A22-0293 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed March 6, 2023

The holding in the court’s own words

Based on the ample evidence and testimony provid ed to the jury, we conclude that admitting d etective V .

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Opinion text

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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0293

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Katherine Leona Collins,
Appellant.

Filed March 6, 2023
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-5420

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty , Hennepin County Attorney, Zachary Stephenson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reyes , Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues on appeal from her convictions of attempted murder and second -
degree assault that (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting as recorded
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recollection the victim’s video-recorded statement interview with a detective following the
shooting incident and (2) appellant’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to object to the video-recorded statement on proper grounds. We affirm.
FACTS 1
On March 5, 2019, at approximately 10:29 p.m., Brooklyn Center police officers
were dispatched to an apartment complex in Hennepin County, Minnesota , after
responding to eight 911 calls about shots being fired in the parking lot . When officer W.
arrived, he observed the victim, M.H., “walking or almost running towards” him. M.H.
appeared to be out of breath and in shock. M.H. told officer W. that appellant Katherine
Leona Collins had fired shots at him but that he was not injured.
M.H. only knew appellant for about a week or two and drove to appellant’s
apartment earlier in the day to pick her up for a lunch date . After lunch, appellant told
M.H. to drop her off because she felt “his attitude was too negative for [her].” They
continued to text throughout the day, and it appeared that they were arguing back and forth.
That evening, M.H. returned to see appellant and waited outside in the parking lot for her.
Appellant came outside and entered M.H.’s vehicle with one hand in her purse. The parties
agree that appellant slapped M.H. across the face but disagree on why the slap occurred
and what happened after that . Appellant claimed she was provoked by M.H. after he
insulted her and spit on her for wanting to end the relationship. Following the slap, she
claimed that M.H. threatened to stab and punch her in the head and face.

1 These facts are based on testimony and evidence received at the jury trial held from
October 6-12, 2021, and are viewed in light most favorable to the verdict.
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Conversely, M.H. stated that once she slapped him, he did not get physical with her
and exited the vehicle to go around the passenger side and told appellant to get out. Instead,
appellant climbed into the driver’s seat. He immediately thought appellant was trying to
steal his vehicle and rushed back to the driver’s seat. M.H. repeatedly y elled at appellant
to exit the vehicle. At some point, appellant exited the vehicle, and M.H. got into the
driver’s seat. M.H. was trying to drive away when appellant fir ed shots at him. Because
the car did not start, he fled by foot , and appellant continued to fire shots at him.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant in an amended complaint with
one count of assault in the second degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd.1
(2018), and one count of attempted murder in the second degree in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018). Before trial, the state requested admission of the video-
recorded statements that M.H. made to law enforcement on March 5, 2019, and March 6,
2019, as prior consistent statements and under the residual exception to the hearsay rule.
The state also asserted that M.H. had “no memory of the incident and [could not] testify
fully as to what happened.” 2 It then provided the district court with nine video-recorded
statements to review, not to introduce them all, but to “show that the victim was consistent.”
The state also informed the district court that appellant did not object to two of the
nine video- recorded statements , specifically, M.H.’s 911 call and the video -recorded

2 While the state did not include the recorded-recollection exception to the hearsay rule in
its motion, it argued it extensively when the district court addressed M.H.’s prior
statements at the jury trial. Further, the district court determined that they were admissible
under this exception.
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statement of M.H. and officer W.’s initial encounter when officer W. arrived at the scene.3
The district court noted that it reviewed all nine video -recorded statements and that they
were consistent with one another.
The district d etermined that the nine video-recorded statements were admissible
under the recorded -recollection exception but found that playing all the video-recorded
statements to the jury would be cumulative. Because appellant did not object to M.H.’s
911 call and the video of M.H. and officer W.’s initial encounter, the district court admitted
those two recordings. The district court then allowed the state to introduce one more video
from the remaining video-recorded statements . The state chose detective V.’s interview
with M.H. in which M.H. recounted to detective V. everything preceding the shooting. The
jury found appellant guilty of both counts, and the district court sentenced appellant to 131
months in prison on the attempted -murder conviction. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the video of
detective V.’s interview with M.H.

Appellant argues that the video- recorded statement did not meet the requirements
under the recorded -recollection exception. We are not convinced.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we
will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235
, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State

3 M.H.’s 911 call was the only audio recording that was not a video- recorded statement.
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v. Hallmark , 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted) . “ A defendant
claiming error in the [district] court’s reception of evidence has the burden of showing both
the error and the prejudice resulting from the error.” State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64
(Minn. 1981). “Even whe[n] the district court abuses its discretion, the court’s evidentiary
ruling will not be reversed unless the error substantially influenced the jury’ s verdict. ”
State v. Stone, 784 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn. 2010) .
Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies.
Minn. R. Evid. 802; State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006). The district
court may admit a hearsay statement under the recorded -recollection exception. Minn. R.
Evid. 803(5). A recorded recollection is:
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insuff icient
recollection to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
the witness’ memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly .
If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
offered by an adverse party.

Id.

Because M.H. had no memory of the incident and could not testify fully as to what
happened, the district court undertook a three-part analysis of M.H.’s video-recorded
statements to law enforcement under the recorded -recollection exception. Stone, 784
N.W.2d at 370 (Minn. 2010) . It found that (1) M.H. had insufficient memory to testify
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fully; (2) within hours of the incident, M.H. gave several interviews which were videotaped
and made when the matter was still fresh in M.H.’s mind; and (3) the video- recorded
statements accurately reflect M.H.’s recollection of the incident. The record supports these
findings. The district court correctly applied the recorded -recollection exception and
therefore did not abuse its discretion by allowing the video-recorded statements to be
played for the jury.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the video-
recorded statement of M.H.’s interview with detective V. as an exhibit, which allowed the
jury to play the video-recorded statement during their deliberations. When the state raised
the issue of admitting the video additionally under the residual exception, the district court
deferred its decision and stated that “[it] [ would] address that at another time.” But the
district court did not address it, and the video was admitted as an exhibit. Assuming error
on the part of the district court, we must then consider if the error substantially influenced
the jury’s verdict .
The record here shows that other evidence was presented to support appellant’s
conviction. First, the district court admitted M.H.’s 911 call in which he told the operator
that appellant shot at him. Second, the district court admitted the bodycam-video-recorded
statement of M.H.’s initial encounter with law enforcement in which he told o fficer W.
that appellant shot at him. Third, the jury saw a surveillance video of appellant shooting
at M.H. Fourth, the jury saw pictures of M.H.’s jacket from the incident that shows bullet
holes through his hood. Fifth, the jury heard M.H.’s testimony that it is hard for him to
be in a romantic relationship because he gets nervous arguing with a woman and that he
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struggles to sleep because of the incident. Sixth, the jury heard testimony from appellant
admitting that she did not see M.H. carrying a knife at any point and that she aimed and
shot at M.H.
Based on the ample evidence and testimony provid ed to the jury, we conclude that
admitting d etective V .’s interview with M.H as an exhibit did not “substantially
influence[] the jury’s verdict. ” Stone, 784 N.W.2d at 370.
II. Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails.

Appellant argues that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when her
attorney failed to object a second time to the admission of the video-recorded statement of
M.H.’s interview with detective V. We are not persuaded.
When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is properly raised on direct appeal,
we examine the claim under the two -prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
. State v. Ellis -Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017).
Under that test , appellant must show “(1) that his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have bee n different. ”
Nissalke v. State , 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted) . “We review a
district court’s application of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed
question of law and fact. Falgren v. State, Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.
1996). “If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, we need not consider
the other requirement.” State v. Mosley , 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017) (citation
omitted).
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Generally, m atters of trial strategy, such as whether to object, “lie within the
discretion of trial counsel and will not be second- guessed by appellate courts.” Leake v.
State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 2007) . As a result, “we presume that trial counsel’s
performance was reasonable and we give particular deference to trial strategy.” Schneider
v. State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 2007).
Here, appellant’s trial counsel objected when the state offered various video-
recorded statements of M.H. as cumulative and requested that the district court only allow
one video-recorded statement . Further, appellant’s trial counsel objected a second time
when the state requested to have the video-recorded statements be admitted as an exhibit
under t he residual exception. Appellant’s trial counsel acted within her discretion by
reasoning that, because M.H. lacked the sufficient memory to testify to the incident, the
recorded-recollection exception applied in this situation. As a result, she used her best
judgment and instead requested that the district court limit the admissibility to only one
more video -recorded statement , which the district court agreed to do. Therefore,
appellant’s trial counsel acted well within her discretion with respect to trial strategy, and
her representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Affirmed.