In the Application of Jose Luis Gutierrez for a change of legal name to Lazarus Twist.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0456

In the Application of Jose Luis Gutierrez
for a change of legal name to Lazarus Twist.

Filed December 19, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-21-336

Jose Luis Gutierrez, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent Dakota County)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jill Gerber, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his application for a name change. We conclude
that (1) denial of the name change does not burden the exercise of appellant ’s religious
beliefs and maintains the state’s compelling interest in public safety , and (2) the district
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant did not meet his burden to
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prove that the name change will not compromise public safety. For those reasons, we
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jose Luis Gutierrez was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (MSOP) indeterminately as a sexually dangerous person and as a sexual
psychopathic personality in 2018. In re Civ. Commitment of Gutierrez, No. A18-1290,
2018 WL 6729833 (Minn. App. Dec. 24, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2019).
Gutierrez’s criminal history includes felony convictions for terroristic threats and twice
violating domestic-abuse orders for protection in Dakota County; third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, terroristic threats, and false imprisonment in Ramsey County; and
fifth-degree assault and false imprisonment in Hennepin County.
In February 2021, Gutierrez applied to the district court to legally change his name
to Lazarus Twist. Respondent Dakota County filed an objection to the name change on the
bases that the name change was being made with the intent to defraud or mislead and would
compromise public safety. Respondent Ramsey County also filed an objection on the same
grounds as Dakota County. Gutierrez filed a written response to the counties’ objections.
In November 2021, Gutierrez represented himself at a hearing on the matter and
argued that his name-change request was made in good faith and with no intent to defraud
or mislead. He further argued that there was “no legitimate governmental interest” in the
counties’ objections on the basis of public safety because he is detained in a secure
treatment facility and will only be released if a court deems him not to be a risk to the
public. Gutierrez described his request as a “religious name change” and argued that denial
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of the request would violate his “constitutional rights to be recognized as a new person and
in spirit.” He explained that the first name is a reference to “Lazarus” as a signifier of
coming back from the dead that is contained in the Bible, the holy scripture of the Christian
religion. He explained that the last name, Twist, is both an “acronym” for “the will of
supreme truth” and a reference to the literary character Oliver Twist from a novel by
Charles Dickens. The counties waived their appearance at the hearing.
Following the hearing, the district court denied Gutierrez’s name-change
application, filing an order with a memorandum of its findings. Gutierrez appeals.
DECISION
A convicted felon’s name-change request is governed by statute. Minn. Stat.
§ 259.13 (2022). Under the statute, a prosecuting authority that obtained a conviction of
the person seeking the name change has the right to object to the request on the basis that
it (1) aims to defraud or mislead, (2) is not made in good faith, (3) will cause injury to a
person, or (4) will compromise public safety. Id., subd. 2. The burden then falls to the
person requesting the name change to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
request “is not based upon an intent to defraud or mislead, is made in good faith, will not
cause injury to a person, and will not compromise public safety.” Id., subd. 3. The statute
requires, however, that the district court must grant the name change “if failure to allow it
would infringe on a constitutional right of the person.” Id., subd. 4.
This court generally reviews a district court’s denial of a name change for an abuse
of discretion. In re Welfare of C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. App. 1994). But the
question of whether denying a name-change application infringes on a constitutional right
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is reviewed de novo. See State v. Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d 368, 372-73 (Minn. App. 2004),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004) (stating that we review de novo whether a statute is
unconstitutional as applied).
Gutierrez argues that the district court (1) erred by failing to consider his protected
constitutional right to freely express his religion through his name change and (2) abused
its discretion by determining that he failed to meet his burden to prove that his name change
will not compromise public safety. We review each issue in turn.
I. The district court properly considered the Hill-Murray factors to determine
that denying Gutierrez’s name change did not violate his constitutional rights.

Gutierrez first argues that the district court erred because it “failed to consider” the
four-factor compelling-state-interest balancing test and whether his religious beliefs were
sincerely held. We disagree.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect the right to practice one’ s
religion. U.S. Const. amend. I; Minn. Const. art. I, § 16. To determine if that right has
been violated, Minnesota courts apply the compelling-state-interest balancing test.
Hill-Murray Fed’n of Tchrs. v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
The balancing test has four prongs: (1) whether the religious belief is “sincerely held”;
(2) “whether the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious beliefs”; (3) “whether
the state interest in the regulation is overriding or compelling”; and (4) whether the
regulation “uses the least restrictive means.” Id.
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The district court’s order addressed each of the balancing test’s four prongs. First,
the district court found Gutierrez’s religious beliefs to be sincere, 1 stating that it
“assume[d]” as much because Gutierrez stated that the requested name change is based on
his religious practice. The district court noted Gutierrez’s explanation of the religious
references contained within the chosen name and observed that his “degree of thought and
knowledge was impressive.”
In addressing the second prong, however, the district court found that Gutierrez
failed to show how denial of his request burdens his exercise of his religious beliefs.
Specifically, Gutierrez provided no evidence demonstrating that he “must change his name
to ‘Lazarus Twist’” in order to “practice his religion as he desires.”
Those challenging the application of a law under the second Hill- Murray factor
“have the burden of establishing that challenged provisions infringe on their religious
autonomy or require conduct inconsistent with their religious beliefs.” Edina Cmty.
Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 204 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 29, 2008). Gutierrez’s written response to the counties’ objections alleges that his
“religious beliefs are embedded in his name change,” and although he argued that denying
the request would infringe on his right to be “recognized as a new person and in spirit,” he

1 Gutierrez seems to argue on appeal that the presence of a sincerely held religious belief
is an overriding factor or one that is weighted more heavily in the balancing test. Gutierrez
cites no relevant authority for this proposition; rather, he directs us to cases such as Fifth
Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2002), and Patrick v.
LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984), in which the issue of a sincerely held religious belief
was contested, and in which the factual circumstances and legal issues differ from those
here.
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bases this assertion on the facts that he “really like[s]” his new name and that it “has a very
deep meaning.” Beyond this, Gutierrez provides no examples of how denial of his name
change requires conduct inconsistent with his religion or risks interference with his
religious beliefs or practice. See Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 866 (stating that remote
assertions of interference with religious autonomy are insufficient to establish a burden on
religious exercise). Thus, Gutierrez’s name -change request fails to satisfy the second
prong of the Hill-Murray compelling-state-interest balancing test.
Further, o n the third prong, the district court found the state’s interest to be
overriding and compelling due to the public’s interest in ensuring that information about
Gutierrez’s criminal history is readily available. In so finding, the district court looked to
Gutierrez’s “serious history of felony-level offenses spread out over a decade.” The record
supports the district court’s finding here.
Appellate courts have upheld a district court’ s recognition of a compelling public
interest in maintaining a defendant’s record of violence. See , e.g., State v. Ambaye,
616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000). Gutierrez has multiple convictions that span many
years for violent offenses including criminal sexual conduct, assault, terroristic threats,
false imprisonment, and violations of orders for protection. Additionally, in an earlier case
in which we affirmed Gutierrez’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person and as
a sexual psychopathic personality, we concluded that the evidence supported the district
court’s finding that Gutierrez is likely to reoffend and is dangerous to others. Gutierrez,
2018 WL 6729833, at *5-6. The state has a compelling interest in public safety that is
implicated if Gutierrez is permitted to change his legal name to Lazarus Twist because the
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name change will make it more difficult to access records of his criminal history. We
conclude that the district court properly considered this compelling interest and determined
it to be overriding when denying Gutierrez’s name-change application.
On the fourth and final prong, the district court found that no less-restrictive
alternative exists. The only options available under the statute are to grant or deny the
name change.
2 Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subds. 3, 4. In sum, we conclude that the district
court considered the four-factor balancing test as required and that denial of the name
change does not impermissibly infringe on Gutierrez’s constitutional rights because it does
not burden his exercise of his religious beliefs, the state’s interest in protecting public safety
is compelling and overriding, and no less-restrictive means other than denying the request
are available.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Gutierrez
failed to meet his burden to prove that his name change will not compromise
public safety.
Gutierrez further argues that the district court should have found that he met his
burden to prove that his name change should be granted over the counties’ objections. We
review a district court ’s denial of a name change for an abuse of discretion. C.M.G.,
516 N.W.2d at 561. “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that
are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is

2 Gutierrez argues that the district court improperly “injected itself” in the matter by stating
in the order that “[p]erhaps if Applicant can remain crime free for several more years this
can be revisited.” We understand this statement to refer to the fact that there is no statutory
restriction on Gutierrez’s ability to apply to change his legal name at another time and
under other circumstances when he may be able to meet his statutory burden. See Minn.
Stat. § 259.13, subd. 3.
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against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.
2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)).
Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 3, prohibits a district court from granting a name change
over the objection of the prosecuting authority unless the person seeking the name change
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the request (1) is not based on an intent to
defraud or mislead, (2) is made in good faith, (3) will not cause injury to a person, and
(4) will not compromise public safety. Here, the district court found that Gutierrez did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the name change will not cause harm to a
person and will not compromise public safety. It therefore determined that Gutierrez did
not meet his statutory burden.
Gutierrez first argues that the counties did not provide proof to support their
objection on the basis that granting his name change will compromise public safety.
Gutierrez misunderstands how section 259.13 operates. Under the statute, once an
objection is filed, the burden to prove that the change will not compromise public safety is
placed on the person requesting the name change. Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 3. Thus, the
burden was on Gutierrez rather than the counties. Gutierrez goes on to assert that he met
his burden, “showing by clear and convincing evidence that [his] name-change request is
not based on an impermissible factor.” Our review of the record does not support this
claim.
At the hearing, Gutierrez testified that because he is detained indefinitely at MSOP,
he does not pose a public-safety concern. The district court considered in its order that
Gutierrez is currently committed to a secure facility but recognized that Gutierrez’s status
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could change. In contesting the counties’ objections, Gutierrez did not provide any other
evidence to the district court showing that the requested name change will not compromise
public safety.3 The district court reviewed the history and nature of Gutierrez’s offenses
in finding that Gutierrez did not meet his “relatively heavy burden,” a finding that is
supported by the record. We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that Gutierrez did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that changing
his name to Lazarus Twist will not compromise public safety and in subsequently denying
his name-change application.
Affirmed.

3 On appeal, Gutierrez asserts that we “should be convinced” he will “identify himself as
both ‘Lazarus Twist’ and his current name going forward.” However, Gutierrez made no
such assertion below. Further, Gutierrez’s reply brief introduces the assertion that requests
for name changes by other clients who are committed to MSOP have been granted. Any
such information is not included in the record, was not argued below, and is therefore
outside the scope of our review. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)
(stating appellate courts generally will not consider matters not argued to and considered
by the district court); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 3 (the reply brief must
be confined to new matter raised in respondent’s brief); Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v.
Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010) (stating that generally, issues not raised or
argued in appellant’s principal brief cannot be raised in a reply brief).