In the Matter of the Welfare of: L. B., III, Child.

1
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0415

In the Matter of the Welfare of: L. B., III, Child.

Filed August 29, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-JV-21-814

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for appellant State of Minnesota)

Drake D. Metzger, Jasmin Quiggle, Metzger Law Firm, L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent L.B., III)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Reyes , Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
On appeal from a pretrial order denying certification of a juvenile for adul t
prosecution, appellant-state argues that the district court clearly erred in its findings on
three of the public -safety factors and abused its discretion by denying adult certification.
We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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FACTS
These facts are based on the allegations in appellant State of Minnesota’s
certification petition, which we must presume are true. See In re Welfare of J.H. , 844
N.W.2d 28, 38 (Minn. 2014). Midmorning on April 4, 2021, respondent L.B. drove
eastbound on County Road 42 at a high speed. Respondent’s twin sister sat in the front
passenger seat. Respondent’s older sister drove alongside him in another car , and the
siblings appeared to be racing. A Honda going westbound on County Road 42 pulled into
the turn lane to cr oss County Road 42 onto Newton Avenue. The Honda moved forward
to cross County Road 42, and respondent “T -boned” the Honda with such force that the
Honda split in half. The Honda driver and passenger died at the scene. Respondent’s twin
sister suffered severe injuries and required several surgeries.
A crash-reconstruction report estimated respondent’s speed at between 93 and 100
miles per hour when he hit the Honda, well over the posted speed limit of 50 miles per
hour. The report stated that responde nt’s excessive speed was the primary contributing
factor to the crash. The secondary contributing factors were respondent’s racing and the
Honda turning into the path of respondent’s vehicle.
At the time of the crash, respondent was 17 years old. He turned 18 just over two
months later.
The state filed a juvenile-delinquency petition charging respondent with two counts
of third-degree murder and two counts of criminal vehicular homicide for the deaths of the
two victims in the Honda and one count of crim inal vehicular operation resulting in great
bodily harm for the injuries caused to respondent’s twin sister. It also moved for
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presumptive certification for adult prosecution under Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3
(2020).
The district court held a certi fication hearing. The district court received into
evidence two certification evaluations: (1) a certification study prepared by Dakota County
probation officer Julie Eckstrom and (2) a psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Tricia
Aiken. Eckstrom’s report recommended extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) designation.
Dr. Aiken’s report recommended certification. Both Dr. Aiken and Eckstrom testified at
the hearing about their recommendations.
The district court denied the state’s certification moti on. It first determined that
respondent is subject to presumptive certification. It then found that two of the six public-
safety factors (the seriousness of the offense and respondent’s culpability) supported
certification, while the other factors (respondent’s prior delinquency record, his
programming history, the adequacy of punishment or programming in the juvenile system,
and the dispositional options available) weighed in favor of EJJ. After considering all six
factors, the district court found that respondent rebutted the presumption of certification
and ordered that the matter remain in juvenile court as an EJJ proceeding. This appeal
follows.
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DECISION
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the state’s motion for
presumptive certification.
The state argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying the state’s
motion to certify respondent for adult prosecution. Although we recognize that this is a
close and difficult case, given our standard of review, we disagree.
The district court “has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify” a
juvenile for adult prosecution. In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Minn. App.
2012) (quotation omitted) . We review a district court’s certification decision for an abuse
of discretion. See J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 34. We review the district court’s underlying factual
findings for clear error. See id. at 35. A finding is clearly erroneous “only if there is no
reasonable evidence to support the finding” and we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[W]e view the record in the
light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings .” Id.
Certification for adult prosecution is presumed when a juvenile is 16 or 17 years old
and is alleged to have committed an offense that involves a presumptive commitment to
prison. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. It is undisputed that the presumption of adult
certification applies here, because respondent was 17 years old at the time of the offense
and his charges involve a presumptive commitment to prison.
When the presumption of certification applies, the juvenile has the burden of
rebutting it by “demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the
proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety.” Id. If the district court finds that
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the juvenile has not rebutted the presumption, it must certify the proceeding. Id. The
district court must consider six factors when determining whether certification serves
public safety:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sente ncing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim ;

(2) the culpability of the [juvenile] in committing the
alleged offense, including the level of the [juvenile’s]
participation in planning and carrying out the offense and the
existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the
Sentencing Guidelines;

(3) the [juvenile’s] prior record of delinquency;

(4) the [juvenile’s] programming history, including
the [juvenile’s] past willingness to participate meaningfully in
available programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the
[juvenile].
Id., subd. 4 (2020). The district court must weigh all the factors but must “give gre ater
weight” to the seriousness of the offense and the juvenile’s record of delinquency. Id.
Undisputed First, Second, and Fourth Factors
The district court found that the seriousness of the offense and respondent’s
culpability favor certification. Neither party challenges the district court’s findings on
these factors. Respondent was driving more than 40 miles per hour over the speed limit at
the time of the collision. The collision caused the death of two people and serious injuries
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to another pers on. The record also reflects that respondent instigated the race with his
sister, and there are no mitigating factors affecting his role in the collision. The district
court did not clearly err by finding that the first two factors favor certification.
The district court found that the fourth factor, respondent’s programming history,
weighed in favor of EJJ. This finding too is supported by the record. Respondent
completed probation for three prior offenses and is responding well to his current
programming at the Juvenile Service Center. Dr. Aiken and Eckstrom both opined that
this factor supports EJJ, and the state does not challenge the district court’s finding on this
factor.
The state argues, however, that the district court clearly erred by finding that the
third, fifth, and sixth public-safety factors support EJJ. We address each in turn.
Third Factor: Prior Record of Delinquency
A juvenile’s “prior record of delinquency” refers to records of petitions to juvenile
court and juvenile court adjudications. In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 710
(Minn. 2008). Respondent’s delinquency record consists of: (1) a 2018 disorderly conduct
charge, for which he received a continuance without adjudication after successfully
completing 180 days of probation; (2) a 2019 misdemeanor theft charge , successfully
resolved by a continuance without findings after he completed 90 days of probation; (3) a
2020 juvenile adjudication of fifth-degree assault; and (4) a 2021 petty misdemeanor traffic
violation for running a red light.
The district court acknowledged those offenses and noted that respondent was still
on probation for the assault and theft offenses at the time of the collision. But it also stated
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that respondent has no prior felony record and that his delinquency history is “limited.” It
accordingly found that this factor weighs in favor of EJJ.
The state argues that the district court’s finding is clearly erroneous because
respondent’s record shows “consistent involvement ” with the juvenile court system and
escalating dangerousness. The state appears to suggest that the seriousness of respondent’s
current felony offense shows that this factor favors certification, citing In re Welfare of
K.A.P., 550 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. App. 1996) , rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1996) . But in
K.A.P., we confirmed that the district court may consider prior unadjudicated, pending
offenses when considering certification for a subsequent, separate offense. 550 N.W.2d at
12. Here, a s the district court noted, respondent has no prior felony petitions or
adjudications; his record consists of misdemeanor and petty misdemeanor offenses .
Moreover, both Dr. Aiken and Eckstrom agreed that respondent’s prior record of
delinquency supported EJJ rather tha n certification. The district court’s finding that this
factor favors EJJ is therefore not clearly erroneous.
Fifth Factor: Adequacy of Punishment or Programming Available in the
Juvenile Justice System
The fifth public-safety factor requires the district court to consider “the adequacy of
the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 4(5). The district court found that this factor weighed in favor of EJJ.
It credited Dr. Aiken’s report, which only recommended treatment in the form of therapy
to address respondent’s behavioral issues, criminogenic thinking, relationships, and stress
management; Dr. Aiken’s note that respondent “seems most appropri ate for standard
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correctional programming in a facility such as Red Wing”; and Dr. Aiken’s statement that
respondent does not have needs requiring specialized or intensive programming. The
district court also credited Eckstrom’s report that correctional p lacement under EJJ could
range up to 21 months.
The district court’s finding is supported by the record. Although Dr. Aiken believed
that this factor supports certification, she also testified that the available juvenile
programming is adequate “to meet [respondent’s] needs” and can provide respondent with
various treatment groups and therapy through which respondent could address his
“criminogenic thinking.” She stated that she recommended certification on this factor
because she believed that two and a half years is not an adequate length of punishment
given the seriousness of respondent’s offense.
Eckstrom’s report, which ultimately recommended EJJ, stated that this factor could
support either EJJ or certification. Eckstrom’s report noted that EJJ jurisdiction over
respondent would extend approximately 30 months, until respondent turned 21. It stated
that respondent could spend 6- 21 months in correctional programming under EJJ and that
an adult sentence could be imposed if respondent fails to compl ete programming or
commits a new offense. I t also stated that respondent could complete programming in the
time he would have left under EJJ jurisdiction. Although the committee members whose
votes provided the basis for Eckstrom’s recommendation did not unanimously agree on
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this factor , Eckstrom testified that four of the seven committee members believed this
factor supported EJJ. 1
The state argues that the district court’s finding that this factor favors EJJ is clearly
erroneous because respondent would have fewer than 24 months under EJJ supervision
while his adult sentence could hypothetically range up to 318 months.2 But while
“[i]nsufficient time for rehabilitation under the juvenile system is an appropriate
consideration when determining whether to certify a juvenile,” In re Welfare of S.J.T., 736
N.W.2d 341, 354 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2007), a disparity
between the EJJ disposition and the length of an adult sentence i s only one consideration.
And, here, the district court acknowledged that the presumptive adult sentence for
respondent’s most serious charge is 150 months and that the term of supervision under EJJ
is shorter than the presumptive adult sentence for respondent’s offenses. But it ultimately
concluded, based on Dr. Aiken’s testimony that programming is available for respondent
and Eckstrom’s recommendation, that this factor supports EJJ. Because that finding is
supported by the record, it is not clearly erroneous.

1 Dakota County Corrections relies on a seven -member staffing committee for final
recommendations on certification cases. The committee’s votes provided the basis for
Eckstrom’s recommendations on each public -safety factor and on the report’s overall
recommendation that the matter remain in the juvenile cou rt as an EJJ proceeding.
2 A 3 18-month sentence assumes that respondent is found guilty of all charges and
sentenced consecutively, which the district court would be permitted but not required to do
under the sentencing guidelines . See Minn. Sent. Guideli nes 2.F.2.a (2020). While we
presume for the purposes of a certification motion that the state’s charges are true, we are
not required to presume that respondent will receive the longest possible adult sentence
under the sentencing guidelines.
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Sixth Factor: Available Dispositional Options
The state argues that the sixth factor supports certification because any dispositional
options are limited by the short amount of time that respondent w ill be under EJJ
jurisdiction and because it is “not clear ” that two of the shorter programs described in
Eckstrom’s report would provide necessary rehabilitation.
The district court found that dispositional options for respondent are available in the
juvenile system. The record supports this finding. The district court cited Eckstrom’s
report, which listed three options available to respondent within the juvenile system: (1) the
Dakota County Juvenile Service Center Long Term Program, which has a maximum
program length of six to nine months but could be extended to 12 months if ordered by a
judge, and which provides therapy, cognitive behavioral groups, schooling, and
accountability; (2) placement at MCF –Red Wing, which would allow for potential
discharge between seven -and-a-half to nine months; or (3) commitment to the
commissioner of corrections for placement at MCF –Red Wing, which would lengthen the
timeframe that respondent could spend in the secured facility to 21 months , followed by a
90-day furlough to a group- home-like setting. Eckstrom’s report described the
programming available at MCF –Red Wing as including individualized treatment plans,
aggression-replacement training, trauma therapy, cognitive -skills development, living
skills, education and vocations training, and mental -health services. Given those options,
Eckstrom’s report recommended that this factor supports EJJ.
Dr. Aiken disagreed and opined that the dispositional -options factor supports
certification. Her report and testimony suggested that she based her recommendation on
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her belief that the juvenile programs are inadequate considering the seriousness of
respondent’s offense and the limited time that respondent would remain under juvenile
jurisdiction. However, Dr. Aiken did testify, as noted above, that “ the juvenile program is
equipped to provide [respondent] the necessary programming,” and that “standard
correctional programming in a facility such as Red Wing” is most appropriate for
respondent. Here, again, because the district court’s finding on this factor is support ed by
the record, we conclude that it is not clearly erroneous.
Weighing of Factors
Finally, t he state, relying on its arguments that factors three, five, and six support
certification, asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying its motion to
certify respondent . We disagree. Having concluded that the district court did not clearly
err in its findings on the six public -safety factors, and mindful of our deferential standard
of review, we also conclude that it did not clearly err by finding that respondent rebutted
the presumption of certification. See J.H. , 844 N.W.2d at 35 (stating that appellate court
will not disturb finding on whether public safet y would be served by retaining proceeding
in juvenile court unless it is clearly erroneous). The district court stated that it weighed the
factors, “giving greater weight to the seriousness of [respondent’s] offense and
[respondent’s] prior delinquency re cord,” and found that respondent overcame the
presumption of certification and established that EJJ serves public safety.
We acknowledge that this is a close and difficult question . However, our role as an
appellate court is to correct errors, not to re weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the district court. See Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)
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(reiterating that appellate courts reviewing district court’s findings for clear error may not
reweigh evidence or retry i ssue but only determine whether record supports findings).
Even if we would have come to a different conclusion, if the record “reasonably supports”
the district court’s finding, then “it is immaterial that the record might also provide a
reasonable basis for . . . findings to the contrary.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221- 23 (Minn. 2021) (discussing highly deferential clear -error standard).
Because the district court did not clearly err by finding that respondent met his burden of
showing that EJJ serves public safety, t he district court acted within its discretion by
denying the state’s motion for certification.
Affirmed.