John P. Norusis, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0365

John P. Norusis,
Appellant,

vs.

John Goodfellow, et al.,
Defendants,

Peter Reich, et al.,
Respondents,

Andrew Kramer, et al.,
Respondents,

Larry Whitaker et al.,
Respondents.

Filed August 15, 2022
Affirmed
Florey, Judge*

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-21-1444

Brandon M. Schwartz, Schwartz Law Firm, Oakdale, Minnesota (for appellant)

Meghan A. Cooper, Stringer & Rohleder, Ltd., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents Peter
Reich, et al.)

Daniel J. Stahley, Provo-Peterse n & Associates, P.A., Rosemount, Minnesota (for
respondents Andrew Kramer, et al.)

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
Richard C. Scattergood, Jessica C. Richardson, Tomsche, Sonnesyn, & Tomsche, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Whitaker)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of his defamation claims
against respondents, arguing that the district court erred by concluding that appellant’s
claims had no merit and abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for leave to
amend his complaint. Because we see no error and no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decisions, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondents Andrew and Karen Kramer, Anne and Peter Reich, and Larry and
Mary Whitaker are residents of properties adjacent to or near a property on Pine Cone Trail
(the property) in the City of Marine on St. Croix (the city). In 2018, appellant John P.
Norusis purchased the property, which he used for short-term rentals and events until the
city enacted an ordinance prohibiting that use. Norusis brought an action, 82-CV-20-3974,
against the city disputing the ordinance.
A private driveway to another Pine Cone Trail property crosses Norusis’s property,
and the residents of that property, John Goodfellow and Kirsten Vadheim, had an easement
to use the driveway for themselves and their invitees. Norusis disputed their use of the
easement and brought an action, 82- CV-21-1370, against them. Norusis also told people
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walking along the easement that they were trespassing and brought actions against the
alleged trespassers, including Andrew and Karen Kramer, 82-CV-21-1045.
In 2020, several residents, including Mary Whitaker, complained about Norusis to
a Marine on St. Croix City Council member who is also a police officer in another
jurisdiction. The council member investigated and provided some information and advice
on dealing with Norusis to respondents.
Norusis then brought an action against the council member, 82-CV-20-4275,
alleging that he had used law-enforcement databases to obtain information on Norusis and
had interfered with Norusis’s prospective customer relationships. In his response to
Norusis’s interrogatories, the council member said that Anne Reich and Mary Whitaker
had told him that: (1) “Norusis was physically and verbally threatening them,” (2) “they
were aware that Norusis has a violent criminal history,” (3) Anne Reich had received a
“cease and desist” letter from Norusis requesting them to stop walking on the easement,
and (4) the two women “were shaking and crying while talking to . . . [the council member]
about . . . Norusis.” The council member also said that the women were concerned because
Norusis had “physically confronted residents and non-residents . . . walking along Pine
Cone Trail, informing them that they were trespassing on his property and threatening legal
action” and because “residents felt physically threatened by . . . Norusis due to his behavior
during these encounters being perceived as physically aggressive in both body language
and tone of voice.”
In April 2021, based on the council member’s responses to the interrogatories,
Norusis brought this action against respondents, claiming defamation and tortious
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interference with prospective business advantage. 1 The defamation claim was based on
statements allegedly made by some or all of the respondents that: (1) Norusis had
physically and verbally threatened them and others, (2) Norusis had a violent criminal
history, (3) Norusis was a violent criminal, and (4) Norusis had physically confronted
residents and non-residents of Pine Cone Trail who were walking along Pine Cone Trail.
Anne Reich was deposed in September 2021. Her deposition responses caused
Norusis to move to amend his complaint by adding further facts supporting the defamation
claim and a claim for punitive damages. In November 2021, respondents moved for
summary judgment.
A hearing was held on the parties’ motions in December 2021. Although Norusis’s
claims in this action were based solely on what the council member said in his responses
to interrogatories in Norusis’s action against him, the council member did not appear at the
hearing because he was unavailable. At the hearing, th e parties agreed with the district
court that it made sense to address respondents’ summary-judgment motion before
Norusis’s motion to amend his complaint and that Norusis’s claim of tortious interference
with prospective business advantage was not actionable.
The district court asked Norusis’s attorney to identify the allegedly defamatory
statements and those who had made them. Norusis’s attorney replied, “We’ve learned
during discovery, that it was [only] Anne Reich and Mary Whitaker that those statements

1 Norusis also brought this action against John Goodfellow and Kirsten Vadheim.
Goodfellow and Vadheim settled with Norusis and were dismissed prior to the summary-
judgment hearing. They take no part in this appeal.
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are attributable to,” and agreed when asked if the only two statements under consideration
were that Norusis “has physically and verbally threatened [respondents] and others” and
“has physically confronted residents and non -residents of Pine Cone Trail while walking
along Pine Cone Trail.”2
After the hearing, the district court granted respondents’ motion for summary
judgment, denied Norusis’s motion to amend, and awarded respondents their “reasonable
costs and disbursements.” Norusis challenges both the grant of summary judgment,
arguing that the district court erred by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
respondents and by resolving factual disputes, and the denial of his motion for leave to
amend his complaint, arguing that it was an abuse of discretion.
DECISION
I. Grant of Summary Judgment
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v.
JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). Summary
judgment may be granted “when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and one
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists
when there is sufficient evidence regarding an essential element [of the claim] to permit
reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” St. Paul Park Ref. Co. v. Domeier, 950
N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2020) (citations and quotations omitted). A genuine issue of

2 The defamation claims as to statements that Norusis had a violent criminal history and
was a violent criminal were dismissed because the statements were true: he had previously
pleaded guilty to or been convicted of crimes of violence.
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material fact is prese nted only when there is “sufficient evidence to allow reasonable
persons to reach different conclusions on the issue.” BFI Waste Sy s. of N. Am., L LC v.
Bishop, 927 N.W.2d 314, 323 (Minn. App. 2019). Summary judgment will be affirmed if
it can be sustained on any grounds. Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Minn.
App. 1995) (citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 196). The evidence is reviewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225,
231 (Minn. 2002). However, the nonmoving party “may not establish genuine issues of
material fact by relying upon unverified and conclusory allegations, or postulated evidence
that might be developed at trial, or metaphysical doubt about the facts.” Dyrdal v. Golden
Nuggets, Inc., 689 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 2004).
A. The statement that Norusis physically and verbally threatened Anne
Reich, Mary Whitaker, and others

Norusis argues first, as he argued to the district court, that by telling the council
member that Norusis had verbally and physically threatened them, Anne Reich and Mary
Whitaker were falsely accusing Norusis of the crimes of terroristic threats under Minn.
Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2020), or assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2020), and
therefore the statement was defamation per se. “Statements are defamatory per se if they
falsely accuse a person of a crime, of having a loathsome disease, or of unchastity, or if
they refer to improper or incompetent conduct involving a person’s business, trade, or
profession.” Longbehn v. Schoenrock, 727 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Minn. App. 2007).
The district court concluded that:
Norusis has not proven that the statement is capable of being
defamatory per se . . . [because it] is too vague to rise to the
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level of assault and terroristic threats, nor is it a false statement
about his business, trade or professional conduct. Mary
Whitaker and Anne Reich never reported assault or the threats
to the police. . . . A reasonable person would also not hear the
phrase “physical and verbal threats” and understand that to
mean Norusis committed an assault or made terroristic threats.

Norusis relies on Wilkes v. Shields, 64 N.W. 921, 921 (Minn. 1895) (holding that
“[a] publication which charges the plaintiff with being ‘a dangerous, able, and seditious
agitator’ is . . . actionable per se”), and argues that “[t]he false statements in Wilkes are
eerily similar to the false statements by [respondents].” But Wilkes is distinguishable.
First, it concerned a printed statement and directly quoted the author’s language. Here, as
the district court noted, the allegedly defamatory per se statement was not a direct
quotation.
3 Second, Wilkes observed that the challenged language charged a person
with being a disturber of public tranquility, and guilty of acts
tending to the breach of public order, all of which is inimical
to good society and the highest and best interests of the people
. . . [and] make[s] the person therewith charged an object of
public distrust, reproach, and contumely.

Id. The unquoted statement of two women to a fellow citizen about a neighbor does not
rise to this level. Norusis’s reliance on Wilkes is misplaced.
Because Norusis’s defamation per se argument fails, he must show that the
statement harmed his reputation in the community and provide direct evidence of that
harm. See McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 729-30 (Minn. 2013) (stating that one of

3The district court added that, “[i]n viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
[Norusis], the [district c]ourt will analyze these statements at face value, but there is a good
argument to be made that [Norusis] mischaracterized what Mary Whitaker and Anne Reich
said.”

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the four element s of a defamation claim is that the statement must tend to harm the
complainant’s reputation and lower the complainant in the estimation of the community);4
Bebo v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that, for a defamation
claim to be actionable, complainants must also prove that they have suffered actual
damages), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001). The district court concluded that Norusis
had neither shown that the statement harmed his reputation nor provided direct evidence
of any harm.
[He] did not identify specific customers that he lost
directly because of the alleged defamatory statement. There
must be a causal connection between the statements and
reputation. . . . He admitted he does not know why [one
customer] didn’t follow up with him, and there is no evidence
that she decided not to do business with Norusis due to
anything [Anne Reich or Mary Whitaker] had said. . . . [T]here
is no evidence that [another customer] lost contact with
Norusis because of any defamatory statements.

Norusis asserts in his brief that “the unrefuted evidence in the record was that [he]
had a proven record of garnering substantial business . . ., but because of . . . defamation,
his reputation was harmed and lowered in the estimation in the community and he suffered
a one-year loss of net income totaling $595,000,” but he offers only evidence of his lost
income, not of the causation of the loss. There is no basis to overturn the summary
judgment granted as to this statement.

4 The other three elements are that the statement must have been communicated to someone
other than the complainant, the statement must be false, and the recipient of the statement
must reasonably understand that it refers to a specific individual. Id. at 729-30.
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B. The statement that Norusis physically confronted residents and non-
residents of Pine Cone Trail, who felt physically threatened

The district court noted that “[t]his statement would fall into the category of
defamation by implication,” or “truthful statements that imply defamatory content.”
Defamation by implication “occurs when a defendant (1) juxtaposes a series of facts to
imply a defamatory connection between them or (2) creates a defamatory implication by
omitting facts.” Metge v. Cent. Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n, 649 N.W.2d 488, 498
(Minn. App. 2002), rev. dismissed (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002).
Norusis argues that, because “[a] physical confrontation implies violence, a fight,
or some kind of physical touching,” and there is no evide nce that he “touched or was
otherwise physical with any individuals on Pine Cone Trail,” the statement cannot be true.
The district court rejected Norusis’s argument and concluded that, to a reasonable person,
the words “physical confrontation” would not imply “a violent confrontation or anything
more than a dispute between neighbors” and supported this position by Anne Reich’s
testimony that, to her, physical confrontation meant “simply . . . stopping someone in an
aggressive way for a conversation.”
The district court further concluded that the statement is substantially true and is
supported with Norusis’s own testimony that he had interactions with numerous
individuals walking on Pine Cone Trail, informed them that they were trespassing,
threatened legal action against them for trespassing, and pursued legal claims for
trespassing. This defamation claim on this statement was also defeated by the lack of
evidence that Norusis’s reputation had suffered.
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There was no error in granting summary judgment as to this statement.
II. Denial of Motion to Amend
A district court’s denial of a motion to amend may be reversed only for an abuse of
discretion. Copeland v. Hubbard Broad., Inc. , 526 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Minn. App. 1995),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1995). Although Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01 provides that leave
shall be “freely given,” a district court “may . . . properly deny a motion to amend when it
would serve no useful purpose.” Bridgewater Tel. Co. v. City of Monticello, 765 N.W.2d
905, 915 (Minn. App. 2009). Norusis moved for leave to amend his complaint by adding
two statements that he alleged were defamatory and a claim for punitive damages.
A. Allegedly defamatory statements
The first statement was that some respondents called Norusis “belligerent.” The
only respondent found to have used the word was Peter Reich. During his deposition, he
said, “[M]y wife felt that [Norusis] was belligerent and aggressive to her. She came in the
house and was crying. She felt threatened and intimidated.” When asked if Norusis had
threatened physical harm against him other than verbally, he answered, “By dint of his
overall belligerence and aggressiveness and hostility, he frightens people, including me,
and especially my wife, and makes us afraid.” When asked if Larry or Mary Whitaker had
told him Norusis was belligerent, Peter Reich said, “Yes, in different words”; when asked
what words they used, he answered, “I don’t remember, but the sense was very much the
same.”
There is no evidence that Anne Reich ever said Norusis was belligerent. Andrew
Kramer, when asked if Peter Reich had told him Norusis was belligerent, said “No,” and
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when asked the same question about Anne Reich, said “I don’t recall her using that exact
term” and added, “but the general meaning of that in terms of somebody that has a
belligerent disposition, yes, she has mentioned that she believes he is that way toward her
sometimes.”
As the district court noted, saying someone is belligerent “amounts to name-
calling.” Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. e (1977), the district
court added that “people often engage in name calling without any real intent to make a
defamatory assertion, and it is properly understood by reasonable listeners to amount to
nothing more.” Amending Norusis’s complaint to add the statements of how various
people felt as a result of his belligerence would have served no purpose; the motion to add
them was properly denied. See Bridgewater, 765 N.W.2d at 915.
The second statement Norusis wanted to add was that Anne Reich told other
defendants, including Karen Kramer, that “she felt threatened by Norusis,” about which
she had testified during her deposition.
Q. Has anybody ever told you they felt physically
threatened by Mr. Norusis?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. Karen Kramer.
. . . .
Q. When did Karen Kramer tell you she felt physically
threatened by Mr. Norusis?
A. I don’t know.
. . . .
Q. Did . . . Karen Kramer explain to you why she felt
physically threatened by Mr. Norusis?
A. His manner is aggressive. It’s intimidating.
Q. Is that your testimony, or is that what Karen Kramer told
you?
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A. She said— I don’t recall exactly, but I think— yeah.
Q. . . . [A]re you testifying that you believe Mr. Norusis is
aggressive and intimidating or that Karen Kramer told you Mr.
Norusis is intimidating and aggressive?
A. I feel intimidated.
Q. And why is it that you feel intimidated by Mr. Norusis?
A. Most interactions have been tense, which is a surprise
in a neighborhood where people tend to be friendly.
. . . .
Q. I want to go back to the questions and close off what
Karen Kramer had talked to you about. . . . Did Ms. Kramer
actually use the words “aggressive” and “intimidating”?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. So when Ms. Kramer told you that she felt physically
threatened, did she explain to you why?
A. Just body language I guess. I don’t know.
Q. Did she describe to you what she meant by body
language as to why she felt physically threatened by Mr.
Norusis?
A. No.
Q. How many times has Ms. Kramer told you she felt
physically threatened by Mr. Norusis?
A. Once.
. . . .
Q. Other than Karen Kramer, are you aware of any
residents feeling physically threatened by Mr. Norusis?
A. Yes.
Q. Who else?
A. My husband.
. . . .
Q. Other than Charlie Anderson, Mary Whitaker, and your
husband, who else have you told that you felt threatened by Mr.
Norusis?
A. I don’t recall.
Q. Well, have you told John Goodfellow and Kitsi
Vadheim you felt threatened by Mr. Norusis?
A. We talk as neighbors, yes.
Q. My question is, though, not just talking as neighbors –
A. I can’t think of every single, you know, I’m sorry, it’s
a—I can not answer that specifically.
Q. Okay. . . .
A. Yes, [I] felt threatened, but not this physical thing. I
mean, threatened, yes.
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. . . .
Q. Did you tell Karen Kramer that you felt threatened by
Mr. Norusis?
A. Probably. We’re friends.
Q. Did you tell Larry Whitaker that you felt threatened by
Mr. Norusis?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you tell Mary Whitaker that you felt threatened by
Mr. Norusis?
A. Yes. We’re all neighbors.
Q. Did Mary Whitaker tell you she felt threatened by Mr.
Norusis?
A. I don’t recall.

The district court stated that “Norusis bases his motion [for leave to amend] on Anne
Reich’s testimony that on one occasion, she believed Karen Kramer told her that she felt
physically threatened by Norusis.” The district court concluded that “Anne Reich’s
statement [that she felt threatened by Norusis] and her conversation with Karen Kramer
cannot purposefully support Norusis’s defamation claim” because the statement “is not
grounded in facts or factual connotations that could be proven false.” We agree; statements
of how people felt are statements of opinion, not of fact.
Finally, adding a claim for punitive damages to Norusis’s complaint would have
required “clear and convincing evidence that the acts of [respondents] show[ed] deliberate
disregard for the rights or safety of others.” See Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1(a) (2020).
To meet that standard, a defendant must either know facts or intentionally disregard facts
that create a high probability of injury to others and either deliberately proceed to act in
conscious or intentional disregard of the high degree of probability of injury to others or
deliberately proceed to act with indifference to the high probability of injury to others. Id.,
subd. 1(b) (2020). Norusis argues that, by stating that he committed crimes they knew
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never happened, Anne Reich and Mary Whitaker falsely accused him of a crime, and
“[f]alsely accusing someone of a crime is the quintessential definition of intentionally
disregarding the high probability that it will injure the other’s reputation.” But Norusis has
shown neither injury to his reputation nor, as the district court noted, “any evidence
suggesting [Anne Reich and Mary Whitaker] had the requisite state of mind to deliberately
disregard Norusis’s rights or safety.” There was no basis for awarding Norusis punitive
damages against them.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Norusis’s motion for leave
to amend his complaint.
Affirmed.