State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0346

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tashawn Antionette Thomas,
Appellant.

Filed January 23, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-13195

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to grant her
a downward dispositional departure from her presumptive executed prison sentence based
upon her particular amenability to probation. Because the district court carefully
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considered appellant’s departure motion and the information and arguments presented, it
acted within its discretion by imposing an executed sentence within the presumptive range.
We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2021, appellant Tashawn Antionette Thomas pleaded guilty to aiding
an offender as an accomplice after the fact to second-degree intentional murder, admitting
that she lied to law enforcement to hide her involvement in the murder of her boyfriend.
During sentencing, Thomas moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing
that she was particularly amenable to probation because she had “shown remorse and a
respectful attitude,” had “been cooperative in her efforts to take responsibility,” had “the
support of her family and motivation of caring for her young children,” had “always sought
employment,” and had “a good work history.” Thomas’s criminal history score was zero,
the severity level of her offense was nine, and her presumptive sentence was a range of 74
to 103 months’ imprisonment. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (2020). The district court
denied Thomas’s motion for a downward dispositional departure, concluding that she was
not particularly amenable to probation, and imposed a sentence of 90 months’
imprisonment. Thomas appeals.
DECISION
We review the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014); State v. Larson, 473 N.W.2d 907, 908
(Minn. App. 1991). “The district court must order the presu mptive sentence provided in
the sentencing guidelines unless substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a
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departure.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
We will affirm a presumptive sentence if “the record sh ows that the sentencing court
carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented,” even if reasons for a
departure exist. State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013); State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn.
2006). “[A]n explanation is not required when the court considers reasons for departure
but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.” State v. Van Ruler , 378 N.W.2d 77, 80
(Minn. App. 1985). Only in a “rare” case will we reverse the district court’s refusal to
depart from a presumptive sentence. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App.
2018) (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981)).
When considering a dispositional departure, the district court focuses on the
defendant as an individual. State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). A
defendant’s particular amenability to probation may justify a dispositional departure. Soto,
855 N.W.2d at 308. The supreme court has explained that “particular” in this context
means “exceptional” or “distinctive among others of the same group,” and “particularly”
means “especially” or “specifically.” Id. at 309 (quotation omitted).
Thomas contends that she is particularly amenable to probation and, therefore, the
district court abused its discretion by denying a downward dispositional departure. We
disagree.
First, “[a] reviewing court may not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of
discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the
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testimony and information presented before making a determination.” Pegel, 795 N.W.2d
at 255 (quotation omitted).
As required by Pegel, the record indicates that the district court “read carefully all
[of] the submissions,” including the presentence investigation, and heard a statement from
the victim’s sister, the arguments of counsel, and statements from Thomas. Therefore, we
“may not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion” to impose the
presumptive sentence. Id. (quotation omitted).
Second, “the district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional
departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not required to do
so.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009). Relevant factors for
determining whether the defendant is particularly amenable to probation include the
defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude in court, and support
of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
The district court found that Thomas did not cooperate with law enforcement
because “she chose not to provide” them with information to assist in identifying the
murder suspect and obtaining potential evidence earlier in the investigation. Additionally,
the district court found that Thomas lacked remorse, stating that “[s] he’s remorseful that
she’s sitting here today but not about her actual actions” and Thomas “took no
responsibility” for her conduct in the presentence investigation when she stated that she
“does not feel like she did anything criminal in this case.” The district court acknowledged
Thomas’s “great work history” as a personal care assistant but noted that Thomas is “not
allowed to work in that field anymore” due to her conviction. The district court also
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considered two domestic-assault charges against Thomas, one from before the events
leading to the charges in the present matter and one from after the charges.
Thus, the district court acted within its discretion by declining to grant the
downward dispositional departure. This is not the “rare” case that would warrant a reversal
of the district court’s refusal to depart from a presumptive sentence. Walker, 913 N.W.2d
at 468 (quotation omitted).
Affirmed.