State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0469

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rolando Banda,
Appellant.

Filed November 7, 2022
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Sibley County District Court
File No. 72-CR-21-228

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald E. Lannoye, Sibley County Attorney, Gaylord, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Connolly ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions
to withdraw his guilty plea and for a downward dispositional sentencing departure.
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Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motions, we
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Rolando Banda was charged with first-degree driving while impaired
(DWI) in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20 , subd. 1(1) (2020), first-degree DWI in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2020), and a violation of driver’s license
restriction under Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(f)(1) (2020). Banda pleaded guilty to one
count of first-degree DWI pursuant to a plea agreement. At the plea hearing, the district
court scheduled a sentencing hearing approximately three months later to give Banda an
opportunity to complete inpatient treatment prior to sentencing. At the time of the entry of
his plea, the district court warned Banda that he would be required to return to jail if he left
the treatment program for any reason. The district court ordered conditions of release,
which included in part that Banda “[m]ust successfully complete treatment and all aftercare
requirements.”
Before the sentencing hearing, Banda completed residential inpatient treatment, but
he was “unsuccessfully discharged” from residential outpatient treatment. The treatment
facility cited behavioral issues as the reason for Banda’s discharge from the program.
Between the plea hearing and sentencing hearing, Banda moved for a downward
dispositional departure from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. At the sentencing
hearing, Banda orally moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied the
plea-withdrawal and sentencing-departure motions and imposed a guidelines 60-month
prison sentence. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (2021).
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Banda now appeals.
DECISION
Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions
to withdraw his guilty plea and for a downward dispositional sentencing departure. We
address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Banda’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

Banda first argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. Banda argues that it was fair and just to allow plea withdrawal
because he did not have an opportunity to complete the treatment program in order to
demonstrate his amenability to probation. Banda specifically argues that because his
inpatient treatment program was not a 90-day program and he was subject to confinement
during outpatient treatment, he did not have a chance to demonstrate his amenab ility to
success in the community. He also argues that the state did not establish prejudice
associated with plea withdrawal. We disagree.
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea under two circumstances: (1) at any time
when it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice or (2) before sentencing and at the
court’s discretion if it is fair and just to permit withdrawal (the fair-and-just standard).
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subds. 1, 2. Banda sought to withdraw his plea under the fair-
and-just standard. Under that standard, a district court considers (1) the reasons the
defendant advances to support withdrawal of the guilty plea and (2) whether granting the
motion prejudices the state. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2; State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
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90, 97 (Minn. 2010). The defendant bears the burden of advancing sufficient reasons to
support withdrawal, and the state bears the burden of showing prejudice by the withdrawal.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, and we reverse “only
in the rare case.” Id. (quotation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is not supported by the facts in the
record. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019).
First, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Banda’s
reasons to support plea withdrawal were insufficient under the fair-and-just standard. In
support of his motion, Banda argued he could not show that he was amenable to probation
because the conditions in the treatment facility were unfavorable to him. Banda asserted
that the treatment facility diet raised his blood-sugar level which prevented him from
sleeping, that he did not enjoy feeling like a burden, and that other residents in the facility
were unfriendly and “using and wanted to sell” to him. The district court considered
Banda’s explanation for his discharge and argument in support of plea withdrawal but
ultimately rejected Banda’s explanation. The district court stated that it understood
Banda’s position, but it believed that Banda was given a chance and had enough control
over his circumstances to demonstrate that he could complete treatment.
This conclusion is supported by the record. Banda did not complete the outpatient
treatment progra m. The treatment facility stated that it discharged Banda because of
behavioral issues. Thus, the district court’s conclusion th at Banda was given an
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opportunity to complete treatment and Banda did not complete treatment because of his
own behavior is supported by the record.
Even so, we observe that the plea agreement did not ensure that Banda was
guaranteed a sentencing departure even if he had successfully completed treatment. The
terms of the plea agreement provided that the parties could argue for their preferred
sentence at the sentencing hearing , but there was no agreement as to specific sentencing
disposition or duration. The district court’s denial of the plea-withdrawal motion therefore
did not undercut any promise to Banda associated with the plea agreement. 1
Second, a district court may deny a plea-withdrawal motion in the absence of
identified prejudice to the state when the defendant fails to show sufficient reasons for
withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97- 98 (holding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny ing a plea-withdrawal motion
under the fair-and- just standard when the prejudice to the state was overstated but the
defendant failed to provide any valid reason why the withdrawal would be fair and just).
Because Banda did not set forth a valid reason why plea withdrawal would be fair and just,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion even in the absence of
prejudice to the state.

1 Banda also argues that he did not receive the benefit of the plea agreement because he
was required to complete residential outpatient treatment as opposed to outpatient
treatment in the community. We note that nothing in the plea agreement or plea hearing
suggested that the parties contemplated that Banda would complete community-based
treatment before sentencing. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that Banda’s proffered reason for plea withdrawal did not satisfy the fair-and-just standard.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Banda’s motion for a
downward dispositional sentencing departure.

Banda also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional sentencing departure because the district court did not fully
consider the factors suggesting that Banda is particularly amenable to probation. We
disagree.
We accord “great discretion” to the district court in the imposition of sentences and
reverse only for abuse of that discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn.
2014) (quotation omitted). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines allow for departures
from a presumptive sentence where, for example, a district court specifically finds that
“[t]he offender is particularly amenable to probation,” a finding which may “be supported
by the fact that the offender is particularly amenable to a relevant program of individualized
treatment in a probationary setting.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (2021). In
determining whether an offender is particularly amenable to treatment in a probationary
setting, district courts consider the offender’s age, prior record, remorse, cooperation,
attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family (Trog factors). State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). General amenability to probation is not enough.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308. To qualify for a dispositional departure from the presumptive
sentence, an offender must be particularly amenable to probation, in that they are
distinguishable from most others. Id. at 308-09; Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.D.303
(2021) (citing Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309). In making its determination, a district court need
not address each Trog factor but instead must exercise its discretion by considering the
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factors both for and against imposition of a departure sentence. See State v. Pegel, 795
N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn.
App. 1985)) (reasoning there is no requirement for a district court to discuss all the Trog
factors before imposing a sentence). And, even if the record establishes certain facts in
support of a conclusion that an offender is particularly amenable to probation, a district
court is not obligated to depart from the guidelines. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468-
69 (Minn. App. 2018).
The district court considered the factors for and against a sentencing departure and
ultimately determined that Banda was not particularly amenable to probation. The district
court praised Banda for his completion of inpatient treatment. The district court also
acknowledged that there may have been some miscommunication about outpatient
treatment. The district court then considered the fact that Banda did not successfully
complete outpatient treatment, noted his prior DWI convictions, and expressed concern
regarding a past incident where he “struggled being on probation.” The district court
weighed all of this information and concluded that it could not “ignore [his] history and
[his] last attempt at treatment.” The district court then imposed the presumptive sentence—
60 months in prison. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A.
We see no abuse of discretion by the district court in making this decision. The
district court considered appropriate factors in denying Banda’s motion—his failure to
complete outpatient treatment, his criminal history, and his treatment history. And the
record supports the district court’s assessment.
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Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banda’s motions
to withdraw his guilty plea and for a downward dispositional sentencing departure, we
affirm.
Affirmed.