Ammie Murphy, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0485

Ammie Murphy,
Appellant,

vs.

Valleyfair, LLC,
Respondent.

Filed September 26, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge
Dissenting, Kirk, Judge∗

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-19-10258

Charles D. Slane, Nathan M. Maus, TSR Injury Law, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Noelle L. Schubert, Harrison E. Berg, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering,
Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Valleyfair, LLC)

Taylor Brandt Cunningham, Conlin Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Jennifer E. Olson, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus
curiae Minnesota Association for Justice)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
On Mother’s Day in 2017, Appellant Ammie Murphy tripped and fell at the
Valleyfair amusement park, injuring her arm and shoulder. She sued Respondent
Valleyfair, and the jury returned a verdict finding both Murphy and Valleyfair negligent.
But the jury found that neither party’s negligence played a substantial part in bringing about
Murphy’s injury. Murphy argued that the verdict was irreconcilable and requested a new
trial, but the district court denied her motion. Because the verdict is reconcilable with the
facts in the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Murphy tripped and fell after exiting a ride at Valleyfair amusement park. Murphy
injured her left elbow and her shoulder when she fell, and she reported numbness in her
left fingers. Her husband drove her to the emergency room, and she had two surgeries on
her elbow. She sued Valleyfair for negligence, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, Murphy testified that when she fell she was carrying a drink, looking
straight ahead, and hurrying to catch up with her husband and four-year-old son who were
walking 20 feet ahead of her after they completed the Lucy’s Tugboat ride. At the time,
Murphy did not know why she tripped, but she described the location to a friend, who
returned to the location later and took a photograph. When Murphy saw the photograph,
she determined that she tripped on a partial curb—an elevation difference between the
street area and the walkway area smaller than a typical curb. Murphy presented incident
reports of patron injuries near where she fell at trial, including a report from two days
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before her injury. But these reports were not specific about exactly where the other patrons
fell. She also introduced a 2016 report from a Valleyfair employee reporting that multiple
patrons tripped and fell over a curb near the same ride where Murphy fell. The reporter
requested that Valleyfair paint the curb, but at the time of Murphy’s fall, Valleyfair had not
painted the entire curb.
The special-verdict form asked the jurors to determine whether Valleyfair was
negligent, if Murphy was negligent, and if either of their negligence played “a substantial
part in bringing about” Murphy’s injury. During jury deliberations, the jury asked the court
what the word “substantial” meant in the special-verdict form. Murphy’s counsel
suggested that the district court tell the jury, “A substantial factor is not necessarily the
only factor but is sufficient to have caused the injury by itself.” Valleyfair’s counsel
suggested referring the jury to instructions they had received on cause. The court included
both suggestions in its answer.
The jury found that both Murphy and Valleyfair were negligent, but it found that
neither party’s negligence played a substantial part in bringing about Murphy’s injury.
Murphy’s counsel asked the district court not to accept the verdict because it was
irreconcilable. The district court denied that request, stating: “there is a factual scenario or
factual conclusions that the jury could have drawn that would support the answers that the
jurors gave.” And the court explained that it would have been reasonable for the jury to
conclude that both Murphy and Valleyfair could have been negligent, but that the
predominant cause of Murphy’s injury was “bad luck or happenstance.” Murphy moved
for a new trial, and the district court denied her request.
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This appeal follows.
DECISION
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure state that a district court may grant a new
trial if the verdict is not justified by evidence or contradicts law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(g).
We review a district court’s decision to deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion.
Christie v. Est. of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).
Here, the question is whether the verdict is not justified by the evidence because the
special-verdict answer s are irreconcilable. See Olson v. Alexandria Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 206, 680 N.W.2d 583, 586- 87 (Minn. App. 2004) (a jury’s verdict is irreconcilable
when the answers to a special-verdict for m are internally inconsistent). They are
irreconcilable, Murphy asserts, because absent another cause, the parties cannot be both
negligent yet neither a substantial cause of her injuries.
In reviewing this issue, we must attempt to reconcile the special-verdict answers in
a reasonable manner consistent with the evidence and its fair inferences. Reese v. Henke,
152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1967). And u nless no reasonable mind could find as the jury
did, this court will not set aside a jury’s special-verdict answers. Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara
Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 734 (Minn. 1997).
To determine whether the completed special-verdict form is irreconcilable, we first
turn to the required elements of Murphy’s negligence claim and how each party addressed
them at trial. We then examine whether the jury’s findings that both parties were negligent
are reconcilable with its determination that neither’s negligence was a substantial factor in
causing Murphy’s injury.
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A successful negligence claim requires a plaintiff to prove four elements: “(1) the
existence of a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an injury; and (4) the breach of
the duty being the proximate cause of the injury.” Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co.,
706 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 2005). Here, Murphy ascribed negligence to Valleyfair for
its failure to either paint the partial curb or place a barrier, such as a fence, around it.
Valleyfair denied any negligence and further asserted that Murphy’s own negligence
caused her to trip and fall. One of its arguments in this regard was that Murphy tripped
over her own feet, not the curb.
Based on the evidence at trial, we agree with the district court that the jury could
have reasonably found that both parties acted negligently, yet neither party’s negligence
was a substantial factor in causing Murphy’s injury. The jury could have found that
Murphy tripped as she hurried to join her family—but not necessarily on the unpainted
partial curb. Murphy was looking straight ahead when she fell, and she did not identify the
curb as the cause of her injury until she saw a photo of it after-the-fact. And when asked
at trial: “do you know what you tripped on?” Murphy at one point answered “no.”
Furthermore, the incident reports that Murphy introduced into the record were not
specific about where patrons had tripped and fallen in the past, and Murphy could not
pinpoint exactly which part of the curb she tripped on—painted or unpainted. In sum, the
jury could have found that Valleyfair was negligent for not providing warning of the curb,
but that this failure did not cause Murphy to fall. See George v. Est. of Baker,
724 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2006) (“If the harm would have occurred even without the
negligent act, the act could not have been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”).
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We so conclude mindful that, in determining whether a verdict is justified by the
evidence, a district court exercises “the broadest possible discretionary power.”
Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). As
a result, we “will not set aside a jury verdict on an appeal from a district court’s denial of
a motion for a new trial unless it is manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence viewed
as a whole and in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Navarre v. S. Wash. Cnty. Schs.,
652 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Minn. 2002). Because the jury’s special-verdict responses are
reconcilable as described above, the district court here acted within its wide discretion in
denying a new trial.
Still, Murphy (and amicus curiae, the Minnesota Association of Justice) assert that
where a jury finds negligence, as it did here, there must be causation unless the evidence
in the record presents another cause. Happenstance or bad luck, to use the phrase from the
district court, does not suffice. 1 But the district court here did not rely solely on
“happenstance or bad luck” to reconcile the special-verdict answers. It also referred to
“factual scenarios” that would support both jury answers. One factual scenario— and one
is all that is necessary —is the scenario that Murphy tripped, but not on the partial curb.
See Reese, 152 N.W.2d at 66.
Nor are we persuaded that—even if this factual scenario did not exist—caselaw
supports the broad rule Murphy proposes. In arguing that where there is a finding of
negligence, there must be a causation finding absent another cause (i.e., more than bad

1 Murphy further alleges that the district court’s reliance on happenstance or bad luck does
not suffice because happenstance and bad luck are outside the record.
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luck), Murphy relies most heavily on Clifford. 681 N.W.2d at 680. In Clifford, a patient
died of lithium poisoning after receiving Lithobid, a drug containing lithium and used to
treat bipolar disorder, instead of Liquibid, a decongestant. Id. at 681. The supreme court
determined that only the physician, the nurse, or the pharmacy could have been negligent
in providing her with that medication. Id. at 688. The jury found that the physician and
the nurse were negligent, but their negligence was not a direct cause of Clifford’s death.
Id. at 686. The supreme court held that this verdict was irreconcilable because only the
physician, the nurse, or the pharmacy could have caused Clifford’s death, so it granted a
new trial. Id. at 689. Based on this caselaw, Murphy argues that if a jury finds negligence
without causation, the verdict is irreconcilable unless there is evidence of another cause.
We do not read Clifford to support the broad rule that Murphy suggests. First, the
case at hand is distinguishable from Clifford. Unlike administering the incorrect
medication, mistakes such as falling at an amusement park happen frequently with and
without negligence. Murphy could have tripped for any number of reasons, while only a
limited number of parties could have given Clifford the wrong medication. The facts of
Clifford are too unique to impose the overarching causation rule that Murphy requests.
Nor do the additional cases Murphy cites support her causation proposal. Certainly,
in George and Hauenstein, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the verdicts were
reconcilable because of evidence of other causes. George, 724 N.W.2d at 7 (car -accident
case also involving bad weather); Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272
(Minn. 1984) (product-liability case about an adhesive that can cause blindness also
involving a defective nozzle). And in Bergemann, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted
8
a new trial because there was no evidence of another cause in the record.
Bergemann v. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. 1978) (verdict
irreconcilable in car -accident case where jury found driver not negligent, township
negligent, but township’s negligence not direct cause of accident). But although there may
have been other causes in George and Hauenstein, and an absence thereof in Bergemann,
these cases do not create a requirement that there must always be another cause when a
jury finds negligence without causation. 2 Nor will we create such a rule where the
Minnesota Supreme Court has not done so.
In sum, evidence in the record supports the jury’s verdict, so it is reconcilable. The
presence or absence of another cause beyond this evidence does not change our analysis.
And we are mindful of the supreme court’s instruction that when a jury finds “negligence
without causation, we have been generally disinclined to second-guess the verdict.”
George, 724 N.W.2d at 6. We see no reason to deviate from that guidance here. Because
the district court exercised its broad discretionary power in determining that the verdict
was reconcilable, and we conclude that there is at least one reasonable way to reconcile the
jury’s verdict based on the evidence in the record, we affirm.
Affirmed.

2 In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently explained that sometimes people trip in
the ordinary course, not because of anyone’s negligence. Staub as Tr. of Weeks v. Myrtle
Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613, 626 n.12 (Minn. 2021).
D-1

KIRK, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent.
After determining that both Murphy and Valleyfair were negligent, the jury found
that neither Murphy nor Valleyfair was a substantial cause of Murphy’s injury, despite no
evidence of another cause of Murphy’s injury in the record. After Murphy challenged the
verdict as irreconcilable, the district court denied her motion, stating that “bad luck” or
“happenstance” could have caused Murphy’s fall.
The district court abused its discretion in two ways. First, it reconciled the verdict
based on evidence not in the record. Second, it disregarded Minnesota caselaw on findings
of negligence without causation. I would conclude that the verdict is irreconcilable and
would reverse and remand for a new trial.
As the majority states, this court must reconcile a jury’s special- verdict answers in
a reasonable manner consistent with the evidence in the record and its fair inferences.
Reese v. Henke, 152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1967). A district court cannot set aside a jury’s
answer to a special-verdict form when there is competent evidence in the record to support
the reasonableness of a jury’s conclusion. Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.,
563 N.W.2d 724, 734-35 (Minn. 1997). But when no such evidence exists in the record,
the verdict is irreconcilable, and the district court may grant a new trial. Minn. R. Civ. P.
59.01(g).
Here, there was no evidence in the record of any cause of Murphy’s injury other
than her negligence and Valleyfair’s negligence. “Bad luck” and “happenstance” were not
presented to the jury as potential causes of Murphy’s injury on the special -verdict form,
D-2

and neither party’s counsel argued these theories of causation at trial. Because there is no
evidence of bad luck or happenstance in the record, and the jury was not asked if bad luck
or happenstance caused Murphy’s injuries, the district court went beyond the record in
seeking to reconcile a verdict that cannot be reconciled.
To reconcile a verdict that found negligence without causation goes against a
substantial body of Minnesota caselaw that requires another cause when a jury finds that
both parties are negligent, but neither caused the injury. The Minnesota Supreme Cour t
has upheld this logic in case after case. For example, the supreme court upheld a verdict
when a jury found that both a taxi driver and truck driver were negligent in a car crash case,
but neither party caused the accident. George v. Est. of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.
2006). The district court held that the jury’s finding was reconcilable because of evidence
of inclement weather in the record, which could have caused the accident. Id. Another
district court reconciled a verdict where both the manufacturer and user of a product were
negligent, but neither caused the user’s injuries because the product’s nozzle was defective,
and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld that finding. Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp.,
347 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Minn. 1984).
Yet another Minnesota court found that a jury finding of negligence by both drivers
but no causation by either in a car crash was reconcilable because of evidence of a defective
yield sign in the record as well. Bergemann v. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 107, 110
(Minn. 1978). And the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld that decision as well. Id. Finally,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that when only one of two parties could have caused
a patient’s death, a jury verdict that only one was negligent, but neither’s negligence caused
D-3

the patient’s death was irreconcilable. Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 680, 688
(Minn. 2004). Thus, in Minnesota, when there is evidence of another cause in the record,
a jury finding of negligence without causation is reconcilable. But when the record lacks
evidence of another cause, the verdict is irreconcilable.
The majority sidesteps this caselaw, opting to focus on Murphy’s burden of proof
instead. But even if Murphy did not meet her burden of proof to show that Valleyfair’s
negligence caused her injury, that does not change the fact that the jury’s verdict cannot be
reconciled by the facts in the record. Neither party claimed that anything besides the other
party’s negligence caused Murphy’s injuries, yet the district court found that the verdict
was reconcilable. There is no evidence of another cause here, and bad luck or happenstance
cannot meet that requirement. No reasonable mind could find as this jury did. Domtar,
563 N.W.2d 734.
Finally, the word “substantial” as used in the jury instructions and verdict form
seemed to challenge the jury. Immediately before returning their verdict, the jury requested
a definition of the word ‘substantial,’ and the district court gave them a definition that
Murphy’s attorney suggested. Once the jury reached its verdict that both parties were
negligent but neither party’s negligence played a substantial part in bringing about
Murphy’s injury, the verdict might have been easily reconcilable had the district court
returned the jury to deliberate with a new interrogatory on the special verdict form. An
instruction such as: “If you find both parties negligent, did their combined negligence play
D-4

a substantial part in bringing about the injury? If you answer yes, then you must compare
the fault of the parties by answering question 53 on the original special verdict form.”
I dissent from the result the majority reaches today.

3 Question 5 asked the jury to apportion fault between negligent parties and required the
total to equal 100%.