State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0350

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Juan Eduardo Rodriguez Morales,
Appellant.

Filed December 11, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-19-1320

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David J. Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Abigail H. Lambert, Assistant County
Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Juan Eduardo Rodriguez Morales appeals the district court’s denial of his
petition for postconviction relief . He argues that the district court erred in rejecting his
postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of the terms of his plea
2
agreement, and unlawful imposition of lifetime conditional release. Because we conclude
that Rodriguez Morales was not prejudiced by his attorney’s performance and that the
district court did not violate the plea agreement by revoking Rodriguez Morales’s release
pending sentencing, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief on those grounds. But
because the di strict court erred by imposing a lifetime term of conditional release, we
reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
Rodriguez Morales pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct and was sentenced to a lengthy prison term to be followed by conditional release.
After sentencing, he filed a direct appeal to this court but then stayed the appeal to pursue
postconviction relief. Rodriguez Morales filed a postconviction petition in the district
court, which challenged his guilty pleas and one of his sentences, and he moved for an
evidentiary hearing. The district court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately denied
Rodriguez Morales’s petition on its merits.
Rodriguez Morales reinstated his appeal, and he now challenges the district court’s
denial of his postconviction petition. Before turning to the legal issues that he raises on
appeal, we summarize the proceedings below.
Rodriguez Morales’s Guilty Pleas
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Rodriguez Morales with eight counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct after two of his stepdaughters reported that he had sexually abused them over an
extended period. The state notified Rodriguez Morales that it intended to seek aggravated
3
sentencing departures. Rodriguez Morales, who was represented by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charges and demanded a jury trial. On the second day of trial, and after both
victims testified, the parties reached a plea agreement. Rodriguez Morales pleaded guilty
to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct—one count for each victim—while
maintaining his innocence of the charges pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970). 1 In exchange, the state dismiss ed the remaining charges and agreed that
Rodriguez Morales could remain in the community on conditional release pending
sentencing. Although there was no agreement as to the sentence that Rodriguez Morales
would receive, the state agreed that he could request probation, which would require a
downward dispositional departure from the presumptive prison sentences for the two
offenses. The state also agreed that it would not seek more prison time than called for by
the sentencing guidelines.
Rodriguez Morales was born in Mexico and is not a United States citizen. He is a
legal permanent resident of the United States who has lived in this country for over 30
years. During the guilty-plea hearing, his attorney asked whether he understood that “if
certain outcomes occur here that you would likely be subject to deportation,” and
Rodriguez Morales responded, “Yes.”
The district court accepted the plea s and adjudicated Rodriguez Morales guilty of
both counts. Following the guilty pleas, the district court allowed Rodriguez Morales to

1 Such a guilty plea, which is known as an “Alford plea,” allows a district court to accept a
defendant’s guilty plea, even though the defendant maintains innocence. Alford, 400 U.S.
at 37-38. The Minnesota Supreme Court approved the use of Alford pleas in Minnesota in
State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977).
4
remain in the community on conditional release pending sentencing and ordered him to
participate in a presentence investigation (PSI) and psychosexual evaluation.
Before sentencing, the Minnesota Department of Corrections informed the district
court that Rodriguez Morales had not completed the psychosexual evaluation or the
chemical-dependency evaluation required as part of the PSI process. The district court
held two sentencing hearings.2 At the first hearing, the prosecutor advised the district court
that Rodriguez Morales had also violated the conditions of his release by continuing to
drink alcohol and having contact with children. The district court revoked Rodriguez
Morales’s conditional release based on his lack of cooperation with conditions and “in the
interest of public safety,” and Rodriguez Morales was taken into custody. He remained in
jail until the second sentencing hearing, less than a month later.
At sentencing, the district court denied Rodriguez Morales’s request for a downward
dispositional departure to probation and imposed two consecutive prison sentences of 172
months— one for each conviction. The district court also imposed a ten-year conditional-
release term following the prison sentence for one conviction, and a lifetime conditional-
release term following the second conviction.

2 The sentencing hearing was originally scheduled to occur in November 2022. But
because the PSI was filed just before the hearing, the district court bifurcated the sentencing
proceeding to give Rodriguez Morales more time to review the PSI. At the first hearing,
the district court received victim-impact statements and heard testimony from Rodriguez
Morales’s character witnesses. At the second hearing three weeks later, the district court
sentenced Rodriguez Morales.
5
Postconviction Proceedings
In his postconviction petition, Rodriguez Morales claimed that the attorney who had
represented him at trial and during the guilty-plea and sentencing hearings provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to inform him that he faced mandatory
deportation as a result of his guilty pleas to first-degree criminal sexual conduct and
(2) insufficiently explaining that, under the terms of his plea agreement, he could receive
consecutive sentences. Additionally, Rodriguez Morales alleged that the district court
violated the terms of his plea agreement by revoking his conditional release before
sentencing.
At the evidentiary hearing on his petition, Rodriguez Morales called as witnesses
his trial attorney, another attorney who assisted his trial attorney, and a former girlfriend.
Rodriguez Morales also testified. The focus of the testimony was the information that the
trial attorney had provided to Rodriguez Morales regarding the immigration consequences
of pleading guilty and sentencing possibilities.
Rodriguez Morales’s trial attorney testified that he consulted with an immigration
attorney at the outset of his representation of Rodriguez Morales, and then discussed with
Rodriguez Morales “deportation . . . depending upon the types of pleas and resolutions that
could be reached.” He testified that he understood Rodriguez Morales “would be deported”
to a “hundred percent certainty” if convicted following a trial and sentenced to prison. But
he advised Rodriguez Morales that by accepting the plea agreement, there would be an
“opportunity to try to reach an outcome to give him a chance at probation and a chance at
an argument before a federal judge on immigration.” The attorney testified that he
6
informed Rodriguez Morales that avoiding deportation would be unlikely “but that there
was a possible argument that could . . . be made.” Although the attorney did not use the
term “consecutive” in explaining to Rodriguez Morales the potential sentences he faced,
the attorney testified that he explained the total duration of possible sentences.
According to the trial attorney, he encouraged Rodriguez Morales to continue with
the trial rather than plead guilty. He advised Rodriguez Morales that there was no
guarantee of probation. But Rodriguez Morales chose to accept the state’s plea offer.
The second attorney who had assisted Rodriguez Morales’s attorney recalled being
present for a discussion regarding the immigration consequences of the guilty pleas. That
attorney testified that Rodriguez Morales was advised that “a guilty verdict on all of the
counts would be an automatic deportation and that there was a possibility of avoiding
deportation risk if he pleaded [guilty].” He recalled that Rodriguez Morales was informed
of the risk of consecutive sentencing.
Rodriguez Morales and his former girlfriend testified that Rodriguez Morales’s
attorney did not advise that Rodriguez Morales would be deported if he received probation
after pleading guilty or that Rodriguez Morales faced consecutive sentences. Rodriguez
Morales also testified that, if he had known he would be deported even if he received a
probationary sentence, he would not have pleaded guilty. The district court did not find
the testimony of Rodriguez Morales or his former girlfriend to be credible.
In a written order, the district court denied postconviction relief. The district court
determined that Rodriguez Morales had not met his burden to show that his attorney’s
performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance.
7
Additionally, the district court rejected Rodriguez Morales’s argument that revoking his
conditional release before sentencing violated his plea agreement.
DECISION
Rodriguez Morales raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that his attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him that he would face
mandatory deportation even if he was sentenced to probation and that the district court
could impose consecutive prison sentences. Second, he contends that the district court
violated his plea agreement with the state by revoking his conditional release before
sentencing. Third , and finally, Rodriguez Morales asserts that the district court erred by
imposing a lifetime conditional-release term to follow his second sentence. 3
I. Rodriguez Morales’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because he
cannot show that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s allegedly deficient
performance.

Rodriguez Morales argues that his convictions must be vacated because he was
deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. He contends that

3 We address two types of “conditional release” in this case. While the charges were
pending and before sentencing, Rodriguez Morales was on pretrial and presentencing
conditional release, which allowed him to remain in the community instead of in jail until
the disposition of charges. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subd. 1 (noting that a defendant
must be released from custody during the pretrial stage of a criminal proceeding unless the
district court finds that doing so would either endanger the public or would not guarantee
the defendant’s appearance at subsequent hearings). At sentencing, the district court
imposed the second type of conditional release—two terms of conditional release that are
part of Rodriguez Morales’s sentences for his two convictions. This second type of
conditional release is akin to additional supervised release that follows prison sentences for
certain types of offenses. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subds. 6, 7 (2018) (providing that
some crimes, including most criminal-sexual-conduct offenses, require an additional
period of supervision, referred to as conditional release, after a defendant completes an
executed sentence).
8
his attorney incorrectly advised him that he would have an “argument” against deportation
if he was sentenced to probation and that, “if he had known that his guilty plea
automatically triggered deportation,” there is “a reasonable probability that he would not
have pleaded guilty.” Additionally, Rodriguez Morales argues that his attorney did not
inform him that he could receive consecutive sentences, and but for this omission, he would
not have pleaded guilty. Because Rodriguez Morales cannot show that he was prejudiced
by his attorney’s advice, we conclude that he did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed to all criminal defendants
by the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 6. To establish a claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance in violation of
this constitutional right , a defendant must satisfy both elements of the test articulated in
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, the defendant must prove that
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-
88. Second, the defendant must prove prejudice resulting from counsel’s inadequate
performance. Id. at 694. To prove prejudice, the defendant must show that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. Id.; Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn.
2013). A defendant bears the burden of establishing both elements of an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. Nowels, 941 N.W.2d 430, 443 (Minn. App. 2020),
rev. denied (Minn. June 16, 2020).
9
Appellate courts “review a district court’s application of the Strickland test de novo
because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585,
591 (Minn. 2017). The appellate court considers whether the “[district] court’s factual
findings . . . are supported in the record, conduct[s] a de novo review of the legal
implication of those facts on the ineffective assistance claim, and either affirm[s] the
court’s decision or conclude[s] that the court abused its discretion because postconviction
relief is warranted.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013). When a
defendant has failed to satisfy the burden of establishing one element of the Strickland test,
the appellate court need not address the other element. Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369,
372 (Minn. 2020).
Here, the prejudice factor is dispositive because Rodriguez Morales has not shown
that his attorney’s alleged errors affected his substantial rights. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. A defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted). In the context of
a guilty plea, a defendant may establish prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.” Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “On the actual prejudice prong, the reviewing
court considers all of the evidence before the district court.” Johnson v. State, 673 N.W.2d
144, 148 (Minn. 2004). “Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
10
assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s
deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a
defendant’s expressed preferences.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017).
As to prejudice, t he district court found that Rodriguez Morales failed to provide
any “credible evidence to suggest he only entered the plea based on misrepresentations or
failings on the part of his attorney.” Rather, the district court determined, Rodriguez
Morales pleaded guilty because he believed there was a substantial likelihood that a jury
would find him guilty and, without a plea agreement, he would receive an aggravated
sentence.
We first consider whether the record supports the district court’s factual findings
regarding prejudice. In support of its finding that Rodriguez Morales pleaded guilty
because he believed he would be found guilty and wanted to minimize his sentencing
exposure, t he district court noted the following facts, which are well supported by the
postconviction record: Rodriguez Morales was charged with ten counts of criminal sexual
conduct; if convicted, he faced consecutive sentences and possible aggravated sentencing
departures; the plea offer “shaved more than ten years . . . off the prison sentence [he faced]
if found guilty at trial”; the plea agreement provided Rodriguez Morales with a significant
benefit; when entering his guilty pleas, Rodriguez Morales acknowledged there was a
substantial likelihood a jury would find him guilty of the two offenses of conviction; and
Rodriguez Morales’s attorney counseled him against accepting the plea offer. The district
court also found that the attorney accurately explained to Rodriguez Morales the potential
sentences he faced under the plea agreement even if the attorney did not use the term
11
“consecutive.” We determine that the facts in the postconviction record support the district
court’s finding that Rodriguez Morales pleaded guilty because he believed the jury would
find him guilty and he hoped to receive a shorter sentence.
Rodriguez Morales testified at the postconviction hearing, as he argues now, that he
pleaded guilty because he believed he could avoid deportation if he received probation and
because he did not understand that he would still be subject to consecutive sentencing. But
the district court found his testimony “wholly self-serving and lacking in credibility.”
Because the district court rejected this testimony, we do not include it in our analysis. See
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (“We recognize that the trier of fact
is in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence.”).
Next, applying de novo review, we consider whether the district court’s factual
findings sustain the legal conclusion that there is no reasonable probability that, but for the
attorney’s allegedly deficient performance, Rodriguez Morales would not have pleaded
guilty. We conclude that the district court’s factual findings support the legal conclusion
that the alleged deficient performance of Rodriguez Morales ’s counsel did not affect the
outcome of the proceeding. The district court found that Rodriguez Morales pleaded guilty
because he wanted to prevent up to ten convictions, multiple prison sentences, and
aggravated sentencing. Given this finding, there is no reasonable probability that
Rodriguez Morales would not have entered the plea agreement but for his attorney’s
assertion that a probationary sentence— which was not the state’s recommendation—
would give him a possible argument against deportation. And there is no reasonable
probability that any failure of the attorney to use the term “consecutive” while otherwise
12
accurately conveying Rodriguez Morales’s sentencing exposure caused Rodriguez Morales
to plead guilty. While these considerations may have further motivated Rodriguez Morales
to plead guilty, there is no reasonable probability that they were the basis for his decision
to plead guilty. Thus, Rodriguez Morales did not establish that he was prejudiced by the
alleged deficiencies of his attorney. And because Rodriguez Morales’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel fails on the prejudice element of Strickland, we need not consider
whether his attorney’s performance was constitutionally deficient. See Peltier, 946
N.W.2d at 372.
We conclude that the district court did not err in rejecting Rodriguez Morales ’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying postconviction relief on that ground. See Matakis v. State, 862
N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015) (stating that an appellate court reviews a district court’s denial
of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion).
II. Because Rodriguez Morales violated multiple conditions of his presentencing
conditional release, t he district court did not violate the plea agreement by
revoking his release.

Rodriguez Morales argues that the district court violated his guilty-plea agreement
with the state by revoking his presentencing conditional release three weeks before he was
ultimately sentenced to prison. We are not persuaded.
Following a guilty verdict or plea, a district court has discretion to allow a defendant
to reside in the community or to confine the defendant pending sentencing. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.01. A defendant who wishes to await sentencing in the community “bears the burden
of showing the defendant will not flee and is not a danger to others.” Id. If a district court
13
elects to release a defendant, it must consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged” and “the community’s safety,” among other factors, and whether to impose
conditions on the defendant’s release to ensure that the defendant will not flee or endanger
the community. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subd. 2 (listing the factors relevant to
determining the conditions of release).
An appellate court reviews a district court’s pretrial release decisions for an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Martin, 743 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2008) (stating that a district
court’s decisions regarding bail and conditions of release are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.03, subd. 3 (providing a district court with
discretion to revise conditions of pretrial release if a defendant violates a release condition).
Because a district court similarly has discretion under rule 27.01 as to a defendant’s custody
status following a guilty plea, it is axiomatic that such decisions likewise are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.
Before the trial and guilty pleas, Rodriguez Morales was in the community on
pretrial conditional release. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state recommended that he
be allowed remain in the community on conditional release pending sentencing. The
district court followed this recommendation but imposed additional conditions on
Rodriguez Morales’s continued release, as it was entitled to do under rule 27.01. Rodriguez
Morales failed to comply with some of these conditions. He did not obtain a psychosexual
evaluation or a chemical-dependency evaluation, which was required to complete the PSI.
He allegedly continued to use alcohol. And the district court was concerned that Rodriguez
Morales was spending time around young children. Based on these violations, the district
14
court noted its grave concern about public safety and revoked Rodriguez Morales’s
conditional release three weeks before sentencing.
Although Rodriguez Morales characterizes the district court’s decision as a
violation of the plea agreement, we reject that framework. The plea agreement did not
require the district court to maintain Rodriguez Morales on conditional release without
regard to his compliance with the conditions imposed. Rodriguez Morales’s continued
release was dependent on his compliance with the conditions of release. Notwithstanding
the plea agreement, the district court had discretion to confine Rodriguez Morales if
Rodriguez Morales failed to comply with those conditions. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.01.
Because Rodriguez Morales violated the conditions of his release, the district court was
well within its discretion to revoke the conditional release and to confine him until
sentencing.
III. The district court err ed by imposing a term of lifetime conditional release to
follow Rodriguez Morales’s second sentence.

Rodriguez Morales challenges the district court’s imposition of lifetime conditional
release. The district court imposed two sentences—one for each count of conviction. For
the first count, the district court sentenced Rodriguez Morales to 172 months in prison to
be followed by a ten-year conditional-release period. As to the second count, the district
court sentenced him to a consecutive 172 -month prison sentence and then lifetime
conditional release. Rodriguez Morales challenges the duration of the second conditional-
release period —the lifetime term— arguing that the district court had no authority to
impose such a term under the language of the conditional-release statute and the caselaw.
On this issue, we agree with Rodriguez Morales.
15
An appellate court reviews de novo whether a sentence is authorized by law. State
v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009). We first turn to the applicable law.
Minnesota law requires a ten -year conditional-release term to follow a prison
sentence imposed for the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota
Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a)-(b) (2018)—which includes the offenses at issue
here. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6. But if a defendant “has a previous or prior sex
offense conviction,” the district court must impose a lifetime term of conditional release.
Id., subd. 7(b). A conviction is a “prior sex offense” if “ the offender was convicted of
committing a sex offense before the offender has been convicted of the present offense,
regardless of whether the offender was convicted for the first offense before the
commission of the present offense, and the convictions involved separate behavioral
incidents.” Id., subd. 1(g) (2018).
In State v. Nodes, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the effect of this statutory
language when two convictions are entered during the same hearing. 863 N.W.2d 77, 80
(Minn. 2015). It clarified that a “prior sex offense conviction” is “a conviction for a
separate behavioral incident entered before a second conviction, whether at different
hearings or during the same hearing.” Id. at 82. Thus, a defendant “who, in a single
hearing, is convicted of two sex offenses, one immediately after the other, each arising out
of separate behavioral incidents, has a ‘prior sex offense conviction’ under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455.” Id. at 77.
However, when two convictions are entered simultaneously—“[w]ith no temporal
gap whatsoever between a district court’s adjudication of offenses”—neither of these
16
convictions is a “prior sex-offense conviction.” State v. Brown , 937 N.W.2d 146, 157
(Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2020). Under these circumstances, and
when the defendant has no other qualifying convictions, the defendant is not subject to
lifetime conditional release. Id.
Rodriguez Morales contends that he did not have a “prior sex offense conviction”
at the time of his sentencing hearing because the district court simultaneously entered
convictions for both offenses at his guilty-plea hearing. The state counters that the district
court entered the convictions sequentially at the sentencing hearing and, for that reason,
Rodriguez Morales had a “prior sex offense conviction” when the district court imposed
lifetime conditional release.
To decide whether Rodriguez Morales had a “prior sex offense conviction” when
the district court imposed the lifetime conditional-release period, we must identify when
the district court convicted Rodriguez Morales of the two offenses in his case and
determine whether the convictions were simultaneously or sequentially entered. “A guilty
verdict alone is not a conviction.” Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007).
Instead, a conviction occurs when the district court adjudicates a defendant guilty on the
record. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d at 81. “For accepted pleas, verdicts, or findings of guilt to
become convictions under Minnesota law, the conviction must be recorded.” State v.
Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “The general practice, and
a practice to which district courts should adhere, is to have the conviction recorded and
appear in a judgment entered in the file.” Id. (quotation omitted).
17
To determine “whether an offense has been formally adjudicated,” the reviewing
court “look[s] to the official judgment of conviction in the district court file as conclusive
evidence” of this fact. Spann, 740 N.W.2d at 573 (quotation omitted); see also State v.
Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999) (“Because the testimony and statements
recorded in hearing and trial transcripts are often imprecise and unclear with respect to
sentencing and conviction orders, we typically look to the official judgment of conviction,
which generally appears as a separate entry in the file, as conclusive evidence of whether
an offense has been formally adjudicated.”); Nodes, 863 N.W.2d at 81 (noting that the
official judgment of conviction “generally appears as a separate entry in the file” ). Cf.
State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that, when a district
court’s oral pronouncement conflicts with the warrant of commitment, the oral
pronouncement controls).
Although we acknowledge that this is a close issue, we agree with Rodriguez
Morales that the district court entered convictions for both counts simultaneously before
sentencing, and thus, Rodriguez Morales did not have a “prior sex offense conviction”
when he was sentenced .4 The state identifies portions of the record that support its
argument. As the state notes, at the sentencing hearing in December 2021, the district court
sentenced Rodriguez Morales first for Count 6, imposing a ten-year conditional-release
period, and then for Count 3, imposing lifetime conditional release. Additionally, the
warrant of commitment reflects that Rodriguez Morales was convicted of the offenses on

4 We also acknowledge that Rodriguez Morales stated during his guilty-plea hearing that
he understood he would receive lifetime conditional release.
18
the date of sentencing. Both the district court’s practice at sentencing of imposing one
sentence followed by another and the warrant of commitment suggest that the convictions
were separately entered in December 2021.
But we are more persuaded by other evidence in the record that the district court
simultaneously entered the two convictions before the sentencing hearing. We base our
decision on two events in the record. First, after Rodriguez Morales entered the guilty
pleas at the guilty-plea hearing, the district court accepted the pleas and stated, “Judgment
of convictions will be entered for both Counts 3 and 6 . The balance of the counts are
hereby dismissed.” Second, three weeks before sentencing, in November 2021, the district
court issued a written order entitled, “Findings of Guilt,” which states that “1. Judgment of
conviction shall be entered adjudicating Defendant guilty of Count 3 . . .” and “2.
Judgment of conviction shall be entered adjudicating Defendant guilty of Count 6.” These
events convince us that the convictions were entered before sentencing and that they were
entered simultaneously.
Because we conclude that the convictions were entered and recorded
simultaneously, the first offense was not a “prior sex offense conviction” for the second
offense. Thus, the district court erred by imposing a lifetime conditional-release period to
follow Rodriguez Morales’s prison sentence for the second conviction. We accordingly
reverse the district court’s imposition of lifetime conditional release and remand for the
imposition of a ten-year term of conditional release.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.