State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0315

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antwan Jamar Jamison,
Appellant.

Filed January 17, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-20-5697

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that respondent
the State of Minnesota had violated the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act
(UMDDA). His motion was denied, and, after a jury trial, he was convicted of third-degree
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burglary. He challenges his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in denying his
motion, and his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to consider appellant’s ability
to pay when it ordered restitution. Because we see no error in the denial of appellant’s
motion to dismiss, we affirm his conviction; because we agree that the restitution award
should be remanded to comply with the requirements set out after sentencing in State v.
Wigham, 967 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 2021), we reverse and remand the restitution award.
FACTS
In April 2020, deadlines governing district court proceedings were suspended
during the COVID-19 pandemic emergency. In August 2020, the state charged appellant
Antwan Jamison with burglary and arson. On September 8, 2020, he requested final
disposition of all charges against him and a trial within six months, i.e., before March 8,
2021, under the UMDDA, codified at Minn. Stat. § 629.292 (2020). On March 3, 2021,
the state filed a notice of motion and motion for a finding of good cause to extend the
detainer deadline beyond 180 days because courtrooms had been closed due to the
pandemic; on March 31, 2021, appellant moved to dismiss the charges for lack of
jurisdiction because the time allowed for his trial had expired.
Following a hearing on these motions, the district court, in May 2021, issued an
order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss, reserving the state’s motion to show good
cause, and noting that the six-month deadline for appellant’s trial had been tolled by
legislative action until September 15, 2021. In July 2021, the district court issued an order
stating that trial would occur from September 13-17, 2021; in September, the district court
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found no good cause to extend the deadline because trial was scheduled to begin two days
before September 15, 2021.
The jury found appellant not guilty of first- and second-degree arson and guilty of
third-degree burglary. On December 9, 2021, appellant was sentenced to the pre sumptive
30 months in prison and ordered to pay $25,000 in restitution in this case jointly and
severally with another case against him.
On December 22, 2021, the supreme court released Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 664
(holding that, in ordering restitution, a district court must expressly state that it considered
the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations, as required by Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 1 (2020)).
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and
seeks reversal of his conviction; he also argues that the district court erred under Wigham
in awarding restitution without having indicated that it considered appellant’s
circumstances and seeks reversal and remand of the restitution order for compliance with
Wigham.
DECISION
1. Jurisdiction
The UMDDA provides that, within six months after receipt of a defendant’s request
for final disposition and certificate, the complaint shall be brought to trial; if the indictment
is not brought to trial within that period, no court will have jurisdiction of it and it shall be
dismissed with prejudice. Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3. This court reviews issues of
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jurisdiction and of statutory interpretation de novo. In re State v. Wilson, 632 N.W.2d 225,
227, 229 (Minn. 2001).
On April 15, 2020, the legislature suspended statutory deadlines due to the COVID-
19 pandemic: “[t]he running of deadlines imposed by statutes governing proceedings in the
district and appellate courts, including . . . time periods prescribed by statute, is suspended
during the peacetime emergency declared on March 13, 2020 . . . and for 60 days after the
end of the peacetime emergency declaration”; it also provided that this section would
expire on the earlier of 60 days after the end of the peacetime emergency or February 15,
2021. 2020 Minn. Laws ch. 74, art. 1, § 16 , at 66. Three days before its expiration, on
February 12, 2021, th e law was amended to provide that deadlines would not expire
between March 13, 2020, and April 15, 2021. 2021 Minn. Laws ch. 3, § 1, at 211.
The complaint was filed on August 28, 2020, before the effective date of the law,
and appellant requested speedy disposition under the UMDDA on September 8, 2020, and
the resulting six-month deadline was therefore March 8, 2021. However, that deadline was
suspended and did not begin to run until February 12, 2021; thus, the six-month period was
extended to August 12, 2021. Moreover, a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
timely honor a UMDDA request for final disposition of a criminal charge tolls the six-
month period until final disposition of the motion. Wilson, 632 N.W.2d at 230. The district
court calculated:
[Appellant’s] Motion to Dismiss was filed on March 31, 2021,
and this order resolving the motion was issued on May 4, 2021.
There are thirty-four (34) calendar days between the time of
filing and resolution of [appellant’s] motion. Accordingly,
thirty-four (34) days should be added to the end of the six
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month time period to bring [appellant’s] matters to trial and
will expire . . . on September 15, 2021.
. . . [B]ecause the six month deadline was tolled, and
does not expire until September 15, 2021, the Complaints
remain in force and effect, the Court retains jurisdiction over
those matters, and thus they are not subject to dismissal
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 629.292.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that “[t]he language of
[the session laws] is clear and unambiguous and does not contain any exclusions or
exceptions” because both sessions laws state that:
Nothing in this paragraph prevents a court from holding a
hearing, requiring an appearance, or issuing an order during the
peacetime emergency if the judge determines that individual
circumstances rel evant to public safety, personal safety, or
other emergency matters require action in a specific case.

Based on this language, appellant argues that the session laws did not apply to the six-
month UMDDA deadline. But the session laws state that they apply to “deadlines imposed
by statutes governing proceedings in the district and appellate courts, including . . . time
period prescribed by statute.” 2021 Minn. Laws ch. 3, § 1, at 211; 2020 Minn. Laws ch .
74, art. 1, § 16, at 66.
Appellant also argues that the Continuing Orders issued by the supreme court, which
provided that district courts could process cases using remote technology and hold criminal
jury trials if the chief judge of the district and the chief justice of the supreme court
approved, superceded the session laws suspending UMDDA deadlines. But, as the district
court observed, “While it is certainly true that the State had every ability to initiate the
proceedings in these cases prior to March 2021, and while these factors may be relevant to
a determination of whether good cause exists to extend the six month statutory deadline,
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these facts and allegations are not relevant to whether the Complaints should be dismissed
[under the UMDDA].” Because appellant’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 13,
2021, two days before the expiration of the six-month deadline, the state’s motion for good
cause to extend the deadline became moot. The district court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges because the time for trial had expired.
2. Restitution
A district court’s authority to order restitution is a question of law, subject to de
novo review, while a restitution award itself is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 662.
In ordering restitution, a district court is required to consider both the amount of the
economic loss sustained by the victim and the circumstances of the defendant, including
income, resources, and obligations. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2020); see also
State v. Hanninen, 533 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. App. 1995) (explaining that this
requirement will prevent a district court from imposing “a judgment that can never be
satisfied”) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1995). A district court fulfills
its duty to consider the defendant’s circumstances by stating, orally or in writing, that it did
consider the defendant’s ability to pay restitution. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 664.
The restitution order here contains no statement concerning appellant’s
circumstances; it says only that appellant “shall develop a restitution payment schedule
which shall be incorporated into any probation agreement made herein, all pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 2a.” Appellant argues that “[t]he district court made no such
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express statement [of consideration of appellant’s circumstances] either at sentencing or in
the restitution order,” and the state does not refute this argument.
While the district court need not make specific findings as to a defendant’s
circumstances when it says that it has considered them, “we hold that the record must
include sufficient evidence about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to
allow a district court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the amount of restitution
ordered.” Id. at 665. Such evidence may be found in the record, in the presentence
investigation (PSI), in a defendant’s statement of ability to pay, or in a restitution payment
schedule. See, e.g., State v. Paludicki , 727 N.W.2d 662, 667- 68 (Minn. 2007) (evidence
provided by the record); State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995) (evidence
found in restitution payment schedule); and State v. Alexander, 855 N.W.2d 340, 344
(Minn. App. 2014) (evidence provided by the PSI and the defendant’s statement); see also
State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Minn. App. 2014) (reversing and remanding because
there was no PSI and no defendant’s statement to provide evidence), rev. denied, (Minn.
Apr. 15, 2014).
Here, as in Wigham, “the district court did not expressly state that it considered [the
defendant’s] ability to pay, and . . . the record does not include sufficient evidence about
[the defendant’s] income, resources, and obligations to allow the count to consider [his]
ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered.” Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 666. In Wigham,
because “the [district] court did not consider [the defendant’s] ability to pay as required by
section 611A.045, subd. 1,” the supreme court reversed and remanded to the district court
“for further proceedings on restitution.” Id.
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We affirm appellant’s conviction and, in light of Wigham, reverse and remand the
restitution award to the district court for further proceedings on restitution.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.