State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0318

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jaye William Snyder,
Appellant.

Filed January 17, 2023
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-20-415

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Dawn R. Nyhus, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Andrew C. Wilson, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas , Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
SYLLABU S
The imposition of a l ifetime period of conditional release does not constitute a
punishment of life imprisonment for purposes of rule 17.01, subd ivision 1, of the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the underlying offense need not be prosecuted
by indictment.

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OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Jaye William Snyder was convicted of third -degree criminal sexual
conduct. Due to a prior third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, the district court
sentenced Snyder to serve a lifetime period of conditional release pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (2022) ,1 upon his release from incarceration . On direct appeal,
Snyder argues that the district court erred when it imposed lifetime conditional release
because the state charged him by complaint rather than indictment. 2 We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Snyder on April 3, 2020, by complaint with
one count each of third - and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct based upon a mentally
impaired, incapacitated, or physically helpless victim . The complaint’s probable-cause
statement noted that Snyder was on supervised release at the time of the offense for a 2016
third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.
On October 27, 2021, a jury returned guilty verdict s on both counts . Before
sentencing, Snyder asked the district court to impose a ten-year conditional-release term
rather than lifetime conditional release . He argued that because the state charged his
offense by complaint rather than indictment, imposing lifetime conditional release would

1 While Snyder committed the assault unde rlying this appeal in 2019, we cite the 2022
Minnesota Statutes to signify that intervening amendments to the statutes cited herein do
not change the analysis.
2 Snyder argued in his principal brief that the district court abused its discretion when it
failed to grant a continuance sua sponte. Because Snyder withdrew this claim at oral
argument, we do not address it.
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be improper. At sentencing, the district court stated that its research had not identified
legal authority to address Snyder’s sentencing argument, but that it understood the relevant
statutes to require lifetime conditional release. The district court sentenced Snyder to 140
months in prison and lifetime conditional release.
Snyder appeals.
ISSUE
Does Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1, require the state to charge a defendant by
indictment to impose a lifetime period of conditional release?
ANALYSIS
Snyder argues the district court erred when it imposed a lifetime term of conditional
release as part of his sentence because the state charged the underlying crime by complaint
rather than indictment. Determining whether the state needed to charge Snyder by
indictment for the district court to impose lifetime conditional release requires u s to
interpret Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd . 1. We interpret rules of criminal procedure de
novo. State v. Thomas, 891 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
When interpreting court rules, “we look first to the plain language of the rule and
its purpose.” State v. Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d 300, 305 (Minn. 2008). If the language is plain
and unambiguous, we follow the plain language. State v. Lee, 929 N.W.2d 432, 439 (Minn.
2019). “We interpret court rules in accordance with the rules of grammar and give words
and phrases their common and approved usage.” Dereje v. State , 837 N.W.2d 714, 720
(Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Minn. 2012)).
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Rule 17.01, subdivision 1, states in relevant part that “[a]n offense punishable by
life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment.” Unlike a criminal complaint, which
requires a judicial officer to make a probable-cause finding , see Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01, an
indictment requires a grand jury to make the probable -cause finding for the charged
offense, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.06. Under existing law, w hen the state prosecutes an
offense by complaint and the offense is punishable by life imprisonment or a lesser
sentence, the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
See State v. DeWalt , 757 N.W.2d 282, 289- 90 (Minn. App. 2008) (remanding for
resentencing after holding the district court lacked the authority to impose an enhanced
sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree criminal-sexual conduct because the offense
was not prosecuted by indictment). Accordingly, the question we must resolve is whether
a lifetime period of conditional release constitutes “life imprisonment” under rule 17.01,
subdivision 1.
A.
To contextualize our analysis, we review Minnesota’s sentencing scheme regarding
supervised release, conditional release, and life sentences.
In Minnesota, when a district court imposes an executed prison sentence for a felony
conviction, it may sentence the defendant to either “life imprisonment” or “to
imprisonment for a fixed term of years” as otherwise authorized by law. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.10, subd. 1 (2022). When a district court sentences a defendant convicted of a felony
to an executed sentence of a fixed duration, “t he executed sentence consists of two parts:
(1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal to two -thirds of the executed
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sentence; and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that i s equal to one -third
of the executed sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2022). Minnesota law mandates
release from incarceration at the completion of the term of imprisonment along with
supervision during the remaining period of the sentence . State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian,
755 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Minn. App. 2008) (“By statute, the [department of corrections] must
release offenders after they serve their term of imprisonment an d must supervise offenders
during their period of supervised release.”) ; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 244.101, subds. 1, 2
(2022); 244.05, subd. 1 (2022); 243.05, subds. 2, 6 (2022) . If a defendant thereafter
violates a condition of his supervised release, the department of corrections (DOC) may
revoke supervised release and reincarcerate the defendant for a period not to exceed the
time remaining in the defendant’s executed sentence. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3 (2022).
Certain crimes, such as felony drivi ng-while-impaired and most criminal-sexual -
conduct offenses, require an additional period of DOC supervision—referred to a s
conditional release —after the defendant completes their executed sentence of fixed
duration. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d) (2022), 609.3455, subd s. 6, 7 ( 2022).
Unless an exception applies, DOC administers a conditional-release term under the same
provisions governing supervised release. A violation of any conditional -release provision
may result in DOC reincarcerating the defendant for a time, up to and including the
expiration of the conditional-release term. Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d), 609.3455,
subd. 8(c) (2022).
In contrast to supervised and conditional release, Minnesota law does not guarantee
a defendant ’s release from incarceration when a district court imposes a life sentence.
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Certain life sentences preclude a supervised-release term by prohibiting any release from
incarceration, and others require a minimum period of imprisonment before a defendant
becomes eligible for supervised release. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 4 (20 22). And even
in the latter cases , s upervised release is not guaranteed and i s instead discretionary with
DOC. Id., subd. 5(a) (2022) (“The commissioner of corrections may, under rules
promulgated by the commissioner, give supervised release to an inmate serving a
mandatory life sentence . . . after the inmate has served the minimum term of imprisonment
specified in subdivision 4.”).
B.
Given the legal distinctions among supervised release, conditional release, and life
sentences, we conclude that a district court’s imposition of lifetime conditional release is
not equivalent to “life imprisonment” under rule 17.01, subdivision 1. In the context of
Minnesota’s sentencing structure, “life imprisonment” contemplates a sentence of
incarceration from wh ich there is no requirement or assurance of release.
Examining the facts of this case, we conclude the district court did not sentence
Snyder to “life imprisonment” as the term is used in rule 17.01, subdivision 1. Because
Snyder was convicted of third -degree criminal sexual conduct and had a previous
conviction for that offense, his sentence must include a mandatory lifetime period of
conditional release. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (“[A]fter the offender has been
released from prison, the commissioner shall place the offender on conditional release for
the remainder of the offender ’s life. ”). Consistent with the statute, t he di strict court
sentenced S nyder to a n executed, fixed-duration sentence of 140 months in prison. The
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sentencing statutes entitle Snyder to release from prison after serving a minimum of two -
thirds of this duration. Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1. Only upon his release from prison
after serving two -thirds of his sentence will he begin DOC supervision on conditional
release. And while on conditional release, Snyder will remain in the community unless
and until he violates a condition of that release and is reincarcerated as a sanction.
Structured in this manner, the sentencing statutes guarantee Snyder’s release from
prison, at which point he will have the opportunity to remain in the community indefinitely,
provided he complies with the terms of his conditional release. Thus, although DOC will
supervise Snyder for the remainder of his lifetime , he was not sentenced to “life
imprisonment” because a release from incarceration is both certain and not subject t o
DOC’s discretion.
C.
The theoretical possibility that DOC could revoke Snyder’s conditional release and
return him to a correctional facility for the rest of his life does not render the “offense
punishable by life imprisonment.” In his brief, Snyder places great emphasis on the word
and suffix “punishable” in rule 17.01, subdivision 1. He argues that because a violation of
his conditional release could result in his return to custody for the remainder of his life, he
technically faces the potential p unishment of life imprisonment, so the state must charge
him by indictment.
While we agree with Snyder that DOC could potentially return him to prison for the
rest of his life if he violates the terms of his conditional release, we disagree that this would
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constitute a punishment for the offense itself. 3 Rather, such imprisonment would result
from the violation of conditional -release terms and not the conduct for which the district
court ori ginally sentenced Snyder. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1 (“ An offense
punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment. (emphasis added)).
When a district court imposes a life sentence for an offense, it commits the
defendant to pris on for an indefinite period as the punishment for that crime, subject to
release—if at all—only at DOC’s discretion. Conversely, when a district court imposes a
fixed-duration sentence followed by a conditional-release term, the only imposed
incarceration for the underlying crime is the term of imprisonment the defendant must serve
under Minn. Stat. § 244.101 (2022). DOC does not have the discretion to extend this
imprisonment or to reincarcerate the defendant after their statutorily mandated release
based upon the original offense. DOC can only extend the term of imprisonment, or return
a defendant to prison after release, if DOC punishes the defendant for separate behavior—
either disciplinary infractions within the institution or violations of the defendant’s release
conditions. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subds. 1b, 3 (2022).
Although the imposition of a lifetime conditional -release term has a lifelong
consequence for the offense of conviction, the fact that this sanction does not involve either
an initial indefinite commitment to prison or the possibility of a return to incarceration

3 Although the statute governing conditional release theoretically provides for this result,
we are aware of no case in which DOC re incarcerated an offender for life following the
revocation of lifetime conditional release.
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based on the underlying crime itself, we conclude that such a sentence does not render that
crime an “offense punishable by life imprisonment.”
DECISION
The state need not prosecute by indictment a case where a defendant faces a sentence
of a fixed-duration prison term, followed by a lifetime period of conditional release,
because such a sentenc e does not constitute “life imprisonment” within the meaning of
Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1.
Affirmed.