In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: P. D. J., Parent.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In re the Welfare of the Child of J.K.T. 814 N.W.2d 76
- 968 N.W.2d 593 not in our corpus
- 744 N.W.2d 381 not in our corpus
- Kroning v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. 567 N.W.2d 42
- In Re the Welfare of the Children of R.W. 678 N.W.2d 49
- In Re the Welfare of J.K. 374 N.W.2d 463
- In Re the Welfare of R.T.B. 492 N.W.2d 1
- Thiele v. Stich 425 N.W.2d 580
- In Re the Welfare of the Children of A.I. 779 N.W.2d 886
- State v. Cannady 727 N.W.2d 403
- In Re the Welfare of D.J.N. 568 N.W.2d 170
- In Re the Welfare of the Children of D.F. 752 N.W.2d 88
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0501
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
P. D. J., Parent.
Filed October 17, 2022
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-21-1563
Cresston Gackle, Cresston Law LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant- mother
P. D. J.)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mary M. Lynch, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Health and
Human Services)
Nancy Applebaum, Fourth Judicial District GAL Program, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(guardian ad litem)
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Mother challenges the district court’s termination of parental rights (TPR), arguing
that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the child suffered egregious
harm, mother failed to satisfy her parental duties, mother is palpably unfit, and TPR is in
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the child’s best interests. Mother also challenges the timing of the permanency trial. We
affirm.
FACTS
On July 16, 2021, respondent Hennepin County Health and Human Services (the
department) received a report that appellant-mother P.D.J. neglected her infant child1 (the
child). According to a police report, mother’s neighbor called 911 after mother knocked
on his door and stated that the child was crying. Officers knocked on mother’s apartment
door, but she did not answer until nearly one minute passed. When she answered, mother
was holding the child, who was wrapped in “paper towels and a wool sweater and appeared
to be in discomfort.”
Officers detected an “overwhelming chemical smell” in the apartment that made
them lightheaded. Large amounts of trash and household items lying around made it
difficult for officers to walk; they stepped on “glass alcohol bottles repeatedly and had to
place their hands on the walls . . . to keep their balance.” Officers observed moldy food,
old standing water in a sink, and a bathtub filled with water and some substance.
Mother told the officers that she and the child “had bugs on them.” Officers saw
“sores on [the child’s] arms and severe redness on her back,” as if mother “had been trying
to scrub off what she thought were bugs.” The child’s hands were “almost rubber like . . .
purple,” and “wrinkly as if she had been left in water for a significant amount of time.”
1 Mother has four children. This appeal relates only to mother’s youngest child, A.W. -J.,
born in 2021.
3
Paramedics observed “clear signs of neglect .” The child “show[ed] physical signs of
extreme dehydration”; she had “extreme” diaper sores, indicating that she “probably stays
in the same diaper for up to 24 hours at a time”; she “has a mark on the back of her head
(as well as the sores on her body) indicative of being left on her back full time”; and she
was likely in the bathtub for “close to an hour” due to how cold she was. An ambulance
transported the child to the hospital.
Responders believed that mother was under the influence of narcotics. Mother
appeared to be “very paranoid and erratic” and had “significant difficulty staying on point,
answering simple questions, and locating child care products within the home.” Mother
packed items to take to the hospital that were inconsistent with a visit to the hospital,
including “strawberries, a roll of paper towels, and other items she seemed to randomly
find and pick up off of the ground.”
At the hospital, the child
had a blood alcohol level of .135 . . . [s]he was very dehydrated
. . . [s]he had what appeared to be chemical burns all over her
back and head. Her vaginal area was extremely red and
swollen with a rash that was beyond . . . a normal diaper rash
. . . . [and] she was terrified of [taking a bath].
Based on this information, officers obtained a search warrant for mother’s apartment.
Mother told officers that she tried to clean the apartment to get rid of the bugs on
her and the child, put Lysol on the child’s bouncer, and put the child on the paper towels
in the bouncer. She claimed to have “holes” in her hands, stated that she was itchy, acted
fidgety, and did not stop moving. Mother had a butane torch in her pocket, which officers
know is commonly used by drug users. Officers found over seven grams of
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methamphetamine and two “meth pipes” in the apartment. Officers also found a baby
bottle holding liquid that field tested positive for alcohol. Mother was charged with felony
neglect of a child.
A report from the child’s maltreatment team showed that the child was diagnosed
with a significant chemical skin burn. The report provided:
The extent and degree of chemical burn injuries on [the
child]’s body is not typical of routine child care, and it is an
unusual presentation of an accidental chemical exposure due to
the large area of skin affected. Rather, the injuries are
consistent with either child abuse or child endangerment. In
either setting, the degree of depressed level of consciousness
due to ethanol exposure on presentation could have been fatal
if she had not presented to medical care.
On July 21, 2021, the department filed a TPR petition. The department noted that
mother has four children, and this was the third child-protection petition filed since 2017
in Hennepin County . The department alleged that mother’s parental rights should be
terminated because she failed to satisfy her parental duties, she is a palpably unfit parent,
and the child experienced egregious harm while in mother’s care . See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (6) (2020).
On July 22, 2021, an order for protective care and out-of-home placement was filed.
And because t he child’s father was deceased , she was put in relative foster care. The
district court found that reasonable reunification efforts were not required because the TPR
petition stated a prima facie case that mother subjected the child to egregious harm. The
district court found that “there are no services or efforts available which could allow the
[child] to safely remain in the home.”
5
The district court held an admit/deny hearing on August 26, 2021. On February 14,
2022, the district court held a trial on the TPR petition. The social worker assigned to the
case testified about the July 2021 incident, referencing the police report included in the
department’s file. The social worker testified that, although the department was relieved
of reunification efforts, the department attempted to assist mother. The voluntary case plan
required mother to complete a psychological evaluation, receive mental-health care,
complete a chemical-dependency assessment and follow any recommendations, complete
a parenting assessment, demonstrate her sobriety via urinalysis ( UA) or some other
method, complete parenting education, and obtain and retain safe housing.
Mother completed a chemical-dependency evaluation and was referred to outpatient
treatment, but she did not attend, even though she admitted to using methamphetamine
daily and the child was born substance-exposed to THC. Although mother claimed that
she completed UAs, the records she provided failed to show sobriety because testing she
underwent did not test for the presence of alcohol. Mother was required to undergo a
psychological assessment and receive treatment. But she did not receive treatment, even
though she had previously been under mental-health commitments with the last expiring
on June 10, 2021. And mother reported being homeless.
The social worker testified that mother’s parental rights to the child should be
terminated. She stated: “There’s really no other option” because the child “almost died”
as a result of the alcohol found in her system, separate and apart from the chemical burns
she sustained. She stated that the child deserved to be adopted.
6
The child’s foster mother, her paternal aunt, testified that the child has chemical -
burn marks. She was told by “three different medical professionals that [the marks] most
likely will not improve until [the child is] around four years old” and that they might not
heal entirely. The foster mother and her husband hoped to adopt the child.
The guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that it was in the child’s best interests for
mother’s parental rights to be terminated. She testified:
When [the child] was brought to [the hospital] in July 2021 she
showed signs of serious physical neglect that had to have
occurred over an extended period of time. She had signs of
severe diaper rash, sores on her body from being left
unattended, she was dehydrated, she tested positive for alcohol,
in addition to the chemical burns on her body. This egregious
harm to [the child] indicates a total lack of regard for her well-
being. [Mother] has demonstrated an ongoing pattern of
putting her children in high-risk situations as indicated from
prior child protection cases including crashing her car while
driving under the influence with her children to having children
live in a home where a drug raid occurred where police
discovered a large number of guns, ammunition and drugs.
. . . [Mother] has not demonstrated she has fully addressed the
reasons this case was opened, and she has not demonstrated she
is committed to putting [the child]’s needs above all else as
demonstrated by her lack of case plan compliance.
Mother, who was represented by counsel, stated that she wanted to call witnesses
on her behalf . The district court left the record open for one week to allow mother to
prepare. But mother ultimately decided to not call any witnesses.
On March 22, 2022, the district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order for TPR. The district court determined that the child suffered egregious harm while
in mother’s care. The district court stated that “[t]he child was not only temporarily but
substantially and permanently disfigured by chemical burns” and mother admitted to
7
“spraying Lysol on the child’s infant carrier and lying her on it.” The district court also
concluded that “[t]here is significant evidence that . . . [m]other was under the influence of
methamphetamine at the time her neighbor placed the 911 call.”
The district court determined that “[t]hroughout the eight months that this case has
been open . . . [m]other has failed to demonstrate the ability to provide the child with food,
clothing, shelter, and other care and control necessary for her wellbeing.” The district court
concluded that mother failed to demonstrate sobriety, participate in mental-health and
chemical-dependency treatment, or complete a psychological evaluation or parenting
assessment. Further, the district court stated that mother “demonstrates a lack of insight
into her chemical dependency issues and the dangerous situations that those issues present
to the child’s safety.”
The district court determined that mother is a palpably unfit parent “due to a
consistent pattern of behavior and conduct that is detrimental to the child’s needs.” The
district court stated that “there is significant evidence” that mother’s issues are
“longstanding” and “pre-date the [d]epartment’s involvement in the summer of 2021.”
These enduring issues, and mother’s failure to address them, each impact her ability to
keep the child safe.
Finally, the district court concluded that TPR was in the child’s best interests
because mother will not be able to care for the child for the reasonably foreseeable future,
and the child will be placed at “a significant risk of instability, physical and emotional
harm, and further neglect” in mother’s care. This appeal followed.
8
DECISION
Termination of parental rights
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by terminating her parental
rights. A district court may terminate parental rights “only for grave and weighty reasons.”
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
On appeal, this court reviews the underlying findings of fact for clear error and the TPR
decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600
(Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).
A district court may terminate parental rights if (1) at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the department made
reasonable reunification efforts, and (3) TPR is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare
of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). The district court concluded that
three statutory grounds for TPR were supported by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the
child suffered egregious harm; (2) mother failed to satisfy her parental duties; and
(3) mother is palpably unfit. The district court also concluded that TPR is in the child’s
best interests.
Evidence
Initially, mother argues that the district c ourt erred in determining that the
department proved that the child suffered egregious harm “because of the scant level of
evidence presented at the trial, lack of medical or other testimony, error in admitting a
police report . . . error in treating an exhibit admitted not for its substance, and failing to
link anything . . . to any unproved harm to the child.” In other words, mother seems to
9
claim that the TPR determination depends on unreliable evidence, and that the properly
admitted evidence fails to show egregious harm and palpable unfitness.
“The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42,
45-46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). A new trial based on an improper evidentiary
ruling is available only if a party demonstrates prejudicial error. Id. at 46. “An evidentiary
error is not prejudicial if the record contains other evidence that is sufficient to support the
findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93.
Mother claims that the district court improperly relied on certain evidence that was
admitted over objection. The district court admitted the police report from the July 2021
incident as a public record. It also admitted medical records and permitted the social
worker to testify about the police report and the medical records.
Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.193, subd. 2 (2020):
Before making a disposition in a case, terminating
parental rights . . . the court may consider any report or
recommendation made by the responsible social services
agency, probation officer, licensed child-placing agency, foster
parent, guardian ad litem, tribal representative, the child’s
health or mental health care provider, or other authorized
advocate for the child or child’s family, a school district
concerning the effect on student transportation of placing a
child in a school district in which the child is not a resident, or
any other information deemed material by the court.
And a hearsay exception includes
[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
10
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice
of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Minn. R. Evid. 803(6).
The social worker testified that the department enters records from different sources
into a statewide system, including records from law enforcement and medical
professionals. She testified that the department is statutorily required to maintain a secure
database to maintain third-party records. She testified that the records are part of a joint
investigation with law enforcement in which the different sources share information, avoid
duplication, and ensure the safety of the child. The social worker testified that she
reviewed, among other pieces of information, the police report and the child’s consultation
report from the Center for Safe and Healthy Children. She included information from these
sources in her report.
The district court stated that it received the exhibits “not necessarily for the truth of
everything in them” and noted that the author (the social worker) was available, and there
was “opportunity for cross examination to point out whatever . . . the defense is calling into
question.” The district court correctly applied the law for the admission of this evidence
and did not abuse its discretion.
11
Egregious harm
TPR is appropriate if the district court determines
that a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care
which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack
of regard for the child’s well- being, such that a reasonable
person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child
or of any child to be in the parent’s care.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6). “Egregious harm” is “the infliction of bodily harm
to a child or neglect of a child which demonstrates a grossly inadequate ability to provide
minimally adequate parental care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14 (2020). “Egregious
harm” includes the infliction of “substantial bodily harm” to a child. Id., subd. 14(2).
“Substantial bodily harm” is a “bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial
disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2020).
Here, the record shows that the child suffered egregious harm while in mother’s
care. The child was solely in mother’s care. And the evidence showed that the child nearly
died while in mother’s care due to the alcohol in her system, which was apart from the
chemical burns she suffered. The foster mother testified that the child still has chemical-
burn marks on her body and may have them her entire life.
In a TPR proceeding, the district court must find “(1) that reasonable efforts to
finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were made . . . or (2) that
reasonable efforts for reunification are not required as provided under section 260.012.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2020). Under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(1) (2020),
12
reasonable efforts are not required when the district court determines that a petition states
a prima facie case of egregious harm.
Here, the day after the department filed the petition, the district court found that the
petition stated a prima facie case that mother subjected the child to egregious harm. Thus,
the department was relieved of reasonable efforts. Because the department was not
obligated to make reasonable efforts and the district court correctly determined that the
child suffered egregious harm, one statutory basis for TPR has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence. We could continue our analysis to determine whether TPR is in the
child’s best interests. See In re Welfare of Child. of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004)
(stating that to affirm TPR, one statutory ground for TPR must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence and the record must show TPR is in the best interests of the child).
The district court, however, determined that two other bases for TPR were proven, and we
will consider mother’s challenges to these determinations.
Parental duties
A district court may terminate parental rights if it finds that a parent has
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2). Parental duties include, but are not limited to, “providing the child with
necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development, if the parent is physically
and financially able.” Id. The district court must also determine that, at the time of
termination, the parent is not presently able and willing to assume her responsibilities and
13
that the condition will continue for the reasonably foreseeable future. See In re Welfare of
J.K., 374 N.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985).
Parental rights may not be terminated for failure to comply with parental duties unless the
department’s reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-
of-home placement, or the district court finds that reasonable efforts would be futile and
therefore unreasonable. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
Even though it was not required in this case, the department provided a case plan
for mother. The evidence showed that mother did not comply with services. Further, the
child was neglected. The evidence showed that the child likely stayed in the same diaper
for 24 hours and had sores on her body from being left on her back for long periods of time.
She was so cold that paramedics believed that she had been left in a bath for at least an
hour. The child “had a blood alcohol level of .135,” showed physical signs of extreme
dehydration, had “chemical burns all over her back and head,” and had an extreme diaper
rash. This evidence shows that mother substantially neglected her parental duties. And
mother’s failure to take any steps to comply with a case plan shows that any reasonable
efforts would be futile and unreasonable.
Palpably unfit
Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), a district court may terminate parental
rights based on a finding
that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a consistent pattern . . . of specific
conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship
. . . which are determined by the court to be of a duration or
nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably
14
foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing
physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child.
The district court determined that “there is significant evidence that . . . [m]other’s
chemical dependency, mental health, and neglectful living conditions are longstanding
issues.” The district court determined that these issues, and mother ’s failure to take any
significant steps to address them, impact her ability to keep the child physically and
emotionally safe. As already described, the record supports the district court’s
determination.
Best interests
Even when statutory grounds for TPR are satisfied, the district court must still find
that TPR is in the child’s best interests. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. In making this
determination, the district court considers “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and
(3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
App. 1992); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (listing these factors). “Competing
interests include health considerations, a stable environment, and the child’s preference.”
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. When the district court rules that a statutory basis for TPR exists,
if “the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020). “Because the best-interests analysis involves credibility
determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court ’s global review of a
record, we give considerable deference to the district court’s findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d
at 92 (quotation omitted).
15
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that TPR
was in the child’s best interests because the department mainly advocated for TPR so that
the child could be adopted. She claims that TPR is not in the child’s best interests because
she is black, the child is biracial, and the foster family is white.
The GAL testified that it was in the child’s best interests for mother’s parental rights
to be terminated because the child “showed signs of serious physical neglect that had to
have occurred over an extended period of time.” She testified that this “indicate[d] a total
lack of regard for her well-being.” Further, the GAL stated that other child-protection
petitions described how mother had a “pattern of putting her children in high-risk
situations” and mother’s failure to adhere to a case plan demonstrated that she is not
committed to “putting [the child]’s needs above all else.” The district court agreed.
The district court found that the department showed that mother has a history of
“use of illicit substances and poor mental health,” which present safety risks for the child.
The district court found that over the course of the matter, mother “demonstrated erratic,
confrontational, and unstable behavior,” and failed to acknowledge “that these behaviors
are problematic or demonstrated the necessary behavioral changes that could instill
confidence that [she] would be able to provide the child with a safe, stable environment.”
The district court concluded that mother will not be able to care for the child for the
reasonably foreseeable future because in mother’s care, the child will be placed at “a
significant risk of instability, physical and emotional harm, and further neglect.” The
district court also concluded that TPR will allow the child to be “adopted by a family that
is committed to caring for her and will keep her in an environment that will provide
16
consistency and support.” The district court considered the relevant interests and
determined that the child’s interests in a healthy, stable environment were paramount.
Due process
Mother argues that her due-process rights were violated when the district court held
“a trial on the TPR petition on February 14, 2022, nearly 4.5 months beyond the deadline
for holding the trial under the applicable court rules.”
First, mother never challenged the trial date. As a reviewing court, we generally
consider only issues presented and considered by the district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see In re Welfare of Child. of A.I., 779 N.W.2d 886, 894
(Minn. App. 2010) (applying Thiele on appeal from a TPR).
Second, even considering mother’s argument, she has not shown any prejudice. The
record shows that mother moved to continue the trial due to her pending criminal matter.
Mother also requested an additional trial date after the February 14 date because she wanted
to call witnesses. Further, in opening statements, mother’s attorney argued:
[I]t is not in [the child]’s best interest to have the
relationship with her mother legally severed because more time
and more demonstration of compliance and progress on her
case plan would enable [mother] to parent her child
successfully and healthily. So, when the evidence closes, I will
ask this Court to make a finding not terminating my client’s
rights and instead reverting this matter to CHIPS for continued
progress.
The request for more time to demonstrate compliance and progress does not show that an
earlier trial date would have been beneficial to mother. Mother has failed to show prejudice
that requires reversal. See State v. Cannady, 727 N.W.2d 403, 409 (Minn. 2007) (applying
17
harmless-error analysis to due -process argument); In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d
170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (declining to reverse TPR for harmless error); see also In re
Welfare of Child. of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 98 (Minn. App. 2008) (applying Cannady and
D.J.N. in TPR appeal).
Affirmed.