reiterated her trial testimony:
B.T.: I was truthful about Mr. Watkins kidnapping me because
if I didn’t go, he was going to come in that bar and beat the hell
out of me and take me out of there and make me
(unintelligible). So, the best thing for me to do was to do
whatever he says.
COUNSEL: Are you saying that you got in the car of your own
free will because you thought that’s what you needed to do?
B.T.: I was forced in the car. And—I was forced in the car, but
I also knew if I didn’t get in the car, I would have to deal with
the consequences of what George does to me all the time.
5
B.T. also explained that her recollection of the incident was better at the time of the trial
than at the evidentiary hearing and stated that her testimony at both the evidentiary hearing
and the trial was true:
COUNSEL : Was your testimony at the trial in this case
truthful?
B.T.: Today?
COUNSEL : Sorry. The original trial in 2014?
B.T.: Yes.
COUNSEL : And has your testimony today . . . been truthful?
B.T.: Yes.

Following the hearing, the district court denied Watkins’s petition. The district
court determined that Watkins could not prove that B.T.’s t rial t estimony was false and
could not show that the jury would have reached a different conclusion in the absence of
any false trial testimony. Watkins appeals.
DECISION
Watkins argues that B.T.’s recantation of her trial testimony requires a new trial .
Because the district court did not abuse its discr etion in concluding that Watkins failed to
show that the witness’s testimony was false, we discern no abuse of discretion.
A person convicted of a crime may seek relief by filing a postconviction petition
with the district court to grant a new trial. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2020). When an
evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition is granted, the petitioner bears the burden
of proof to establish the facts alleged in the petition “by a fair preponderance of the
evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2020). In cases where alleged newly discovered
evidence is false trial testimony, we apply the Larrison test. Sutherlin v. State, 574 N.W.2d
428, 433 (Minn. 1998) (applying the test adopted by federal courts in Larrison v. United
6
States, 24 F.2d 82, 87- 88 (7th Cir. 1928)). The Larrison test requires the petitioner to
establish that a material witness’s testimony was false and that absent the false testimony,
the jury might have reached a different conclusion. Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 740
(Minn. 2013). 1 Establishing inconsistencies between trial testimony and a subsequent
statement falls short of establishing that the trial testimony was false. Opsahl v. State, 710
N.W.2d 776, 782 (Minn. 2006) ( concluding that “a simple statement contradicting earlier
testimony is not sufficient” to satisfy the first prong of the Larrison test). We review the
district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017).
Here, the district court concluded that Watkins failed to establish the first prong:
that B.T.’s trial testimony was false. The district court found that B.T.’s recantati on
resulted from Watkins’s continued pressure and reasoned that any discrepancies between
B.T.’s trial testimony and her testimony at the evidentiary hearing likely resulted from the
passage of time. We observe that p ortions of the testimony that B.T. provided at the
evidentiary hearing are nearly indistinguishable from her trial testimony, including when
B.T. reiterated at the evidentiary hearing her recollection that Watkins forced her into the

1 The Larrison test also includes a third prong: whether the petitioner was “taken by
surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of
its falsity until after trial.” Martin, 825 N.W.2d at 740. The petitioner must establish the
first two prongs of the Larrison test, and courts should consider the third prong when the
first two are satisfied but establishing the third prong is not required to obtain a new trial .
State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Minn. 2007). We need not address the second or
third prongs here because Watkins did not establish the first prong of the La rrison test.
7
car.2 Importantly, B.T. testified at the evidentiary hearing that her recantation was not
truthful and that her trial testimony was the truth. B.T. further stated that she had a better
ability at the trial to recollect the events that occurred on March 6, 2014, than she did during
the evidentiary hearing. The district court expressly found credible B.T.’s testimony that
her recantation was not truthful, and we do not review the district court’s determinations
of credibility. E.g., Opsahl, 710 N.W.2d at 782. For these reasons, the district court di d
not abuse its discretion in denying Watkins’ petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.

2 The parties disagree whether certain testimony at the evidentiary hearing —including
testimony that B.T. feared Watkins would assault her if she did not get into his vehicle —
could establish the elements of felony kidnapping. We need not address this issue,
however, because it relates to the second prong of the Larrison test.