State of Minnesota, Respondent

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0453

State of Minnesota,
Respondent

vs.

Corey Duane Warner,
Appellant

Filed January 17, 2023
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-20-876

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Carlotta Navarrette, Assistant County Attorney,
Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this direct appeal of the judgment of conviction for fifth-degree drug possession
and unlawful transportation of a firearm, appellant argues (1) he is entitled to a new trial

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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because the jury was not asked to find facts necessary to enhance the severity of the drug-
possession offense to a felony, and (2) the evidence was insufficie nt to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knew he was transporting a firearm. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2020, a Lyon County deputy sheriff stopped appellant Corey Duane
Warner for speeding. After approaching the vehicle, the deputy could smell “the fresh odor
of marijuana” coming from inside Warner’s vehicle. The deputy asked Warner how much
marijuana he had, and Warner said he had “a little bit” inside a grinder. The deputy
searched the vehicle and found two THC vape cartridges, an uncased and unloaded 12-
gauge shotgun in the backseat area, cash, and a small amount of marijuana inside the
grinder. The deputy arrested Warner.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Warner with felony fifth-degree possession
of a controlled substance, illegal transportation of a firearm, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
The deputy and a forensic scientist for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension testified at the jury trial, and the jury found Warner guilty of all three
charges.
At sentencing, the district court stayed adjudication on the felony fifth-degree
possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense, entered convictions on the other tw o
offenses, ordered 45 days of jail time, and placed Warner on probation. One month later,
the state filed a probation violation report alleging that Warner “[f]ail[ed] to report to jail”
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at the date and time required as part of his sentence. The district court found that Warner
violated his probation.
The district court revoked the stay of adjudication on the felony fifth-degree
possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense, entered a conviction, stayed imposition of a
felony sentence, and reinstated probation. Warner appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court’s plain error did not affect Warner’s substantial rights.

Warner argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court did not
instruct the jury to make a finding as to the amount of controlled substance that he
possessed, which is required to prove felony fifth-degree possession. The state concedes
that the “jury instruction did not include an instruction regarding the weight of the mixture”
but argues that it “proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the weight of the oil contained in
only one of the cartridges was felony level.”
“We review unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error.” State v. Reek, 942
N.W.2d 148, 158 (Minn. 2020). Warner’s counsel specifically stated, “I have no
objections” to the jury instruction at issue. “Under the plain-error doctrine, an appellant
must show that there was (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that the error affected his
substantial rights.” Id. at 158-59. “An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is
typically established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.”
State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Under Minnesota law, fifth-degree possession becomes a felony if the state proves
that the amount of the controlled substance possessed was 0.25 grams or more. Minn. Stat.
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§ 152.025, subd. 4(a) (2020). Here, the district court did not instruct the jury on this
element of the felony-level offense, and the state does not contend that it did. Questions
of fact “must be submitted to the jury.” See State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Minn.
2005); see also State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 30 (Minn. 2013). Therefore, it was plain
error for the district court not to do so. See Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 787. However, the
state argues that this error does not require reversal because it “proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the weight of the oil contained in only one of the cartridges was felony level.”
“A plain error affects the substantial rights of the defendant when there is a
reasonable likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.” State v. Matthews,
800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “The defendant bears the burden
of persuasion on this third prong. We consider this to be a heavy burden.” State v. Griller,
583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998). We “may consider, among other factors, whether:
(1) the defendant contested the omitted element and submitted evidence to support a
contrary finding, (2) the [s]tate submitted overwhelming evidence to prove that element,
and (3) the jury’s verdict nonetheless encompassed a finding on that element.” Watkins,
840 N.W.2d at 29. “The court’s analysis under the third prong of the plain error test is the
equivalent of a harmless error analysis.” Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634.
Warner argues that “[t]he state’s evidence wasn’t exactly overwhelming” because
the forensic scientist “simply weighed the liquid in one of the cartridges” and “[t]he jury’s
verdict did not encompass a finding regarding weight.” We are not persuaded.
Here, the jury found credible the evidence regarding the testing and composition of
THC liquid mixture when it found Warner guilty. The forensic scientist testified, and the
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state provided her report indicating the same, that the weight of THC liquid mixture in just
one of the vape cartridges was 0.545 grams +/- 0.10 grams, which is well over the 0.25
grams needed to prove a felony -level offense. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a).
Moreover, this did not include the weight of the liquid in the second cartridge. Therefore,
the plain error did not affect Warner’s substantial rights because there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634.
II. The state presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Warner knew he was transporting a firearm.

Warner argues his conviction must be reversed because the statute under which he
was convicted does not have a mens rea requirement, our court must read a knowledge
requirement into the statute, and the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew he
was transporting a firearm.
“Because the meaning of a criminal statute is intertwined with the issue of whether
the [s]tate proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the statute, it is
often necessary to interpret a criminal statute when evaluating an insufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim.” State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017). “We review issues
of statutory interpretation de novo.” Id. Whether a defendant’s conduct meets the
definition of a particular offense presents a question of statutory interpretation that is also
reviewed de novo. State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013).
When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, “[t]he verdict will not be
overturned if the fact-finder, upon application of the presumption of innocence and the
[s]tate’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have
6
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263
(Minn. 2016). As a reviewing court, we undertake “a painstaking analysis of the record to
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
When a jury is the fact-finder, we assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted). We apply this traditional standard of review “whenever the
direct evidence establishing a particular element of a crime is alone sufficient to support
the jury verdict.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). “When the direct
evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict,” we
apply the heightened two-step circumstantial-evidence standard of review. Id.
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the fact[-]finder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step
to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id. When reviewing challenges
to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, appellate courts apply a two-step analysis in
which they “identify the circumstances proved and independently consider the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from those circumstances, when viewed as a whole.” Id. at
598; see also State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013).
When identifying the circumstances proved, appellate courts “defer to the jury’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598-
7
99 (quotation omitted). First, “we construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the
defense witnesses.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). When considering “whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt,” we view the circumstances proved “not as isolated facts,
but as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, we independently “determine whether
the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt, not simply whether the inferences that point to guilt are
reasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We give no deference to the fact[-]finder’s choice
between reasonable inferences.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must
form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt
of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other
than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Minnesota law provides that a firearm may not be transported “in a motor vehicle
unless the firearm is . . . unloaded and in a gun case expressly made to contain a firearm,
and the case fully encloses the firearm by being zipped, snapped, buckled, tied, or
otherwise fastened, and without any portion of the firearm exposed.” Minn. Stat.
§ 97B.045, subd. 1(1) (2020). Though the statute provides several exceptions to that
general prohibition, see id., subds. 2, 3(a) (2020), the law is silent as to any mens rea
requirement, such as whether the defendant knew he was transporting the firearm. See id.,
subd. 1.
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“In general, criminal offenses require both a volitional act and criminal intent,
referred to as mens rea.” State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. 2021) (citing
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law, § 5.1, at 253 (5th ed. 2010)). “Mens rea is the element
of a crime that requires the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.” State
v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “If a criminal statute
does not require the defendant to know the facts that make the conduct illegal, the crime is
considered to be a strict liability offense.” Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d at 419 (citing Ndikum,
815 N.W.2d at 818).
Warner does not argue that Minn. Stat. § 97B.045, subd. 1(1), contains an explicit
mens rea element. Instead, he argues that we must read a mens rea element into the statute.
Warner relies on several cases for his argument, including Schwartz. But Schwartz is
inapposite.
In Schwartz, the supreme court explained that there is a “long established principle
of American criminal jurisprudence that in common law crimes and in felony level offenses
mens rea is required.” Id. It further explained that, particularly for “gross misdemeanor
and felony liability,” our courts are “guided by the public policy that if criminal
liability . . . is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to
do so should be clear.” Id. (quotation omitted). But Warner’s case is distinguished because
it involves a misdemeanor, not a felony or gross misdemeanor. And the cases that Warner
cites all involve felonies or gross misdemeanors. See id. at 417 (gross misdemeanor); In
re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 803 (Minn. 2000) (felony); Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d
9
at 818 (gross misdemeanor to potential felony); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618
(1994) (felony).1
Warner’s case is like State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 2000). Loge involved
a “question of whether knowledge is an element of the crime under the open bottle law
when the driver is the sole occupant of a motor vehicle.” 608 N.W.2d at 153. Loge
maintained that he did not know there was an open bottle with alcohol in the vehicle he
borrowed from his father, and raised the same argument presented here. Id. at 153-54.
The supreme court analyzed the statute as a whole to determine whether the
legislature intended to impose strict liability. Id. at 156 (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2)).2
Ultimately, the supreme court held that it was “clear from reading the statute as a whole
that the legislature intended to categorically prohibit open bottles of alcohol in a motor
vehicle on a public road except under the limited circumstances that the legislature
expressly addressed and carved out.” Id. We reach a similar conclusion.
The statute at issue, Minn. Stat. § 97B.045, subd. 1, first provides that “[a] person
may not transport a firearm in a motor vehicle unless” one of three enumerated conditions

1 Citing C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 805, and Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 818, Warner argues that
we may turn to “the legislative history” in this analysis. This misstates what the supreme
court did in those cases. In C.R.M., the supreme court turned to the legislative history of
the statute only after it determined that the statute’s terms at issue were not defined in the
statute and dictionary definitions provided “little guidance.” 611 N.W.2d at 805. In
Ndikum, the supreme court did not review the statute’s legislative history to ascertain the
legislature’s intent, it merely reviewed the statute’s policy statement and the statute as a
whole. 815 N.W.2d at 819-22. Here, there is no question as to the language of the statute.
2 “In ascertaining the intention of the legislature, the courts may be guided by the following
presumptions,” specifically, “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and
certain.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2022).
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exist, which do not exist here. The statute then provides two broad exceptions, which do
not apply here, for persons with disabilities and for hunting and shooting ranges. Minn.
Stat. § 97B.045, subds. 2, 3. Similar to Loge, from reading the statute as a whole, it is clear
that the legislature intended to categorically prohibit the transport of firearms “except under
the limited circumstances that the legislature expressly addressed and carved out. ” 608
N.W.2d at 156. The legislature provided three enumerated conditions by which a person
may transport a firearm, and then carved out two exceptions to the statute’s applicability.
Minn. Stat. § 97B.045 . Therefore, we conclude that the legislature understood that the
statute imposed a strict prohibition, it understood how to carve out exceptions to that
prohibition, and it chose to draft the statute as a strict-liability offense.
But even assuming arguendo that Minn. Stat. § 97B.045 has a mens rea element,
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that Warner knew he was transporting
a firearm in his vehicle, particularly when we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599.
The state proved the following circumstance via the deputy’s testimony. During the
stop, Warner stated that he thought the manner in which he was transporting the shotgun
“was legal” because “it was unloaded in the backseat.” Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict, the legitimate inference drawn from this
circumstance proved is that Warner knew he was transporting an uncased shotgun in the
backseat area of his vehicle, but he incorrectly believed that he was doing so in a lawful
manner.
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The circumstances proved are also consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Id. Warner argues that, because the only evidence
presented was the deputy’s testimony, “[t]he circumstances proved are also consistent with
the rational hypothesis that Warner did not know he was transporting the shotgun.” But
this would require the jury to believe that Warner attempted to justify possessing a gun
which he did not previously know was in his vehicle rather than deny that it was his or that
he knew it was there. This is not a reasonable inference. The only reasonable inference
from Warner’s explanation is that he knew he was transporting an uncased shotgun in the
backseat area of his vehicle, but he incorrectly understood the law. Ignorance or mistake
of law is generally not a defense unless knowledge of the law is an element of the offense,
such as when the offense requires that the offender knowingly violate the law. State v.
Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 30 (Minn. 2013); see also State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603
(Minn. 2017). After examining the record, the circumstances proved form a complete
chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the Warner’s guilt “as to
exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted).
Affirmed.