State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0353

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Melvin Karnes,
Appellant.

Filed April 17, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-18-1170

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant seeks reversal of his convictions for third-degree assault, false
imprisonment, and criminal vehicular operation (CVO), arguing the evidence is legally
insufficient. Appellant argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
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he inflicted substantial bodily harm, and therefore, the evidence is insufficient to sustain
his convictions for third-degree assault and CVO. Appellant also contends that his
false-imprisonment conviction rests on circumstantial evidence and that there is a
reasonable inference that appellant lawfully detained the victim. Because we conclude the
evidence sustains all three convictions, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant John Melvin Karnes with
third-degree assault inflicting substantial bodily harm under Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1
(2016); false imprisonment by intentional restraint under Minn. Stat § 609.255, subd. 2
(2016); CVO causing substantial bodily harm under Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 2(1)
(2016); and fifth- degree assault with intent to inflict bodily harm under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2016). 1 The following summarizes the evidence received at
Karnes’s jury trial.
Around midday on May 28, 2018, in Austin, Karnes drove a white van on 12th
Street at about 15 miles per hour. Karnes abruptly stopped, nearly causing B.N.’s car to
collide with the rear of Karnes’s van and a motorcycle to collide with the rear of B.N.’s
car. Karnes and B.N. exited their vehicles, and Karnes “instantly started screaming.” B.N.
“threw his sandals down on the ground.” After prompting from the motorcyclist, Karnes
and B.N. returned to their vehicles and drove them “off the road” so traffic was not blocked.

1 The state also charged Karnes with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon under
Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016). The jury did not reach a unanimous verdict on that
charge.
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Karnes started recording the encounter on his cell phone. The argument resumed, and
Karnes “stepped towards” B.N. and “open-palm slapped [B.N.] in the face.” B.N. and
Karnes “hit each other back and forth a couple times.”
Karnes put B.N. in a “headlock” and bit B.N. on the top of the head. Karnes climbed
into his van and started driving while holding on to B.N. by the neck. B.N. was “flailing”
and “trying to get free.” B.N. tried to run alongside the vehicle, fell, and was dragged more
than 100 feet before Karnes let go. B.N. recalls hitting his head as he “skipped across the
ground.” B.N. estimated Karnes drove at speeds up to 40 miles per hour.
Law enforcement responded and took B.N. to the hospital, where he was treated for
injuries to his neck, feet, back, and head. B.N. was diagnosed with a cervical neck strain,
multiple abrasions, and a bite wound. The treating physician instructed B.N. to wear a
cervical collar and expressed concern about a potential ligamentous injury.
At the October 2021 jury trial, the state called B.N.; the emergency-room physician
who treated B.N.; B.N.’s girlfriend, who was in B.N.’s car at the time of the incident; a
responding police officer; and four eyewitnesses. B.N. testified that having gravel removed
from his feet was “the most painful thing [he has] ever experienced” and that he could not
wear shoes for “about four months” and “couldn’t work” because of the injuries. B.N. also
testified that he had a head injury and is “very forgetful” after the accident. And B.N.
testified that his neck still hurts, he “still go[es] to a chiropractor and [has] massages done,
because [he is] still in pain.”
Karnes testified in his own defense. He admitted that he slapped B.N. and could
have ended the encounter earlier by leaving when he moved his van out of the street. Karnes
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also testified he held B.N. “around [B.N.’s] neck,” but added that he “let go of [B.N.]” as
he got into the van and before he drove away.
The jury found Karnes guilty of third- and fifth-degree assault, false imprisonment,
and CVO . At sentencing, the district court convicted Karnes of all offenses except
fifth-degree assault and imposed the presumptive stayed sentence of 18 months for
third-degree assault.
Karnes appeals.
DECISION
Karnes’s brief to this court challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
convictions for third-degree assault, false imprisonment, and CVO. When evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence, “t he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, and it mu st be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that
conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). “The
verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder . . . could reasonably have found the
defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
I. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Karnes’s convictions for third -degree
assault and CVO.

Karnes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving substantial bodily harm,
a necessary element of his convictions for third-degree assault and CVO. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.223, subd. 1, .2113, subd. 2(1). Substantial bodily harm is “bodily injury which
involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but
substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which
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causes a fracture of any bodily member.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7(a) (2016). Karnes
argues that none of B.N.’s injuries satisfied the substantial-bodily-harm element. B.N.’s
injuries included a cervical strain, deep cuts to his feet, memory loss, a bite wound,
abrasions on his back, and a head injury.
Karnes argues that the cervical collar B.N. wore after the May 28 incident was “to
prevent a potential injury, not the result of an actual bodily injury.” Karnes contends that
precautions taken to prevent injury cannot meet the standard of substantial bodily harm.
The state responds that Karnes’s argument is unconvincing because it “diminishes the
diagnosed cervical neck strain.”
Karnes relies on the treating physician’s testimony that the cervical collar was a
precaution based on “concern[] for a ligamentous injury” that could have developed from
B.N.’s cervical neck strain. The physician added that a ligamentous injury could not have
been confirmed “in the emergency department.”
Karnes’s brief to this court ignores other record evidence about B.N.’s neck injury.
The treating physician testified that B.N.’s cervical collar was used to “keep the head in [a]
particular position” and to “provide some stability.” B.N. testified that he wore the cervical
collar for four weeks and could not work during that time. B.N. also testified that he “still
go[es] to a chiropractor and [has] massages done, [be]cause [he is] still in pain.” Thus, the
record evidence establishes that B.N. suffered substantial bodily harm because his neck
injury caused a “temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function” of his head
and neck.
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Karnes also contends that evidence of B.N.’s foot injury was insufficient to establish
substantial bodily harm, arguing that B.N. “did not testify as to any specific impairment in
the functioning of his feet.” B.N. testified that his bare feet were “dragging” on the road as
Karnes drove and held him. B.N. also testified that “the wounds were so deep on [his] feet”
that he could not wear shoes for four months , and his feet still hurt “to this day.” B.N.
testified that because of his various “injuries,” he “couldn’t work.” Thus, we conclude the
record evidence establishes that B.N. suffered substantial bodily harm because B.N.’s feet
were “temporar[ily] but substantial[ly] impair[ed].”
The state compares B.N.’s neck and foot injuries to the injuries in State v. Carlson,
in which this court affirmed a conviction for third-degree assault based on its conclusion
that evidence of two black eyes, facial bruises, bruises on the neck and head, and scratches
on the arm sufficiently proved substantial bodily harm. 369 N.W.2d 326, 327-28 ( Minn.
App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. July 26, 1985). We agree. Like the record evidence in
Carlson, the record evidence of B.N.’s neck and foot injuries “taken together were
sufficient for a jury” to conclude that substantial bodily harm occurred.
Because we conclude that the record evidence of injuries to B.N.’s neck and feet
satisfies the substantial-bodily-harm standard, we need not consider B.N.’s additional
injuries, including a bite wound, abrasions, and a head injury.
II. The evidence is sufficient to s ustain Karnes’s conviction for false
imprisonment.

Karnes argues that his conviction for false imprisonment should be reversed because
the circumstances proved “failed to eliminate the rational inference that Karnes reasonably
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believed he had lawful authority to restrain or confine [B.N.].” A conviction for false
imprisonment under Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2, requires evidence that Karnes,
“knowingly lacking lawful authority to do so, intentionally confine[d] or restrain[ed]” B.N.
Karnes does not contend that he had actual lawful authority. Rather, Karnes argues
the state failed to prove he “knowingly” lacked lawful authority. Intent or knowing conduct
is often proved by circumstantial evidence because a defendant’s knowledge is usually
inferred from the evidence. See State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn. 2013) (“The
State ordinarily proves a criminal defendant’s mental state by circumstantial evidence.”).
We agree with the parties that the record includes only circumstantial evidence of Karnes’s
intent or knowledge. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can
infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist,” and it “always requires an
inferential step to prove a fact.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017).
We review t he legal sufficiency of circumstantial evidence using heightened
scrutiny in a two-step test. State v. Al- Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). The
first step is to identify the circumstances proved. Id. “In identifying the circumstances
proved, we defer, consistent with our standard of review, to the jury’s acceptance of the
proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with
the circumstances proved by the State.” Id. (quotations omitted). The second step is to
“examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved; this includes inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than
guilt.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). In
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conducting this examination, “[w]e give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between
reasonable inferences.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 474 (quotations omitted).
In the first step of our review, we note the circumstances proved that support the
verdict: Karnes screamed at B.N., used his cell phone to record the encounter, is bigger and
heavier than B.N., slapped B.N., traded punches with B.N., put B.N. in a headlock, bit
B.N., got into his van while holding on to B.N.’s neck, began driving while still holding
B.N., and dragged B.N. over 100 feet.
Under the second step, Karnes argues that there is a rational hypothesis of
innocence. He contends that “[t]hese facts support a rational inference that, even if not
satisfying all elements of a self-defense claim, Karnes reasonably believed he could
lawfully restrain [B.N.] for the purposes of stopping [B.N.]’s blows and driving away from
the altercation.” We disagree for two reasons. First, Karnes’s theory conflicts with evidence
that Karnes used his cell phone to record the fight but did not call 911 for emergency
assistance. It also conflicts with the evidence that Karnes is bigger than B.N. and gained
control over B.N. by placing him in a headlock.
Second, it is not a reasonable inference that a person intending to extricate himself
from a fight would reasonably believe it necessary to forcibly drag the other combatant for
over 100 feet. Karnes agreed that he had a chance to drive away from B.N. after moving
his van from the middle of the street. Instead of driving away, Karnes reengaged with B.N.
See State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014) (requiring a person to retreat if
reasonably possible before acting in self-defense). Karnes’s argument that his only course
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of escape was to drive away while holding on to B.N.’s ne ck conflicts with Karnes’s
admission that he could have driven away before reengaging with B.N.
In conclusion, there is no reasonable inference based on the circumstances proved
that is consistent with a verdict other than guilt.
Affirmed.