Eddie Markeith Frazier, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0441

Eddie Markeith Frazier, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 30, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-17-900

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott Buhler, Assistant County Attorney, Crookston,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order denying his petition for postconviction
relief, appellant argues that his guilty plea was inaccurate. Because appellant’s plea
included a s ufficient factual basis and appellant agreed that the anticipated trial evidence
is sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of the offense , we affirm.
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FACTS
In May 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Eddie Markeith
Frazier with one count of second -degree intentional murder, one count of second -degree
felony murder, and one count of second -degree murder of a person protected by an order
for prote ction. Frazier ultimately entered an Alford plea to one count of second -degree
intentional murder. The state agreed to an executed guideline sentence of 429 months and
to dismiss the remaining counts. 1 In April 2019, the district court sentenced Frazier to 429
months in prison, consistent with the plea agreement. Frazier filed a petition for
postconviction relief in April 2021, arguing that his Alford plea lacked a sufficient factual
basis because he never acknowledged during the plea colloquy that the anticipated trial
evidence was sufficient to prove that he did not act in the heat of passion. The district court
denied the petition, and Frazier appeals.
The following facts summarize the allegations in the complaint, the testimony heard
by the grand jury, and the anticipated trial evidence discussed during Frazier’s Alford plea
colloquy.
The complaint alleged that , on May 3, 2017, police received a 911 call and heard
what sounded like furniture being moved before the call disconnected. Police responde d
to the apartment where Frazier lived with T.R.W., his romantic partner , but no one
answered the door when police knocked. Later that day, police received a request for a

1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the
charged offense because there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant guilty
at trial. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977) (discussing North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)).
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welfare check on T.R.W. and returned to the apartment . Officers entered the apartm ent
and found T.R.W.’s dead body submerged in the bathtub and what appeared to be drag
marks on the floor. An officer spoke with members of T.R.W.’s family, including
T.R.W.’s sister, who said that she had spoken with Frazier . According to T.R.W.’s sister,
Frazier stated that while he was intoxicated, he and T.R.W. got into a heated argument .
Frazier claimed that, d uring the argument, T.R.W. stabbed him. In response, Frazier said
he grabbed T.R.W., “blanked out,” and brought T.R.W. into the bathroom. Believing she
was dead, Frazier told T.R.W.’s sister that he left T.R.W.’s body in the bathroom. The
complaint further alleged that another individual told police that Frazier admitted to killing
T.R.W. and leaving her in the bathtub. According to the summary of Frazier’s criminal
history in the complaint, at the time of these events, Frazier had pending charges for
domestic assault against T.R.W. , and, pursuant to an order in one of those cases, he was
prohibited from having contact with T.R.W.
In November 2017, the state presented testimony from more than a dozen witnesses
to a grand jury. The testimony was generally consistent with the allegations in the
complaint, but it also included additional details. For example, the medical examiner who
performed the autopsy on T.R.W. testified t o the following: T.R.W. died from “homicidal
violence, including asphyxia by strangulation”; death from asphyxia by strangulation takes
about four minutes; T.R.W. had multiple abrasions, contusions, and a laceration to her liver
that had been inflicted shortly before her deat h; T.R.W. did not drown; and T.R.W.’s body
had likely been placed in the bathtub after she died .
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Several of T.R.W.’s family members also testified to the grand jury and they each
described witnessing or hearing about Frazier abusing T.R.W. T.R.W.’s sister also testified
regarding her phone conversation with Frazier on the day of T.R.W.’s death. S he stated
that Frazier kept repeating that he was “sorry” and “didn’t mean to,” and that he told her
he “bear hugged [T.R.W.], [he] grabbed her, [he] just squeezed her so tight until . . . [he]
thought she was faking.” T.R.W.’s daughter stated that she also called Frazier that day,
and that Frazier told her, “I don ’t know why and I’m sorry. It wasn’t supposed to happen
like that.”
The grand jury also heard testimony from police that, after finding T.R.W.’s body,
they received informa tion suggesting that Frazier had withdrawn money from T.R.W.’s
bank account, purchased liquor at a convenience store, and taken T.R.W.’s car. When
police attempted to arrest Frazier, he fled in the car, was shot in the arm, abandoned the
car, fled on foot , and was found hiding in a shed.
At the plea hearing, the district court asked Frazier numerous questions, including
whether he understood the nature of the offense to which he was pleading guilty, the
meaning of an Alford plea, the terms of the agreement, and the rights that he was giving up
by pleading guilty. The district court also inquired whether Frazier thought he had had
sufficient time to discuss the case with his attorneys and whether he was satisfied that his
attorneys had fully advised him . Frazier responded affirmatively to all of these questions.
The prosecutor then asked Frazier several questions to establish a factual basis for
Frazier’s plea. The questions and answers fill 24 pages of transcript. The prosecutor asked
Frazier whether he understood that he was charged with “intentionally, feloniously, and
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unlawfully causing the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person
or another, but without premeditation.” Frazier acknowledged that he di d. Frazier also
agreed that he caused T.R.W.’s death but disputed whether he did so intentionally. The
prosecutor then walked through the state’s evidence that would be presented at trial. The
evidence that the prosecutor described included the following:
1) testimony from two police officers about a prior domestic
assault against T.R.W. by Frazier;
2) a recorded statement from T.R.W. regarding that assault as
well as photographs of T.R.W.’s injuries;
3) a recorded statement from Frazier acknowledging that he
slapped T.R.W.;
4) evidence that Frazier had been charged with assault based on
that incident and that a no -contact order had been issued that
was still in place when T.R.W. was killed ;
5) testimony from another police officer about an additional
prior domestic assault of T.R.W. by Frazier, with another
recorded statement from T.R.W. ;
6) testimony from a 911 dispatcher that the dispatcher had
received a 911 call from T.R.W. on the day that she was
killed and that the call was interrupted;
7) testimony that the dispatcher had received a subsequent 911
call from the same number and that the caller identified
himself as “James Moore” and stated that his granddaughter
had accidentally called 911 ;
8) recordings of both 911 calls and the testimony of multiple
individuals identifying the voices in the two calls belonged
to T.R.W. and Frazier;
9) testimony from police officers that they went to T.R.W.’s
apartment, heard what sounded like furniture being moved,
and did not receive an answer at the door ;
10) testimony from police officers that they found T.R.W.’s body
submerged in the bathtub with what appeared to be drug
paraphernalia and alcohol positioned nearby;
11) testimony from the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy on T.R.W. describing her injuries , opining that the
cause of death was manual strangulation, and explaining that
manual strangulation takes approximately four minutes;
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12) testimony that the evidence suggests that T.R.W. was killed
in the bedroom, that her body was put in the bathtub, and that
the crime scene was staged to look like an accidental death ;
13) evidence that Frazier had accompanied T.R.W. to the
emergency room to treat other injuries earlier that day , and
that the new injuries found on her body had not been present
then;
14) evidence that T.R.W. ’s card was used to withdraw money
after her death and that Frazier had purchased alcohol, taken
T.R.W.’s car, packed his belongings into T.R.W.’s car, and
driven it towards the Twin Cities;
15) testimony from several of T.R.W .’s family members about
conversations they had with Frazier that day in which Frazier
had allegedly told the family members that he killed T.R.W.
accidentally;
16) telephone records showing that Frazier never called
emergency personnel to assist with T.R.W.;
17) evidence that officers attempted to arrest Frazier; that he was
shot in the arm; and that he fled, first at high speed in a car,
and later on foot ;
18) evidence that items including a can of alcohol with a receipt,
two cell phones, T.R.W.’s card which had been used to
withdraw money, and belongings packed up from T.R.W.’s
apartment were found in the car ;
19) a text message sent to Frazier the day of T.R.W.’s death
stating that the family thought Frazier had drowned T.R.W.
and that he should turn himself in;
20) testimony that Frazier told officers after his arrest that he fled
because he possessed controlled substances , and that he di d
not mention T.R.W.;
21) evidence that Frazier had four prior domestic assault
convictions involving two other victims; and
22) testimony from four individuals that they had previously seen
Frazier assault T.R.W. or been told by T.R.W. that Frazier
assaulted her.

The prosecutor asked Frazier whether he understood that the state would present all of this
evidence at trial, and Frazier acknowledged his understanding as to each one, individually.
The prosecutor then asked Frazier:
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Q: Now, knowing all that evidence, do you believe that if a jury
here in Polk County were to see, hear and believe that
evidence, that there’s a substantial likelihood you could be
found guilty, even though you’re presumed innocent and I bear
the burden of proving your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
A. Yep.
Q. And the reason you’re entering your plea is you want to take
advantage of the plea agreement. Correct?
A. Yep.

The prosecutor confirmed the details of the plea agreement with Frazier, who
acknowledged them and again reaffirmed that he had no second thoughts and had had time
to discuss the plea with his attorneys. The prosecutor also asked the district court “to accept
the previous documents that I filed with the court in relation to this matter . . . including
the grand jury transcript, the trial exhibits, as well as some of the documents that were filed
with the pretrial memorandum . . . to find an additional factual basis for this Alford plea,”
and Frazier’s counsel replied that he did not object.
The district court then accepted Frazier’s Alford plea as follows:
THE COURT: Mr. Frazier, in conclusion, you’re confident and
believe a jury hearing that evidence would find you guilty of
second-degree murder?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: I am going to make a finding on the record that
there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of guilty
to murder in the se cond degree, intentional, in violation of
Minnesota Statute 609.19, subdivision 1(1), and that Mr.
Frazier’s plea of guilty to this crime is voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently entered.

. . . .

THE COURT: I have already reviewed the grand jury
transcript and a lot of the evidence, if not all of the evidence,
that has been subject to discovery in this case, Counsel, and I’ll
accept the defendant ’s guilty plea at this time.
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DECISION
Frazier asserts that his guilty plea was inaccurate because he did not acknowledge
that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in
the heat of passion. Because the prosecutor thoroughly described the anticipated trial
evidence and Frazier acknowledged that th is evidence was suffici ent to convict him of
second-degree murder, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied the petition.
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea at any time if “withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn . R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1; see also James v. State ,
699 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 2005) (stating that, after sentencing, a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief). A manifest injustice
occurs if a guilty pl ea is not constitutionally valid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94
(Minn. 2010). A constitutionally valid plea “must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”
Id. “The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious
offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial. To be
accurate, a plea must be established on a proper factual basis.” Id. (citations omitted). The
factual basis must support a conclusion that the defendant’s conduct meets every element
of the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Barnslater v. State, 805 N.W.2d 910,
914 (Minn. App. 2011).
In the context of an Alford plea, which involves an “inherent conflict in pleading
guilty while maintaining innocence,” a particularly “strong factual basis” is required. State
v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007). Additionally, “the court must be able to
9
determine that the defendant, despite maintaining his innocence, agrees that evidence the
State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict.” Id. This agreement can be
ascertained by the defendant’s acknowledgment “on the record at the p lea hearing that the
evidence the State would likely offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying a
reasonable doubt standard, to find the defendant guilty of the offense to which he is
pleading guilty.” Id. The strong factual basis for an Alford plea, coupled with the
defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to convict, must “provide the court
with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant
would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims
of innocence.” Id. A defendant bears the burden of showing that a plea was invalid.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. When reviewing the denial of a petition for postconviction
relief, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, its legal conclusions de
novo, and its ultimate decision for an abuse of discretion. Matakis v. State , 862 N.W.2d
33, 36 (Minn. 2015).
First-degree heat -of-passion manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second -
degree intentional murder. State v. Leinweber, 228 N.W.2d 120, 125 (1975); see also State
v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn. 2006) . When a person “ causes the death of a
human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without
premeditation,” that person is guilty of second -degree intentional murder. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016). When a person “ intentionally causes the death of another
person in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke
a person of ordinary self -control under like circumstances, ” that person is guilty of first -
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degree manslaughter. Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1) (2016). Thus, when a defendant is charged
with second -degree intentional murder, “[o]nce [the] defendant raises a claim of heat of
passion, the burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
heat of passion.” State v. Robinson, 539 N.W.2d 231, 238- 39 (Minn. 1995).
Frazier contends that he needed to specifically acknowledge that the state’s evidence
would have been sufficient to prove the absence of heat of passion at trial. 2 Frazier’s
argument contradicts applicable caselaw, which does not require specific admissions
regarding each element of an offense when making an Alford plea. See, e.g., State v. Ecker,
524 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Minn. 1994) (holding that defendant did not need to express the
requisite intent for the charged crime); see also State v. Klug, 839 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn.
App. 2013) (same). In light of this caselaw , we decline to hold that a defendant must
specifically acknowledge, element-by-element, that the anticipated evidence is sufficient
to prove each element of the offense.

2 In making this argument, Frazier refers to cases addressing when a defendant is entitled
to a jury instruction on a heat -of-passion defense. See, e.g., State v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d
588, 598 (Minn. 2005). For its part, the state argues that the evidence—including Frazier’s
interruption of the 911 call, staging of the crime scene, failure to call for emergency
assistance, and subsequent flight, coupled with the four minutes necessary to manually
strangle T.R.W.—is inc onsistent with heat of passion, and no instruction would have been
required. See State v. Stewart , 624 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2001) (observing that
defendant’s actions were inconsistent with heat of passion because rather than “clouded
reason or weakened willpower,” they demonstrated “a rational, calculating and controlled
emotional state of mind—attempting to avoid detection for the crime he just committed”).
The state also disagrees with Frazier’s characterization of the absence of heat of passion as
an essential element of the offense. In light of o ur decision regarding the applicability of
Ecker and Klug, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding whether a jury
instruction would have been required at a hypothetical trial or whether absence of heat of
passion is an element of second -degree intentional murder.
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The prosecutor l ed Frazier through a colloquy summarizing the anticipat ed trial
evidence and spanning 24 pages . During this colloquy, the prosecutor specifically
described anticipated witness testimony and numerous other pieces of evidence that the
state would introduce at trial, asking Frazier whether he understood each one . Frazier
expressed his understanding as to all of them. The prosecutor also asked the district court
to “accept the previous documents that I filed with the court in relation to this matter . . .
including the grand jury transcript, t he trial exhibits, as well as some of the documents that
were filed with the pretrial memorandum . . . to find an additional factual basis,” and
Frazier did not object. This anticipated evidence, coupled with Frazier’s general agreement
that the evidence is sufficient to convict him of second-degree intentional murder,
“provide[s] the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong
probability that [Frazier] would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty,
notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (Minn. 2007). W e
therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny Frazier’s
petition.
Affirmed.