In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: N. U. M. and R. E. F., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0362

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
N. U. M. and R. E. F., Parents.

Filed November 7, 2022
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-JV-21-245

Megan Hunt, Hunt Law Office, Stillwater, Minnesota (for appellant N.U.M.)

Kevin Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Erin A. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent Washington County Child Protection)

Nancy Cottrell, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights to a two-year-old daughter,
appellant-mother argues the district court erred by determining that (1) mother failed to
rebut the statutory presumption that she is an unfit parent, (2) clear and convincing
evidence establishes that mother neglected the duties of the parent-child relationship, and
(3) termination is in the child’s best interests. We need not address whether the district
court erred by determining that mother failed to rebut the statutory presumption because
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any error was harmless. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by determining that mother neglected her parental duties and that termination is in the best
interests of the child. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the procedural history and factual findings after a bench
trial. We have included record evidence when helpful to the issues on appeal.
Appellant N.U.M. (mother) was born in 1993 and has two children: A.M.-K. (son),
born in 2013, and P.M. (daughter), born in December 2019. The district court terminated
mother’s parental rights to son in January 2016. We briefly discuss the facts in the prior
proceedings because the prior termination is relevant to the presumption of unfitness
applied in this case.
In March 2014, Hennepin County opened a child-protection case involving son
based on mother’s “unstable mental health and inability to provide appropriate parenting.”
Mother participated in the services offered, and Hennepin County dismissed the case in
September 2014. Soon after, Hennepin County filed a petition alleging that son was a child
in need of protection or services (CHIPS), and son was placed in foster care. Later,
Hennepin County petitioned for termination of mother’s parental rights (TPR) to son.
Following a trial, mother’s parental rights to son were involuntarily terminated in
January 2016. 1 The district court found that mother failed to address her mental health,

1 The district court’s termination order found statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (neglecting the duties of the
parent-child relationship), (5) (following an out-of-home placement, reasonable efforts
failed to correct conditions), (8) (child is neglected and in foster care) (2014).
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could not regulate her emotions, and could not “safely parent” son. The district court found
that mother “clearly love[d]” son and “availed herself of various services offered by the
county,” but also found that mother can only “successfully parent for a few days on her
own” before needing “significant help—not just a break—to continue to be able to
parent.”2
Hennepin County and Ramsey County Protective Proceedings Involving Daughter

Hennepin County opened a child-protection case for daughter and later petitioned
to terminate mother’s parental rights to daughter, citing the presumption of unfitness
resulting from mother’s previous TPR. In August 2020, the district court granted mother’s
motion to dismiss the TPR petition over Hennepin County’s opposition.
While the Hennepin County proceedings were pending, in March 2020, Ramsey
County received a report that mother left daughter alone in the apartment while mother
“smoked marijuana in a vehicle.” Ramsey County conducted a family assessment but
closed its case because “the Hennepin County court case was ongoing at the time.”
In November 2020, Ramsey County opened a child-protection case after mother
requested a placement for daughter while mother was “hospitalized for a herniated disk
and chronic pain.” The “very day” daughter was returned to mother’s care in December
2020, Ramsey County received a report of mother leaving daughter “home alone for one
to two hours while [mother] took an Uber to court.” Ramsey County closed the case
because mother was working with the Parent Support Outreach Program.

2 Mother appealed, and this court affirmed the termination order. In re Welfare of Child of
N.U.M., No. A16-0545, 2016 WL 4497594 (Minn. App. Aug. 29, 2016).
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In December 2020, mother began using the services of Safe Families for Children
(SFC), which provided mother with transportation and cleaning services as well as respite
care for daughter. Between December 30, 2020, and May 8, 2021, daughter spent 65 nights
with mother and 65 nights in respite care through SFC.
Washington County Protective Proceedings Involving Daughter
On May 14, 2021, Washington County received a report from daughter’s daycare
that daughter “wore the same clothes multiple days in a row, came to daycare smelling of
urine and feces and wearing the same diaper as the previous day, and did not appear to be
adequately fed at home because she would rummage in the garbage for food.” Daycare
providers also reported that mother stated she gave daughter “crushed Benadryl and
melatonin” so daughter would sleep. The assigned county social worker visited mother’s
home, but mother refused to speak with her and would not let her inside the home.
On May 17, 2021, the social worker returned to mother’s home with a Washington
County detective, but mother “again refused to open the door and yelled or talked over”
the social worker and detective. On May 21 , when mother and the social worker met,
mother blamed the daycare for daughter’s hygiene. Mother also stated that a doctor advised
her to give daughter Benadryl or melatonin to sleep. The social worker observed mother’s
home and found it “to be sufficient for a child.”
Also in May 2021, SFC informed mother that it could no longer provide care for
daughter “because [mother] was not complying with the child protection assessment,” and
SFC “had concerns about [mother’s] mental health and need for professional support
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services.” The SFC social worker who had provided respite care for daughter agreed to
keep providing care at mother’s request and ultimately became daughter’s foster parent.
On May 24, 2021, Washington County received a report from a Lyft driver who
transported mother to buy tobacco that mother left daughter in the home alone during the
25-minute trip.
On May 26, 2021, Washington County filed an expedited TPR petition and
requested an order for immediate custody of daughter. At the May 28 hearing, mother
received court-appointed counsel, and daughter was placed in protective care. The district
court ordered mother to “complete a psychological evaluation and participate in parenting
services.”
In June 2021, mother hired private counsel to replace her court-appointed counsel.
The district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL). Washington County asked the
district court to allow it to “cease reasonable efforts towards reunification” because of
mother’s previous TPR. The district court deferred ruling on the county’s request.
On July 14, 2021, Washington County filed an out-of-home placement plan.
Mother, however, refused to communicate with the social worker after the plan was
prepared, and the plan was submitted to the district court without mother’s signature. The
placement plan provided that mother agree to psychological and parenting assessments,
participate in parenting-skills classes, and cooperate with the GAL and Washington County
service providers. The plan was later amended and filed with the district court after mother
again refused to sign it.
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In August 2021, m other participated in a court-ordered parenting assessment. The
assessment noted that mother “would call off all services and visits only to ask for them to
resume either hours later or the next day.” During the interview, mother admitted she did
not have a support system or “anyone she can turn to with a problem.” The assessment
summary stated that mother cared about her daughter but “seemed to misunderstand her
daughter’s cues” and that mother’s “physical needs sometimes got in the way of interacting
with her daughter.” The assessment also noted that mother “seemed reluctant to learn from
previous faults.” The assessment recommended that m other follow through on the case
plan, attend individual therapy, undergo a neuropsychological evaluation, and attend
parenting education.
In September 2021, Washington County referred mother to FamilyWise Services
for parenting education. After two supervised visits with daughter, mother sent an email
stating she would discharge herself from FamilyWise because she felt the reports generated
from the visits were “not credible.” Mother stated she was receiving parenting education
from First Care Pregnancy Center, but mother revoked her release for Washington County
to obtain information. Mother next claimed she was receiving parenting education from
One Stop, but the assigned Washington County social worker discovered One Stop does
not provide parenting education.
In October 2021, mother discharged her private counsel and “affirmed that she
understood she would be assigned the same court-appointed attorney as she originally had.”
At the December 7, 2021 pretrial hearing, mother discharged her court-appointed counsel
and announced her intention to represent herself. On December 16, after Washington
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County amended its TPR petition, mother requested a new court-appointed attorney, but
the district court denied mother’s motion.
On December 20, 2021, daughter completed a diagnostic assessment with Sarah
Bumgarner. Bumgarner’s report stated , “Given the information presented, the child
appears to meet DC:0 -5 diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder.” At a subsequent
meeting to discuss daughter’s assessment, mother did not agree with the diagnosis and did
not believe daughter needed therapy.
Termination Trial and the District Court’s Decision
At the February 7- 8, 2022 trial on the TPR petition, the district court heard from
two Washington County social workers, an SFC social worker, a clinical psychologist, the
GAL, two family-service workers for Washington County, and mother.
A Washington County social worker testified that mother started therapy in June
2021 at the Lorenz Clinic but stopped therapy in October 2021. Mother then did an intake
with Ellie Family Services but switched to Nystrom and Associates in November 2021.
The social worker testified that she had ongoing concerns about mother’s “impulsivity, her
ability to control her emotions and to recognize her mental health needs in order to
adequately address them to safely parent [daughter].”
The SFC social worker, who provided respit e care for daughter and became her
foster parent, testified that she began “hosting” daughter in December 2020. She stated that
the reasons for respite care “varied between [mother] having court hearings, looking for
employment, stress due to caring for [d aughter], and needing mental breaks.” The SFC
social worker testified that the respite care was “almost every week” and agreed that it was
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“always overnight and multiple days,” including stretches of time “more than a week.” The
SFC social worker testified that when daughter was dropped off with mother, daughter
would scream and appeared to not want to be with mother. The SFC social worker added
that “these behaviors became more severe” over time.
A clinical psychologist testified about mother’s psychological evaluation. She
testified that mother described parenting as “self-explanatory” and that mother said she
would not change her parenting. The clinical psychologist also testified that she diagnosed
mother with generalized anxiety disorder , that mother lacked sufficient coping skills, and
that “if a parent is dysregulated there is the potential of engaging in unsafe behavior.” The
clinical psychologist opined in her report that mother has a “high risk” of committing
further abuse against daughter and testified that this was due to mother’s “denial of need
for change or need for assistance, inability to acknowledge any concerns in parenting
practices, or emotional regulation for social support.” While she recommended that mother
engage in individual therapy, she also noted that therapy could be difficult because mother
is not “willing to practice those skills, to attend sessions, to actually participate.”
The GAL testified at trial that she had observed mother and daughter together 12
times. The GAL recalled that daughter was very nervous during these visits and that
daughter “did not want to be held by her mother.” The GAL stated that throughout the
visits, mother did not typically engage with daughter and that the last visit “was one of the
first times” she had seen mother engage with daughter. The GAL concluded, “based on
reports that [mother] has not followed through on her recommendations from her psych
eval,” that “it is in [daughter’s] best interest that the parental rights of [mother] be
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terminated” because mother cannot currently provide a safe environment. The GAL
expressed concerns that “the child’s needs are not being put first.”
The two Washington County family-service workers each testified that mother
struggled to change daughter’s diaper during supervised visits and that mother struggled to
engage with daughter and to communicate with service providers.
Mother testified that although she disagreed with the PTSD diagnosis for daughter,
she believed therapy for daughter “could be beneficial because of the traumatic situation
[daughter] is going through by being out of [mother’s] care.” Mother acknowledged that
her parental rights to son had been terminated, but mother also testified that the allegations
in the petition initiating that proceeding were “false,” the allegations in the Washington
County case were “false,” and the Washington County social workers were “lying.” Mother
testified that her back pain “does not make [parenting] difficult” and that she has “never
needed help changing [daughter’s] diaper.”
Mother stated that she only participated in county services “because the court
ordered it.” Mother also testified that she does not feel therapy is “necessary” for her
because “there’s nothing mentally wrong with [her].” Still, mother testified that she was
working with Nystrom for dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) and taking prescribed
medication. Mother testified that she has herself as a support system and that “every single
person that [she has] tried to use as a support system has stabbed [her] in the back and
called CPS.” When asked what she would do if she needed help, mother replied , “I feel
like I’ve learned my lesson with getting help because, like I said, getting help has gotten
me punished every single time.”
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In a March 9, 2022 order, the district court terminated mother’s parental rights to
daughter.3 First, the district court determined that Washington County had made reasonable
efforts to reunite mother and daughter.4 Second, the district court determined that mother
had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of unfitness because mother did not show that
her “conduct and abilities” have changed or improved since her parental rights were last
terminated. Third, the district court determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly
demonstrated that mother disregarded the duties of the parent-child relationship, that she
was palpably unfit to parent, and that reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions
leading to an out-of-home placement. Finally, the district court weighed the child’s interest
in preserving the relationship, the parent’s interest in preserving the relationship, and the
competing interests of the child; it then determined that “termination of parental rights is
in [daughter’s] best interests.” Mother appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights should be terminated only “for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). On appeal from a district court’s
termination of parental rights, appellate courts review whether the district court’s findings
“address the statutory criteria” for termination. In re Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d

3 The district court’s order also discussed daughter’s father and noted his parental rights
are the subject of a separate proceeding.

4 Although the reasonable-efforts determination is not challenged on appeal, we note that
the district court found mother received these services: out-of-home placement plans;
referrals for a psychological evaluation, individual therapy, a parenting assessment, and
parenting-skills education; supervised visits with daughter; transportation assistance; and
a mental-health evaluation and therapy for daughter.
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656, 660 (Minn. 2008). Appellate courts look at the “sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether it was clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P.,
744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). Appellate courts give “[c]onsiderable deference” to
the district court’s decision given its “superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, but we review the
district court’s “determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child. of
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). This
means “we view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings. We will not conclude that
a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation and citation omitted). We must “fully and
fairly consider the evidence, but so far only as is necessary” to determine if the evidence
“reasonably tends to support the findings.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). “A district court
abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts will affirm the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights
when (1) “at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and
convincing evidence,” (2) “the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family,”
and (3) “termination is in the best interests of the child.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
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Mother does not challenge the county’s reasonable efforts on appeal. Mother raises
three issues: (1) the district court erred by determining that she did not rebut the
presumption of unfitness, (2) the district court erred by determining that clear and
convincing evidence supported statutory grounds for termination, and (3) the district court
erred by determining that termination was in the child’s best interests. We address these
issues in turn.
I. We need not address whether t he district court erred by determining that
mother failed to rebut the presumption of unfitness because we determine that
any error was harmless.

Courts must apply a presumption of palpable unfitness when a parent’s rights to a
child previously have been terminated involuntarily. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4)
(2020) (stating that a parent is presumed to be palpably unfit “upon a showing that the
parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated”). This
statutory presumption is “easily rebuttable” if the parent introduces evidence that the parent
can care for the child:
The statutory presumption imposes only a burden of
production, which means that a parent may rebut the statutory
presumption merely by introducing evidence that would justify
a finding of fact that [the parent] is not palpably unfit. In other
words, a parent seeking to rebut the statutory presumption
needs to produce only enough evidence to support a finding
that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the
[child].

In re Welfare of Child of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 135-38 (Minn. 2014) (quotation marks
omitted)). In determining whether a parent’s evidence rebuts the statutory presumption, a
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court should credit the parent’s evidence without weighing it against any contrary evidence.
See In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445-47 (Minn. App. 2011) (concluding
that the parent’s evidence, “if believed,” would support a finding that the parent was not
palpably unfit, and that the evidence was therefore sufficient to rebut the statutory
presumption), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
The district court determined that mother did not rebut the statutory presumption
that arose from the termination of her parental rights to son.5 Below, we affirm the district
court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence shows mother neglected the
duties of the parent-child relationship as to daughter; therefore, we need not address
whether mother rebutted the statutory presumption.
We note, however, that on this record, mother rebutted the statutory presumption.
Any error in the district court’s decision to the contrary is rendered harmless by our
affirmance of the district court’s determination that mother neglected the duties of the
parent-child relationship. See In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App.
1997) (declining to reverse TPR decision for harmless error).

5 In determining that mother did not rebut the statutory presu mption, the district court
considered evidence contrary to mother’s testimony. Mother testified that she was in
individual therapy using DBT, had resumed taking her medications, and was physically
able to parent. In the section of its written order discussing the statutory presumption, the
district court weighed mother’s testimony against that of the clinical psychologist, who
testified that recovery from DBT takes a year to complete and noted that mother “had only
recently completed an intake” for DBT. The district court also stated that mother “has
minimally engaged in some services but has not sustained a relationship with a service
provider for any meaningful length of time.” Because the district court failed to consider
mother’s evidence as “if believed” and weighed mother’s evidence against the county’s
evidence, the district court erred by determining that mother did not rebut the statutory
presumption.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that at least one
statutory ground for termination was supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

The district court found three statutory grounds supported termination of mother’s
parental rights: (1) mother neglected the duties of the parent-child relationship; (2) mother
“is palpably unfit” to parent; and (3) “reasonable efforts . . . failed to correct the conditions
leading to” daughter’s out-of-home placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b)(2), (4),
(5) (2020). On appeal, we need to determine only whether “at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence” to affirm the district court’s
termination decision. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We first consider mother’s neglect of her
parental duties.
A parent’s rights may be terminated if the parent has “substantially, continuously,
or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed . . . by the parent and
child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Those duties include providing
“food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child’s
physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Id. Parental duties also include a
duty to “protect and care for the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902 (quotation omitted). The
district court must “determine that at the time of termination, the parent is not presently
able and willing to assume [their] responsibilities and the condition will continue for the
reasonably foreseeable future.” In re Welfare of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. App.
2018).
The district court determined that mother neglected her parental duties based, in
part, on SFC providing respite care 50% of the time, mother’s unwillingness to sign the
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out-of-home placement plan, mother’s failure to comply with the placement plan, and
mother’s consistent need for assistance during supervised visits. The district court found
that during supervised visits, daughter was often apprehensive about approaching mother
and often stayed near either the supervisor or an other caregiver. The district court also
found that when mother engaged with daughter, mother often missed daughter’s cues and
was then unreceptive to feedback from the supervisors.
These findings are fully supported by record evidence. For example, the Washington
County social worker and the family-service providers testified that mother struggled to
engage with daughter at the supervised visits and that mother had trouble changing
daughter’s diapers or recognizing daughter’s feeding cues. The GAL and SFC social
worker also testified about mother’s failure to engage with daughter during visits and
daughter’s apprehension about visiting with mother.
Mother argues that by seeking respite care, she demonstrated her ability to meet
daughter’s needs. This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, instead of mother
meeting daughter’s needs, the alternative caregivers were meeting daughter’s needs during
respite care and then returning daughter to mother’s care, often a week later. The district
court also commented that mother “consistently need[ed ] to ask for assistance at
[supervised] visits,” reinforcing its determination that mother was unable to continuously
meet daughter’s needs.
Second, a parent’s chronic mental illness that excessively impinges on the parent’s
care of a child supports a finding of parental neglect. In re Welfare of B.L.W., 395 N.W.2d
426, 430 (Minn. App. 1986). Here, the district court found that mother “minimiz[es] her
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mental health issues and how they impact her ability to function,” which has led to “a
pattern of conduct that is of a duration and nature that renders [mother] unable to
appropriately care for [daughter], now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.” In making
this determination, the district court relied on record evidence. For example, the district
court found mother’s untreated mental health caused her to fail “to recognize the risk of
leaving a one-year-old home alone.” The district court also noted that mother “is at high
risk of further abuse” of daughter.
The district court found that mother “did not consistently take her medication” and
“disagreed with the diagnoses of the psychological evaluation.” Mother testified that she
does not consistently take her medication and that she does not need assistance with
parenting. Mother also testified that she participated in services because they were required
by her case plan. Mother repeatedly had to switch county service providers because mother
“found fault with every worker who was assigned to her case.” Mother also provided false
information about parenting education she was allegedly receiving from First Care
Pregnancy and One Stop. We conclude that the record fully supports the district court’s
determination that mother “cannot effectively manage her mental health, and that she
cannot safely and independently care” for daughter “for even a minimal period of time.”
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that mother
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed . . . by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
17
mother neglected to comply with the duties of the parent-child relationship, we need not
review the other statutory grounds for termination. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
was in daughter’s best interests.

A district court “must consider the child’s best interests and explain why termination
is in the best interests of the child.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545
(Minn. App. 2009); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020) (requiring a district court
to consider the child’s best interests). The district court must consider both the child’s
interest and the parent’s interest in preserving the relationship and “any competing interests
of the child.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012); see
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring a district court’s best-interests analysis to
address these factors). Still, when a statutory basis for termination exists, “the best interests
of the child must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 7.
The district court considered each of the best -interests factors before determining
that termination was in daughter’s best interests. In considering daughter’s interest in
preserving the parent- child relationship, the district court found that, generally, children
have an interest in preserving their parental relationship “so long as that relationship meets
their essential needs.” The district court noted that daughter, aged two, had spent roughly
eight and one-half months in foster care. The district court found that mother’s frequent
absences contributed to daughter’s hesitation in approaching mother during visits and that
daughter relied on caregivers other than mother to meet her needs even when mother was
present. The district court recognized that daughter enjoys sitting on mother’s lap and
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having mother read to her. But the district court found that this was an interest in preserving
a playmate relationship rather than a parent-child relationship.
In considering mother’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship, the
district court credited mother’s desire to have daughter returned to her care. The district
court, however, questioned whether mother’s actions matched her stated preference
because mother “is not able to even articulate [daughter’s] needs, much less meet those
needs.”
In considering the competing interests of daughter, the district court recognized the
need for “a primary caregiver who provides [daughter] with consistency and stability, both
as it relates to her physical needs and to her emotional needs.” The district court found that
mother has “consistently provided for only one of [daughter’s] needs: shelter” and that
mother “has not consistently provided for [daughter’s] physical, mental, or emotional
health and development.” The record fully supports the district court ’s related findings—
for example, that mother failed to consistently provide stability for daughter, as evidenced
by the 65 nights daughter spent in respite care between December 2020 and May 2021.
The district court also found that mother did not “appropriately provide for [daughter’s]
needs regarding hygiene.” Relying on testimony that mother failed to recognize daughter’s
cues surrounding hunger, the district court noted that mother sent dirty bottles to respite
care and found that daughter’s dietary needs were likely not being met, which led daughter
to rummage for food in the trash can at daycare. The district court also discussed daughter’s
need for therapy and found that mother “does not believe it is necessary (despite her
testimony at trial, which was not credible because it was inconsistent with prior
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statements).” The district court determined that mother “consistently puts her own needs
ahead of the needs” of daughter.
Based on these findings, the district court determined that termination is in
daughter’s best interests. Because the district court identified the best interests of both
mother and daughter, weighed those interests, and concluded that termination was in
daughter’s best interests, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.