The holding in the court’s own words
While we do not agree that evidence regarding the behavior of prospective johns is relevant to Sserwanja’s behavior, we conclude that reversal is not necessary because Sserwanja fails to show that admission of this evidence was prejudicial.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State of Minnesota v. Marlon Rashaad Robertson 884 N.W.2d 864
- State of Minnesota v. David Muniz Bustos 861 N.W.2d 655
- State v. Loebach 310 N.W.2d 58
- State v. Williams 525 N.W.2d 538
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0392
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Derrick Sserwanja,
Appellant.
Filed February 27, 2023
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-16163
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Zachary Stephenson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his electronic-solicitation-of-a-child conviction, arguing that
the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence regarding the typical behavior
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of “johns” on an online dating site when they learn that they are chatting with a minor. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Derrick Sserwanja went to trial on a charge of engaging in electronic
communication relating to sexual conduct with a child. He asserted an entrapment defense.
An officer testified that law enforcement creates profiles of fictional young girls on
dating sites that men contact seeking sexual encounters. During the online
communications, or “chats,” the officer using the fictional young girl’s profile discloses to
a prospective “john” that the girl is 15 years old or younger. At trial, the prosecutor asked
the officer: “[I]n your training and experience, what is the most common response by johns
when they learn” that they are “chatting with . . . someone 15 years or younger[?]” The
officer replied: “Most often that’s when they disengage the conversation.” He testified that
some johns stay in the conversation. The officer stated that when a john disengages,
officers will “not at any point reengage.”
The officer testified that he created a fictional profile for a girl named “Emma.” He
indicated that Emma was 18 years old, which is the minimum age requirement to create a
profile. He used images of an adult female that were publicly available online to create the
profile.
On July 5, 2019, Emma received a message from Sserwanja. Sserwanja stated that
he was 22 years old. Emma stated that she was 15 years old. Sserwanja replied, “I thought
your profile said you were 18.” Emma replied that she had to say that she was 18 to create
a profile. Sserwanja said that Emma’s age was not a problem.
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Sserwanja suggested that he meet Emma at her house. She asked him what he
would be interested in doing. Sserwanja replied that he wanted to do something sexual.
Emma asked Sserwanja to bring condoms, and he stated that he would. Emma provided
an address. Sserwanja stated that he was on his way. An officer stopped Sserwanja as he
was traveling to the meeting place and took him into custody. Sserwanja admitted that
Emma told him that she was 15 years old and that he hoped to have a sexual encounter
with her.
Sserwanja testified that he believed that the dating site verified ages. He testified
that Emma’s profile indicated that she was 18 years old and she sent him a photo of a
female who looked 18 years old. Sserwanja testified that he thought Emma lied about
being 15 years old . Sserwanja testified that he was looking for a friendship with Emma
and did not intend to have a sexual encounter with her. But he admitted that he sent sexual
messages to Emma after she said that she was 15 years old.
The district court instructed the jury on the entrapment defense. In closing
argument, Sserwanja’s attorney argued that law enforcement created the criminal design
and that Sserwanja would not have committed the crime without the acts of law
enforcement because Sserwanja did not intend to commit the crime.
On rebuttal, the state argued that “[t]he fact that the government agent has provided
what appears to be a favorable opportunity is not . . . a defense.” The prosecutor concluded:
Please recall that law enforcement did not reach out and do not
reach out in these types of operations. If after he learned that
Emma was 15 the defendant had ceased the conversation, law
enforcement would not have pursued him. It was the
defendant’s choice to send sexually explicit messages to a 15-
4
year-old that brought about the criminal act. No one forced
him.
The jury found Sserwanja guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Sserwanja
to a stay of imposition, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.135 (2022), and placed him on
probation for three years. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Sserwanja argues that the district court admitted “character evidence on the typical
behavior of innocent men chatting [online] to suggest that because . . . Sserwanja did not
follow this typical behavior [he] must be guilty.” “A district court’ s evidentiary rulings
will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d
864, 872 (Minn. 2016). Sserwanja bears the burden of showing that the district court
abused its discretion and that he was prejudiced by it. See State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d
655, 666 (Minn. 2015).
Sserwanja challenges the following exchange that occurred between the prosecutor
and an officer:
Q: [W]hen the john learns that they’re, in fact, chatting
with . . . someone 15 years or younger. And in your
training and experience, what is the most common
response by johns when they learn that information?
A: Most often that’s when they disengage the conversation
or end the text thread.
Q: And if someone ends the text thread or the conversation
at that point, do you reinitiate at any time as a chatter?
A: We do not at any point reengage the conversation.
Q: Have you as a chatter had your profiles flagged?
A: Yes.
Q: Have they been brought down after you’ve revealed the
age to johns?
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A: Yes. Oftentimes we’ll have the profile reported to the
company after we reveal that the person is underage.
Q: Obviously some do not get off of the conver sation; is
that fair to say?
A: Correct. Some stay.
Over objection, the district court ruled that the evidence was admissible because:
The . . . question was relevan[t] to show how the defendant
acted after he learned the age of the chatter, and that went
directly to . . . one of the elements the [s]tate needs to prove.
In addition . . . it is relevant to address the . . . defense of
entrapment, and it’s relevant to showing that . . . law
enforcement did not pester, induce, or coerce action.
While we do not agree that evidence regarding the behavior of prospective johns is
relevant to Sserwanja’s behavior, we conclude that reversal is not necessary because
Sserwanja fails to show that admission of this evidence was prejudicial.
The evidence was not used to show Sserwanja’s character or that he fit a profile.
Character evidence is generally prohibited to ensure that the jury does not return a
conviction to penalize a defendant “because he is an undesirable person.” State v. Loebach,
310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981). But ceasing communication with an underage person is
not a character trait. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion.”).
In arguing that the evidence was improperly used as evidence “akin” to character
evidence, Sserwanja relies on State v. Williams. See 525 N.W.2d 538 (Minn.1994). In
Williams, police officers testified regarding ty pical behavior of drug couriers. Id. at 548.
The court stated that such evidence is like character evidence, and is inadmissible, because
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it permits the jury to infer that, if the defendant’s conduct fits the profile, then it is probative
evidence that she is a drug courier. Id. But here, unlike in Williams, Sserwanja raised an
entrapment defense. Thus, the evidence was not intended to show that Sserwanja fit the
profile of a guilty person, but rather to show that it was possible for him to end the
communication upon learning the age of the chatter.
Additionally, the evidence was a very small piece of the state’s case. The state did
not reference the evidence in closing argument, but only on rebuttal in addressing
Sserwanja’s entrapment defense. And even then, the prosecutor stated only, “[R]ecall that
law enforcement did not reach out and do not reach out in these types of operations. If
after he learned that Emma was 15 the defendant had ceased the conversation, law
enforcement would not have pursued him.” While the behavior of other johns is irrelevant
to Sserwanja’s behavior, there is an absence of any prejudice to Sserwanja. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence.
Affirmed.