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Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0306**

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
T. R. F. P., Parent.

**Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge**

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-21-527

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Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WHEELOCK, Judge

Appellant-mother challenges the district court's order terminating her parental rights. Mother first seems to argue that the district court's findings of fact regarding the county's reunification efforts are clearly erroneous and that its determination that those efforts were reasonable was an abuse of its discretion. Mother also argues that the district court's determination that statutory grounds supported termination is clearly erroneous. Finally, mother argues that the district court's determination that termination of mother's

parental rights was in the children's best interests is an abuse of its discretion. Because the district court's determinations regarding reasonable efforts and statutory grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and the district court acted within its discretion, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant T.R.F.P. is the mother of child 1, born in April 2011, and child 2, born in July 2020. Mother was not married to child 1's father, R.S.K., or child 2's father, G.R. Both R.S.K.'s parental rights to child 1 and G.R.'s parental rights to child 2 were involuntarily terminated through separate proceedings. Previously, mother and R.S.K. had voluntarily terminated their parental rights to two older joint children.

In July 2020, G.R.—mother's live-in boyfriend at the time—disclosed to mother that he had been sexually abusing child 1. At a regularly scheduled therapy appointment five days later, mother told her therapist about G.R.'s disclosure of the abuse. Mother's therapist immediately reported mother's statement to police, who responded to mother's residence and took a statement from mother. During mother's interview, she stated that after G.R. told her that he had sexually abused child 1, she questioned the child, who denied any abuse was occurring. In her police statement, mother said she questioned whether the disclosed sexual abuse "was all in [G.R.'s] head." G.R. had remained in the home with child 1 during the five-day period following his disclosure of the abuse to mother. Mother also reported to police that G.R. had taken the family van and left the home without informing anyone of his whereabouts.

Respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance (the county) directed mother to bring child 1 to the county office for an interview, which mother did. Police and county staff then continued mother's interview and conducted an interview with the child. During the initial interview, child 1 did not disclose sexual abuse; however, several months later, child 1 told a social worker that G.R. had sexually abused her. After child 1 divulged the abuse to the social worker, child 1 participated in a forensic interview. G.R. contacted mother while mother and child 1 were at the county office. He then reported to law enforcement for questioning and was placed under arrest.

After G.R.'s questioning and arrest, police and county staff resumed their interview with mother, who stated that prior to G.R.'s disclosure of the abuse, mother had (1) found child 1 watching pornography on G.R.'s phone, (2) discovered G.R. masturbating on a bed while child 1 was under the blankets, and (3) been informed by her ex-husband, C.P., that child 1 disclosed sexual abuse by G.R. to C.P. Based on this information, the county placed child 1 into emergency protective care and filed a petition in Steele County District Court alleging that child 1 was in need of protection or services. Two weeks later, the county amended the petition to include child 2 after child 2 was born.

Child 1 and child 2 were adjudicated as children in need of protection or services (CHIPS) under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2), (3), (8), (9), (11) (2020). At a dispositional hearing, the district court ordered mother to comply with requirements, including but not limited to the following: have supervised visitations with child 1 and child 2; disclose significant relationships to county staff; participate in individual therapy and follow recommendations; follow the recommendations of her completed

parenting-capacity evaluation; demonstrate skills to provide safety to child 1 and child 2; remain law-abiding and ensure that criminal activity does not occur in her home; demonstrate knowledge of child development and provide safe, nurturing, and responsive care to child 1 and child 2; support the children's educational, medical, and psychological needs; ensure the conditions of her home are adequate for the ages of both children; and work with the county to successfully complete a case plan.

The county filed a permanency petition seven months later, and a court trial was held over nine days between October 2021 and January 2022. The district court heard testimony from numerous individuals, including mother, the children's maternal grandmother and biological fathers, the guardian ad litem (GAL), one of the children's foster parents, law-enforcement officers, social workers, therapists, and medical providers, among others. The county presented evidence about G.R.'s sexual abuse of child 1 and mother's response to the abuse, as well as evidence of mother's history of relationships with individuals who had prior criminal-sexual-conduct convictions, some of whom are required to register as predatory offenders, including R.S.K. and C.P.

Witnesses testified that, during the CHIPS proceeding, mother was engaging in relationships she did not disclose to the county and allowing visitors to the home who had criminal convictions or open child-protection cases. The county expressed concerns that mother was not complying with the court's order and that mother was not demonstrating that she could provide a safe environment in the home. The district court heard evidence of mother's participation in mental-health services, the degree of her progress, and the results of her neuropsychological examination and parenting-capacity evaluation.

Additionally, the district court received evidence regarding mother's supervised visitation sessions, medical professionals' observations of mother's ability to appropriately care for the children's physical needs, and child 1's special developmental needs resulting from educational delays and having been a victim of sexual abuse.

In February 2022, the district court issued an order with findings that the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification, that the county proved by clear and convincing evidence that multiple statutory bases existed to terminate mother's parental rights, and that termination of mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests.

Mother appeals.

DECISION

A district court may terminate parental rights "only for grave and weighty reasons," and it is presumed that parents are fit to be entrusted with the care of their children. *In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T.*, 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). A district court's termination of parental rights may be affirmed if (1) the county made reasonable reunification efforts, (2) at least one of the statutory grounds for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) termination is in the children's best interests. *In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P.*, 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). On appeal from a district court's order terminating parental rights, we review the underlying findings of fact for clear error, and we review the determination of whether a statutory ground for termination exists, whether termination is in the child's best interests, and a district court's ultimate decision on termination for an abuse of discretion. *In re Welfare of Child of J.H.*, 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), *rev. denied* (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).

Mother challenges the district court's finding that the county made reasonable reunification efforts, its determination that statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights exist, and its determination that termination was in the children's best interests. We address each of mother's arguments.

I. The district court's findings of fact regarding the county's reunification efforts were not clearly erroneous, and its determination that those efforts were reasonable was not an abuse of discretion.

Mother argues that the county did not show by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children. Mother specifically bases her contention that the county's efforts were not reasonable on the following: (1) statements the parenting-capacity evaluator made; (2) the county's alleged failure to provide services, ongoing assistance, or education to help mother improve the conditions of the home; (3) the county's decision to change child 1's therapist while treatment was ongoing; and (4) the lack of a trial home visit or transfer. We are not persuaded.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2020), requires that the district court make specific findings in every termination-of-parental-rights proceeding that

reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

In evaluating whether the county made reasonable efforts, the district court must consider whether the services provided to the child and family were: "(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under

the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). To be reasonable, efforts must be tailored to the problem that caused the inability to parent. *In re Welfare of S.Z.*, 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996). The district court must also consider the duration and quality of the county’s efforts. *J.K.T.*, 814 N.W.2d at 88.

We review the district court’s findings of fact regarding reasonable efforts for clear error, *see id.* at 87, and we review the district court’s determination of whether the efforts the county provided are reasonable under the circumstances of that particular case for an abuse of discretion, *In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D.*, 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015), *rev. denied* (Minn. July 20, 2015). When reviewing for clear error, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings. *In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney*, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021); *J.H.*, 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6 (applying *Kenney* in a termination-of-parental-rights case). Unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has occurred based on the entirety of the evidence, we will not conclude that the fact-finder clearly erred. *Kenney*, 963 N.W.2d at 221. In applying the clear-error standard, our role is not to reweigh evidence; therefore, we need not engage in extended discussion of the evidence to demonstrate the correctness of the district court’s findings. *Id.* at 223. When the record reasonably supports the findings, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis to the contrary. *Id.*

In support of its determination that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify her with the children, the district court found that the county offered a parenting assessment and services, a referral for mental-health services, psychological or therapeutic services, medical services, a referral for public-health nursing, visitation,

transportation, case-management services, and services to assist mother with improving her boundaries with men in her life. Consistent with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 260.12(h), the district court further found that the services offered were relevant to the safety and protection of the children, adequate to meet the needs of the family, culturally appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic under the circumstances. In so finding, the district court noted the testimony of both the GAL and mother herself that the services offered were appropriate for mother and that no services were missing that mother needed.

The record supports these findings. The county provided mother with many services, including individual and family therapy, a child-protection social worker, a mental-health worker, an early-childhood public-health nurse, and supervised visitation. The services the county provided were tailored to the case-plan goals for mother. These goals included that mother show acceptance and understanding of and provide emotional support to child 1; demonstrate that she will not permit others to sexually abuse the children; provide a safe and suitable home; attend mental-health appointments and follow recommendations; accept responsibility for her actions related to the abuse of child 1; appropriately and adequately parent the children and monitor the children's health, safety, and well-being; demonstrate knowledge of age-appropriate behavior for the children; express anger appropriately; take appropriate action to avoid being a victim of domestic violence; and follow a visitation schedule to maintain a relationship with the children. The county and mother developed the case plan to specifically address the following safety concerns for the children: that they may be harmed by mother's continued failure to protect

the children from abuse or exploitation; emotionally harmed by her denial of the abuse that occurred; or physically, emotionally, or developmentally harmed by the cluttered condition of her home.

The county social worker testified that the goal of working with mother was reunification, and the GAL testified that the services provided to mother were appropriate, and the efforts toward reunification were reasonable. Indeed, mother testified that there were no additional services she needed that the county did not provide.

Notwithstanding her testimony, mother claims that the county did not make reasonable efforts. She points first to a statement in the record by her parenting-capacity-assessment provider that the assessment's recommendations were not necessarily designed to position mother as a good parent, but rather to benefit a parent in everyday life, and seems to argue that the recommendations were not tailored to the problem that caused her inability to parent. However, the same practitioner went on to say that the recommendations, if followed, would contribute to improving parenting skills.

Mother next claims that the county did not offer services, ongoing assistance, or education to help mother improve the issues of clutter and cleanliness at the home. To the contrary, the record reflects that the social worker visited the home a number of times and provided suggestions for mother to correct the conditions. Mother further claims that the county's decision to stop child 1's individual therapy with the therapist who provided mother's family therapy and switch to another therapist "brings into question the reasonable efforts" in this area. The county responds that this change was made out of concern for child 1's safety and protection because the previous therapist was not prompt

in responding to requests for information from county caseworkers, communicated poorly with child 1's other service providers, and appeared reluctant to allow child 1 to establish and communicate boundaries about physical affection with mother. In addition, the drive time required for appointments with the therapist caused child 1, who was already educationally delayed, to miss school.

Finally, mother argues that the lack of a trial home visit or transfer shows that the county "made an insufficient reasonable effort," but she does not point to any evidence or authority suggesting that such a step was necessary for the district court to find that the county's efforts were reasonable. We perceive no clear error in the district court's findings of fact regarding the services the county provided and its reunification efforts, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that those services were, in this particular case, reasonable and tailored to the problems that caused mother's inability to parent.

II. The district court's findings of fact underlying its determination that a statutory basis existed for termination of mother's parental rights are not clearly erroneous, and its determination that a statutory basis to terminate her parental rights existed was not an abuse of its discretion.

Mother argues that the district court incorrectly determined that statutory grounds exist for termination of her parental rights. Only one statutory ground must be supported by clear and convincing evidence to affirm the district court's termination of mother's parental rights. *See* Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2020); *In re Welfare of Child. of R.W.*, 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). The district court found that the county proved by clear and convincing evidence that four statutory bases exist to terminate mother's parental

rights.¹ We agree with the district court's determination that each of the four statutory bases supports the termination of mother's parental rights to the children. To affirm the district court's order, we only need to conclude that one of the four statutory bases is supported by findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, and therefore we limit our analysis to the following basis—that mother substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship.

Under Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), the district court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds

that the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but not limited to providing the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development, if the parent is physically and financially able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable.

¹ The district court determined that the following four statutory grounds existed for termination of mother's parental rights: (1) mother substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship; (2) mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship; (3) following the children's placement out of the home, reasonable efforts under the direction of the court failed to correct the conditions leading to the children's placement; and (4) a child in mother's care experienced egregious harm of a nature, duration, or chronicity indicating a lack of regard for the child's well-being, such that a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child or any child to be in the parent's care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4)-(6).

The petitioner bears the burden of proving that a statutory termination ground exists and must show that conditions justifying termination exist at the time of the hearing and will continue to exist for an indeterminate period of time. *In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B.*, 805 N.W.2d 895, 901-02 (Minn. App. 2011), *rev. denied* (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). The district court must find that clear and convincing evidence supports its determination that a statutory termination ground is present. *Id.* at 899.

To challenge the district court's findings related to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), mother first argues that the district court clearly erred because it did not find that she had made demonstrable changes to show that she could comply with the duties of a parent. Mother points to her establishing a personal policy of non-involvement in romantic relationships, improved skills in identifying problematic dating practices, progress in her mental-health treatment, and improvements to the cluttered condition of the home. Mother further argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the efforts made by the social-services agency that failed to correct the conditions justifying termination were reasonable, because they were not directed at correcting the problem presented. Again, we disagree.

“[T]ermination of parental rights is always discretionary with the [district court].” *In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L.*, 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014). We give considerable deference to the district court's decision “because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” *In re Welfare of L.A.F.*, 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). We review factual findings for clear error and the determination of the existence of the statutory basis for abuse of discretion. *J.K.T.*, 814 N.W.2d at 87.

In determining that the county established the existence of grounds to terminate pursuant to Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), the district court made factual findings regarding mother's refusal or neglect to comply with her parental duties. Those findings include mother's history of inappropriate relationships and failure to protect children from sexual abuse. The record supports these findings, including evidence of mother's failure to take action to prevent the sexual abuse of child 1 *after* both having been warned by C.P. that abuse was occurring and having observed G.R. masturbating in child 1's presence.

The district court's findings that the conditions that led to the county filing the petition had not been corrected and would continue to exist for an indeterminate period of time are supported by the record. Specifically, the district court heard evidence that mother continues to allow individuals to visit the home who are required to register as predatory offenders or who have other criminal convictions and open child-protection cases. In fact, mother allowed one such individual to reside at the home for a period during the pendency of the district court phase of these proceedings.

The social worker also indicated that mother lacked understanding or insight into her pattern of dating men who have a history of harming children and that mother's repeated practice of allowing potentially unsafe people in her home demonstrates that mother has not developed the skills to protect her children from situations and environments that may cause them harm. The social worker provided specific examples of this pattern that continued while the county and mother were working mother's case plan.

As to the condition of the home, the social worker testified to observing some improvement in the overall cleanliness of the house; however, the worker stated that cluttered conditions persisted up to the time of the trial, with little room for children to play in or move through the common areas and items stacked along the walls that a small child could pull down or tip over.

Mother asserts that the county's efforts were not directed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the initial petition and were therefore not reasonable. Specifically, mother asserts that her delay in reporting the abuse of child 1 was "relatively short," and the perpetrator of the abuse is no longer in her home. We concluded above that the county made reasonable efforts. Thus, mother's argument fails here for the same reasons we already discussed.

Mother's argument regarding the statutory basis to terminate her parental rights also fails to address the many other findings the district court made of mother's continued refusal or neglect to comply with her parental duties beyond those related to preventing abuse of the children—conditions were not corrected by the county's reasonable efforts.

For instance, the district court found that mother demonstrated an inability to communicate effectively with child 1, difficulty in reading child 2's cues, and failure to take direction on feeding the children and modifying the foods she provides to meet their dietary needs and allergy restrictions. These findings are supported by the record. The children's pediatrician testified that child 1's weight was in the range considered to be obese while in mother's care, and a hospital social worker testified that mother had difficulty following instructions on an infant-feeding schedule for child 2. The county

social worker testified that despite numerous conversations about child 2's intolerance of certain foods, including dairy products, mother continued to bring those foods to parenting visits for child 2, and that throughout the proceedings, mother continued to miss child 2's cues and seemed not to engage with child 1 during supervised visits. One of the foster parents testified about child 1's inability to perform basic age-appropriate self-care and hygiene functions—she was unable to appropriately toilet and use utensils to eat—and child 1's improvements in those areas since leaving mother's care.

Mother asserts that because she made progress on the issues of boundaries, codependency, and appropriate relationships, the district court's finding that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions on which the petition was based is inconsistent with the great weight of the evidence. We acknowledge that mother's mental-health practitioner testified that mother was making progress in appropriate decision-making and socialization skills and intended not to date anyone in order to focus on her personal development, and that mother's social worker indicated that mother largely complied with scheduling and completing recommended mental-health interventions. But in reviewing for clear error, our role is not to reweigh the evidence; rather, we "review . . . the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision" of the district court. *Kenney*, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22. While mother does seem to have participated in the recommended services, there is evidence contrary to mother's claim of significant improvement in the conditions that formed the basis of the initial petition. Testimony from the social worker indicated that, while open to hearing suggestions, mother would often revert to former parenting behaviors or offer excuses or rationalizations; that mother's progress throughout the case has been

“limited”; and that mother participated in the services as required, but “[i]t’s implementing the skills that she has learned in those services that has been a struggle.”

The district court’s findings that mother demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to keep children safe, an inability to appropriately communicate with the children and to provide for their physical and emotional development, and an inability to apply the skills learned through the provided services are supported by the record. The continuation of these problems supports the district court’s determination that mother “has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship, including . . . care and control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development,” and that “reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable.” *See* Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). We perceive no clear error in the district court’s findings of fact regarding the statutory basis for termination of parental rights pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that at least one statutory ground for terminating mother’s parental rights exists.

III. The district court acted within its discretion by determining that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

Mother argues that it was not in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights, asserting that (1) the district court should have given less weight to the

opinion of child 1, given her age and developmental delays, and (2) some of the service providers indicated that mother was a safe parent. Again, we disagree.

In any termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, the best interests of the child must be the “paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020); *In re Welfare of Child. of K.S.F.*, 823 N.W.2d 656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012). Thus, if it finds that a statutory ground for termination exists, the district court must still determine that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. *J.R.B.*, 805 N.W.2d at 905. To analyze whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the district court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, and (3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). Competing interests may include a stable environment, health considerations, and the child’s preferences, and the interests of the parent and child are not necessarily given equal weight during the balancing process. *In re Welfare of R.T.B.*, 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). We review the district court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. *J.H.*, 968 N.W.2d at 600.

When the district court determined that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of child 1 and child 2, it considered the children’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the children’s needs and development and found that “[t]he children’s needs, primarily the need for protection from harm from others and a responsive parent, weighs in favor” of

terminating mother's parental rights. The district court noted the children's young ages and their strong bond with each other, finding that the children "should have the opportunity to reach their full and complete physical well-being and emotional development" but that "[m]other cannot provide this opportunity and continues to have relationships and friendships with inappropriate men who have criminal backgrounds, including criminal sexual conduct and child protection history."

The district court also considered child 1's mental-health needs as a victim of sexual abuse and reasoned that this weighed in favor of terminating mother's rights. The district court found that mother was unable or unwilling to protect the children from sexual abuse, unable to communicate with child 1 as would a supportive parent who believes the child was a victim of sexual abuse, and unable to provide for the children's physical well-being and emotional development. The district court further found that because mother failed to make necessary changes to her parenting during her work with the service providers, waiting to give mother additional time to correct the deficiencies was not in the children's best interests.

The district court's findings are supported by the record. The GAL testified that mother's failure to build trust with child 1 would make it difficult for the child to report any future sexual abuse to mother. Mother testified that, even months after G.R.'s admitting to having abused child 1, mother had difficulty believing that the abuse had actually occurred. The social worker testified that, just days before the final date of the termination trial, mother failed to respect child 1's physical and emotional boundaries as a sexual-abuse victim, relating that mother "forced" a hug on child 1 by approaching the

child from behind as she was walking away from mother, even though child 1 had told mother she did not want a hug and despite earlier discussions between mother and the social worker.

Child 1 expressed a preference not to return to mother's care, testifying to feeling safe in the current placement and that her basic needs for care, connection, and engagement were being met there, in contrast with child 1's stated feelings about the care received in mother's home—that she was often alone and without interaction from caregivers and that mother “let [her] get hurt.” Mother asserts that child 1's preference should be given less weight due to the child's age and developmental delays and because the child stated to the court that she “like[s] lying.” The record shows, however, that before considering child 1's preferences, the district court inquired into the child's ability to discern between truthfulness and dishonesty and confirmed that the child knew the importance of truthfulness to the court and was competent to testify. Again, we decline to reweigh the district court's findings in making this determination, as that is not the appellate court's role. *See J.H.*, 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6.

Mother directs us to the testimony of her family therapist about mother's bond with child 1 and the public-health nurse's testimony that mother could be an appropriate parent to child 2. The district court, however, found the testimony of those two witnesses worthy of only limited evidentiary value. In contrast, the social worker and GAL both testified that they believed it to be in the children's best interests to discontinue the case plan and terminate mother's parental rights.

The district court's detailed order includes a thorough analysis of the best-interests factors and provides more than 17 pages of factual findings supporting its various determinations. The record supports the district court's determination that termination of mother's parental rights is in the children's best interests. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it made that determination.

Affirmed.