In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0359

In re the Marriage of:

Russell Vander Wiel, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Sharna Ann Wahlgren,
Appellant.

Filed January 23, 2023
Affirmed as modified
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-17-2657

Linda S.S. de Beer, de Beer & Associates, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Evon M. Spangler, Spangler and de Stefano, PLLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Johnson , Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After more than 20 years of marriage, respondent and cross-appellant Russell
Vander Wiel (husband) petitioned the district court to dissolve his marriage to appellant
and cross-respondent, Sharna Ann Wahlgren (wife). The ensuing litigation lasted over five
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years, due in part to the impact of wife’s ongoing significant health issues and the
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the parties’ extensive marital assets.
After a five-day trial, the district court entered a judgment and decree ruling, among
other things, that husband did not dissipate marital assets following the parties’ separation.
The district court then divided the property (and debts) between the parties and awarded
wife five years of temporary spousal maintenance.
On appeal, the parties collectively raise 12 issues, which fall with in three broad
areas: (1) property division, (2) dissipation of marital assets, and (3) spousal maintenance.
Because the record largely supports the district court’s findings— with one exception—we
affirm as modified.
FACTS
In October 2017, after more than 20 years of marriage, the parties separated.
Around this time, husband petitioned the district court to dissolve the parties’ marriage.1
Five years of contentious litigation ensued, including numerous requests for
continuances, discovery disputes, motions in district court, and one appeal.2 The district
court then held a five-day trial in October and November 2020.
The May 2021 judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage denied wife’s motion to
value the parties’ property as of September 30, 2020, in favor of the original March 20,

1 This matter was heard by a referee, who made recommendations adopted by the district
court. This court treats a referee’s recommendations, as adopted by the district court, as
the district court’s order. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
2 During earlier proceedings, the district court appointed a guardian ad litem for wife given
her ongoing mental-health concerns. This court, however , reversed that appointment.
Vander Wiel v. Wahlgren, 934 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. App. 2019).
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2018, valuation date, which was based upon the date of the original pretrial conference.
The judgment then awarded wife the marital home (valued at $323,900) and a ca bin in
Lindstrom (valued at $277,000), and awarded husband a condominium in Utah (valued at
$1,250,000). The judgment also divided the bank accounts, retirement funds, and other
assets. With regards to debts, the judgment made wife responsible for repaying a home
equity line of credit ( HELOC) debt on the marital home because wife “unilaterally
withdrew the entire $200,000 . . . [and] deposited the funds into an account in her name
only” after the parties’ separation. The judgment directed husband to share equally in
wife’s medical debt incurred prior to the valuation date, and divided approximately
$208,124 in unsecured debts between the parties, as well as retirement, bank, and
investment accounts, among other items.
In sum, each party received approximately $1,702,754 after the district court
divided assets, debts, and the marital estate. The court ordered wife to pay husband a
$3,574 equalizer payment to compensate for the slightly higher value of the net marital
estate that wife received. The district court rejected wife’s claim that, after the parties’
separation, husband dissipated marital assets through unnecessary spending. In doing so,
the district court considered wife’s spending, the parties’ standard of living over the last
three years of their marriage, and credited husband’s testimony regarding his need for the
expenditures.
Finally, the district court addressed spousal maintenance. Wife sought permanent
maintenance, contending that she can no longer work as a result of her emotional and
mental health. After hearing extensive testimony—including expert testimony —the court
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determined that wife’s mental health rendered her temporarily unable to work. But the
court rejected wife’s proposed monthly budget of over $16,000 after examination of wife’s
expenses— which the district court determined were overstated—and the marital standard
of living. Instead, the district court awarded wife monthly maintenance of $5,667 for five
years.
Both parties moved the district court to amend the findings, and wife moved for a
new trial. The district court granted, in part, the parties’ motions for amended findings to
correct certain clerical errors but declined to materially alter the findings, and it denied
wife’s new-trial motion.
Wife appealed, and husband filed a notice of related appeal.
DECISION
The parties dispute aspects of the district court’s decisions regarding its division of
the parties’ marital assets and its award to wife of spousal maintenance. An appellate court
will not alter a district court’s decision on these matters unless that decision constitutes an
abuse of the district court’s discretion. Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018)
(property); Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997) (maintenance). “A
district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the
evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting
Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)).
The parties also dispute aspects of the district court’s determination that husband
did not dissipate marital assets. What is often colloquially referred to dissipation of marital
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assets is currently addressed by Minnesota Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1a (2022).
Under that provision, a person who is a part y to, or who contemplates initiation of, the
dissolution of a marriage
owes a fiduciary duty to the other for any profit or loss derived
by the party, without the consent of the other, from a
transaction or from any use by the party of the marital assets.
If the court finds that a party to a marriage, without consent of
the other party, has in contemplation of commencing, or during
the pendency of, the current dissolution . . . proceeding,
transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of marital
assets except in the usual course of business or for the
necessities of life, the court shall compensate the other party
by placing both parties in the same position that they would
have been in had the transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or
disposal not occurred.

Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a. The applicability of this statute depends on whether the
district court “finds” that one of the spouses, in contemplation of commencing or during
the pendency of the dissolution “transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of marital
assets.” Id. A district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Minn. R. Civ.
P. 52.01; see Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (applying
rule 52.01 in a family-law appeal). Thus we review the district court’s determination that
husband did not dissipate marital assets for clear error.
The clear -error standard of review, whether employed in the
findings-unsupported-by-the-evidence prong of the abuse-of-discretion standard of review
or otherwise, “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the
decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021); see
Bayer v. Bayer, 979 N.W.2d 507, 513 (Minn. App. 2022) (citing Kenney in a family-law
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appeal). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted). When applying the
clear-error standard of review, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do not find their own facts;
and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus an appellate court need
not engage in extended discussion of the evidence to demonstrate the correctness of the
district court’s findings; rather, it need only fairly consider all the evidence and determine
that the evidence reasonably supports the decision. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222; see
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear-error
standard of review).
Finally, we note that appellate courts do not presume error. I nstead, the party
seeking relief on appeal must both show that the district court committed the alleged error
and that the error was prejudicial. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d
76, 78 (Minn. 1975); see Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Minn. App. 2001)
(applying Midway in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001); see Minn.
R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error be ignored); see also Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark,
787 N.W.2d 690, 694 n.1 (Minn. App. 2010) (refusing to grant appellate relief when any
error was de minimis), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010); Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98,
105 (Minn. App. 2009) (same).
With these standards of review in mind, we address the parties’ arguments.
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I. The district court’s division of marital assets fell within its broad discretion.
A district court must divide marital assets justly and equitably. Minn. Stat. § 518.58,
subd. 1 (2022). Here, the judgment and decree included a balance sheet identifying the
parties’ assets and debts and addressing the values of those assets and debts as of the March
2018 valuation date. Those assets and debts can be summarized as real property valued at
$1,850,900; bank, retirement, and investment accounts valued at $3,353,687; vehicles
valued at $53,144; personal property valued at $50,000; and debts totaling $208,124. Thus
the parties’ marital assets had a gross value of over $5 million, while the parties had
marital-debt total of about $208,000. Of that debt, the district court assigned over $200,000
to wife.
A. Property Valuation
Husband challenges the district court’s valuation of the Utah condominium.
A district court’s valuation of property is a finding of fact and will not be set aside
unless it is clearly erroneous. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472. The district court is not
required to be exact in its valuation of assets, as long as its valuation “lies within a
reasonable range of figures.” Passolt v. Passolt, 804 N.W.2d 18, 25 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011).
Here, the district court valued the Utah condominium at $1,250,000. That valuation
is supported by the record. The record contains both a 2017 tax-assessed value of the Utah
condominium of $980,000 and a November 2017 sales-comparison-approach appraisal,
valuing the condominium at $1,199,000. While neither value addresses the
condominium’s value as of the March 20, 2018 valuation date, the district court noted both
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that husband’s March 9, 2018 financial disclosures valued the Utah condominium at
$1,250,000 and that wife requested that the property be valued at $1,250,000.
But husband argues that his financial disclosures contained a clerical error, and that
the November 2017 appraisal should have been used to determine the Utah condo’s value.
We disagree. First, husband’s financial disclosure was submitted to the court within two
weeks of the valuation date—the most recent out of all of the estimates. Second, we defer
to the district court’s choice to rely on the parties’ assertions. Pechovnik v. Pechovnik,
765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (explaining that appellate courts neither reconcile
conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness credibility, which are exclusively the
province of the factfinder). Third, even ignoring the valuation of the condominium in
husband’s financial disclosures, the district court’s valuation of the condominium was
reasonable given the values generated by the other parts of the record addressing the
condominium’s value. And this $50,000 difference in a million-dollar property is less than
five percent more than its proposed value —a de minimis difference we will not overturn
on appeal. Miller, 787 N.W.2d at 690. As a result, we cannot say that the district court’s
valuation of the condominium is clearly erroneous.
Husband also challenges the district court’s finding of wife’s investment income.
In finding wife’s investment income, the district court applied the four-percent rate of
return-on-investments to which the parties agreed. But the parties disagree on how much
of the property awarded to wife should be treated as investable. Husband contends that
wife’s investable property should have included amounts (including amounts in wife’s
high-yield savings and her money-market account) which originated from funds she
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borrowed via the HELOC, which the district court assigned as a debt to be paid by wife.
Husband also asserts that the district court should have applied the four-percent rate of
assumed return to stock options and restricted stock units awarded to wife.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination. The
calculation of investment income by a district court only need fall within a reasonable
range. Passolt, 804 N.W.2d at 25. And the difference between the annual investment
income advocated by husband ($31 ,000) and the amount determined by the district court
($25,000) is within that range of reasonableness given the extent of marital assets here.
Further, both parties’ experts agreed that stock-option values are volatile. Thus we cannot
say that omitting those assets from the flat rate of return assumed by the parties constituted
an abuse of the district court’s broad discretion in these matters.
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B. Debts
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering her to repay the
entire HELOC.3 Specifically, she contends that the HELOC is a marital debt and should
be divided between the parties accordingly.4
In a dissolution proceeding, the parties’ debts are divided in the same manner as the
division of assets. Korf v. Korf, 553 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn. App. 1996). Marital assets
can be “property, real or personal,” acquired by the parties, collectively or individually, to
a dissolution proceeding, “at any time during the existence of the marriage relation between
them.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2022). Meaning, generally, debts incurred after
the marriage and before the valuation date are considered marital property subject to just

3 While not entirely clear, husband also seems to assert that the district court miscalculated
the property -equalizer payment because of the treatment of the HELOC debt. But the
record shows that the district court fully considered the parties’ assertions o n HELOC
matters when it awarded wife the marital home and treated the HELOC secured by that
home as a marital debt. Specifically, while the district court did not deduct the HELOC
from the value of the marital home, it did use the HELOC debt as a separate item in
calculating the property-equalizer payment. Absent more, we cannot say that husband has
shown that the district court abuse d its discretion when it used the HELOC debt in its
calculation of the equalization payment.
4 Husband further argues that the district court abused its discretion when it assigned him
wife’s outstanding medical bills. The district court determined that to the extent the debt
was incurred prior to the valuation date, the parties share equally in those debts and any
medical debt incurred after the valuation date was wife’s sole responsibility. Husband
contends that wife failed to properly submit her medical bills through the parties’ insurance
provider, which caused additional costs. But husband does not identify where, in this very
extensive record, the evidence is that supports his assertions. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
128.03 (requiring a cite to the record for each material fact). Nor did we locate the evidence
to which he seems to refer. See Hecker v. Hecker , 543 N.W.2d 678, 681 n.2 (Minn.
App. 1996) (stating citations to the record “are particularly important where . . . the record
is extensive”), aff’d, 568 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1997); see also Cole v. Star Trib.,
581 N.W.2d 364, 371-72 (Minn. App. 1998) (noting that failure to cite the record can result
in an argument not being properly before this court).
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and equitable division. Id. But it is within the district court’s broad discretion to assign a
party solely responsible to pay a debt that benefits only that party. See Tasker v. Tasker,
395 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding it was not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to assign one party all the student-loan debt where the party’s education
had not yet produced a financial benefit).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it assigned wife sole
responsibility for the repayment of the entire HELOC when it also awarded the marital
home to wife. As the district court determined, wife unilaterally withdrew approximately
$200,000 from the HELOC postseparation and maintained exclusive control over the funds
throughout the proceeding. And while wife testified that she withdrew the monies to cover
her living expenses, the district court determined that at the time of the withdrawals, she
was working full-time and had access to other brokerage accounts which the court
implicitly found could have covered these costs. Moreover, the district court noted wife’s
testimony that she used a portion of these funds to pay a nonmarital expense.
5
Given this testimony, the district court’s assignment of the HELOC debt to wife is
not an abuse of discretion.6

5 The district court found wife’s testimony credible that she used a portion of the HELOC
funds to pay for her attorney’s fees, whi ch are considered a non-marital expense.
Thomas v. Thomas, 407 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Any amount taken from
marital property to pay one party ’s attorney’s fees should be accounted for . . . and the
other party compensated in the distribution.”).
6 Wife contends that the district court’s finding that there was “nothing nefarious” about
the parties’ spending postseparation is at odds with the assignment of the HELOC to her.
She further asserts that the court treated her differently than husband by assigning this debt
to her while not requiring husband to repay “similar” postseparation expenses. For two
reasons, we disagree. First, the treatment of husband’s expenses was addressed by the
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C. Posttrial Motions
Wife broadly challenged the asset valuation underlying the property division in a
new-trial motion requesting relief under rule 59.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure. According to wife, because husband failed to disclose assets and comply with
discovery requests, she was unable to provide evidence of a change in value to justify an
alternate valuation date. As a result, wife contends, she is entitled to a new trial with regard
to the property division. 7 Wife, however, does not identify any assets husband failed to
identify during the discovery process.
Despite wife’s motion being one for a new trial under rule 59.01, the district court
analyzed this posttrial -valuation issue utilizing Minnesota Statutes section 518.145,
subdivision 2 (2020).8 The district court “spent considerable time explaining why [it]

district court in the context of wife’s motion —where she bore the burden of proof—that
husband dissipated marital assets. A district court’s decision regarding whether a party
dissipated marital assets is separate and distinct from its division of marital debts. Compare
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (requiring the division of marital property to compensate a
party if the district court “finds” that the other party improperly “transferred, encumbered,
concealed, or disposed of marital assets”), and Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that findings
of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous), with Korf, 553 N.W.2d. at 712 (applying
the abuse-of-discretion standard to the division of marital debts). Second, the court’s
decision in addressing husband’s spending was based, in part, on its determination that
husband spent money on living expenses, a factual finding it did not make regarding wife’s
HELOC withdrawal.
7 Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that wife’s
motion for amended findings was not a request for reconsideration. But given our
determination that the district court properly handled the posttrial motions, we need not
reach this issue.
8 The supreme court has stated that “[t]he sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in
meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Shirk v. Shirk,
561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997); see Pooley v. Pooley , 979 N.W.2d 867, 876
(Minn. 2022) (quoting this aspect of Shirk). Because Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2,
provides the “sole” vehicle for relief from a “judgment and decree,” it is at least arguable
13
assigned March 20, 2018 as the valuation date and why it did not credit wife’s argument
about husband’s alleged disclosure failures.” And the court noted that wife’s motion for a
new trial amounted to an attempt to relitigate this issue, and it denied wife’s motion for a
new trial on this ground.
The denial of wife’s posttrial motion based upon the valuation date falls squarely
within the district court’s discretion. Wife’s argument is premised on the theory that
husband had a duty to provide information about his assets “until trial and beyond.” And
that, under rule 26.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, husband was required to
supplement his discovery responses up to the trial.
But here husband did answer and supplement discovery responses multiple times,
up to three months before trial. The district court set a discovery cut-off date of
September 30, 2020, which husband complied with. Setting and enforcing discovery limits
is within the broad discretion of the district court. In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to
the district court’s broad power to issue discovery orders). We see no abuse of that
discretion given the multitude of documents produced here and the delays in this matter
which were attributable to both parties, as well as the global pandemic.

that the “judgment and decree” for which Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2, provides the
“sole” vehicle for relief is a judgment and decree that is otherwise final. If a motion for
amended findings or a new trial is available, it is at least arguable that any then-existing
judgment is not yet final. For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that a
motion for relief under Minnesota Statutes section 518.145, subdivision 2, is viable despite
the simultaneous availability of a motion for a new trial or amended findings, or both.
14
Still, wife argues that the district court erred in denying her new-trial motion when
it analyzed this issue using Minnesota Statutes section 518.145, subdivision 2, instead of
rule 59.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Minnesota Statutes section 518.145,
subdivision 2, provides that the district court may order a new trial as relief from a
judgment and decree for one of the following reasons: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . . ; (3) fraud . . . ; (4) the judgment
and decree . . . is void; or (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, . . . or
it is no longer equitable.”
Rule 59.01, on the other hand, states in applicable part that a new trial may be
granted based upon an irregularity in the proceeding that deprived the moving party of a
fair trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01. That irregularity, according to wife, was the district
court’s failure to enforce the discovery rules. And she asserts, as she must, that the error
was prejudicial error.
Given the district court’s careful consideration of the parties’ ongoing discovery
disputes and its consideration of the valuation date in both its original decision 9 and in the
judgment and decree, we discern no difference, in this case, between the posttrial
application of Minnesota Statutes section 518.145, subdivision 2, and rule 59.01. Under

9 In its November 2019 order, the district court determined that neither wife’s
(September 30, 2020) nor husband’s (December 4, 2017) requested dates of valuation
would be fair and equitable, given the circumstances. The district court set the date of
valuation for March 20, 2018, the date of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement
conference. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. And further, the district court noted that
Minnesota Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1, allows the parties the opportunity to
request the court adjust the valuation date if there is a substantial change in value of an
asset between the date of valuation and the final distribution of assets.
15
either analytical framework, the district court operated within its broad discretion in
denying the posttrial motion on this ground.
II. The record supports the district court’s finding that husband did not dissipate
marital assets.

Husband spent various amounts on furnishings for the apartment he occupied after
the parties separated, on ce rtain gifts of college tuition to his nieces and nephews, and on
attorney fees. The district court found husband’s testimony on these matters credible and
that there was no improper use of marital assets by husband. Wife argues that these
determinations by the district court are clearly erroneous.
A. Household Goods and Gifts
In challenging husband’s expenditures on household goods, wife asserts that
husband could have used furniture the parties already owned, or lived at one of the parties’
furnished residences that wife was not occupying, instead of renting an apartment.
Therefore, wife concludes, husband’s expenditures on these goods were neither for the
necessities of life nor in the usual course of business. But the district court credited
husband’s testimony regarding the expenses for the months immediately following his
departure from the marital home in October 2017. And appellate courts defer to a district
court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Further, in crediting husband’s testimony on these matters, the district court reviewed the
documents addressing both parties’ postseparation spending, and stated that each party
“spent money over the course of [the dissolution proceeding] as they would have if they
had remained together.” On this record, wife has not shown that the district court clearly
16
erred in determining that husband did not attempt to conceal or otherwise dissipate marital
assets by making expenditures on household goods.
Regarding husband’s gifts of college tuition to his nieces and nephews, the record
reflects postseparation payments from one of husband’s bank accounts for student loans
(or college tuition) for his nieces and nephews totaling about $26,000. The record also
reflects that the parties had a practice of giving gifts to relatives. Absent more, wife has
not shown that the district court’s finding that husband did not dissipate marital assets
through gifts was clearly erroneous. And even if the finding regarding the gifts was clearly
erroneous, the amount of the gifts in question ($26,000) was de minims when compared to
the full marital estate. Therefore, even if the finding was clearly erroneous, relief would
not be required here. See Hesse, 778 N.W.2d at 105 (noting that appellate courts ignore
prejudicial error when the prejudice is de minimis); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring
harmless error be ignored).
B. Attorney Fees
Generally, the payment by a party to a marital dissolute proceeding of attorney fees
is not a payment “in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life.”
Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 654 (Minn. 2008). But Baker does not require the finding
that husband’s expenditures on attorney fees violated Minnesota Statutes section 518.58,
subdivision 1a. Specifically, wife has not established that the funds at issue here were not
funds husband earned after the valuation date—March 20, 2018. 10 And for property to be

10 The record shows that husband made the following payments from his bank
account: (1) August 2018 payment for $5,000; (2) September 2018 payment for $10,000;
17
considered “[m]arital property,” it must have been acquired by the parties after marriage
but before the date of valuation. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. Because wife has not
shown that the payments for attorney fees were made with funds acquired before the
valuation date, those funds were not marital property. See id. As a result, the district
court’s findings that husband did not dissipate marital assets on this basis is not clearly
erroneous.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that wife was
entitled to temporary spousal maintenance.

When determining spousal maintenance, the district court engages in a two-part
inquiry. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subds. 1, 2 (2022). First, the district court determines
whether the party requesting spousal maintenance lacks the ability to provide adequate
self-support at the marital standard of living. Id., subd. 1; see Lyon v. Lyon ,
439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (stating that an award of spousal maintenance requires a
showing of need). Second, if the district court determines that the spouse is entitled to
spousal maintenance, it determines the amount and duration of the maintenance. Id.,
subd. 2; see also Schmidt v. Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Minn. App. 2021) (stating a
spousal-maintenance award is intended to recreate the standard of living consistent with
the parties to the dissolution’s marital standard of living, as close as is equitably possible
under the circumstances). Here, husband challenges the district court’s determination that
wife was temporarily unable to support herself, as well as the amount of maintenance

(3) November 2018 payment for $10,000; and (4) December 2018 payment for $10,000.
Husband’s postseparation paychecks were deposited into this account.
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awarded to her. We review these spousal-maintenance decisions for an abuse of discretion.
Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d at 226.
A. Wife’s Ability to Work

After hearing extensive expert testimony regarding wife’s mental health, the district
court found that wife is unable to work because of her mental-health difficulties. This
inability was temporary, the court determined, given that wife’s mental-health providers
testified that once the dissolution litigation is over, her mental health should improve.
Accordingly, the district court awarded temporary maintenance for a five-year period.
The district court’s findings are well supported by the record. While there was much
dispute over wife’s current mental health, it was undisputed that wife has been out of the
workforce and collecting long-term disability for the two years preceding trial. Wife, who
previously was licensed to practice law, testified that she would need time to take the
necessary courses to restore her license to practice. And her treatment records demonstrate
a lengthy pretrial period of anxiety, depression, and ongoing mental-health challenges. Her
therapist—found to be credible by the district court—explained that wife consistently has
difficulty with focus and concentration, skills necessary for employment. And one of
wife’s expert witnesses, after reviewing wife’s medical and employment records, stated in
his report that wife “is not capable of working at the level she worked in 2014, and it is not
foreseeable when she might be at that level.”
Still, husband argues that wife’s mental-health challenges are “situational,” caused
by the stress of the dissolution. And, citing to Gales v. Gales, he contends this is not a
basis for a permanent maintenance award. 553 N.W.2d 416, 421-22 (Minn. 1996). But
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Gales does not dictate the outcome here. First, the district court awarded temporary
maintenance. S econd, the Gales court only stated that emotional distress caused by the
dissolution should not “by itself” justify an award. Id. at 421. Here, where wife’s
mental-health issues are longstanding and impact her employment, and where the
maintenance award is limited to five years, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s award based upon wife’s inability to work.
B. Amount of Spousal Maintenance
Spousal maintenance is “an award made in a dissolution . . . proceeding of payments
from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the
other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (202 2); Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 266
(Minn. 2021) (stating that “an award of maintenance depends on a showing of need”
(quotation omitted)). This court reviews a district court’s spousal- maintenance decision
for an abuse of discretion. Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 265. A district court abuses its discretion
if it makes findings unsupported by the record, misapplies the law, or decides the question
in a manner contrary to logic and the facts on record. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506; Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d at 202.
Here, the district court ordered husband to pay wife 60 months of temporary spousal
maintenance in the amount of $5,667, plus 20% of the gross of husband’s work bonus.
This monthly amount was arrived at based upon a monthly budget of $10,981 for wife—
which the court found reasonable— and after deducting wife’s monthly income for
long-term disability and investment income from her budget amount. Husband challenges
six of the district court’s estimated values for wife’s monthly expenses: car payment, rent,
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clothing, gifts and charitable contributions, travel, and entertainment. We begin with an
overview of the evidence presented regarding monthly expenses before turning to examine
the specific items challenged by husband.
Wife’s expert estimated wife’s monthly expenses to be $16,679. And wife testified
that she believed her monthly expenses were closer to $24,000, although she offered no
documents supporting her estimate. The district court determined that wife’s expert’s
estimates were overstated, but took them into consideration. And the court considered
husband’s monthly-expense estimates based on the parties’ average expenses between
2013 and 2017. According to husband’s analysis, wife’s monthly expenses should be
$6,002. But the district court, noting that the period of time husband relied upon coincided
with a decrease in the parties’ income due to wife’s 2013 retirement and that husband
omitted the parties’ monthly retirement contribution, determined that husband’s estimates
were too conservative. Yet, in making its ultimate decision, the district court took into
account husband’s calculations as well.
1. Car Payment
Husband contends that wife’s car payment of $542.69 should not be included as a
monthly expense because wife purchased the car after the valuation date and, given the
parties’ past spending on cars, wife should have purchased the new vehicle outright. He
also points out that wife was awarded the parties’ Porsche Boxter in the property division
and that, when he bought a new car after the valuation date, he did not use a loan to do so.
The inclusion of the car payment is supported by the record. There is no dispute
that wife incurred this monthly car-payment expense. And wife testified that her previous
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car was 13 years old, needed to be replaced, and she did not have sufficient funds to
purchase it outright, testimony upon which the district court was free to rely. As to the
2000 Porsche Boxster, wife testified that it had not been used since 2017 and that she was
unsure of its condition. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the inclusion of
a car payment in wife’s budget.
2. Rent
Husband challenges the district court’s inclusion in wife’s monthly budget of a
$2,000 rent payment for a condominium wife purportedly rents from her mother. The
month-to-month lease agreement in the record states that rent payments were scheduled to
begin on August 1, 2018. Husband’s argument for excluding the $2,000 figure is
persuasive for three reasons.
First, review of the financial records shows no evidence that wife currently pays—
or that she ever paid— a monthly amount of $2,000. Nor was there trial testimony by wife
that she resides at her mother’s condominium. Thus the record lacks evidence supporting
an inclusion in wife’s budget of any amount for rental of the condominium.
Second, the district court awarded wife two other pieces of real property where she
could reside: the marital home and the Lindstrom cabin. We understand that, for a period
of time, there was water damage to the marital home.
11 But the record does not reflect that

11 Husband testified that in February 2020, the marital home suffered extensive water
damage. Upon husband’s arrival to assess the damage , he saw water flowing from the
ceiling, running down the walls, and pooling on the floors. Given the extent of the water
damage to the marital home, substantial repairs were necessary. In July 2020, the necessary
steps were taken by wife to initiate these repairs. By September 2020, wife had paid for
22
this damage necessitated rental of the condominium for a five-year period, particularly
when wife could have resided at the cabin while the marital home was being repaired.
Third, “[t]he purpose of a maintenance award is to allow the recipient and the
obligor to have a standard of living that approximates the marital standard of living, as
closely as is equitable under the circumstances.” Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 358
(Minn. App. 2004). If free use of the condominium was part of the marital standard of
living, that use of the condominium was free because wife’s mother declined to enforce the
lease; in other words, the free use of the condominium was functionally a gift to the parties
from wife’s mother. To include the (apparently never paid) rent amount in wife’s budget
for purposes of spousal maintenance would essentially make husband—via his
maintenance obligation—responsible for continuing the gifts that had been made by wife’s
mother. How this is equitable is neither clear nor explained by wife. Alternatively, if wife
did not start using the condominium until after the parties separated, the use of the
condominium was neither part of the marital standard of living nor a substitute for what
would otherwise have been a marital expense. In these circumstances, including the
(unpaid) rent amount in wife’s budget would run afoul of the idea that it is “the standard
of living established during the marriage” that the district court is to consider. Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(c).
Given the dearth of evidence that wife actually made rental payments, that the use
of the condominium was required, and that including the rent amount in wife’s monthly

about half of the repair costs and requested that the contractor begin additional projects at
the marital home.
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budget would be an equitable representation of the marital standard of living, we must
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by including a $2,000 per month rent
payment in wife’s temporary maintenance budget.
3. Clothing, Gifts and Charitable Contributions, Travel, and
Entertainment

The district court’s monthly maintenance budget for wife included $400 for
clothing, $200 for gifts, $400 for charitable contributions, $915 for travel, and $400 for
entertainment. When addressing the evidence regarding wife’s monthly expenses in these
areas, the court generally found that wife’s estimates were overstated and, at times,
unsupported by the record. On the other hand, the court found husband’s estimates, at
times, too conservative. Accordingly, the district court determined that wife’s monthly
expenses in these areas fall someplace between the parties’ estimates.
A district court’s determination of a party’s expenses is a finding of fact. See
Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989). And findings of fact are not set aside
unless clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22
(discussing clear-error standard of review). Here, the district court’s findings on the
relevant expenses are not clearly erroneous. For example, wife’s expert’s budget allocated
$750 monthly for clothing, while husband listed the five-year average as $228 per month.
The court found wife’s amount too high, husband’s amount low, and decided that a
reasonable amount for a clothing budget, given the standard of living during the marriage,
is $400 per month. This amount is supported by the record. Wife submitted bank and
credit-card statements that showed spending that averaged more than $228 per month, and
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husband’s five-year average did not include all of wife’s spending on clothes. Thus the
district court’s finding for wife’s clothing expense is not clearly erroneous.
The district court allocated $200 for gifts and $400 for political contributions per
month. These numbers fall between wife’s expert’s budget of $550 for charity and
husband’s five-year average of $309 for charity. The court’s number for gifts is lower than
both wife’s ($400) and husband’s ($312) because the district court found that husband was
no longer responsible for supporting wife’s family members, whom they had given gifts to
in the past. Because these numbers fall within a reasonable range supported by the record,
we discern no clear error in this decision.
The district court allotted $915 for travel. The court found husband’s five-year
average of $915 per month for travel supported by the evidence because wife provided no
documentation to support her expert’s budget of $1,000 per month for travel. Wife argues
that she has taken many costly trips in the past, and even taking one of these trips per year
would average out to more than $915 per month. But the district court had evidence of
these trips before it when it found husband’s five-year average credible.
With regard to the $400 allocation for entertainment and dining out, this amount
was less than wife’s expert’s budget of $550 per month and more than husband’s five-year
average of $124 per month. The court found that wife’s budget was high and not supported
by the evidence, but also found that husband’s account was low given the amount of
traveling the parties have done. Wife submitted bank and credit-card statements to the
court that demonstrate that she ate out frequently, went to movie theaters, theater
25
performances, and spent money on other hobbies. The court did not clearly err by making
this finding.
4. Retirement Contributions
After hearing testimony that the parties invested $3,500 every month for retirement,
the district court included half that amount ($1,750) as part of wife’s spousal-maintenance
award. Husband contends this is error because it is unsupported by the record and in
contravention of precedent, citing Sefkow. 427 N.W.2d at 216.
We disagree. The record (including wife’s testimony and even a portion of
husband’s testimony) supports the district court’s finding. And while husband argues that
wife was confused about the purpose of investment funds—which he stated were to build
assets and equity for the future, not necessarily retirement—this argument only amounts to
a credibility determination, which we leave to the district court. See Goldman,
748 N.W.2d at 284 (explaining that appellate courts give deference to the district court’s
opportunity to evaluate witness credibility).
Nor does Sefkow, which did not include savings as a need for the purposes of spousal
maintenance, dictate otherwise. 427 N.W.2d at 216. Where the parties’ standard of living
during the marriage includes savings and retirement planning, it is within the district
court’s wide discretion to include it as a maintenance expense. Sch midt, 964 N.W.2d at
230-31. Given the testimony that the parties invested $3,500 every month to go towards
retirement planning, the district court’s decision in this regard is not clearly erroneous.
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5. Life-Insurance Policy
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to
maintain life insurance for wife’s benefit, particularly where the court did not specify that
the amount of insurance be limited to the amount of spousal maintenance. Here, the district
court determined that husband shall name wife as the beneficiary of the life -insurance
policy maintained through his work as security for an award of spousal maintenance so
long as he is obligated to pay spousal maintenance.
We discern no abuse of discretion in this order. In determining whether an award
of spousal maintenance is justified, the district court has discretion to secure the award with
life insurance. Minn. Stat. § 518A.71 (2022); Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 635
(Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007). And when considering how much
security is required, there is no requirement that “security be strictly equivalent” to the
spousal-maintenance obligation. Head v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d 449, 453
(Minn. App. 1989) (stating district court’s spousal-maintenance award must simply be
reasonable), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 1990); see also Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 358.
Given the parties’ marital standard of living and the temporary award of
maintenance here— such that wife is not required to remain the beneficiary of husband’s
work policy indefinitely—the district court did not abuse its discretion by including
husband’s life-insurance policy with its spousal-maintenance award.
12

12 Husband also argues that wife is not entitled to spousal maintenance in the form of 20%
of his yearly bonus because she can support herself without it. Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d
631, 642 (Minn. 2009) (remanding for reconsideration of maintenance award that exceeded
recipient’s needs). But we evaluate the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion,
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In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its division of marital assets,
did not clearly err in finding that husband did not dissipate marital assets, and did not abuse
its discretion in the majority of its spousal- maintenance decisions. However, on this
record, the district court should not have included the $2,000 per month rent payment in
wife’s temporary maintenance budget and, consequently, should have reduced the amount
of temporary spousal maintenance by $2,000 . Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
decision, but modify it by removing this rent payment from wife’s monthly budget and by
reducing the amount of temporary spousal maintenance to $3,667 per month.
Affirmed as modified.

Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 265, and discern no such abuse here. This award of spousal
maintenance lasts only for 60 months, and the portion attributable to the potential bonus is
projected to amount to $375 per month—a small fraction of wife’s monthly budget.
Because it is unlikely that such a small payment (if, indeed, husband is awarded a bonus)
will cause the spousal-maintenance award to exceed wife’s needs, we hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion.