Dr. Eric Ringsred,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-0374

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

Dr. Eric Ringsred,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: September 13, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
City of Duluth, et al.,

Appellant,

Duluth News Tribune, et al.,

Respondents.

________________________

William D. Paul, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent Eric Ringsred.

Rebecca St. George, Duluth City Attorney, Elizabeth Sellers Tabor, Assistant City Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota, for appellant City of Duluth.

Patricia Y. Beety, Susan L. Naughton, Paul A. Merwin, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus
curiae League of Minnesota Cities.

Kimberly J. Maki, Saint Louis County Attorney, Nick D. Campanario, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.

________________________

2
SYLLABUS
The continuing violation doctrine does not apply to a First Amendment retaliation
claim where, as here, the plaintiff has alleged discrete acts of retaliation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Reversed and remanded.
OPINION
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
The question presented in this appeal is whether the continuing violation doctrine
applies to toll the statute of limitations for a First Amendment retaliation claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ruled that the claim was time- barred. The court of
appeals reversed and reinstated the claim, concluding that the alleged retaliatory acts
constitute a continuing violation that tolls the statute of limitations. Because we conclude
that the complaint alleges discrete acts of retaliation that do not constitute a continuing
violation, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
FACTS
1
Respondent Dr. Eric Ringsred brought this action against appellant City of Duluth
(the City) in 2020, alleging that the City retaliated against him in violation of his First
Amendment rights. The complaint details a long, contentious history between Ringsred

1 The district court dismissed Ringsred’s complaint for failure to state a claim under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). On appeal, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as
true. See Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 2011). We
therefore state the facts here as alleged in the complaint.
3
and the City over development in Duluth. Indeed, Ringsred claims that the City has been
retaliating against him for over 20 years because he has been a vocal advocate for historic
preservation in Duluth. Among other claims, the complaint includes one count for
interference with Ringsred’s First Amendment rights by the City and former City Attorney.
The complaint alleges several specific “retaliatory actions.”
The first dispute described in the complaint occurred in 1998. Ringsred tried to
preserve an area described as “Old Downtown” by preventing the City’s “Tech Village”
project from going forward. In a lawsuit Ringsred filed, the district court permitted “Tech
Village” to proceed, but the court also held much of “Old Downtown” to be a protected
historic site. Ringsred essentially asserts that the City has been retaliating against him since
the 1998 dispute and his complaint details several alleged examples.
Ringsred alleges that the City sought to have him declared a “frivolous litigant” in
2001 in retaliation for his earlier efforts relating to development.
Later, in 2006, Ringsred purchased a building in Duluth called the Pastoret Terrace
(the property). The property included both residential and commercial spaces. Ringsred
alleges that the City took “adverse actions” involving the property, including increased
police surveillance. After a few years of Ringsred’s ownership, the Duluth News Tribune
ran an article in 2009 about the property titled “Officials Roust Cellar Dwellers from
Duluth Buildings.” Ringsred contends that the article defamed him because it ran on the
front-page of the newspaper and accused him of fire code violations. He contends that this
article was also in retaliation for his earlier efforts relating to development.
4
In 2010, there was a fire at the property. Based on the fire damage, the City
condemned the property for human habitation. Following the condemnation, Ringsred
spent significant resources to repair and restore the property between 2011 and 2015. But
because Ringsred failed to pay the property taxes, the property was forfeited to Saint Louis
County in 2015.
In 2016, Ringsred tried to buy the property back from Saint Louis County, but the
Duluth Economic Development Authority (DEDA) bought the property instead. Ringsred
contends that DEDA bought the property in order to deprive him of it and that the City
acted in concert with DEDA to prevent him from buying back the property in retaliation
for his speaking out and taking earlier legal action against the City.2
After this, Ringsred brought two different lawsuits against the City and DEDA: one
to challenge the County’s sale of the property and the other to prevent the demolition of
the property. Ringsred contends that the City’s retaliation continued after these two
lawsuits. He points specifically to three newspaper articles appearing in the Duluth News
Tribune on April 25, 2018, October 7, 2019, and October 28, 2020, and an article in the
Star Tribune on January 23, 2020, where the former City Attorney is quoted: “We’ve been
dealing with the Ringsreds for decades. It’s not surprising.”

2 The district court noted that Ringsred’s complaint references a lack of police
protection and actions of Saint Louis County and DEDA as examples of alleged retaliatory
acts. Because the Duluth Police Department, Saint Louis County, and DEDA are not
parties to the suit, the district court concluded that these allegations do not support
Ringsred’s retaliation claim. The court also noted that even if the Duluth Police
Department were a party to the suit, the allegation regarding the lack of police protection
fails because it lacks a causal connection to the retaliation claim. These rulings are not
before us.
5
In April 2020, Ringsred brought this action against the City and several other
defendants. At issue here is his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City
interfered with his First Amendment rights by making false statements and engaging in
other negative conduct toward him in retaliation for his prior lawsuits and his public
opposition to the City.3
The City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). The district court dismissed the First
Amendment retaliation claim against the City. The court ruled that certain instances of the
alleged retaliation are time-barred. The court rejected Ringsred’s reliance on the
continuing violation doctrine, citing “the lack of continuity” between the alleged retaliatory
actions. The court then addressed the merits of the remaining, timely allegations of
retaliation and ruled that these allegations failed on the merits. The court explained that
there was “no evidence, clear or muddled, that shows because [Ringsred] spoke out against
the City, the City retaliated by discussing him and his former property in a newspaper
article.” The court also determined that Ringsred had “not shown a person of ordinary
firmness would be deterred from speaking out or continuing to litigate.”
Ringsred appealed to the court of appeals, raising multiple issues involving multiple
defendants. As relevant to the issues before us, Ringsred argued that his section 1983
retaliation claim against the City is timely and properly stated a claim on which relief could

3 Ringsred’s section 1983 claim against the former City Attorney is not before us.
Ringsred also brought other claims against members of the media, the City, and the former
City Attorney for defamation and for conspiring to defame him. These claims are not
before us here.
6
be granted. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
section 1983 retaliation claim. Ringsred v. City of Duluth, No. A22-0374, 2022
WL 4295372, at *4–5 (Minn. App. Sept. 19, 2022). First, on the timeliness of the claim,
the court of appeals concluded that Ringsred’s allegation of “a 20-year ‘running battle’ of
direct and indirect retaliatory conduct . . . is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations”
under the continuing violation doctrine. Id. at *4. Second, on the merits of the claim, the
court of appeals concluded that the district court “departed from” our pleading standard
because Ringsred’s “allegations as a whole support inferences that the city took various
adverse actions against him, directly and indirectly, over a number of years; it did so as a
matter of formal policy or accepted custom; its motive for doing so was to retaliate for his
litigation and public outcry against the city; and the city’s actions may have dissuaded an
ordinary person from continuing his protected activities.” Id. at *5. The court of appeals
therefore reinstated Ringsred’s section 1983 retaliation claim against the City. Id.
The City of Duluth petitioned for further review only on the timeliness of the section
1983 retaliation claim. 4 The City asked us to consider whether the continuing violation
doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for First Amendment retaliation claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Minnesota. The City did not challenge the court of appeals’ ruling

4 The Duluth News Tribune, Forum Communications, and Peter Passi also petitioned
for review, asking us to consider whether the court of appeals had appellate jurisdiction to
reinstate claims against them, asserting that they were never sufficiently served with the
notice of appeal. We denied their petition for review without prejudice to filing a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in the district court.
7
that the complaint states a viable First Amendment retaliation claim on the merits under
Rule 12.02(e). We granted the City’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
The City of Duluth argues that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to
First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. In the alternative, the City
contends that if the continuing violation doctrine could apply in theory to section 1983
retaliation claims, the doctrine does not toll Ringsred’s claim here. This is so, the City
argues, because the complaint alleges discrete acts of retaliation that do not constitute a
continuing violation.
This case comes to us on review of the district court’s grant of the City’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12.02(e) of
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Our “review [of] a district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim [is] de novo.” Thompson v. St. Anthony Leased Hous. Assocs. II,
LP, 979 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2022). We accept the facts alleged in the complaint “as true
and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also review de novo the running of the
statute of limitations. Franklin v. Evans, 992 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 2023).
Ringsred brought the retaliation claim against the City under 42 U.S.C § 1983, a
federal civil rights statute, which “provides a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose
constitutional rights were violated by state officials.” McDeid v. Johnston, 984 N.W.2d
864, 871 (Minn. 2023). To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim under section 1983,
Ringsred “must show (1) that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) that the defendant’s
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actions caused an injury . . . that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in the activity, and (3) that a causal connection exists between the retaliatory
animus and the injury.” Scott v. Tempelmeyer, 867 F.3d 1067, 1070 (8th Cir. 2017). The
cause of action accrues “when the retaliatory action occurred.” Rassier v. Sanner, 996 F.3d
832, 836 (8th Cir. 2021). The cause of action accrues at the time of the retaliatory action
“because damages result at that time,” even when “ ‘the full extent of the injury is not then
known or predictable.’ ” Id. at 837 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007)).
Section 1983 does not include a specific statute of limitations. According to the
Supreme Court, because a “federal cause of action brought at any distance of time [is]
utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws,” courts apply the “most analogous” or “most
appropriate” state statute of limitations when, as here, federal law is silent on the matter.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268, 271 (1985) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In addition, courts generally refer to “state law for tolling rules.” Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007). But see id. at 388 (explaining that “the accrual date of
a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to
state law”).
In determining the length of the state statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has
held that section 1983 claims are “best characterized as personal injury actions” for statute
of limitations purposes. Wilson, 471 U.S at 280. In Minnesota, the statute of limitations
for personal injury actions is 6 years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2022). There is no
dispute that the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Minnesota is
9
6 years, and so we apply that limitations period here. 5 See Rassier, 996 F.3d at 836;
Franklin, 992 N.W.2d at 385 & n.3. Because Ringsred brought his section 1983 retaliation
claim against the City in April 2020, the 6-year statute of limitations bars a retaliation claim
that is based on alleged retaliatory acts before April 2014, unless the continuing violation
doctrine applies.
Ringsred asks us to affirm the court of appeals’ holding that his section 1983 claim
based on retaliatory acts before April 2014 is timely under the continuing violation
doctrine. Ringsred , 2022 WL 4295372, at *4. The continuing violation doctrine is an
equitable doctrine that can toll the statute of limitations where a pattern of conduct
“constitute[s] a sufficiently integrated pattern to form,” in effect, a single act. Hubbard v.
United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 n.11 (Minn. 1983). In determining whether
the doctrine applies here, the threshold question is whether federal law controls because
the accrual date of Ringsred’s claim is a question of federal law, or whether Minnesota law
applies because the continuing violation doctrine is a tolling rule. See Wallace, 549 U.S.
at 388, 394. Because the parties agree that Minnesota law controls, we do not reach this
issue and simply assume that Minnesota law on the continuing violation doctrine applies.
We previously have applied the continuing violation doctrine in two contexts. The
first context is continuing trespass claims. See N. States Power Co. v. Franklin,
122 N.W.2d 26, 30–31 (Minn. 1963). In that context, we have explained that “[w]here a

5 The district court concluded that the statute of limitations for the First Amendment
retaliation claims here is 4 years. The court of appeals held that “the district court erred by
applying a four- year limitations period,” because “the applicable statute of limitations is
six years.” Ringsred, 2022 WL 4295372, at *4.
10
structure is erected or junk is stored and the harmful effect is one that may be abated or
discontinued at any time, there is a continuing wrong so long as the offending object
remains, and the courts regard such as a continuing trespass . . . and the statute of
limitations does not run from the initial trespass.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The second context is employment discrimination claims under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. See Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 71 (Minn. 2020). The
continuing violation doctrine may apply to hostile environment claims because “an affected
individual may not be aware of the discriminatory impact of certain employment practices
until a pattern emerges as a result of the cumulation of numerous events over a substantial
period of time.” U.S. v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 922 (5th Cir. 1973). Abel
provides a helpful example. There, a female graduate student alleged employment
discrimination stemming from her time working at a hospital. We concluded that she had
“plausibly alleged a continuing violation” stemming from her allegations of “a series of
related acts of discrimination based on [her] sex and race.” 947 N.W.2d at 72. In making
this determination, we emphasized that “the continuing violations doctrine is particularly
relevant in hostile environment claims” because such “claims may be based on ‘[p]ervasive
incidents, any of which may not be actionable when considered in isolation.’ ” Id. at 71
n.5 (quoting Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 232 (Minn. 2020)).
While we have applied the continuing violation doctrine in only these two contexts,
we have never held that such contexts are the exclusive areas for application of the doctrine.
But we need not resolve in this case whether the continuing violation doctrine could ever
11
apply to section 1983 retaliation claims under Minnesota law. Even assuming the doctrine
could apply to such claims, it does not apply here because the acts of retaliation that
Ringsred alleges are discrete acts, each of which was actionable when committed.
Both the Supreme Court and our court have recognized that the continuing violation
doctrine is not applicable where the conduct at issue constitutes discrete acts. See Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (discussing discrete acts); Abel,
947 N.W.2d at 71 n.5 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 –17). “Discrete acts” are “easy to
identify” and are separately “actionable.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. And even if a discrete
act outside the limitations period is “plausibly or sufficiently related to” a discrete act
within the limitations period, such that there may be a “serial violation,” each discrete act
is still considered separately for timeliness based on when that act became “actionable.”
Id. The continuing violation doctrine “does not allow a plaintiff to recover for discrete acts
of retaliation that occur outside of the limitations period simply because those acts are
related to other acts of retaliation that occurred within the limitations period.” Katz v.
McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 2d 311, 338 (D.N.H. 2013).
Ringsred’s complaint alleges a series of discrete acts of retaliation, each of which
would have been actionable when committed. See Rassier, 996 F.3d at 836. For example,
assuming, as Ringsred alleges, that the City interfered with his ability to buy back his
property as retaliation for his prior speech, that conduct was actionable when it was
committed. Similarly, if the City’s statements that appeared in the newspapers were
retaliatory, Ringsred could have pursued his claims when those statements were published.
The fact that Ringsred alleges that the City committed the retaliatory acts over a period of
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time with the same motive does not allow him to aggregate those discrete acts into a
continuing violation of his First Amendment rights. See O’Connor v. City of Newark,
440 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that acts of First Amendment retaliation are
“individually actionable, even when relatively minor”).
Comparing hostile environment claims to First Amendment retaliation claims
further illustrates this principle. Hostile work environment claims “cannot be said to occur
on any particular day” and are instead based on the “cumulative effect of individual acts.”
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; see also Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 71 n.5 (noting that “the continuing
violations doctrine is particularly relevant in hostile environment claims”). Because the
harm “occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts,
a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own,” the continuing violation
doctrine may be applicable to hostile environment claims. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; see
also Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 71–72, 71 n.5. By contrast, the wrongful nature of each act of
retaliation Ringsred alleges was complete and known at the time the City committed the
act. Accordingly, the retaliatory acts alleged here do not constitute a continuing violation
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
6
The court of appeals reached a contrary conclusion, relying on Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The court of appeals explained that,

6 Ringsred argues that his allegation in the complaint of a “continuing violation” is
sufficient to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. We disagree. While we are bound by
factual allegations at the Rule 12 stage, we are not bound by conclusory legal labels dressed
up as factual allegations. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008).
13
under Monell, “retaliatory conduct may be official policy or governmental ‘custom,’ ”
Ringsred, 2022 WL 4295372, at *4 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91), and an allegation
of “retaliation as custom” requires the plaintiff to “point to, and eventually prove, a
‘continuing, widespread, persistent pattern’ ” id. (quoting Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th
888, 899 (8th Cir. 2022)). Based on this “concept of retaliation through govern mental
custom” from Monell and the court of appeals’ conclusion that it is “similar” to the
continuing violations doctrine, the court of appeals reasoned that Ringsred’s allegations
were “sufficient to toll the statute of limitations” because he had alleged “a 20-year
‘running battle’ of direct and indirect retaliatory conduct.” Id.
But Monell is about municipal liability for a section 1983 claim; it is not about the
timeliness of a section 1983 claim. Under Monell, in order to hold a municipality liable
“for an injury inflicted solely by its employees,” a plaintiff must establish that the action at
issue was the result of a municipal “policy or custom” and not just the action of individual
municipal employees. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To subject a municipality to section 1983
liability, the plaintiff generally must show either a policy—“a deliberate choice of a
guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority
regarding such matters”—or a custom —a sufficiently “widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct.” Corwin v. City of Indep., 829 F.3d 695, 699–700 (8th Cir.
2016) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the Monell
municipal liability standard asks whether the challenged conduct was the result of an
14
official policy, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986), 7 or an
unofficial custom, which can be shown by the frequency of similar conduct being done in
a widespread fashion, often through instances of similar conduct being done to parties other
than the plaintiff, see Perkins v. Hastings, 915 F.3d 512, 521–23 (8th Cir. 2019).
Monell and its policy or custom requirement is a test for establishing liability against
a municipality. The continuing violation doctrine, by contrast, is a test for determining
whether a series of acts should be treated, in effect, as a single, continuous violation that
tolls the statute of limitations. See Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 73. These tests are different in
their applications and purposes. To the extent that the court of appeals relied on the Monell
custom element to toll the statute of limitations under the continuing violation doctrine, we
hold that the court of appeals erred.
In sum, the acts Ringsred alleges as retaliation are discrete acts that were actionable
when committed. Accordingly, those acts do not constitute a continuing violation that tolls
the statute of limitations.8

7 Under Monell, a single discrete act of a government official can be actionable
against a municipality if the discrete act was in conformity with an official policy. See,
e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484–85 (holding a municipality liable for a single act of an
unconstitutional search by public officials acting in accord with municipal policy).

8 On remand, the district court needs to assess whether Ringsred’s complaint alleges
a timely retaliation claim, and if so, resolve that claim on the merits. Our holding on the
timeliness of the retaliation claim should not be read as restricting the right of Ringsred on
remand to offer evidence of a municipal practice that took place before April 2014 to help
establish a pattern of municipal misconduct that may be relevant to proving a timely section
1983 retaliation claim against the City. See Corwin, 829 F.3d at 700.
15
CONCLUSION
Based on our analysis, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.