Husky Construction, Inc., Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0467

Husky Construction, Inc.,
Respondent,

vs.

Gestion G. Thibault, Inc. a/k/a E2SH,
Appellant.

Filed December 5, 2022
Reversed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-21-1740

Courtney J. Ernston, Minnesota Construction Law Services, PLLC, Vadnais Heights,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Richard R. Voelbel, Zachary Alter, Felhaber Larson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
In examining the sufficiency of contacts with the forum state to determine the
existence of specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, we generally focus
on those contacts leading up to and surrounding the accrual of the cause of action.

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OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
This interlocutory appeal follows an unsuccessful challenge to the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction by a Minnesota court over a Canadian company that
completed a single business transaction with a Minnesota company. We reverse the district
court’s denial of the Canadian company’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction because Minnesota’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the
Canadian company would violate due process.
FACTS
This matter relates to the advertisement and sale of a piece of equipment known as
a Finn T330 hydroseeder. Appellant Gestion G. Thibault, Inc., also known as E2HS
(E2HS), advertised the hydroseeder and respondent Husky Construction, Inc. (Husky)
purchased the hydroseeder. In this action, Husky asserts various claims against E2HS
related to its allegation that the hydroseeder was not in good working condition as
represented and warranted by E2HS. E2HS moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
specific personal jurisdiction, and the district court denied that motion. E2HS appeals the
denial of its motion to dismiss. The record contains the following allegations and facts
pertinent to jurisdiction.
E2HS is a Canadian company registered to conduct business in Quebec, Canada.
E2HS has only one physical location, in Becancour, Quebec. E2HS has no employees or
officers outside of Quebec. The vast majority of E2HS’s business occurs in Eastern
Canada. E2HS has no operations in Minnesota. E2HS has never had any operations in
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Minnesota. Before the transaction at issue in this case, E2HS had never transacted business
in Minnesota or with a Minnesota company. E2HS does not have any assets in Minnesota.
E2HS advertises inventory in Machinery Trader, Eastern Canada magazine, also
known as MarketBook Eastern Canada (Machinery Trader). Machinery Trader also has
a website, and E2HS inventory advertised in the magazine is also published on the
magazine’s website.
In April 2020, E2HS advertised the hydroseeder with Machinery Trader. The
advertisement was published on the magazine’s website. The website advertisement
contains a toll-free number provided by the magazine. Calls to the toll-free number are
forwarded to E2HS. Husky, a Minnesota entity, viewed the advertisement on the internet
and decided to contact E2HS using the toll-free number.
On April 29, 2020, Husky initiated a call to E2HS to inquire about the hydroseeder.
E2HS answered the call in French. E2HS responded that it would call Husky back “to
discuss the posting.” E2HS returned the call to Husky. Husky asked for some new pictures
of the hydroseeder, and E2HS sent the requested photos to Husky. The photos depicted a
truck attached to the hydroseeder. Husky asked E2HS if the truck was also available.
E2HS informed Husky that “the listed price was just for the hydroseeder tank and did not
include the price of the attached truck” depicted in the photos. Husky and E2HS discussed
the condition of the hydroseeder as refurbished. The parties discussed shipping and
customs. At the conclusion of the call, E2HS informed Husky that it would obtain certain
shipping and customs cost estimates. At some point, E2HS also described the truck to
Husky.
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E2HS returned the call to Husky with a shipping cost estimate and inquired if Husky
was still interested in completing a purchase. Husky said it was interested in a purchase of
the hydroseeder and truck and desired “to move forward with the sale documents.”
Thereafter, the parties exchanged an unspecified number of emails and telephone
calls. On May 1, the parties exchanged several calls regarding when shipment would occur
and an inspection of the hydroseeder. The record does not indicate who initiated these
calls. That same date, E2HS sent an email stating, “Thanks for your order.” E2HS also
told Husky “[ t]o proceed with US Customs, we need your FED ID # and complete
detail[]ed business information. (ad[d]ress, contact, etc. . . .).” Husky responded with
shipping details, federal identification for customs, and contact information.
On May 4, E2HS emailed Husky that it would “have the invoice and bank info
provide[d] to you later today.” E2HS later responded to an inquiry from Husky about
delivery time with details of its ongoing repair of the hydroseeder. E2HS then sent to
Husky an order confirmation and wire instructions.
On May 6, Husky wired the purchase funds to E2HS. Periodically during May, the
parties discussed the condition of the hydroseeder, and E2HS notified Husky of progress
on repairs. On June 3, E2HS sent the hydroseeder and truck to Husky in Minnesota. No
E2HS employees traveled to Minnesota in connection with this sale.
Husky alleges that the hydroseeder immediately malfunctioned. Husky brought the
hydroseeder to an authorized repair dealer for inspection and was advised that the
equipment was not as represented by E2HS. Husky specifically alleges that the
hydroseeder was not refurbished, that most of the component parts needed replacement,
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and that repairs would cost several thousand dollars. In July, Husky notified E2HS of the
necessary repairs, and E2HS requested more information from Husky, stating it would
“help you in that manner.” Husky claims to have spent $81,857.18 in costs associated with
the allegedly defective hydroseeder.
The district court denied E2HS’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
because it determined that “E2HS’s contacts with Husky are sufficient in this matter to
establish the Court’s personal jurisdiction over E2HS.” This interlocutory appeal follows.
ISSUE
Would Minnesota’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over E2HS violate due
process?
ANALYSIS
E2HS argues that the district court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for lack of
specific personal jurisdiction because E2HS lacks the necessary connection to Minnesota
as the forum state to satisfy due-process requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Personal jurisdiction refers to “the court’s power to exercise control over the
parties.” Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979). “The requirement
that a court have personal jurisdiction flows . . . from the Due Process Clause” of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). The Due Process Clause
“limits the ability of a state to exercise its coercive power by asserting jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants.” Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn.
2019) (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017)).
6
The personal jurisdiction of Minnesota courts over a nonresident defendant is
governed by Minnesota’s long-arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19 (2020), which “extend[s]
the personal jurisdiction of Minnesota courts as far as the Due Process Clause of the federal
constitution allows.” Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn.
1992). The long-arm statute “prevents personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
if it would vio late fairness and substantial justice.” Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749
(quotation omitted). In evaluating whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process such that a party may be required to defend claims in
Minnesota, we “may s imply apply the federal case law” regarding personal jurisdiction.
Id. (quotation omitted); Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 2016).
A state may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless
the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state and maintenance of the action “does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, Off. of Unemployment Compensation & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quotation omitted). A nonresident defendant has the requisite “minimum contacts” with
Minnesota if it “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of conducting business in
Minnesota such that it “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-78 (1985) (quotations omitted).
Two types of personal jurisdiction exist: general personal jurisdiction and specific
personal jurisdiction. Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn.
1995). General personal jurisdiction relates to “contacts unrelated to the litigation”
including “domicile or continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state.” Rilley,
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884 N.W.2d at 327 n.7 (quotation omitted). Specific personal jurisdiction may arise when
“the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are limited, yet connected with the plaintiff’s
claim such that the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”
Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 30. Only specific personal jurisdiction is at issue here.
We analyze five factors in evaluating whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice embedded in the due-
process guarantee: “(1) the quantity of conta cts with the forum state; (2) the nature and
quality of those contacts; (3) the connection of the cause of action with these contacts;
(4) the interest of the state in providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of the parties.”
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (quotation omitted). The first three factors relate to whether
a nonresident defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with Minnesota, and the last
two factors establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction under the concepts of “fair play and
substantial justice.” Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 570
(Minn. 2004).
We focus on “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation”
and consider whether the “defendant’s suit-related conduct” creates “a substantial
connection with the forum State” in determining the existence of minimum contacts for
purposes of determining specific personal jurisdiction. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,
283-84 (2014) (quotations omitted). We “look to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself and not [a nonresident] defendant’s random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts
with persons affiliated with the State or persons who reside there.” Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d
8
at 750 (quotations omitted). The physical presence of the nonresident defendant in
Minnesota is not required to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. Id.
“Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review
de novo.” Id. at 749 (quotation omitted). In our review of a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint and supporting
affidavits as true. Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 326.
Against this backdrop, we consider the five factors set forth in Bandemer to
determine whether E2HS has sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota and whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the concepts of fair play and substantial justice.
Quantity of Contacts with the Forum State
“It is a defendant’s contacts with the forum state that are of interest in determining
if [personal] jurisdiction exists, not its contacts with a resident.” Scullin Steel Co. v. Nat’l
Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 313 (8th Cir. 1982) (quotation omitted).
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but
it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting business in the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (emphasis added). “Merely entering into a
contract with a forum resident does not provide the requisite contacts between a
(nonresident) defendant and the forum state.” Scullin Steel, 676 F.2d at 313 (quotation
omitted).
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The record sets forth contacts between E2HS and Husky in consummating the
transaction. The record shows that Husky viewed an online advertisement for the
hydroseeder, E2HS made an unspecified number of telephone calls and sent an unspecified
number of emails to Husky, and E2HS shipped the hydroseeder to Husky in Minnesota.
These contacts were minimal, and but for this transaction, E2HS would have no connection
to Minnesota whatsoever. The record does not set forth any contact between E2HS and
Minnesota separate from this transaction. E2HS did not direct marketing efforts in
Minnesota and had never conducted business in Minnesota or with any Minnesota resident
before this transaction . We have previously determined that similar, limited contacts
associated with a single , internet-based purchase are insufficient to establish the quantity
of contacts favoring the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. See Sunnarborg Well
Drilling, Inc. v. Thompson’s Well Pump & Drilling, Inc., No. A04-2159, 2005 WL
1331722, at *4 (Mi nn. App. June 7, 2005) (concluding that nonresident defendant’s
placement of advertisement in nationally circulated trade magazine with the advertisement
also appearing in online magazine edition did not satisfy minimum contacts with forum
when plaintiff was the only Minnesota entity proven to have accessed online
advertisement). Given this record, we are unconvinced that E2HS has the requisite quantity
of minimum contacts with Minnesota to satisfy the due-process requirement.
Nature and Quality of Contacts with the Forum State
“When the quantity of contacts is minimal . . . , the nature and quality of the contacts
with a state are dispositive.” Trident Enters. Int’l, Inc. v. Kemp & George, Inc., 502
N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. App. 1993). The essence of Husky’s argument on appeal, and
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the basis for the district court’s order, is that a Minnesota court may exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over E2HS because it entered into a contract and transacted business
with a Minnesota company. That fact alone is insufficient to subject E2HS to personal
jurisdiction in Minnesota. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478- 79 (explaining that
establishment of minimum contacts in a contract dispute requires evaluation of “prior
negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract
and the parties’ actual course of dealing”); see also Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617,
622 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that for purposes of determining purposeful availment of a
forum by nonresident defendant, contracting “a one-shot deal that was merely negotiated
and signed by one party in the forum” differs from contracts contemplating future
performance in forum state).
E2HS argues that it does not have the requisite minimum contacts with Minnesota
to satisfy the due-process requirement. We agree. The contacts that Husky alleges are, in
totality, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process are: (1) E2HS’s hydroseeder
advertisement was published on the Machinery Trader website and that internet
advertisement reached a consumer in Minnesota; (2) E2HS negotiated and entered into a
contract for sale of the hydroseeder and truck with a Minnesota company; (3) during the
negotiation and sale, some telephone calls and emails were initiated by E2HS to Husky and
E2HS made representations about the condition of the equipment to a Minnesota company
over the telephone and in emails; (4) E2HS managed the customs documents and delivered
the hydroseeder and truck to Husky in Minnesota; and (5) after delivery, E2HS continued
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discussions with Husky about the condition of the hydroseeder. The nature of these
contacts does not satisfy the due-process requirement.
First, the internet advertisement for the hydroseeder does not justify the exercise of
jurisdiction. In determining whether internet activity can give rise to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction, we examine “the nature and quality of the commercial activity
conducted on the Internet to determine whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of
the laws of the forum state.” Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 574 (quotation omitted). And “a
purely national advertising campaign that does not target Minnesota specifically cannot
support a finding of personal jurisdiction.” Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 334. Minimum contacts
exist where a nonresident defendant engages in “purposeful and active solicitation of
Minnesota customers.” BLC Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. App.
1985), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1985). The record does not show that E2HS directed
its advertising and marketing efforts toward Minnesota customers. E2HS is a Canadian
company. It placed an advertisement in a print magazine directed toward customers in
Eastern Canada. The advertisement was published on the Machinery Trader website. The
fortuity of a Minnesota company viewing and acting upon such an internet advertisement
is the type of random event that does not give rise to specific personal jurisdiction.
Second, the inclusion of the truck in the transaction does not augment the connection
between E2HS and the forum state. We disagree with Husky’s characterization that its
purchase of the truck from E2HS constitutes a second or separate transaction enhancing
E2HS’s contact with the forum state. As part of its purchase negotiations for the
hydroseeder, Husky inquired about purchasing the truck, and E2HS responded to Husky’s
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inquiry. These negotiations culminated in a single business transaction whereby Husky
purchased two items. Husky’s choice to pursue multiple items as part of the same order
does not increase E2HS’s contacts with Minnesota.
Third, the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and sale of the hydroseeder do
not establish sufficient minimum contacts between E2HS and Minnesota. Nothing about
this transaction supports a conclusion that E2HS purposefully availed itself of the laws and
protections of Minnesota. The record confirms that the transaction itself was complete
upon the delivery of the hydroseeder and truck to Husky. E2HS had been paid by that time
and did not contemplate any future obligation or ongoing relationship with Husky or the
forum state. In other words, in this business transaction, E2HS would have no conceivable
basis to avail itself of the laws and protections of Minnesota. The parties’ use of telephone
and email during the transaction does not, standing alone, satisfy the necessary minimum
contacts to establish jurisdiction over E2HS. Scullin Steel, 676 F.2d at 314 (“The use of
interstate facilities (telephone, the mail) . . . [is a] secondary or ancillary factor[] and cannot
alone provide the minimum contacts required by due process.”); see also Digi- Tel
Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecom. (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Although
letters and faxes may be used to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, they do not
by themselves establish jurisdiction.”). And the nature of E2HS’s communications with a
Minnesota resident does not support a conclusion that E2HS purposefully availed itself of
a legal forum in Minnesota.
Fourth, the delivery of equipment to Minnesota does not establish minimum
contacts. “[T]he provision for delivery within the forum state is a secondary or ancillary
13
factor[] and cannot alone provide the minimum contacts required by due process.” Scullin
Steel, 676 F.2d at 314 (quotation omitted).
Fifth, the parties’ post-sale communications about the hyd roseeder do not support
the exercise of jurisdiction. The fact that, after completion of the transaction, Husky
complained about the condition of the hydroseeder to E2HS and E2HS discussed the same
with Husky cannot satisfy the due- process requirement. “ [T]he fair warning that due
process requires arises . . . when the events that gave rise to the suit occurred.” Steel v.
United States, 813 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987). When examining the sufficiency of a
nonresident defendant’s contacts with a forum for purposes of determining specific
personal jurisdiction, courts look to “those contacts leading up to and surrounding the
accrual of the cause of action. Later events are not considered.” 16 Moore’s Federal
Practice § 108.42[2][a], at 108-76 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2022). 1 At oral argument,
Husky agreed that events occurring after accrual of the cause of action are not germane to

1 See also XMission, L.C. v. Fluent LLC, 955 F.3d 833, 848-49 (10th Cir. 2020); Rocke v.
Pebble Beach Co., 541 Fed. App’x 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2013); Harlow v. Children’s Hosp.,
432 F.3d 50, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2005); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co.,
907 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Only contacts occurring prior to the event causing the
litigation may be considered.”); United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp.
2d 904, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“The focus on whether a defendant has purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state necessarily implies that
only conduct prior to the accrual of the cause of action or, at the very latest, the filing of
the lawsuit is relevant.”); Toshiba Funding Auth. LTD. v. Somerset Marine, Inc., 923
F. Supp. 982, 986 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (explaining that defendant had no notice that the
plaintiff had a connection with the forum state at the time the relevant policy was issued);
Stein v. Horwitz, No. 98-2474, 1999 WL 710355, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999) (“As to
the due process considerations, we assess Horwitz’s contacts with Maryland at the time of
the accident.”); Lamensdorf v. New York Univ., Civil Action No. 5:09-CV-424 (HL), 2010
WL 11519546, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2010) (noting that flying to the forum state after
the accident that caused the litigation did not create a contact for due-process purposes).
14
the jurisdiction inquiry. We therefore hold that, in examining the sufficiency of contacts
with the forum state to determine the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, we generally focus on those contacts leading up to and surrounding
the accrual of the cause of action.
We discern no difference between this matter and the circumstances arising in RH
Sealcoating & Asphalt Maint., Inc. v. Mach. Tradeoff, LLC, Civil No. 18-2734
(DSD/BRT), 2019 WL 121952 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2019). There, a Minnesota company
initiated a contract and warranty suit against a Texas company arising out of the purchase
of a chip spreader advertised on Machinery Trader’s website, the same publication in this
matter. 2019 WL 121952, at *1. The Texas company advertised to Texas local outposts
and listed inventory on the Machinery Trader website. Id. The Minnesota company
viewed the advertisement on the internet and called the Texas company to inquire about
the purchase of the chip spreader. Id. In response to that inquiry, the Texas company sent
an email to the Minnesota company with a cost estimate and contacted the Minnesota
company multiple times to encourage the purchase of the equipment. Id. The parties
thereafter exchanged communications related to the acquisition of the equipment,
including invoices and wire payment instructions. Id. The Texas company delivered the
equipment to Minnesota. Id. at *2. The Minnesota company discovered that the machine
did not work as promised, the Texas company declined to fix the problem, and the
Minnesota company initiated suit in Minnesota. Id. at *1.
The district court found that the contacts between the Texas company and
Minnesota as the forum state did not satisfy due process and dismissed the action for lack
15
of specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at *2-3. The court found that a single transaction for
a product was insufficient to confer jurisdiction; the Minnesota company initiated the
parties’ relationship; the exchange of communication leading to the purchase of the
equipment did not convert the Texas company to the aggressor in the transaction; the
parties only communicated by telephone, email, and letter; and the delivery of equipment
to Minnesota did not in itself establish the necessary contacts with the state. Id. at *2.
These facts and circumstances are nearly identical to those in this case, and Husky has not
set forth a principled reason why we should reach a different result. 2
Connection Between Cause of Action and the Forum State
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant “purposefully
directed his activities at residents of the forum” and the action “arise[s] out of or relate[s]
to those activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quotations omitted). We focus on the
relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Walden, 571 U.S. at
283-84.
This case involves a single business transaction, where a Minnesota company claims
that a nonresident defendant allegedly misrepresented the condition of equipment in an
advertisement targeted to residents of Eastern Canada. Husky admits that the
“advertisement lays the foundation for this lawsuit” because the advertisement contained

2 The circumstances in RH Sealcoating are more favorable to the exercise of jurisdiction
than in this case because there, the Texas company contacted the Minnesota company “at
least twenty (20) times to encourage [a] pur chase [of] a chip spreader” and then after
delivery of the invoice contacted the Minnesota company “several more times” to see if
the Minnesota company was going to purchase the equipment. Id. at *1. E2HS did not
engage in similarly aggressive sales behavior.
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alleged misrepresentations about the condition of the hydroseeder. We have previously
determined that an asserted connection to Minnesota based on a misrepresentation in an
advertisement published in a national trade magazine was insufficient to connect the
nonresident defendant to the cause of action in Minnesota. Now Foods Corp. v. Madison
Equip. Co., 386 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that “the asserted
connection, i.e., the trade journal advertising, is too insubstantial to provide a connecting
link with the cause of action by Now Foods in Minnesota”), rev. granted (Minn. July 16,
1986) and ord. granting rev. vacated (Minn. Nov. 17, 1986). This factor does not satisfy
the due-process requirement.
Interest of State in Providing a Forum
Husky argues that Minnesota has an interest in providing a forum for its injured
resident. But that interest “has been de-emphasized in an attempt to slow the inexorable
expansion of jurisdiction in state courts.” S.B. Schmidt Paper Co. v. A to Z Paper Co., 452
N.W.2d 485, 489 (Minn. App. 1990) (quotations omitted). As a secondary factor in the
overall analysis, “Minnesota’s interest in providing a forum, standing alone, is
insufficient.” Now Foods, 386 N.W.2d at 368. “Even if a state’s interest is com pelling,
the primary focus must be on the nonresident’s interests and contacts with the forum state,
not on the resident’s interests in having the case decided in its home state.” Id. (citing W.
Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 679-80 (Minn. 1983)). Minnesota’s interest
in providing a forum therefore does not override the first three factors.

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Convenience of the Parties
Like Minnesota’s interest in providing a forum, the convenience of the parties is a
secondary consideration in determining the existence of specific personal jurisdiction. See
Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 1983 )
(identifying the interest of the state in providing a forum and the convenience of the parties
as factors that deserve “lesser consideration”). Witnesses to this action are located both in
Minnesota and Canada, and the parties would be equally inconvenienced by selection of
the other’s preferred forum. In such a situation, “convenience of the parties and witnesses
is a neutral factor in the analysis.” Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 575-76.
DECISION
The circumstances surrounding the single business transaction between Husky and
E2HS do not establish the requisite minimum contacts with Minnesota as the forum state
necessary to satisfy the due-process requirement. E2HS did not purposefully avail itself of
the laws and protections of Minnesota. It did not initiate business in Minnesota. E2HS has
no offices, facilities, property, employees, or equipment in Minnesota. It does not actively
or purposefully direct its advertisements to Minnesota residents. Husky initiated and
pursued a business relationship with E2HS. The post-delivery communications between
the parties do not satisfy due-process requirements. Based on the parties’ negotiations, and
the lack of contemplated future consequences, E2HS did not have the requisite minimum
contacts with Minnesota to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. Our
decision regarding the absence of specific personal jurisdiction does not strip Husky of its
ability to pursue a remedy for the alleged wrongs, but it may not do so in Minnesota.
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We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of E2HS’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.
Reversed.