Arctos Wealth Management and Fiduciary LLC, o/b/o Irvin John Cooper, Sr., Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0487

Arctos Wealth Management and Fiduciary LLC,
o/b/o Irvin John Cooper, Sr.,
Respondent,

vs.

Kathy Jeno, aka Kathy Brown, aka Kathy Ann Verdorn,
aka Kathy Skweres, aka Kathy Rothfuaz,
Appellant.

Filed January 30, 2023
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-21-1083

Daniel Kufus, Kufus Law, LLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for respondent)

David L. Ludescher, Grundhoefer & Ludescher, P.A., Northfield, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Laurie J. Nevers, St. Paul, Minnesota (for Irving John Cooper, Sr.)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Kathy Jeno (n/k/a Kathy Cooper) appeals from a harassment restraining
order (HRO) obtained by respondent Arctos Wealth Management and Fiduciary LLC on
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behalf of Irvin John Cooper, Sr. She argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction
to issue the HRO, respondent lacked standing to petition for an HRO on Cooper’s behalf,
the district court abused its discretion by issuing an HRO against Cooper’s wishes, and
there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the HRO. Because none of
appellant’s arguments have merit, we affirm.
FACTS
Cooper is an 82-year -old man who became subject to an emergency guardianship
in the fall of 2021. Days later, the emergency guardian, respondent Arctos Wealth ,
petitioned for an HRO against appellant on Cooper’s behalf. The district court granted an
ex parte HRO. Appellant contested the HRO and requested a hearing. Before the hearing,
and in a separate probate matter, the district court appointed respondent to be Cooper’s
general guardian and general conservator for a one-year period. Following an evidentiary
hearing on the HRO, the district court determined that appellant’s behavior constituted
harassment and granted an HRO that prohibits appellant from having unsupervised contact
with Cooper, among other conditions, until February 2024. Appellant now appeals the
HRO.
In its order granting the HRO, the district court stated that respondent’s witnesses
at the evidentiary hearing were credible and found “the facts to be as alleged in the petition
and as presented by [ respondent]’s witnesses.”1 The following summary of the facts is

1 Appellant did not testify or present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
3
based on the evidence introduced at the evidentiary hearing and on the facts as alleged in
the HRO petition and supporting documents.
Cooper lost his wife of almost 60 years in the spring of 2020. He spent much of
2020 struggling with health issues while staying in an assisted living facility. That summer,
Cooper met appellant online, and at some point, they began having in-person contact. In
April 2021, Cooper drove appellant to the hospital at appellant’s request, and as a result,
Cooper contracted COVID-19. Cooper was hospitalized and “incoherent” due to the
illness. Following a two- to three-month stay in the hospital and a rehabilitation center, he
was discharged to an assisted living facility. During this time, Cooper’s children sought
an emergency guardianship, and his son was appointed as an emergency guardian . The
district court also appointed an attorney to represent Cooper’s interests.
While Cooper was subject to the emergency guardianship, appellant removed him
from the assisted living facility without approval from the family, the facility, or the
emergency guardian. Cooper missed important medications , and his son was concerned
about Cooper’s nutrition, hygiene, and general stability. During this time, Cooper paid a
$4,000 veterinary bill for appellant and bought appellant a car. Appellant also attempted
to break into Cooper’s home to take his personal items.
Eventually, Cooper and his son filed a stipulation with the district court. The
stipulation required that Cooper consent to moving to a different assisted living facility,
that Cooper’s son would withdraw the emergency guardianship, and that respondent would
be appointed as Cooper’s conservator.
4
Cooper failed to follow the stipulated agreement, however. He left the assisted
living facility with appellant. Cooper would not meet with his attorney or a representative
of respondent unless appellant or appellant’s attorney was present.
Appellant continued to isolate Cooper by interfering with Cooper’s family
relationships. She was overheard verbally abusing Cooper in a bank parking lot—
ridiculing him for agreeing to a conservatorship and instructing him to do exactly what she
said. Appellant also forwarded Cooper’s mail to her home address without the knowledge
or consent of respondent or Cooper’s family.
On October 8, 2021, the district court appointed respondent as Cooper’s emergency
guardian. The emergency guardianship order and letters of guardianship specifically
granted respondent all statutory powers of a guardian, including securing no contact orders
on Cooper’s behalf. See Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c) (2022).
One week later, respondent obtained an ex parte HRO on Cooper’s behalf. Police
attempted to serve appellant with the HRO at her home, but appellant refused to open the
door. Instead, she sat inside her darkened home, Cooper by her side, and appeared to be
video recording the police officer and respondent’s representative with her camera. A few
days later, appellant enrolled in a state program that allows certain protected people to
avoid in-person service of process. On October 19, 2021—before appellant could be
served with the HRO—she traveled to Iowa with Cooper, and they married.
Once appellant was served with the ex parte HRO, s he requested a hearing. In the
meantime, the district court extended respondent’s status as emergency guardian for an
additional 60 days and ensured that Cooper had his own independent counsel.
5
Before the hearing, appellant continued to have contact with Cooper in violation of
the ex parte HRO. While in appellant’s care at appellant’s home, Cooper fell and broke
his hip. He did not receive immediate medical attention, which the district court attributed
to appellant. Cooper was ultimately hospitalized and required surgery. Following the
surgery, two individuals unknown to the family twice attempted to remove Cooper from
the hospital without physician approval. Cooper did not return phone calls from his adult
children. Appellant repeatedly called the hospital and asserted that appellant’s guardian
had no authority to plan for Cooper’s discharge. She also attempted to have Cooper’s
medical records released to her attorney without the guardian’s authorization.
Around this time, both appellant and Cooper moved to dismiss the HRO. In late
December 2021, the district court extended the ex parte HRO and scheduled the hearing
requested by appellant.
The hearing was held over two days, January 26 and February 3, 2022. At the
hearing, both Cooper’s son and respondent’s representative testified about the events that
led to seeking an HRO on Cooper’s behalf. Cooper also briefly testified. According to
Cooper, appellant had never harassed him and he did not want an HRO. The district court
took the HRO request under advisement, although the ex parte HRO remained in effect.
On February 4, 2022, a different district court judge acted in the separate probate
proceeding involving the same parties. In that case, the district court found Cooper to be
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incapacitated and appointed respondent to be Cooper’s general guardian and conservator
for a one-year period.2
In the HRO proceedings, the district court issued an order granting the HRO on
March 14, 2022. It concluded that appellant’s “problematic behavior” constituted
harassment. The HRO, which remains in effect, prohibits appellant from having “direct or
indirect contact” with Cooper unless “authorized by court order” in the probate matter and
“approved by the guardian.”
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting the HRO. A district court’s
issuance of an HRO is generally reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Peterson
v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion
if its findings are unsupported by the record or if it misapplies the law.” Pechovnik v.
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting Braend ex rel. Minor Children
v. Braend, 721 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. App. 2006)); see Sperle v. Orth, 763 N.W.2d 670,
672-73 (Minn. App. 2009). A district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to the district court’s opportunity to judge the
credibility of witnesses. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221-23 (Minn. 2021) (discussing clear-error review and noting that it is “a
review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision”). But this
court will reverse the issuance of an HRO if it is not supported by sufficient evidence.

2 Appellant also appealed the probate decision. The appeal in that case is currently pending
before this court.
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Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d 604, 606-07 (Minn. App. 1986). And the district court’s
issuance of an HRO must be based on admissible testimony and document evidence. Kush
v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sep. 29, 2004).
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in four ways. First, she
contends that the district court lacked “jurisdiction” to issue the HRO because the
emergency guardian was the petitioner for the ex parte HRO, but the emergency
guardianship had been terminated by the time the district court issued the March 14, 2022
HRO. Second, she argues that respondent did not have standing to seek an HRO on behalf
of Cooper over Cooper’s objection. Third, she asserts that the HRO violated the Minnesota
statute that protects the rights of persons subject to guardianship, including the right to
communicate with others. Fourth, she contends that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that she engaged in harassment. We reject each of appellant’s arguments.
I. Appellant provides no legal authority for her challenge to the district court’s
“jurisdiction” to issue the HRO.

Appellant contends that the district court lacked “jurisdiction” to issue the
March 14, 2022 HRO on Cooper’s behalf because the emergency guardianship expired on
February 4, 2022. Although the district court appointed respondent as Cooper’s general
guardian on the same day that the emergency guardianship expired, appellant notes that
respondent had petitioned for the ex parte HRO when it was serving as Cooper’s emergency
guardian. Appellant argues that, because the emergency guardianship was terminated
before the district court issued the HRO, the district court was somehow divested of
“jurisdiction” and the HRO now in effect is a “legal nullity.”
8
Appellant does not specify the type of jurisdiction that the district court purportedly
lacked. Furthermore, appellant cites no legal authority for this argument in her brief, and
her attorney conceded during his oral argument that there is no authority for it. We
therefore decline to address this issue. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately
briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying
Wintz in a family-law appeal).
II. Respondent had standing to seek an HRO on Cooper’s behalf.

Appellant next argues that respondent lacked standing to seek an HRO on Cooper’s
behalf because, first, respondent was an emergency guardian and not a general guardian
when it petitioned for the ex parte HRO, and second, Cooper opposed the HRO. When, as
here, the relevant facts are undisputed, the existence of standing is reviewed de novo.
Richards v. Reiter, 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011); Pollard v. Crowghost, 794 N.W.2d
373, 376 (Minn. App. 2011).
Appellant first contends that, although the HRO statute provides that a “victim’s
guardian or conservator” may seek a restraining order, the statute does not explicitly
authorize an emergency guardian to do so. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 2(a) (2022)
(“A person who is a victim of harassment or the victim’s guardian or conservator may seek
a restraining order . . . .”).3 She again points out that respondent was Cooper’s emergency
guardian when it filed the petition for an ex parte HRO.

3 Minnesota Statutes section 609.748, subdivision 2 was amended in 2022. 2022 Minn.
Laws ch. 82, § 1, at 394-95. The amendment added additional subsections and made some
9
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, appellant cites no legal
authority for the premise that emergency guardians do not have standing to petition for
HROs on behalf of victims. See Wintz, 55 8 N.W.2d at 480 (declining to address an
inadequately briefed issue). Second, the statutory definition of “guardian” expressly
includes emergency guardians. Minn. Stat. § 524.5 -102, subd. 5 (2022) (defining a
“guardian,” for the purpose of Minnesota’s guardianship laws, as “a person who has
qualified as a guardian of a minor or incapacitated person pursuant to appointment . . . by
the court, and includes a limited, emergency, or temporary substitute guardian.” (emphasis
added)). Third, the emergency guardianship order specifically conferred on respondent the
power to seek an HRO on Cooper’s behalf. It gave respondent all the powers of a guardian,
including the authority to “institute suit on behalf of the person subject to guardianship and
represent the person subject to guardianship in . . . harassment proceedings” to obtain
“restraining orders, [and] orders for protection.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(10). These
powers also include the authority to “restrict the ability of the person subject to
guardianship to communicate, visit, or interact with others” when “interaction with the
person poses a risk of significant physical, psychological, or financial harm to the person
subject to guardianship, and there is no other means to avoid such significant harm.” Minn.
Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(6). Fourth, respondent was no longer the emergency guardian when

substantive changes that are not relevant to the outcome of this case. We therefore cite the
most current version of the statute. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000).
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the district court issued the HRO on March 14, 2022. By that point, it had been appointed
to be Cooper’s general guardian.4
Appellant’s second argument is that respondent lacked standing to obtain an HRO
on Cooper’s behalf because Cooper opposed the HRO. While appellant frames this issue
as one of standing, she does not explain how Cooper’s opposition to the HRO affected
respondent’s standing. See Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 2007)
(stating that standing is established when the initiating party is “the beneficiary of some
legislative enactment granting standing”); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 609.748, subd. 2 (a)
(including guardians in the class of persons with standing to seek a restraining order on
behalf of a protected person); 524.5-313(c)(10) (granting guardians the power to institute
harassment proceedings, including restraining orders, on behalf of a protected person). Nor
does appellant cite any law to support her claim that Cooper’s opposition implicated
respondent’s standing. We therefore decline to consider appellant’s second standing
argument. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480; Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d at 479.

4 If appellant’s argument is accepted, a person subject to an emergency (but not yet general)
guardianship would lack the ability to seek an HRO in what is often a time-sensitive
situation. The appointment of an emergency guardian can suggest that the person subject
to the emergency guardianship has a compromised ability to make decisions. Appellant’s
argument that an emergency guardian cannot seek an HRO on behalf of the person subject
to the emergency guardianship would, if adopted, preclude a person who is possibly
compromised from obtaining timely relief that is available to those who are not so
compromised. We decline to read a statute enacted to protect possibly compromised
persons to produce such a result.
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the HRO despite
Cooper’s stated opposition.

Appellant argues that the district court erred “as a matter of law” by issuing the
HRO over Cooper’s objection. Generally, appellate courts review de novo a district court’s
application of law. Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn.
2016). But “[w]here, as here, the application of law occurs as part of a discretionary
decision to grant an HRO, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion.” Harris ex
rel. Banks v. Gellerman, 954 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. App. 2021) (citing Kush, 683
N.W.2d at 843). We therefore consider whether the district court abused its discretion by
granting the HRO over Cooper’s objection.
Relying on our decision in Gellerman, appellant contends that the district court erred
in granting the HRO because it was against Cooper’s wishes. In Gellerman, a guardian
petitioned for an HRO over the objection of the protected individual . Id. at 606-07. The
protected individual submitted an affidavit to the court objecting to an HRO. Id. at 606.
Although the protected person was available and at the courthouse during the HRO hearing,
the protected person, who was unrepresented at that point, did not attend the hearing and
was not called to testify. Id. at 606 n.1. The district court also did not consider whether
the guardian had authority to seek an HRO under the guardianship order. Id. at 607. Given
these circumstances, we concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting
the HRO. Id. at 610. We stated that, in deciding whether to grant the HRO, the district
court should have considered the bill of rights of persons subject to guardianship, which
includes a right to communication and visitation with individuals of the protected person’s
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choosing. Id. at 608-09; see Minn. Stat. § 524.5-120 (2022) (bill of rights of persons
subject to guardianship).5
In granting the HRO here, the district court specifically referred to Gellerman and
the bill of rights of persons subject to guardianship. The district court noted that the
circumstances here were different than those in Gellerman because Cooper was represented
by independent counsel, he attended the hearing, and he testified about his wishes. The
district court found that Cooper’s rights as a person subject to guardianship were “being
given maximum effect possible without risking significant physical, psychological, and

5 Relevant rights identified by the bill of rights include the right to:

(1) treatment with dignity and respect;
(2) due consideration of current and previously stated personal
desires . . . ;
. . . .
(4) exercise control of all aspects of life unless delegated
specifically to the guardian . . . by court order;
. . . .
(6) petition the court to prevent or initiate a change in abode;
. . . .
(9) personal privacy;
(10) communicate, visit, or interact with others . . . unless the
guardian has good cause to believe restriction is necessary
because interaction with the person poses a risk of significant
physical, psychological, or financial harm to the person subject
to guardianship, and there is no other means to avoid the
significant harm . . . ;”
. . . .
(13) at any time, petition the court for termination or
modification of the guardianship. . . ; [and]
(14) be represented by an attorney in any proceeding or for the
purpose of petitioning the court . . . [.]

Minn. Stat. § 524.5-120.
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financial harm to him.” And the district court specifically tailored the HRO to be “co-
extensive with the visitation directives issued by the probate court in the conservatorship
and guardianship matter.” The HRO allows appellant to “have contact with [Cooper] and
be at his residence if and as authorized by [c]ourt order in [the probate file] and approved
by the guardian.” We therefore disagree that the district court abused its discretion by
granting the HRO over Cooper’s objection.
Appellant also contends that the district court erred when it rejected Cooper’s
testimony that appellant had not harassed him. The district court found that this portion of
Cooper’s testimony was not credible. It is the district court’s role to evaluate witness
credibility, especially when there are conflicting accounts as to whether harassment
occurred. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52. 01; see also In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393,
396 (Minn. 1996) (“Considerable deference is due to the district court’s decision because
a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”). Appellate
courts give “deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility.”
Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008 ). We defer to the district
court’s determination that some of Cooper’s testimony was not credible.
Although Cooper may not have wanted an HRO, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it issued the HRO over Cooper’s objection. Cooper was given a full
opportunity to express his views on the HRO. He was represented by counsel, he was
present during the hearing, and he testified about his wishes. The district court acted within
14
its discretion by making credibility determinations. And the district court’s order shows
that it carefully weighed all the evidence, including the views expressed by Cooper. 6
IV. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of harassment.

Finally, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the district
court’s finding that she harassed Cooper. A district court may grant an HRO when it “finds
at the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent [to the
petition for an HRO] has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(3)
(2022). Harassment is defined as “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words,
or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd.
1(a)(1) (2022).
The district court determined that appellant engaged in repeated intrusive acts that
had a substantial adverse effect on Cooper’s safety, security, and privacy. Those acts
included: removing Cooper from assisted living without the knowledge or approval of his
family or guardian, using Cooper’s money to pay her veterinary bill and buy a car,
interfering with Cooper’s ability to have contact with his family, preventing Cooper from
meeting privately with his lawyers and guardian, delaying medical treatment for Cooper

6 We note that there is not always a perfect alignment of interests between a person subject
to guardianship and that person’s guardian, who is supposed to act in the best interests of
the person subject to the guardianship. Thus, the mere fact that there is a disagreement
between a person subject to guardianship and that person’s guardian does not render the
guardian’s position defective. When such an unfortunate disagreement exists, the district
court must address the matter as best as it can based on the facts and circumstances of that
particular case.
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when he broke his hip, attempting to remove Cooper from the hospital against medical
advice and without the knowledge of his family or guardian, having contact with Cooper
in violation of the ex parte HRO, evading ser vice of the HRO, taking Cooper to Iowa to
marry him after the ex parte HRO was issued, verbally abusing Cooper on one occasion
that was witnessed by others, telling Cooper that he needed to do everything that she
instructed him to do, forwarding Cooper’s m ail to her rather than to the guardian, and
attempting to send Cooper’s medical records to her attorney.
Appellant argues that, because Cooper did not believe appellant harassed him,
appellant’s conduct did not constitute harassment. But as previously noted, we must defer
to the district court’s findings regarding the credibility of Cooper’s testimony. See L.A.F.,
554 N.W.2d at 396.
The record supports each of the district court’s findings regarding appellant’s
conduct. And the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this conduct
amounted to harassment. Because there was sufficient evidence that appellant harassed
Cooper, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the HRO.
Affirmed.