City of Minneapolis, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0449

City of Minneapolis,
Relator,

vs.

Thomas R. Tichich,
Respondent,

Public Employees Retirement Association of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 5, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Office of Administrative Hearings
File No. 65-6010-36308

Kristyn Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Heather P. Robertson, Assistant City
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)

Ashley Biermann, Derek Stewart, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent Thomas R. Tichich)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kevin Finnerty, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Public Employees Retirement Association of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Relator City of Minneapolis appeals the decision of an administrative law judge
(ALJ) affirming a determination by the Public Employment Retirement Association
(PERA) that respondent, Thomas R. Tichich, a former police officer, has a duty disability
that requires the city to provide continued health insurance coverage under Minnesota
Statutes section 299A.465 (2020). Because the errors of law that the city alleges on appeal
would not affect the ALJ’s determination that the city failed to satisfy its burden of showing
that Tichich did not suffer a duty disability, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal stems from PERA’s 2019 decision to approve Tichich’s application for
duty disability benefits after Tichich was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) caused by traumatic events he experienced while working as a Minneapolis police
officer. When PERA approved Tichich’s application for duty disability benefits, the city
became obligated to pay for Tichich’s health insurance. The city challenges this obligation,
contending that PERA should not have approved Tichich’s benefits application because
Tichich—who was ultimately fired from the police department after being convicted of
criminal sexual conduct—did not have a genuine duty disability. But according to Tichich,
PERA properly approved his benefits application and the ALJ correctly determined after a
three-day hearing that the city failed to satisfy its burden of proving otherwise.
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The ALJ’s decision— which the city now appeals by writ of certiorari—includes
detailed factual findings, which the city does not challenge on appeal. The following
summary of the relevant facts is based on those findings.
Tichich was a Minneapolis police officer for 12 years. From 2007 to 2014, Tichich
served as a patrol officer. Between 2014 and 2016, he was a member of the police
department’s Community Response Team, where he primarily worked on narcotics
investigations.
In December 2016, Tichich was charged with several criminal-sexual-conduct
offenses based on a single incident. The police department initially placed Tichich on paid
administrative leave. But in August 2017, Tichich was assigned to the department’s traffic
investigation unit, where he performed only “non-enforcement duties.” In this position,
Tichich did office work and investigated nonfelony traffic cases that did not involve bodily
injuries or fatalities. Tichich performed well in this position.
As a police officer, Tichich was eligible to apply for PERA disability benefits. Soon
after he was criminally charged, he began the process of applying for such benefits. In
October and November 2017, he met with psychologist Beth Jordan, who specialized in
treating emergency workers, including police. Based on two meetings and some
assessments, Jordan diagnosed Tichich with PTSD. Tichich visited Jordan several times
after this diagnosis. Jordan’s treatment notes do not reflect that she was aware of Tichich’s
pending criminal case.
In March 2018, Tichich met with Dr. Michael Keller—also a psychologist—for a
formal evaluation. During the evaluation, Tichich highlighted several traumatic events that
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he experienced as a police officer between 2014 and 2016, among his many exposures to
homicides, suicides, serious bodily injury assaults, accidents, and situations involving
suspects with guns. He told Dr. Keller that his alcohol consumption significantly increased
after a 2016 incident involving an infant. On March 18, 2018, Dr. Keller diagnosed
Tichich with PTSD, major depression, anxiety disorder, and alcohol abuse disorder caused
by Tichich’s exposure to traumatic events as a police officer. Dr. Keller’s report did not
reference Tichich’s criminal charges.
In March 2018, Tichich’s criminal charges were amended to include more serious
offenses. Due to the more serious charges, the police department again placed Tichich on
paid administrative leave.
In April 2018, a jury found Tichich guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
The police department immediately terminated his employment.
While Tichich was detained in the county jail before sentencing, he was evaluated
by psychiatrist Dr. Sujit Varma. Dr. Varma diagnosed Tichich with PTSD caused by
traumatic events that Tichich experienced as a police officer. According to Dr. Varma’s
report, Tichich’s symptoms began to emerge around 2012, and began to worsen in
September 2016 after an incident involving an infant.
Tichich was sentenced to 36 months in prison. While he was serving his sentence,
and with the assistance of an attorney, Tichich asked the Minneapol is Police Department
to file a first report of injury. See Minn. Stat. § 176.231 (2020 & Supp. 2021) (requiring
an employer to report a serious injury to the commissioner of labor and industry and the
insurer within a specified period from the date of occurrence). Tichich’s attorney identified
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the date of his injury as March 18, 2018—the date of Dr. Keller’s report—and included
Dr. Keller’s psychological evaluation with the request. The police department completed
a first report of injury, which listed the date of injury as March 7, 2018, when Dr. Keller
evaluated Tichich.
On March 26, 2019, Tichich applied to PERA for disability benefits. His
application included the position description of a “recruit police officer,” the reports of
Dr. Keller and Dr. Varma, clinical notes from his visits with Jordan, and the first report of
injury.
After receiving Tichich’s application, PERA sent the city a questionnaire and asked
the city to provide the following documentation:
• Pre-employment physical report
• All First Reports of Injury for [Tichich]
• If the onset of the illness/injury occurred within t he last 2
years, attach a copy of [Tichich]’s position description for the
position held when the applicant became disabled
• If the illness/injury occurred more than 2 years ago, attach a
copy of [Tichich]’s position description for the last 90 days
actually worked.

The city responded to PERA on April 26, 2019, stating that “[w]ithout additional
facts and without access to [Tichich]’s application and medical records” it could not
provide PERA with information about Tichich’s qualifying injury or disease. Moreover,
the city stated, without such information, it could not identify the date of the onset of injury
or illness or “[w]hat job duties [Tichich] is unable to perform due to the disabling
condition.” Although Tichich’s application to PERA included a signed release authorizing
6
PERA to share his medical records with the city, the city did not request his medical records
from PERA, and PERA did not affirmatively share them with the city.
PERA ultimately approved Tichich’s application for disability benefits, determining
that he had a duty disability. Its decision stated:
OFC Tichich suffers from PTSD as a result of exposure
to numerous incidents throughout his career, including, but not
limited to, homicides, suicides, medical calls involving serious
injury or death, serious injury assaults and accidents, and
altercations with suspects.

Exposure to several traumatic incidents throughout his
career as Police Officer are police officer duties that are
inherently dangerous and specific to positions covered by the
Police and Fire Plan. Reporting health care providers indicate
that the disability will last for at least one year; and as a result,
OFC Tichich is eligible for duty disability under Minn. Stat.
§ 353.01, subd. 41.

On May 30, 2019, PERA informed the city that Tichich’s duty disability application
had been approved, which in turn, triggered the city’s statutory duty to pay for Tichich’s
continued health insurance. The city timely filed a petition for review with the Office of
Administrative Hearings and requested a contested-case hearing before an ALJ.
Before the hearing, Tichich—who had been released from prison— participated in
two more psychological evaluations. He hired Dr. Kasey Aleknavicius to evaluate him.
According to Dr. Aleknavicius’s report, it was “reasonable to believe” that Tichich had
PTSD in March 2018, when he was diagnosed by Dr. Keller, and that Tichich’s work as a
police officer, and not his criminal issues, caused the PTSD. Dr. Aleknavicius believed,
based on her review of medical records, that Tichich was “likely” suffering from PTSD in
2016, and he certainly had this condition in 2018 when evaluated by Dr. Varma. But
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Dr. Aleknavicius also opined that Tichich had “gotten better” since 2018. Nonetheless,
she believed that Tichich remained disabled and was unable to perform the duties of a
police officer.
The city retained psychologist Mark Radersdorf to evaluate Tichich. Radersdorf
diagnosed Tichich with adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features and alcohol
abuse disorder in remission. He opined in his report that Tichich’s disorder was related to
the criminal conviction and prison sentence, and not to police work. Radersdorf was also
critical of the earlier evaluations performed by Jordan and Dr. Keller because, among other
things, neither of these professionals considered the impact of the criminal case on
Tichich’s mental health. But Radersdorf agreed with Dr. Varma’s diagnosis of PTSD in
May 2018. Radersdorf believed that Tichich could have performed his duties in the traffic
investigations unit as of March 7, 2018, but not the normal duties of a police officer. He
acknowledged that he could not determine whether Tichich had PTSD in 2016, 2017, or
2018 because he did not evaluate him then. Radersdorf also admitted that he could not
comment about the cause of Tichich’s PTSD at the time of the disability application in
March 2019. He agreed with Dr. Aleknavicius that Tichich no longer had PTSD.
At the hearing before the ALJ, the city presented the testimony of the PERA
employee who processed Tichich’s disability -benefits application and Tichich’s former
supervisor in the traffic-investigations unit. Tichich testified on his own behalf and called
Dr. Aleknavicius. Additionally, the parties introduced multiple exhibits, including each
of Tichich’s psychological evaluations.
8
Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that the city “failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Tichich] did not incur a duty disability.” Thus, the
ALJ concluded, the city is statutorily required to provide Tichich with continued health
insurance coverage.
DECISION
On appeal, the city challenges the final determination that Tichich was duty
disabled, which obligates the city to continue providing Tichich with health insurance
coverage for the duration of the disability. See Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1(b)(3)
(allowing judicial review of “a final determination made by the Office of Administrative
Hearings” regarding an employer’s obligation to provide continued health insurance
coverage to an officer disabled in the line of duty). In considering this appeal, we apply
our standard of review for agency decisions. See In re PERA Salary Determinations
Affecting Retired & Active Emps. of City of Duluth, 820 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Minn. App.
2012) (stating that, because PERA is analogous to an administrative agency, we review
PERA decisions using our standard of review for agency decisions); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 14.63 (2020) (providing a right to judicial review of a final agency decision in a contested
case). The scope of our review of an agency’s decision following a contested-case hearing
before an ALJ is provided by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2020). We may affirm the
agency’s decision or remand for further proceedings. Id. Or we may reverse or modify
the agency’s decision, but only if the petitioner’s substantial rights have been prejudiced
because the decision violates a constitutional provision, exceeds the scope of statutory
authority or the agency’s jurisdiction, is based on unlawful procedure, is affected by an
9
error of law, lacks substantial supporting evidence, or is arbitrary or capricious. Id.; Mass.
Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964) (finding no basis
for reversal “when a mistake of the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing
on the procedure used or the substance of decision reached”); Partners in Nutrition’s
Appeal of Disapproval of Site Expansion in CACFP Program, 904 N.W.2d 223, 231
(Minn. App. 2017) (declining to reverse decision based on nonprejudicial legal error). The
appellate court reviews questions of law de novo. In re Restorff, 932 N.W.2d 12, 18 (Minn.
2019).
The city argues that the ALJ’s final determination—which is binding on the city,
Tichich, and PERA, see Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 1(b)(3) —is affected by two errors
of law. First, the city contends that the ALJ improperly interpreted the statute that obligates
the city to pay for Tichich’s insurance benefits as limiting the scope of an ALJ’s review of
PERA’s initial duty disability determination. Second, and alternatively, the city argues
that the ALJ failed to apply the complete statutory definition of a duty disability and
therefore erred in concluding that Tichich suffered such a disability. We conclude that,
given the ALJ’s factual findings, to the extent the ALJ erred, any error did not impact the
ALJ’s ultimate determination that the city failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Tichich did not have a duty disability.
A. State Statutes Governing Duty Disability Benefits
To understand the city’s arguments, we first consider the applicable state statutes
governing PERA disability benefits. In Minnesota, PERA administers retirement and
disability benefits for governmental employees or public officers who serve governmental
10
employers. See generally Minn. Stat. § 353.01 (2020 & Supp. 2021). 1 Full-time police
officers must participate in PERA’s police and fire plan. See Minn. Stat. § 353.64, subd. 1
(2020). State law dictates the contributions that employees and employers must make to
the police and fire fund. Minn. Stat. § 353.65, subds. 2, 3 (2020).
When a police officer who is a member of PERA suffers a qualifying disability, the
officer is entitled to receive disability benefits during the period of disability. Minn. Stat.
§ 353.656, subd. 1 (2020). PERA offers two primary types of disability benefits to police
officers: “regular” disability benefits and “duty disability” benefits. Minn. Stat. § 353.656,
subds. 1, 3 (2020).
Eligibility for disability benefits is governed by Minnesota Statutes section 353.656
(2020). To qualify for duty disability benefits under that statute, an officer must have a
duty disability as defined by another statute—Minnesota Statutes section 353.01,
subdivision 41. Minn. Stat. § 353.656, subd. 1(a). That statute defines a duty disability as
a physical or psychological
condition that is expected to prevent a member, for a period of
not less than 12 months, from performing the normal duties of
the position held by a person who is a member of the public
employees police and fire retirement plan, and that is the direct
result of an injury incurred during, or a disease arising out of,
the performance of inherently dangerous duties that are
specific to the positions covered by the public employees
police and fire retirement plan.

Minn. Stat. § 353.01, subd. 41. “Normal duties” are further defined as “specific tasks
which are designated in the applicant’s job description and which the applicant performs

1 The 2021 amendments are not relevant here.
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on a day-to-day basis, but do not include less frequent duties which may be requested to be
done by the employer from time to time.” Minn. Stat. § 353.01, subd. 44.
Section 353.656 instructs that the application procedure for disability benefits is set
forth by Minnesota Statutes section 353.031 (2020). Minn. Stat. § 353.656, subd. 8.
Section 353.031, which is entitled “disability determination procedures,” provides that it
“applies to all disability determinations for . . . the public employees police and fire
fund . . . and any other disability determination subject to approval by the [PERA] board,
except as otherwise specified in section . . . 353.656.” Minn. Stat. § 353.031, subd. 1. Of
particular relevance here is subdivision 4, entitled “Additional requirements; eligibility for
police and fire or local government correctional service retirement plan disability benefits.”
Subdivision 4 provides two different application procedures for disability benefits. The
procedure that must be followed depends on the date of the injury or the onset of the illness
that caused the alleged disability in relation to the date that the applicant first applied for
benefits. Minn. Stat. § 353.031, subd. 4(a), (b).
If an application for disability benefits is “filed within two years of the date of the
injury or the onset of the illness that gave rise to the application,” the applicant must include
“evidence that the applicant is unable to perform the duties of the position held by the
applicant on the date of the injury or the onset of the illness causing the disability.” Id. ,
subd. 4(a) (emphasis added). In turn, the employer
must provide evidence indicating whether the applicant is able
or unable to perform the duties of the position held on the date
of the injury or onset of the illness causing the disability, a clear
explanation of any duties that the individual can or cannot
perform, and an explanation of why the employer may or may
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not authorize continued employment to the applicant in the
current or other position.

Id.
On the other hand, if an application is “filed more than two years after the date of
injury or the onset of an illness causing the disability,” the applicant must provide
“evidence that the applicant is unable to perform the duties that were expected to be
performed by the applicant during the 90 days preceding the last day the applicant
performed services for the employer. ” Id., subd. 4(b) (emphasis added). Under these
circumstances, an employer then
must provide evidence of the duties that were expected to be
performed by the applicant during the 90 days preceding the
last day the applicant performed services, whether the
applicant can or cannot perform those duties overall, a clear
explanation of any duties that the applicant can or cannot
perform, and an explanation of why the employer may or may
not authorize continued employment to the applicant in the
current or other position.

Id.
When an applicant’s application for disability benefits is denied under section
353.031, the applicant may “appeal the executive director’s decision to the board of
trustees.” Minn. Stat. § 353.031, subd. 9. The executive director may elect to further
develop the record for the board’s review by directing the applicant to participate in a fact-
finding session with an ALJ or a vocational assessment. Id.
If PERA grants a police officer’s application for duty disability benefits, the officer
is statutorily entitled to continued health care coverage funded by the officer’s employer,
in addition to disability benefits funded by PERA. See Minn. Stat. § 299A.465. The
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requirement for employer-funded health care coverage, which is mandated by Minnesota
Statutes section 299A.465, “applies to any peace officer . . . who [PERA] . . . determines
is eligible to receive a duty disability benefit pursuant to section 353.656.” Id., subd. 1.
An employer can challenge PERA’s determination of disability that triggers the
employer’s obligation to provide continued health care coverage. Section 299A.465 allows
the employer to “petition for a review of the determination by requesting that a contested
case be initiated before the Office of Administrative Hearings.” Minn. Stat. § 299A.465,
subd. 1(b)(2). The ALJ’s decision after a fact-finding hearing is a “final decision” that is
binding on PERA, the officer, and the employer. Id., subd. 1(b)(3). A party may then seek
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. Id.
Following this process, the city has disputed its obligation to provide Tichich the
health insurance coverage mandated by section 299A.465. In the proceedings before the
ALJ, and now on appeal, the city argues that PERA erroneously decided that Tichich had
a duty disability and was eligible for duty disability benefits.
B. The Proceedings Before the ALJ
Before turning to the city’s arguments on appeal, we examine the proceedings
before the ALJ. In the contested case, the city argued to the ALJ that PERA failed to
comply with the application procedures of section 353.031, subdivision 4, which first
required PERA to identify the date of onset of Tichich’s PTSD in relation to his application
for disability benefits, and then required PERA to examine Tichich’s job duties using the
guidelines provided. With its evidence, including the evaluation of its expert psychologist
Radersdorf, the city sought to prove that Tichich was not duty disabled because the onset
14
of his PTSD was more than two years before he applied for disability benefits in March
2019, and he was able to perform the duties that were expected of him as a traffic
investigator during the 90 days preceding his administrative leave and termination by the
city.2 The city contended that the preponderance of the evidence showed that the last
documented work -related event that could have caused Tichich’s PTSD—the incident
involving an infant that Tichich disclosed in his psychological evaluations—occurred in
August 2016, over two years before he applied for disability benefits.
Tichich countered that the city itself did not follow the procedures of section
353.031, subdivision 4 , because it submitted no evidence to PERA and did not seek any
information about Tichich’s disability during the application process. Moreover, Tichich
argued that his application materials to PERA, and the evidence presented during the
contested case, established that his disability occurred in 2018, when he was diagnosed
with PTSD. Based on this timing, Tichich argued, PERA was only required to consider
whether he was incapable of performing the general duties of his police officer position,
and not the specific duties that he performed as a traffic investigator before he was placed
on administrative leave and ultimately terminated.

2 The city acknowledges that, in the proceedings before the ALJ, it bore the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that Tichich did not have a duty disability
and therefore was not eligible for duty disability benefits, including employer-provided
health-insurance coverage. See Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 5 (2021) (providing that in a
contested case before an ALJ, the “party proposing that certain action be taken must prove
the facts at issue by a preponderance of the evidence,” unless otherwise provided by law).
On appeal, the city does not challenge the ALJ’s application of this burden of proof.

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The ALJ determined that whether PERA complied with section 353.031,
subdivision 4, in considering Tichich’s disability application, and whether Tichich was
disabled under the standards set forth in subdivision 4(a) or (b), were questions that were
beyond the scope of the contested case. According to the ALJ, under section 299A.462,
her review was confined to “the duty disability determination, as defined in Minn. Stat.
§ 353.01, subd. 41.” The ALJ stated:
When reviewing a duty disability determination, the legislature
has limited the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s
review to the definition of “duty disability” and the defined
“normal duties” of a police officer. . . . [T]he applicable
review for the contested case hearing is limited to the definition
of duty disability set forth in Minn. Stat. § 353.01, subd. 41.
This definition looks to the “normal duties of the position held”
by the applicant, not the duties that the applicant performed in
the last 90 days of work.

Moreover, the ALJ noted that the statutory definition of “normal duties” in section 353.01,
subdivision 44, simply required her to consider “the job description for a police officer and
the tasks that are normally designated to police officers on the force . . . [and] . . . not the
restricted duties or specific assignments that are in place temporarily.”
The ALJ also made detailed factual findings based on the evidence regarding the
onset, causation, and impact of Tichich’s PTSD. As to the conclusions of the city’s expert,
regarding the onset of Tichich’s PSTD, the ALJ noted that Radersdorf “admitted that it
would not be possible for him to determine whether [Tichich] had PTSD in 2016, 2017, or
2018 because he did not evaluate [Tichich] at that time.” Although Radersdorf “was
critical” of the evaluations by Jordan and Dr. Keller, the ALJ found that he “did not provide
any evidence that [Tichich] did not suffer from PTSD as of March 2018.” The ALJ found
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that Radersdorf “agreed with Dr. Varma’s diagnosis of PTSD in May 2018, and its causal
relation to [Tichich’s] work as a police officer for the city.” And Radersdorf “did not
provide any evidence that [Tichich’s] PTSD symptoms in 2018 were solely caused by
[Tichich’s] criminal issues.” Finally, the ALJ found that Tichich “would have been unable
to perform the normal duties of a police officer in 2018 due to his PTSD.”
Citing to the definition of duty disability in section 353.01, subdivision 41, the ALJ
concluded that the city failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Tichich
did not incur a duty disability within the meaning of that provi sion. Thus, the ALJ
concluded, the city was obligated to provide continued health insurance coverage to
Tichich under section 299A.465, subdivision 1.
C. The City’s Alleged Errors of Law and the ALJ’s Ultimate Determination

Finally, we turn to the city’s arguments on appeal. As noted, the city argues that the
ALJ’s decision was affected by two errors of law. First, the city contends that the ALJ
erred in confining her review of PERA’s decision to the issue of whether Tichich suffered
a duty disability as that term is defined by section 353.01, subdivision 41. According to
the city, the ALJ also should have referred to section 353.031, subdivision 4— which
governs PERA’s decision making—to determine whether Tichich was disabled. Applying
section 353.031, subdivision 4, the city argues, would have required the ALJ to identify
when Tichich began to suffer from PTSD. And because the onset of his PTSD was more
than two years before he applied for disability benefits, the ALJ would then have been
required to determine whether Tichich was unable to perform the duties assigned to him
during his last 90 days of employment, when he was successfully performing his limited
17
duties as a traffic investigator. The city argues that by failing to apply 353.031, subdivision
4, the ALJ deprived it of meaningful review of PERA’s decision and reached the wrong
conclusion as to whether Tichich was duty disabled.
Second, the city argues that, even if the ALJ correctly confined the analysis to
whether Tichich was duty disabled under the definition provided in section 353.01,
subdivision 41, the ALJ ignored an important part of that definition. The city points out
that subdivision 41 requires a determination of whether an applicant can perform the
“normal duties” of the position. See Minn. Stat. § 353.01, subd. 41. And “normal duties”
is further defined by subdivision 44 as “specific tasks” that are “designated in the
applicant’s job description” and “which the applicant performs on a day-to-day basis.”
Minn. Stat. § 353.01, subdivision 44. According to the city, the ALJ applied an overly
broad interpretation of “normal duties” by focusing on “the job description for a police
officer and the tasks that are normally designated to police officers on the force.” The city
contends that by properly focusing instead on what Tichich was actually doing day-to-day
as a traffic investigator in the eight months before he was discharged, the ALJ would have
concluded that he was not duty disabled.
Although the city persuasively presents both legal arguments, we do not reach the
merits of either of them under the circumsta nces here. That is because the ALJ’s factual
findings conclusively establish that the alleged legal errors did not affect the ALJ’s ultimate
determination that the city failed to prove that Tichich did not have a duty disability. Even
assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ should have applied section 353.031, subdivision
4, to determine whether Tichich had a duty disability or should have focused on Tichich’s
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day-to-day tasks during his eight months as a traffic investigator, given the ALJ’s factual
findings, the alleged legal errors did not affect the final decision.
As to the city’s argument concerning the ALJ’s failure to apply section 353.031,
subdivision 4, the ALJ’s factual findings show that she would have reached the same
conclusion even if she had applied this section. The ALJ found that the city’s evidence did
not pinpoint when Tichich began to suffer PTSD or show that his PTSD was caused by his
criminal case. And the ALJ found that the evidence did establish that Tichich had PTSD
in 2018, that Tichich’s inherently dangerous work as a police officer caused his PTSD, and
that he could not perform the duties of his position as a police officer. Because, according
to the ALJ’s factual findings, (1) Tichich’s application for disability benefits was filed
within two years of the date of his injury or the onset of his illness, (2) Tichich established
that he was unable to perform the duties of the position he held on the date of the injury or
the onset of the illness, and (3) Tichich’s disability was caused by his duties as a police
officer, he would have qualified for duty disability benefits under section 353.031,
subdivision 4(a). Thus, even under section 353.031, subdivision 4, the ALJ’s factual
findings support the legal conclusion that Tichich was duty disabled.
Likewise, any error in the ALJ’s interpretation of the term “normal duties” in
353.01, subdivision 41, did not affect the ALJ’s ultimate determination that the city failed
to prove that Tichich was not duty disabled. The ALJ found that the city did not prove
when Tichich began to suffer from PTSD. Therefore, in considering the normal duties of
Tichich’s position as a police officer, the ALJ was not required to limit her analysis to
Tichich’s day-to-day duties as a traffic investigator—a position he held only between
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August 2017 to March 2018. Moreover, as the ALJ found, even the city’s own expert
agreed that Tichich would not have been able to perform the normal duties of a police
officer in 2018 due to PTSD.
Given the ALJ’s factual findings, neither of the city’s alleged errors of law affected
the ALJ’s decision. Thus, in accordance with our limited standard of review, see Minn.
Stat. § 14.69, we must affirm the decision. See Mass. Trs., 377 U.S. at 248; Partners in
Nutrition, 904 N.W.2d at 231.
Affirmed.