In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. S. and J. H., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0440

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A. S. and J. H., Parents.

Filed September 6, 2022
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Murray County District Court
File No. 51-JV-21-40

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant-mother
A.S.)

Travis J. Smith, Murray County Attorney, Kayla M. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney,
Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent Southwest Health and Human Services)

Bethany Blegen, Marshall, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant-mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by terminating
her parental rights. Because the district court acted within its discretion by determining
that termination is supported by a statutory basis and is in the best interests of the children,
we affirm.
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FACTS
On December 3, 2020, law enforcement conducted a drug raid at the home that
appellant A.S. (mother) shared with her children. During the raid, law enforcement
discovered methamphetamine and methamphetamine paraphernalia stored in the presence
of children and arrested mother. 1 The following day, respondent Southwest Health and
Human Services (the county) filed a child in need of protective services (CHIPS) petition
on behalf of mother’s children, and on December 7, the district court ordered the children
into out-of-home placement. Mother admitted that the children were CHIPS, and on
December 14, the district court adjudicated them as such.
The county developed a case plan with mother, which included a requirement that
mother complete chemical-dependency treatment. In January 2021, mother completed a
chemical-dependency assessment. Mother, however, did not begin chemical-dependency
treatment until June. The treatment program discharged mother following missed intake
appointments, and on June 24, law enforcement arrested mother after she admitted to using
methamphetamine. Later in June, mother enrolled in another treatment program. In
August, mother was admitted to drug court. In September, mother was discharged from
the treatment program when she failed to attend required session s. In October, mother
enrolled in a third treatment program.
On November 8, the county filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights.
The county alleged that four reasons supported termination: mother’s failure to complete

1 Law enforcement subsequently tested the children for methamphetamine; both children
tested positive.
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treatment, her inability to meet the basic needs of her children, her failure to follow the
rules of the child-visitation center, and her failure to maintain sobriety. The petition also
noted the existence of a pending investigation of sexual abuse against mother related to her
behavior around her children.2
On November 20, mother gained housing at a sober group home despite having
previously been discharged from the home. In December, the county approved a plan
allowing the children to live in the group home with mother on a trial home-visit
arrangement. In January 2022, mother was removed from the group home. Because she
was removed from the group home, mother was also discharged from drug court.
In February 2022, the district court held a termination hearing. At the hearing, the
director of the group home testified that mother failed to follow the group-home
requirements and rules, allowed the children (then-ages two and four) to engage in unsafe
behavior, and did not appropriately supervise her children. For example, mother did not
adhere to the group home’s policies, often missing required events and leaving her room
in disarray. Mother also allowed her four-year-old child to smoke a vape pen and laughed
about it before later taking it away. Mother did not put the children in car seats, did not
secure the children in her car with seat belts, and let one of her small children sit in the
front seat of her car. The group home received other complaints about mother’s inadequate
supervision of the children, including witnessed reports of mother sleeping while the
children were still awake. In January 2022, the group-home director gave mother a

2 Specifically, the county was investigating allegations that the mother “engaged in sexual
acts in front of her children knowingly and repeatedly.”
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warning and informed her that another violation of house rules would result in mother
being removed from the program. The next morning, the director went to mother’s room
and observed her room in disarray and mother wanting to take a nap while the children
played around her.
The county social worker who supervised mother’s case also testified. The social
worker explained that the same concerns that existed at the creation of mother’s case plan
remained at the time of the termination hearing. The social worker expressed continuing
concerns about mother’s parenting skills and the safety of the children. The social worker
identified mother’s lack of stable housing, lack of stable employment, failure in drug court,
failure to take parenting-skills classes, and the potential for mother’s incarceration related
to the sex-abuse allegations as reasons why the county did not believe mother could resume
parenting responsibilities in the near future. The social worker concluded that mother was
not in compliance with her case plan.
Mother’s chemical-dependency counselor also testified at the termination hearing,
noting that mother has been actively working to maintain her sobriety and that mother was
in good standing with the program at the time of the hearing. Mother also testified, averring
that she was employed, had been accepted into housing, and desired to be reunified with
her children. Mother specifically disputed the description of events as described by the
group-home director.
In March 2022, the district court terminated mother’s parental rights.
In its order,
the district court found that mother’s description of events at the group home was less
credible than the testimony of events from the director of the group home, which it found
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was credible. The district court found that four statutory grounds existed to justify
termination of mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best
interests. Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by terminating her parental
rights because (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a statutory ground for
termination, and (2) termination was not in the best interests of the children.
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). Whether to terminate parental rights is
discretionary with the district court. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127,
136 (Minn. 2014). A district court may order the termination of parental rights if it (1) finds
by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory condition exists to support termination,
(2) determines that termination is in the child’s best interests, and (3) finds that reasonable
efforts toward reunification were either made or were not req uired.3 Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1 (2020); see also In re Welfare of Child. of
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “We review the termination of parental rights
to determine whether the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether
the district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. In doing so, we “review the district court’s
findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determination of

3 Mother does not argue on appeal that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunify the family.
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whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present
for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn.
App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
I. The district court acted within its discretion by concluding that a statutory
ground existed to terminate mother’s parental rights.

The district court found that four statutory grounds existed to support the
termination of mother’s parental rights: failure to comply with parental duties, palpable
unfitness to parent, failure of reasonable efforts to correct the conditions leading to the
children’s out-of-home placement, and that the children were neglected and in foster care.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8). Mother argues that the district
court clearly erred by making certain findings of fact and abused its discretion by
concluding that the evidence in the record was sufficient to support the statutory grounds
for termination. We disagree.
“[W]e closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it
was clear and convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. “A finding is clearly erroneous if
it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported
by the evidence as a whole.” In re Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). “In applying the clear-error standard, we view the evidence in a light
favorable to the findings. We will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on
the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has bee n
committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation and citation omitted). We must “fully and fairly consider the evidence, but so
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far only as is necessary to determine beyond question that [the evidence] reasonably tends
to support the findings of the factfinder.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen
the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the
record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.”
Id. (quotation omitted). Only one properly supported statutory ground is needed for us to
affirm a termination order. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn.
App. 2012).
The record supports the district court’s determination that mother neglected to
comply with her parental duties. A district court may terminate parental rights if it finds
“that the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to
comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). The requirements of the parent-child relationship
“include[e] but [are] not limited to providing the child with necessary food, clothing,
shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or
emotional health and development, if the parent is physically and financially able.” Id.
“Failure to satisfy requirements of a court-ordered case plan provides evidence of a parent’s
noncompliance with the duties and responsibilities under section 260C.301, subdivision
1(b)(2).” In re Welfare of Child. of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Minn. App. 2012). When
reviewing evidence of a parent’s neglect of their parental duties, we address the conditions
present at the time of termination. In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 603
(Minn. App. 2021) (citing In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980)) ,
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).
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At the time of the termination trial, mother had failed to complete requirements in
her case plan . She did not accept the parenting-skills services provided to her by the
county. Mother also struggled to maintain stable and consistent housing. Despite the
opportunity to live with her children on a trial basis at the group home, mother did not
follow the rules at the group home, did not provide safe or adequate supervision of her
young children, did not maintain a clean living space, and was ultimately removed from
the group home. Mother had exposed her children to methamphetamine and allowed one
of her children to “vape” and reportedly laughed about it. Mother was also reportedly
sleeping in the middle of the day while her two- and four-year-old children played without
supervision and drove her children while using neither car seats n or seat belts for the
children.
Although mother denies that these events occurred, the district court expressly
found her testimony less credible than the group-home director, whose testimony it
expressly found was credible. We do not overturn credibility determinations when
supported, as here, by the factual record. See In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4
(Minn. App. 1992) (stating that we must defer to the district court’s determinations
regarding the weight of evidence and testimony); see also In re Welfare of the Child of
D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. App. 2009) (deferring to a district court’s credibility
determination in a termination-of -parental-rights proceeding). Accordingly, the record
supports the district court’s conclusion that mother is not presently able to properly care
for her children, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s termination of
mother’s parental rights.
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Mother argues that other evidence in the record shows that she did not neglect her
parental duties. She claims she had been accepted to a different housing program that
would allow her to live with her children and that she has maintained her sobriety. But the
record also establishes that mother’s stability is far from certain given her repeated failures
at maintaining housing and the potential sex-abuse charges. And while we commend
mother for her continued sobriety, the record also demonstrates that mother nevertheless
failed to properly care for or supervise the children.
The record reasonably supports the district court’s findings of fact and we discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that those findings of fact show that
mother neglected to comply with her parental duties. Because we conclude that one
statutory ground to support termination exists, we decline to address the other statutory
grounds the district court concluded supported its termination decision. J.K.T. , 814
N.W.2d at 92.
II. The district court acted within its discretion by finding that termination is in
the best interests of the children.

A district court may terminate parental rights only if it is in the children’s best
interests. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. When a statutory basis to terminate parental rights
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1, exists “the best interests of the child must be the
paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. When addressing the best
interests of the children in a termination proceeding, the district court must consider
(1) “the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship,” (2) “the parent’s
interests in preserving the parent-child relationship,” and (3) “any competing interests of
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the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); see In re Welfare of Child. of J.C.L., 958
N.W.2d 653, 656-57 (Minn. App. 2021) (distinguishing best-interests test for termination
matters from best-interests test for non-termination matters), rev. denied (Minn. May 12,
2021). Where the interests of the parent and the child conflict, the interests of the child are
paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. We review a district court’s best-interests
determination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661,
669 (Minn. App. 2020).
Mother summarily argues that the district court made no findings regarding the best
interests of the children. That is incorrect. The district court expressly found that, although
the children and mother love each other and want to be together, the competing interests of
the children’s health and well-being supported termination of mother’s parental rights. The
district court specifically cited the guardian ad litem’s report to support its conclusion ,
noting that the children require a predictable home life with stable and safe housing, a sober
caregiver, and nurturing and consistent care. The guardian ad litem report, along with the
testimony from the social worker, support the district court’s finding that it is not in the
best interests of the children to remain in mother’s care. Thus, we discern no abuse of
discretion.
Affirmed.