State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0368

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Leah Racquel Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed January 17, 2023
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-20-892

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanlan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Following her conviction for a methamphetamine-related crime involving children,
appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, that the

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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district court erred in admitting certain evidence, and that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because the evidence to convict appellant was sufficient, the
admission of the challenged evidence did not affect her substantial rights, and appellant
did not meet her burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were elicited at a jury trial. Appellant Leah Racquel Anderson
was scheduled to have a court-ordered visit with her son (the child) to occur on May 16,
2020. Anderson had arranged to meet the child at a predetermined pick-up location and
bring him to her home. The child had been staying with his grandmother for several months
because he did not feel safe living with Anderson. At the time of trial, the child was 14
years old.
On May 16, grandfather brought the child to the predetermined location where
Anderson agreed to pick up the child. The child waited for Anderson for 15 to 30 minutes,
but Anderson never arrived. Upon the child’s request, grandfather brought the child
directly to Anderson’s home. Grandfather and the child believed Anderson was not living
with anyone else at that time.
When the child and grandfather arrived at Anderson’s residence, they saw her car
parked in the driveway with the door open. The front door of Anderson’s home was
partially open. The chil d went inside the residence and observed something “abnormal”
on a blue rug about two feet from a recliner near the front door. The child walked past the
object and found Anderson sleeping on the child’s bed. The child unsuccessfully tried to
wake Anderson by shaking her and pouring cold water on her. The child told grandfather,
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“Go ahead and go,” and that Anderson was sleeping but the child could not wake her.
Grandfather left and notified grandmother of the situation.
The child inspected the object on the floor and determined that it was a pipe lying
in an open case. The child waited for Anderson to wake up but eventually called
grandmother and asked to be collected from Anderson’s home. Grandmother told the child
that she could not collect the child because the child was required to be at Anderson’s
residence for a court-ordered, five-hour visit. The child called his guardian ad litem (GAL)
to ask to leave with grandmother. The GAL gave the child permission to leave Anderson’s
home. The child then informed the GAL of the discovery of a pipe in Anderson’s home
and provided a description of the same. The GAL told the child to pack up the pipe in the
case and instructed the child to “get out of there.” The child used bare hands to zip the
case closed. The child placed the closed case in their sweatshirt pocket. The child called
grandmother and started walking into town. The GAL also called grandmother, informed
grandmother that the child had discovered a pipe, and emphasized that grandmother needed
to get the child from Anderson’s home. The child was at Anderson’s house for about one
and a half to two hours. The child did not observe evidence that anyone else had been in
the residence. Anderson did not wake up while the child was in the home.
Grandmother picked the child up in the middle of town. The child showed
grandmother the pipe and told her that the GAL provided instructions to bring it to the
police. Grandmother looked at the pipe and agreed to deliver it to the police. Grandmother
and the child gave the pipe to a deputy, who then took pictures of the pipe and confiscated
it. The child gave a statement to the deputy.
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Investigation
The deputy recognized the pipe as one that is commonly used to smoke
methamphetamine. The pipe had a white residue on the inside.
The deputy went to Anderson’s home to speak with her. The deputy asked
Anderson if she would be willing to open the front door, which she did. Without entering
Anderson’s residence, the deputy observed the blue rug where the child found the pipe.
The deputy returned to the police station and performed an unofficial field test to
confirm that the residue in the pipe was methamphetamine. The test was positive.
The state charged Anderson with a methamphetamine-related crime involving
children in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(4) (2 018), and a fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018).
At a later date, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) conducted
further testing on the pipe. The BCA test also produced a positive result for
methamphetamine.
Procedural Posture
At the pretrial conference, defense counsel informed the district court that the
defense would stipulate to “the report” from the BCA. The BCA analyst who prepared the
report was not available to testify on the scheduled trial date, and Anderson did not want
to continue the trial to a date when the analyst would be available to testify. Before jury
selection began, defense counsel confirmed that Anderson stipulated to the “lab results”
from the BCA to avoid a delay in the trial date. Anderson personally agreed to stipulate to
the lab results.
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At trial, the state introduced an exhibit containing the BCA lab results. The exhibit
consisted of four pages. The first page of the exhibit contained the test results, and the
remaining pages of the exhibit contained chain-of-custody documents, including an
evidence submission form and a laboratory- analysis request. The exhibit was received
without objection.
The jury found Anderson guilty on both counts. The district court stayed imposition
of a sentence and ordered a 45-day period of electric home monitoring with authorized
work release and supervised probation for five years with conditions.
Anderson appeals.
DECISION
Anderson argues that her conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, that
admission of certain chain-of-custody evidence was erroneous, and that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each argument in turn.
I. The evidence was sufficient to convict Anderson of a methamphetamine-
related crime involving children.

Anderson argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of a
methamphetamine-related crime involving children because the evidence did not show that
she (1) knowingly engaged in storing methamphetamine or (2) knowingly expected the
presence of the child. We disagree.
Anderson was convicted of a methamphetamine-related crime involving children
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(4):
(a) N o person may knowingly engage in any of the
following activities in the presence of a child or vulnerable adult;
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in the residence of a child or a vulnerable adult; in a building,
structure, conveyance, or outdoor location where a child or
vulnerable adult might reasonably be expected to be present; in a
room offered to the public for overnight accommodation; or in
any multiple unit residential building:

. . . .

(4) storing any methamphetamine paraphernalia.

(Emphasis added.) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under this
statute turns on its interpretation, which presents a question that we review de novo. State
v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018). “When interpreting a statute, we seek
to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Morgan, 968 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. 2021).
We first determine whether language in the statute is ambiguous. Id. A statute is
ambiguous if it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. If the
statute is unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning. Id.
We first address Anderson’s arguments regarding the interpretation of statutory
language and then analyze the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. State v. Vasko, 889
N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017).

Storing
Anderson argues that the word “storing” could mean either “the discrete act of
putting away” (discrete usage) or “the ongoing act of keeping” (ongoing usage), but that
as used in this statute, the word storing means the discrete act of putting away. We
disagree.
As a threshold matter, we disagree with Anderson’s interpretation of the word
“storing” as used in this statute. In State v. Maack, we interpreted the plain meaning of the
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act of storing under Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(4), as “keeping . . . for future use.”
921 N.W.2d 790, 793-94 (Minn. App. 2018). We concluded that the language of the statute
was unambiguous because to “store means to keep (goods, etc.) in safekeeping for future
delivery in an unchanged condition and to reserve or put away for future use.” Id.
(quotations and citations omitted). We concluded that the statute unambiguously
“prohibits a person from participating and taking part in the activity of keeping
methamphetamine paraphernalia for future use.” Id. at 794.
Anderson nevertheless argues that the statutory term “storing” unambiguously
means a discrete act of putting away identified items for future use and does not mean to
engage in an act of keeping for future use. Anderson cites no authority to support this
interpretation. And this argument is contrary to our holding in Maack, in which we defined
the term “storing” to include the ongoing usage “keeping . . . for future use” and concluded
that the evidence there was insufficient because the defendant’s mere knowledge that
another person stored methamphetamine paraphernalia in the home and the defendant’s
limited use of that paraphernalia did not amount to engaging in the activity of keeping the
methamphetamine for future use within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 794-95.
Anderson also asserts that the discrete- usage interpretation must apply because it
effectuates a legislative intent to enable prosecution of those who abandon
methamphetamine paraphernalia. Anderson cites no authority in support of this
proposition.
Anderson further suggests that defining storing to mean the ongoing act of keeping
could render the statutory language “in the presence of a child” surplusage because (1) the
8
purpose of that language is to prevent the child from coming into contact with the
criminalized items and (2) it would permit a situation where a person is liable because they
stored methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child and where a child might
reasonably be expected to be present. First, Anderson cites no authority in support of her
argument that the legislature intended the language “in the presence of a child” to prevent
the child from coming into contact with the criminalized items. The statute contains no
requirement that the child personally view the prohibited item for liability to attach.
Second, we do not read “in the presence of a child” as mutually exclusive of other
conditions that could give rise to liability. We can envision a scenario where
methamphetamine is kept for future use in the presence of a child, in the residence of a
child, and where a child might reasonably be expected to be present. But we can also
envision a scenario where methamphetamine paraphernalia is kept for future use at a place
where a child may reasonably be expected to be present but the child is not actually
physically present. The fact that certain circumstances could give rise to multiple theories
of liability does not necessarily render the meaning of the phrases identical. Cf. State v.
Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Minn. 2021) (rejecting the defendant’s interpretation of
“expose to ” as “physically subjected to” under the canon of surplusage because the
supreme court could not envision a scenario in which a child would be “physically
subjected to” methamphetamine in a way not otherwise described by the statute). We also
note that “storing” is not the only action that may result in liability under the statute.
“Manufacturing” and “attempting to manufacture” in the presence of a child also give rise
to liability. Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018). Thus, the binding interpretation
9
of storing in Maack does not render the statutory language “in the presence of a child”
surplusage in the context of the statute as a whole. State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683
(Minn. 2015) (recognizing courts construe a statute as a whole to determine if it is
ambiguous and interpret its language to give effect to all of its provisions).
Thus, consistent with Maack, the act of storing under Minn. Stat. § 152.137,
subd. 2(a)(4), unambiguously means to keep for future use.
Expected Presence of a Child
Anderson next argues that the statutory terms “expected,” read with “knowingly”
means that “the state must prove the defendant was aware of or believed in the probable or
anticipated presence of a child.” Anderson further argues that “knowingly” requires a
continued awareness of the planned encounter.
We agree with Anderson’s interpretation that the phrase “knowingly expect the
presence of a child” means “aware of or believed in the probable or anticipated presence
of a child.” See State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 29 (Minn. 2013) (defining knowingly as
a derivative of “know,” which means “to perceive directly; grasp in mind with clarity or
certainty” (quotation omitted)); State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 160-61 (Minn. App.
2012) (applying the Model Penal Code definition of “knowingly”); The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 623 (5th ed. 2011) (defi ning “expect” as “[t]o look
forward to the probable occurrence or appearance of”). This statutory language is
unambiguous.
But Anderson’s assertion that such an interpretation necessarily means that she
could not have knowingly expected the presence of a child while asleep is not reasonable.
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The statute does not require uninterrupted conscious awareness. The fact that Anderson
was asleep at the time the child discovered her in the residence does not necessarily negate
a conclusion that she was aware of or believed in the probable or anticipated presence of
the child. The authority cited by Anderson does not require continued, uninterrupted
conscious awareness for liability to exist under the statute. See Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d at
160-61 (reasoning that a felony-level violation of a harassment restraining order occurs
when an individual “knowingly violates” the harassment restraining order and, applying
the Model Penal Code definition of “knowingly,” that requires that a person is aware that
the violative action was prohibited ). And “[o]ur rules of statutory interpretation forbid
adding words or meaning to a statute that are purposely omitted or inadvertently
overlooked.” Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Thus,
we are not persuaded that the statute requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the
continuous and uninterrupted awareness of the expected presence of a child by a conscious
person.
Having defined the relevant statutory terms, we turn to Anderson’s argument
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her conviction.
Sufficiency of Evidence
The state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that Anderson knowingly stored
methamphetamine paraphernalia in a place where a child might reasonably be expected to
be present. When “the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone sufficient
to sustain the verdict,” we apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review. Loving v.
State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). “[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an
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inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” State v. Harris,
895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017).
Under the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, we conduct a two-step
analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). We first identify the
circumstances proved by the state. Id. In so doing, we defer to the jury’s acceptance of
the circumstances proved and rejection of evidence conflicting with those circumstances.
Id. at 598-99. We “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and assume that the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense
witnesses.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). “The second step is to determine whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). In making this determination, we
view the circumstances proved “not as isolated facts, but as a whole,” and independently
examine the reasonableness of all inferences rather than deferring to the jury’s choice
between reasonable inferences. Id.
To sustain a conviction for a methamphetamine-related crime involving children
under the statute, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) Anderson knowingly stored methamphetamine paraphernalia; (2) Anderson knowingly
stored the methamphetamine paraphernalia where a child might reasonably be expected to
be present; and (3) Anderson’s act took place on or about May 16, 2020, in Polk County.
Anderson disputes the first two elements.
The circumstances proved at trial are: (1) pursuant to an established plan, Anderson
was to pick up the child at a predetermined location and return with the child to her home;
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(2) Anderson did not appear at the predetermined location and the child’s grandfather
brought the child to Anderson’s home; (3) the child visited Anderson pursuant to a court-
ordered visit; (4) Anderson was believed to own her home and live alone; (5) Anderson
was the only person in the home when the child arrived; (6) Anderson was asleep in the
child’s bed when the child arrived at Anderson’s home; (7) upon arrival, the child found a
pipe in the living room in Anderson’s home; (8) the pipe appeared used and had a white
residue inside; (9) the child contacted the GAL and followed instructions to pack up the
pipe and bring the pipe to police; and (10) the pipe tested positive for methamphetamine.
Together, these circumstances are consistent with guilt and ar e inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than that of guilt. Anderson knowingly stored methamphetamine
paraphernalia at the same time and place she was scheduled to have a court-ordered visit
with the child. The evidence was therefore sufficient to sustain the conviction.
II. Any evidentiary error did not affect Anderson’s substantial rights.

Anderson argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in
admitting an exhibit containing testimonial hearsay statements in violation of her
confrontation rights.
The state introduced the exhibit Anderson now challenges. The entire exhibit
consisted of four pages. The report on the examination of physical evidence containing
the BCA lab results and the evidence submission form comprised the first three pages of
the exhibit. The remaining page of the exhibit consisted of a laboratory-analysis request.
The evidence submission form contained information regarding the offense, the personnel
investigating the offense, Anderson, the paraphernalia to be tested, and a brief summary of
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the case and special circumstances. Anderson stipulated to the admission of the BCA lab
results, but she did not personally stipulate to the admission of the remainder of the
information contained within the multi- page exhibit, including a statement purporting to
summarize a confession. 1 Anderson now specifically objects to three portions of the
evidence submission form: the FBI number for Anderson; a summary note that reads, “The
suspect was later questioned and admitted to having the pipe in her house which resulted
in new charges. Jury trial date is scheduled please complete confirmatory testing”; and the
response “no” to the question “Is this a first offense being charged as a gross
misdemeanor?” In other words, Anderson contends that this exhibit supplied the jury with
testimonial and hearsay evidence of her possession of the pipe and her criminal history.
Anderson also contends that admission of the form was plain-error prosecutorial
misconduct. Anderson asserts that the prosecutor offered evidence that they knew or
should have known was false and inadmissible.
Anderson did not object to the admission of the evidence. The stat e agrees that
admission of the evidence was erroneous but the parties dispute whether we review the
erroneous admission of the evidence for plain error or under a modified plain-error test.
When reviewing for plain error, we consider if “(1) there is error, (2) the error is plain, and
(3) the error affects substantial rights.” State v. Carridine , 812 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn.

1 We note that the state argues that Anderson waived her right to appellate review of this
issue when she stipulated to the admission of the BCA lab results. The record reflects that
the BCA lab results were a distinct document that made up only a portion of that admitted
at trial. Because Anderson did not stipulate to the evidence that she now challenges, she
did not waive her right to appellate review.
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2012). “If the defendant establishes all three factors, we consider a fourth: whether the
error should be addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.”
Id. (quotation omitted). But if there are allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we apply
a modified plain-error test. Id. at 146. Under the modified plain-error test, the defendant
must show that the prosecutorial misconduct was plain error, such that it “contravenes case
law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). Then, the burden shifts to
the state to show that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id.
Although we do not consider the prosecutor to have committed affirmative
misconduct in this case, we need not decide whether the plain error or modified plain-error
test applies, because, in any event, the erroneous admission of the evidence did not affect
Anderson’s substantial rights. When determining “whether the error affected substantial
rights, we ask whether the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” Id.
at 142. “[W]e consider the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the
pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity
to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789,
803 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted).
In Mosley, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the modified plain -error test and
placed the burden on the state to show that there was “no reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict.”
Id. at 801 (quotation omitted). The state introduced an exhibit with graphic sexual
references and potential references to prostitution. Id. at 802-03. The supreme court
reasoned that the state established that there was no reasonable likelihood that admission
15
of the evidence affected the defendant’s substantial rights because the evidence against the
defendant was strong, the prosecutor did not rely on or elicit testimony about the co ntent
of the messages, the prosecutor focused solely on the admissible part of the evidence in the
exhibit, and there was no evidence that the fact-finder relied on the problematic evidence
in its decision. Id. at 803.
We read the facts of this case to be analogous. Like the circumstances in Mosley,
we assume that the exhibit contained information that should have been redacted. But the
other evidence in the case was strong and the improper evidence consisted of a small
portion of the totality of the evidence. This improper evidence was never mentioned during
the trial, and there is no indication that the jury relied on it in reaching its verdict. The
overwhelming evidence introduced at trial related to Anderson’s possession or awareness
of the pipe in her home. The child’s uncontroverted testimony about where the pipe was
found, which the deputy corroborated, was duplicative of the inadmissible material
erroneously introduced at trial. The prosecutor did not elicit testimony about the improper
evidence and made no mention of it in opening or closing arguments. The prosecutor
focused solely on the stipulated portion of the exhibit and did not elicit testimony or suggest
in opening statement or closing argument that Anderson confessed to having the pipe in
her home or had a criminal history. And Anderson suggests that the prosecutor may have
been unaware of the improper evidence. Finally, there is no evidence that the jury relied
on the objectionable material in convicting Anderson. We therefore conclude that the
erroneous admission of the evidence did not affect Anderson’s substantial rights and no
new trial is warranted.
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III. Anderson failed to establish that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Anderson argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial
counsel either (1) did not read the exhibit containing the impermissible evidence, or (2) was
aware of the inadmissible evidence and did not object to or contest its content. We review
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842
(Minn. 2003).
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. This right is the “right to the effective
assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quotation
omitted). We analyze ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under a two-prong test set
forth in Strickland . Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020). To prevail on
such a claim, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there was a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Id. (relying on Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). We need not address
both prongs of the test if one prong is determinative. Id.
Under the first prong, the appellant must show that counsel’s “representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We assign
“a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Andersen v. State, 830
N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). “An attorney’s representation meets the objective standard of
reasonableness if the attorney exercises the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably
competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Strategic choices made by an
17
attorney after a thorough investigation of the facts and law are virtually unchallengeable.”
Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Minn. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted).
Anderson’s argument that her trial counsel failed to read the exhibit containing the
objectionable evidence is speculative and not supported by the record on appeal. But even
assuming that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
Anderson failed to meet her burden to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
[alleged] errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Peltier, 946
N.W.2d at 372 (quotation omitted). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.” Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 217 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Anderson did not carry her burden to establish a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different because, as set forth above, the
objectionable material was cumulative of direct evidence introduced at trial that the pipe
was found by the child in Anderson’s home.
Affirmed.